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ADDENDA
1. Addendum after 2.4.4
Some Recent Additions to Development Literature
There are two relatively recent additions to development literature which we need to
discuss briefly insofar as they have relevance for our research: the endogenous
growth theory and the New Instituitional Economics. Both are extensions of neo-classical
economic theories. Both have extremely wide parameters and a broad range of issues and
problems can be incorporated within them.
We shall argue that whilst both new theories need to be discussed, it may be too early
to evaluate their contribution to an understanding of the development process. However,
as we shall see, both theories support our argument which favours state intervention in
the development process, and also the significance of human capital development.
Endogenous growth theory has been pioneered by Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988).
Their work has been added to considerably by others: Grossman and Helpman (1994);
Yip and Zhang (1997); (Tamura 1996); Palivos (1995); and Becker et al (1990), amongst
others.
The context in which endogenous growth theory has risen is the attempt to explain
diiferences in growth rates of different economies, with particular momentum being
derived from the success of the NICs (Crafts, 1996). In this context, the
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divergence/convergence debate is relavant. Within endogenous theory, the convergence of
per capita growth rates have been tested by taking them as a dependent variable with per
capita income as the independent variable in cross-section analyses. This has provided
some useful means for hypotheses testing (ibid).
The basic premise of endogenous growth theory is that long-mn growth in income per
head depends on investment decisions, rather than, as in traditional growth theory,
resulting from unexplained or exogenous improvements in technology. Since policies of
the state can influence these decisions both directly through taxes and subsidies and
directly via reform of insitutional arrangements, intervention may in principle be used to
raise investment and hence the long-run growth rate
It should be noted however, that in endogenous growth theory investment usually refers to
a broader concept than the physical capital accumulation reoported in national accounts;
human capital and/or Research and Development expenditures may also be included. The
key to endogenous steady-state growth is that there should be constant returns to this
broad capital accumulation (Crafts, 1996; World Bank, 1993b). As we indicate in our
thesis, a social economic transformation of Oman, which includes development of human
resources, requires a set of complex and complementary policies to secure these
objectives.
One of the strengths (and maybe also the weakness) of endogenous growth
theory is its ability to incorporate ideas from other pre-exisiting theories both from within
economics or development-related disciplines.
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Similarly, whilst endogenous growth theory may not directly address problems of the
developing countries, it can incorporate issues which are relevant to the latter, for
example application of the theory to basic needs (Pio, 1994). Another characteristic of
endogenous theory is the way it tends to extend the meaning of some concepts used in
economic theory: so that human capital means not only education but also health and
nutrition (Pio, 1994:278). According to Pio (1994:296-7):
[In] a matter of a few years endogenous growth models have been
developed which provide an analytical framework and policy prescriptions
on a variety of topics linked to economic development. Admittedly, not all
the relevant issues facing developing and industrialsed countries are amenable
to analysis in a dynamic optimisation framework. Nevertheless, by focussing
on the role of externalities in the development process, on the production
functions with constant or increasing returns to scale, on human capital
accumulation and on the political process through which economic policy
decisions are reached, these models have considerably expanded our
understanding, as well as our doubts, about the dynamics of economic systems.
As mentioned above endogenous growth theory supports our view on the role of the
state: Pio, a proponent of the theory, suggests that after decades during which the state
was seen a major determinant of development, the neo-classical backlash asserted that the
state could only do harm and misallocate resources. This established the grounds for a
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considerable reduction in the role of the state. According to Pio, a more balanced view,
prescribed to by endogenous theory now prevails, where it is recognised that in some
areas state intervention is essential for promoting growth, whilst other areas are best left
to the private sector (1994:284-5). Thus the role of the state becomes one of adopting
policies which may be necessary to move the economy from its competitive second-best
optimum and bring it closer to the optimal solution of a command economy which
internalises externalities (ibid.287).
Endogenous growth theory also gives significance to human development, which figures
prominently in Oman's development strategy, particularly in the Fifth Five Year Plan and
Vision 2020. In endogenous growth theory, human capital accumulation is crucial for
sustained development and growth. Appropriate levels of provision of health, education
and nutrition are the result of either private or public resources being allocated for this
purpose. If the private sector provides these resources, then a sufficiently equitable
distribution of income will allow indidividuals to have access to these provisions in the
open market. If the public sector is the main provider of these resources, as in the case of
Oman, as we shall see, then sufficient revenues must be raised to cover the necessary
expenditures (ibid.291). In the latter, therefore, the role of the state has been extremely
important in Oman. Though, as chapters Six and Seven in particular show, the role of the
private sector is likely to increase during the current Fifth Plan.
In endogenous growth theory, the meaning attributed to human capital relates either to a
notion of a general state of knowledge, or more specifically to education.Romer (1986)
considers knowledge to mean the state of availability of technology, with knowledge being
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rather more embodied in machines than in human beings. On the other hand Lucas (1988)
places emphasis on investment in formal education and training to constitute the core of
human capital.
Another new addition to development literature is provided by the New Institutional
Economics (NTE)(Hariss et al, 1995). The NILE is 'new' because there is an older school of
institutionalisn in economics. Thus:
OlE [Old Insitutional Economics] may be presented as descriptive, holistic
and behaviuorist and the NIE as formalist and reductionist. [Morevover], it
is an explicit incorporation of the political and the social into analyses of the
formation of institutions that has generated interest in institutional economics
among social scientists. These characteristics, given the multi-disciplinarity
of a large part of the existing literature, also point to the relevance of NIE
for future research on Third World development (ibid: p.5).
In other words, NIE like the endogenous growth theory engages with and incorporates
ideas from other disciplines and from particular branches of economics itself. Like
endogenous growth theory NIE takes on board concepts from outside of mainstream
economics: for example from those relating to legal systems, property rights and
organisations, public and rational choice theory, empowerment of the individual agent, to
rent-seeking behaviour and distributive coalitions, dynamics that that have an impact on
transaction costs, income distribution and economic efficiency (ibid). We address these
issues in our work, in subsequent chapters. Of particular relevance of this theory for our
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research is the significance it places on the role of institutions in development, and in
particular the role of the state. The latter being especially relevant in both strategic
allocation of resources, and in situations of market failure (Bates, l995:pp.36-39).
NTE is seen to be particularly relevant for analysing third world development because of its
focus on institutions and organisations. It recognises that productivity enhancing
institutions can emerge through spontaneity of individual behaviour driven by optimising
rarionality, without implying collective behavioural change (Harriss, op.cit.p.6).
Toye (1995: p.61) states that development used to be defined as economic growth plus
structural change, whilst NIE proposes that development should be defined as economic
growth plus institutional change: 'Appropriate institutional change has been elevated by
the NIE to a central place in the theory of development, by contrast with neo-classical
growth theory's central focus on saving and population growth' (ibid). As a critique it
may be said, however, that whilst neo-classical theories of development might not have
addressed issues relating to institutions, other theories (modernisation, Marxist and
dependency theories) have done so. Nevertheless it should be recognised that ME has
brought to the fore, in way of a reminder, that processes other than the narrowly economic
are of crucial significance in securing development, as we have stressed in our research.
6
Addendum to Chapter 6.5
The significance of providing strictly non-economic institutions, such as legal
insitutions/framework, for protection and regulation of contracts, of property, of stock
exchange, and so on, to facilitate the development process has been re-emphasised (both
implicitly and explicitly) by the New Institutional Economics which we have discussed in
the Addenda.
Addendum to Chapter 7.5 p.379:
We have discussed the significance of human development and human capital development
including from the perspective of the endogenous growth theory in the addendum to 2.4.4
in the addendum. Here we have indicated the extended but comprehensive perspectives on
human capital in the context of development.
Addendum to Chapter 8.3.4
We have indicated in the addendum the significant role ascribed to the state by the two
relatively new additions to development literature, endogenous growth theory and the
NIE. Both approaches argue as we have done, for the state and market to work in
tandem.
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ABSTRACT
This thesis is a theoretically grounded empirical analyses of the economic and
social development of Oman particularly from the mid-1970s to 1995. The analyses
focuses on the major factors responsible for Oman's development particularly its
development policy and strategy which involved a systematic use of both the state via the
Five Year Plans and the market in inducing economic and social development of the
country. These instruments were crucial in the allocation of resources to the various
economic and social sectors of the country which secured relatively high rates of
economic and social development. A brief historical sketch of Oman's economy and
society highlights the significant transformation that the country has undergone since the
inception of development planning in the mid-I 970s.
The study is located within the context of the global economy and international
policy and provides in particular a critical reappraisal of structural adjustment propagated
by the major world organisations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund. In this connection the thesis provides a critical appraisal of the 'market-friendly'
'minimal state' policies promoted (and required) by provisions under conditionality. After
analysing the role of the state in the development of some countries to provide a
comparative dimension, the study cautions against unselective or universal adoption of
structural adjustment and the privatisation package and hence a reduction in the role of the
state, which is supported by the Bank and International Monetary Fund or national
governments.
The research critically appraises the various theories of development from both the
development economics and development studies tradition; the study evaluates the plan
versus the market debate in relation to both the two theoretical traditions and international
policy of structural adjustment, and the theoretical assumptions underlying this. The thesis
shows the importance of the role of the state in securing economic and social development
including in some East Asian Countries. After analysing Oman's strategy in combining the
2
strengths of planning and the market processes in securing development, the thesis argues
that contrary to the neo-classical viewpoint now dominant, the case for rolling back the
state is questionable. On the contrary the thesis recommends a proactive role for the state,
in a number of spheres of Oman's economy and society including in industry and
agriculture. Specifically the research findings describe how a number of five year plans
have succeeded in both expanding and diversifying Oman's oil-dependent economy as
reflected in various indicators such as increase in per capita income and gross national
product, and in increasing social welfare as indicated by greater provision of education and
health services in the country.
The thesis finally offers some suggestions and recommendations in terms of dealing
with future problems that Oman have to encounter, including unemployment, need for
more (appropriate) trained labour force and greater diversification of the economy.
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INTRODUCTION
1. Background
In the post-World War H era, the consensus in the newly formed discipline of
development economics' was that promotion of development could not be left to markets;
planned state intervention was considered an indispensable condition for development in
less developed countries. However, since the rnid-1970s the pendulum has swung
towards the opposite view; the state is now considered the problem, rather than a source
of solutions, and the free market is regarded as a panacea for the problems of
development. Prosperity, it suggests, is best secured by free markets.
The significance of this state versus market debate, in the area of economic and
social development has a bearing on the on-going controversy about the success or failure
of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) and market-oriented reforms which are
being carried out by a number of developing countries under the auspices and supervision
of international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). Equally relevant for formulating an appropriate mix of policies are
the issues emerging from this debate that should inform and shape the development
process in the next century.
In view of these changed perspectives on development strategies and problems,
and keeping in view the part hitherto played by the state in developing economies, it is
necessary to re-examine the roles of state and markets in economic and social
development without being dogmatic in extolling the virtues of one and denouncing the
other.
Development economics was itself to be considered later as inadequate to comprehend problems of
development; a more interdisciplinaiy approach emerged culminating in development studies.
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In the case of Oman the issues involved in this debate are important because in
contrast with many other developing countries which have relinquished or substantially
diluted development planning from the late 1970s, Oman has actually embarked upon
state-led developmental planning since 1976. Even now Oman's development hinges
upon state-sponsored five-year development plans. The question therefore is: what are
the implications of the state-versus market debate for Oman? And ipso facto for other
developing countries. Do they indicate that in Oman the state should - in view of the
results achieved and lessons learnt - roll back and allow its development functions to be
performed by the market? Or should the state in Oman redefine its role within the
tradition of indicative planning and serve only as a guardian of the economy by providing
strategic guidance and let the market play an increasingly large role in resource allocation
and development? These are some of the key issues which form the basis of the thesis.
2. Objectives of the Thesis
This thesis provides a theoretically grounded, empirical analysis of Oman's
development experience in the context of issues involved in the state versus market
debate. The period covered by our analysis is from 1970 to 1995 and more specifically
from 1976 onwards, when the First Five-Year Plan (FYP) was launched. The analysis is
comparative in the sense that the achievements and problems of Oman's economic and
social development are, wherever relevant, compared with the development performance
of other similarly placed developing countries.
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With the objective of providing an analysis of Oman's development performance
the thesis focuses on investigating the following issues:
i) the systematic use made by the state in Oman of the five-year plans and the market
mechanism via the growing private sector for implementing the multiple objectives
of its development policy;
ii) the policies followed by the Omani government for effective utilisation of the oil
revenues in maintaining macro-economic stability and, at the same time, promoting
socio-economic transformation;
iii) the changing importance of oil as compared to other sectors of the economy; and
iv) the new development strategy introduced in the current Fifth FYP (1996-2000) to
overcome a number of obstacles and challenges that Oman faces in achieving
sustainable development, and the four pillars of this new strategy, viz. (a) fostering
a diversified and dynamic economy; (b) promoting an efficient and competitive
private sector; (c) accelerating development of Omani human resources; and (d)
sustaining and enhancing macroeconomic stability.
As already stated this thesis intends to provide theoretically grounded empirical
analysis of Oman's development experience. Hence, in this regard, it examines critically
(a) the various theories of development - from the mainstream, structuralist and radical
schools of development thought and also the theories dealing specifically with primary
exporting countries; and (b) the implications of the recent resurgence of neo-classical
economics - the so called counter-revolution - for development theory and policy.
Both state-sponsored planning and the market have played an important role in
Oman's development. The thesis is thus also concerned with analysing the theoretical
underpinnings and policy implications of the on-going debate on the role of market and
planning in developing economies. The issues involved in this debate are evaluated in the
context of international policy and the global economy.
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In this context, the thesis provides a critical assessment of 'market-friendly',
'minimal-state' approach to development policy advocated by the World Bank and
supported by neo-classical economists. This assessment is carried out by briefly examining
the socio-economic aspects of the SAPs carried out by a number of developing countries,
in addition to investigating the importance of state intervention in the high performance of
the East Asian economies' (including Japan). A brief empirical analysis of the way
planning has worked in practice in four selected countries, China, India, South Korea and
Japan, in addition to Oman, is also provided.
In relation to the oil-export dependent economy of Oman, the thesis analyses the
complementary roles of the government and the private sector in promoting diversification
of the economy and development of indigenous human resources to reduce dependence
upon oil exports and an expatriate labour force. Since privatisation of State-Owned
Enterprises (SOEs) is a crucial issue in the state versus market debate, the thesis examines
the various issues involved in the privatisation process in the light of the experience of
Oman and other countries.
3. Main Conclusion of the Thesis
The main conclusions of this research is that in a short period of twenty-five years
(1970-1995) Oman has achieved considerable economic growth, social development and
macroeconomic stability. This is especially so when one bears in mind the fact that until as
late as 1970, Oman was a poor country suffering from prolonged economic stagnation and
political isolation. It lacked the basic elements of development such as paved roads,
electricity, telephones, health and education facilities, safe drinking water, housing and
employment opportunities. Oman's achievements in terms of per capita income growth;
control over rate of inflation; trends in primary and female education; life expectancy;
infant mortality and supply of safe drinking water, compare very favourably with other
These are the so called 'four tigers', South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore (World Bank,
1 993b).
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similarly placed developing countries. This was achieved by the state allocating public
investment through a series of FYIPs' and actively encouraging private investment, i.e.
through a combination of planning and the market.
The main factor which contributed to these achievements was the investing of a
sizeable proportion of economic rents generated from oil in the establishment of
economic and social infrastructure through allocation of public investment. It was through
development planning that Oman could implement such rational allocation of public
revenues and public expenditure, in accordance with predetermined priorities, within the
framework of a long-term development strategy.
Oman could control inflation and maintain exchange rate stability largely because
of (i) its free trade policy, and (ii) the mechanism established through the setting up of
State General Reserve Fund 2
 (SGRF) to deal with oil price volatility. This involved
transferring a portion of government gross oil revenues to the Fund in times of high oil
prices and resorting to the Fund when there was a need to finance fiscal deficits. This
fund was thus used to counter the adverse effects of Dutch disease 3 syndrome faced by oil
exporting countries in times of booming oil exports.
Oman's industrial policy was based on the principles of promoting the growth of
private industry in a competitive environment, with minimum protection, SOEs were set
up only where private capital was not forthcoming or in case of "natural monopolies"4,
where competition was impracticable or undesirable. Oman has been able through
development planning and encouragement of the growth of the private sector, to augment
substantially the relative share of the non-oil sector in the gross domestic product, even as
Between 1976 and 1995 Oman had executed four five-year plans. Currently the Fifth FYP (1996-2000)
is under implementation.
2 The State General Reserve Fund established in 1980 has been the main reserve fund (Oman,
1981a:pp.243-246). Chapter IV and V provide further details on this and other funds instituted for this
purpose.
This is discussed in Chapter II of this thesis.
These are public utilities such as water, electricity, gas and telecommunication.
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the latter has increased significantly over the last two decades. However, within the non-
oil sector, it is the services sector which accounts for the predominant share and the
relative shares of industry and agriculture, though growing, are quite small. This presents
one of the main challenges, as we shall see in subsequent chapters.
In the last decade, Oman has experienced declining trends in savings and
investment rates mainly because of a falling rate of public savings and investment,
stagnation in private savings and investment and a rapid rise in the outflow of expatriate
workers' remittances. un recent years, the government's fiscal deficits have also become
increasingly large because of unchecked growth in current expenditure and sluggishness of
net oil revenues. Large withdrawals from the SGRF for financing the growing fiscal
deficits have reduced considerably the resources of the fund while the progressively
increasing workers' outward remittances have been the main reason for the rising trend in
external current account deficits.
The state has continued to play a pre-dominant role in Oman's social and
economic development. However, the state has not assumed this role by suppressing
market forces or restricting expansion of private sector activities. In fact, in Oman, the
long-term development policy is committed to maintaining a free market mechanism and
expanding the scale and scope of private sector activities. To achieve these objectives the
government provides concessionary long-term loans and equity participation either
directly or through specialised development banks which have been set up for this
purpose. No taxes are levied on exports, while a certain level of tariff protection is
provided to infant industries. In addition, the government has established a comprehensive
regulatory framework, capital market institutions and modern industrial estates to promote
private sector activity. Thus the roles of the state and the market in Oman are not
conflicting but complementary, and these two institutions have so far worked in tandem,
with the result that their contributions to the development process in Oman have been
synergetic and not mutually exclusive.
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Our analysis of development theories suggests that different schools of
development thought connote different interpretations of economic development. An
examination of the concepts underlying these theories leads to the conclusion that
development is a multi-dimensional process entailing simultaneous achievement of multiple
goals, such as: sustained per capita income growth, equitable distribution; provision of
basic needs to all; enhancement of people's entitlements and capabilities, and
environmental sustainability. The market has played - and continues to play - a
supporting and complementary role, but development planning has been and continues to
be necessary for achieving the twin objectives of growth and human development.
Our discussion of the importance of state intervention in the East Asian
economies, the salutary effects of market reform in China and India and our analysis of
Oman's record in combining the strengths of planning and market mechanism leads us to
conclude that contrary to the neo-classical viewpoint advocated by the World Bank, the
case for 'rolling back the state' is rather weak. Our thesis cautions against the universal
adoption of the market-oriented policy reforms prescribed by the World Bank and the
IMF under the SAPs. Keeping in view the development experience of these countries, the
conclusion of our research favours an active role of the state in spheres of human resource
development, diversification of the economy, and private sector development. It must be
stated at the outset that the aim of this thesis is neither to laud and shower uncritical praise
on Oman's development nor to adopt an air of false modesty in so far as Oman's
development is concerned. Our aim is to be objective.
The next phase of Oman's development, beginning with the Fifth FYP, formulated
according to Oman's new long-term development strategy' is both difficult and crucial for
its future prosperity. The objectives set in this strategy are likely to be more difficult to
achieve than those attained since 1976, when Oman began its economic planning. This is
not to suggest that the process of development has been easy or has been entirely
successful in attaining the stated objectives. On the contrary, there have been difficulties
'This new strategy is described as 'Vision : 2020'.
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and failures. For example, as we will discuss in subsequent chapters, Oman's performance
in diversification and industrialisation has been less than satisfactory. And unless the
economy becomes less dependent on oil, it could face serious dislocation - when this
resource is depleted by the year 2020.
4. Previous Studies on Oman's Development
The review of literature below is not aimed at providing a detailed analysis of each
text, which is not necessary for our purpose. The aim rather is to situate the existing state
of scholarship (its strengths and weaknesses) on Oman's development, and the way our
research points to a new departure, and original synthesis, for analysing that process in the
Sultanate.
Oman is one of the least researched countries, particularly in the area of economic
and social development. Our study is one of a few, if not the only, theoretically based
empirical study of the economic and social transformation of the country covering the
period 1970-95. Our study approaches this problem by locating Oman's principal
instruments of development - its development policy and plans, within a comparative,
theoretical and international policy perspective.
In contrast, most books and articles on Oman tend to deal with the economy,
society, culture, history and politics of the country either by separating the subjects or
they tend to be informative but journalistic and descriptive in their orientation.
Another shortcoming of works on Oman is that Oman's economic and social
development is studied as if Oman were a self-contained entity with little systematic
connection to the rest of the world, except where changes in the price of oil affect its
exchequer. In other words, analyses are also lacking of Oman's economic and social
transformation within the context of the global policy and economy, (price of oil, terms of
trade, the World Bank, the IMF, globalisation), and within a comparative framework
28
(development experience of other countries), together with consideration of the major
instruments and strategies adopted by these countries and Oman.
In fact one study on Oman states that "[T]here has been only a very limited list of
scholarly publications about Oman in books and journals" (Skeet, 1992:p.xii). It is
however, possible for our purpose, to discern two categories of scholarship on Oman'.
In the first category there are books and articles which provide descriptive
accounts of Oman's economic and social development. These lack any theoretical
framework or explanatory schemata, and are thus limited in their analytical value.
Different levels of abstraction and concreteness remain unconnected, as we shall see
below. Moreover, since the period covered by these works does not extend to 1995, they
do not carry any discussion of Oman's new development strategy.
The second category of scholarship tends to be theoretically rather narrow,
technical and highly specialised in one or two aspects of Oman's development. These
approaches lack a macro and intersectoral (multi-dimensional) perspective on Oman's
development, and are thus limited in their analytical value in so far as an understanding of
the transformation and development of Oman 's economic and social structures are
concerned.
The fact that Townsend's (1977) work published twenty years ago is reviewed in
our research which is being completed in 1997, shows the sad lack of scholarship on
Oman. This book, like Skeet's, represents standard scholarship on the political economy
of Oman, with sections on the development of the state, the economy and society, and so
on.
Written by an 'insider' in the sense that the author was the Economic Advisor to
the Omani Government during the years 1972 to 1975 when the new ruler, Sultan
'Works on Oman reviewed in this section are arranged according to the year of their publication.
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Qaboos, had just embarked upon his modernisation programme, the book mainly covers
the period 1970 to 1976. It is divided into three parts, of which the first deals with the
historical background for the period 1932 to 1970. Apart from a brief chapter on the
economic geography of Oman, giving brief details of climate, crops, population and oil
production (1966-75), the rest of this part deals with political history of the pre-1970
period.
In this connection the author states the problem of economic development in
Oman in the following manner:
[T]he possibility of the destruction or impoverishment of
Oman's natural water resources, coupled with probable
early exhaustion of the country's crude oil reserves, means
that there are very severe constraints both to economic
development and to political independence (Townsend,
l977:p.22).
Townsend's analysis of Oman's development constraints, which points to an
ecological (water) and resource (oil) reductionism is seriously flawed. There is a lack of
systematic analysis of theory or policy which may constrain or facilitate development in
Oman, thus transcending a reductionist argument. Moreover, there is no attempt in
Townsend's work to locate Oman's development within the operations of the international
economy or to refer to and learn from (however problematically) the development
experience of other countries, including the Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs), which
secured development in spite of a poor resource base. State policy and the international
political economy, rather than resources, were crucial in their development (Wade, 1990),
as we shall see in later chapters.
The Second Part of the book which is devoted to the emergence of the 'new order'
under Sultan Qaboos, provides detailed discussions of the accession of Sultan Qaboos, the
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nature of insurgency in Dhofar, the making of the new government, the beginning of
development programmes and the involvement of the World Bank assistance in this task.
This part also highlights the support for state-led development that was given in those
days by the World Bank. While recommending a technical assistance project for
strengthening the planning mechanism in Oman, the 1974 World Bank Report stated:
The proposed technical assistance project is an essential first
step in Oman's development ... The assistance for economic
planning would help devise the general framework and
strategy for development ... Now that the Government has
succeeded in stimulating economic growth, it recognises the
need to administer the development, and guide its future
direction (Townsend, l977:p.l56) (emphasis added by the
present author).
Part Three of the book deals with the style of functioning of the new government
under Sultan Qaboos, the problems of expanding modern education in a traditional,
religious society, and the challenges that would come up in the process of rapid
development. The last chapter briefly deals with Oman and its neighbours in the Arab
World.
From this short summary of the book, it is clear that its subject-matter has very
little bearing on the analysis of the economic growth and human development of Oman
from 1976 to 1995 which is the major concern of our thesis. Moreover, while the overall
tone of the book is one of great pessimism about the future development of Oman, one
can argue that the justification for state-led development planning lies in its findings. For,
as we shall see in Chapters IV, V and VI, it was through a systematic implementation of a
series of five-year development plans that Oman has been successful in overcoming the
institutional, financial and economic problems that Townsend argued might bring down
the government of Sultan Qaboos.
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Clements' (1980) work describes the rebirth of the ancient land of Oman as a
modern nation in 1970 with the accession of its present ruler, Sultan Qaboos bin Said
following a bloodless coup in July, 1970. The book's purpose is to discuss various
aspects of the "renaissance" ushered in under the reign of Sultan Qaboos and the problems
that Oman faced during the first decade (1970-79) of this renaissance.
Clements emphasises that in terms of its people, society and culture, Oman differs
significantly from the rest of Arabian Peninsula, particularly in terms of the multireligious1,
multicultural and liberal aspects of Omani society. An important observation Clements
makes is that "Omani society is a paternal one and indeed if one is to understand its
structure and the role of the Sultan this has to be appreciated because the Sultan is
regarded very much as the father of his people" (p.18).
Clements suggests that Oman's well being in the future rests on two main factors:
educational development and providing for the needs of the young people, and on the
development of agriculture and fisheries. With regard to education he analyses the
qualitative aspects of educational development such as the structure and curricula of
school education, its planning and administration and the significance of peoples'
enthusiasm without which the rapid expansion of education could not have taken place.
Clements also stresses that though the development of oil and gas has made a
major contribution to Oman's present prosperity, the future economic base of Oman will
consist of agriculture and fishery. He argues that oil and gas are finite resources whereas
land and sea, if carefully developed and husbanded, are infinite resources. This is a very
plausible argument, for it does make sense to develop and rely on sustainable and
relatively abundant resources. We discuss the allocation of resources to agriculture and
fisheries in the chapters that follow, but particularly in Chapters V, VI and VII and within
the context of diversification strategies in Oman.
That is, groups following different sects of Islam and groups belonging to different religions (Muslims,
Hindus and Christians).
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Clements' work like that of Townsend, does not discuss Oman's political,
economic and social developments during the period 1970-1979 in the context of any
explanatory theoretical framework. In contrast, our analyses of Oman's economic and
social development engages with both development theory and the theoretical issues
surrounding the role of the state and market in development.
Pridham' s (1987) work contains 13 papers, only four of which deal with the social
and economic development of Oman.
The paper on "Updating Agricultural and Associated Rural Enterprises" by
Dutton discusses the transition of Oman's rural sector from the pre-1970 to post 1970
period. This paper brings out the importance of the unique falaj system of groundwater
irrigation in Oman's rural economy and the conservation measures required to sustain it.
The measures taken by the government in relation to agricultural research and extension
are also discussed in this paper. The scope of this however is limited in that it does not
place development of agriculture within the perspective of overall economic development
and diversification of the non-oil sector.
"Oman's Development Strategy" by Whelan is mainly descriptive and informative.
It deals with economic development achieved in Oman during the period 1970 to 1984.
Therefore, the problems experienced by Oman during the period of declining oil prices, i.e.
from 1985 onwards, are not discussed in this paper. Moreover, the specific aspects of
development strategy and achievements are described only briefly with the necessary
statistics.
Birks and Sinclair's paper on "Successfiul Education and Human Resource
Development" provides useftil information up to the period 1983-84 on aspects of
development in which Oman has made significant gains. The paper also provides
interesting analysis of the main schemes and programmes in relation to education, training
and public health care systems in Oman.
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The paper by Hughes' on "Oil in Oman - A Short Historical Note" provides a
brief history of the exploration and production of oil in Oman from the 1920s. It describes
the process of the formation of the largest oil company viz. Petroleum Development Oman
(PDO) and the main features of the partnership agreement between the Omani government
and foreign companies. The history of the oil sector presented here stops at 1985.
Compared to the topics covered in the papers included in Pridham's work, our
thesis is much more specific because it deals with policy and planning and is also more
comprehensive in content. Our analysis discusses the period up to 1995 but also analyses
future strategies in light of the past and future trends in the development of Oman's
economy (both macro and sectoral) but within the overall long-term development strategy.
Kalmoor's (1988) work is academically rigorous but its scope is limited to
examining the way financial processes contribute (indirectly) to development in Oman.
Among the issues that Kalmoor addresses are: the qualitative and quantitative relationship
between the real rate of interest on deposits and private saving and consumption; the role
of real interest rate in private investment, and so on (ibid. :p. 88).
The methodology adopted is that of constructing (a) a macroeconomic model
reflecting the structure of Oman's economy and (b) a complete (economy-wide) model.
Kalmoor's analysis is often abstract and couched in mathematical language,
avoiding identification of Oman's political, economic and social structures in which
financial processes take shape, and in turn, condition these processes and structures.
Whilst Kalmoor's work is a significant piece of research applying modern
macroeconomic theory to evaluate a country's economic policies, its scope is nevertheless
Francis Hughes was the General Manager in the late 1 960s and early 1 970s of the only oil producing
company then - Petroleum Development (Oman) Ltd.
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limited since it deals mainly with the fiscal and monetary policies of Oman and that too
only from 1977 to 1985.
Speece's (1989) work provides an historical analyses of Oman's traditional,
historical duality of two distinct spatial structures of the coast and the interior which
prevailed in pre-1930, i.e. in pre-oil Oman. The coastal trading towns with international
marketing networks were characterised by a dendritic spatial system based on rent
capitalism. That is, a system in which the trading merchants - many of them foreigners
- as owners of capital acquired economic interests in land and agriculture in the interior
through their trading and money lending activities and appropriated surplus from
agriculture in form of rent. These merchants were rentier capitalists and absentee
landlords, but they did reinvest part of their rental surplus in land through improving or
creating irrigation systems, etc. In the interior, agriculture and manufactured goods were
traded through the bazaar systems with links extended to coastal merchants. The land
tenure system in the interior was such that small, owner-cultivated subsistence holdings
existed side by side with large farms owned by absentee landowners residing in the coastal
towns.
Speece argues that this duality between coast and interior has not disappeared
completely with the emergence of the oil sector as the dominant sector of the economy.
Of course this duality has remained even after the emergence of oil as the primary
resource. However, as we shall see in Chapters IV and V, Omani development plans have
given particular attention to overcoming the economic and spatial duality prevailing in
Oman in 1970 by allocating resources and economic activity to the regions. It is most
likely that in the absence of such planned allocations the duality analysed by Speece might
have been exacerbated fi.irther after the expansion of oil revenues.
Skeet's (1992) work belongs to the first of the above two categories of works on
Oman. It may be considered standard genre of the political economy of Oman. It is
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descriptive and informative, but rather journalistic in its orientation. There is a brief
historical account of the emergence of modern Oman and the factors that facilitated this
process. The main focus is on the post 1970 changes.
The section on Economy and Infrastructure in Part Two of the book is most
relevant for us. This section, which comprises sub-sections on oil, finance, investment,
education and health and telecommunications, is informative and presents lucidly the
highlights of Oman's performance in growth and human development. A brief descriptive
account is given of achievements in the oil sector, development in areas of agriculture and
fisheries, small scale industry, Muscat Securities Market (MSM), actual and planned
allocation of investment under the first two five-year plans, expenditure on and
achievements of infrastructural growth and immigrant work-force. The few pages
devoted to education and health, provide information about the rapid expansion in
education and health care systems. There is also a brief description of the measures
planned to achieve balanced regional development and regional distribution of investment
under the Third and Fourth FYPs.
Part Three of the book also briefly discusses the challenges that Oman will have to
face in the 21st century in the areas of water supply and conservation, diversification of
economy and employment generation. It also reviews briefly some of the objectives laid
down in the Fourth FYP (1991-1995). These objectives are Omariisation, regional
development and the building-up of government financial reserves.
The main weakness of Skeet's text is that it is atheoretical. Each section and sub-
section is discrete and unconnected, with an absence of theoretical underpinnings that may
explain the empirical processes being described. Thus in describing the aims and
objectives of the various five-year plans, one does not find any discussion on the rationale
of adopting development planning and its relationship with the market in Oman. Neither is
there any discussion on the place of Oman in the international division of labour, which
Oman has attempted to turn to its advantage, or in fact to extricate itself from this bind.
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There is little in the book which establishes the fact that Oman, like other commodity
exporting developing countries, has to negotiate obstacles to development, precisely
because of the 'comparative advantage' it has as an oil-exporting economy. In contrast,
our thesis is concerned with providing detailed, in-depth, critical appraisal of Oman's
performance in the fields of social and economic development up to 1995 - the last year
of the Fourth FYP. Moreover, our thesis compares Oman's experience with a number of
similar developing countries, and also evaluates Oman's development planning in light of
prevailing development theory.
The World Bank's (1994a) document on the Sultanate of Oman : Sustainable
Growth and Economic Diversification, is a report which examines Oman's longer-term
economic prospects, assesses the government's economic policies and provides a package
of recommendations for future sustainable growth.
The report indicates that because Oman's oil reserves are not likely to last beyond
year 2011, Oman ought to maximise the national saving rate (from its current oil income)
and invest the same in foreign assets or domestic projects in such a way that the return
from these investments, would be sufficient to sustain consumption standards at current
level in the post-2011 1 period. Considering the declining rate of national saving as the
main constraint on Oman's continued economic and social development, the report
devotes its remaining chapters (Chapter 3 to 10) to two objectives: (a) formulating a
macroeconomic model to estimate the optimal rate of saving for Oman; and (b)
suggesting a package of structural reforms to attain the optimal rate of saving.
The reform measures suggested include, inter al/a, eliminating the public sector
deficit and generating a high rate of public saving, allocating a substantial portion of
increased public saving to foreign investment to ensure competitive risk-adjusted return on
both domestic and foreign assets, establishing separate and effective long-term saving,
stabilisation and contingency funds, curtailing the role of government in social and
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economic services and concentrating government's efforts on the effective fulfilment of its
traditional public functions, and so on.
While the assessment rightly identifies a number of development constraints and
challenges facing the economy, its recommendations to overcome them are based solely
on the neo-classical approach, in the sense that they are biased towards a "pro-market
minimal state" viewpoint of Oman's development performance, and their main intention
is to drive home the point that the state must "roll back" in Oman. For example, while the
report admits the remarkable strides Oman has made in economic, social and political
development over the years 1970-1990 through adopting a government-led development
strategy, it simply states that reducing the role of the government and expanding the role
of the private sector will achieve long-term economic growth, promote diversification and
increase economic efficiency. While diversification and human resources development are
both given prominence, these are not systematically analysed or placed in the context of
overall long-term strategy and linkages with the development process. The World Bank's
report also gives a crucial determining role to public finance and the price mechanism.
Our thesis analyses Oman's economic policies without such predilections i.e. we
neither assume superiority of market mechanism nor do we intend to propagate the
superiority of the state's role in promoting development. In that sense, the viewpoint
projected in our thesis about Oman's development performance has a wider scope and
perspective, as it includes discussion on the roles of the state, the market and planning in
Oman. It also evaluates each policy prescription in the light of contemporary experience
and in a way that would increase efficiency without adversely affecting social welfare.
With regard to privatisation we show that it would not be an unmixed blessing. Similarly,
while principles of sound fiscal management, are important, they cannot by themselves
secure economic and social transformation of a developing economy.
Although Chatty's (1996) research is more recent, it needs but a brief mention.
This is an anthropological work which traces the history of a development project from
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conception and design through to implementation and completion. It then assesses the
impact of the project on Omani nomads, the harasiis, it was intended to benefit. Whilst
this is an interesting empirical study of a local entity, it scarcely illuminates the problems of
socio-economic transformation of the country within the global context.
The present author's own book (Al Yousef, 1995), Oil and the Transformation of
Oman (19 70-95), shows the use of oil revenues in securing increased social welfare in
Oman, but within the context of fluctuating income derived from the export of a primary
commodity. The book is largely empirical and statistical in its orientation and while
informative, it does not address the theoretical and empirical processes of development
and the role of the plan and market in a systematic manner. Moreover, the data coverage
extends only up to 1993.
In comparison with most of the works reviewed above, the scope of our thesis is
rather more comprehensive as it covers both the empirical and theoretical aspects of
Oman's planning strategies and policies of development. In addition our research makes
use of data from 1970 to 1995, i.e. up to the latest year for which official data were
available' at the time of completion of our research. Importantly our research also
analyses some crucial aspects of future development policy adopted after 1995.
The development-related works on Oman reviewed here show a lack of both
quality and quantity of research on the country. Thus our research makes a contribution
towards reducing that particular shortcoming by providing a systematic analysis of the
complexity of the factors involved, including policy, planning and the market, which have
determined Oman's economic and social development.
'Statistical Year Book for 1996 was published in the second half of 1997, i.e. by the time our research
was nearing its completion. Moreover, the year 1995 coincides with the last year of the Fourth FYP
(1991-95) and hence provides an appropriate milestone for evaluating the outcome of the plan.
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5. Methodology and Data Sources
The empirical analysis in this thesis is based on secondary sources. The main
secondary sources of information are the official publications of the government of the
Sultanate of Oman, and include in particular: (i) the annual Statistical Year Book published
by the Ministry of Development'; (ii) the Five-Year Plan issued periodically by the then
Technical Secretariat of the Development Council starting with the First FYP issued in
1976, and the current Fifth FYP issued by the Ministry of Development; (iii) the results of
the 1993 General Census of Population, Housing and Establishments published by the
Ministry of Development; (iv) the Quarterly Statistical Bulletin issued by the Central
Bank of Oman; and (v) internal data of the Ministry of Development, when published
statistical information was not available. For data relating to other countries, the main
secondary sources are the data published by international organisations which include: (i)
the World Development Report issued annually by the World Bank; (ii) the new annual
World Development Indicators issued in 1997 by the World Bank; (iii) the Human
Development Report issued annually since 1990 by the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP); and (iv) The Handbook of International Trade and Development
Statistics issued annually by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD). With the exception of Oman's Fifth FYP, which is being translated from
Arabic into English2, all publications are in English and are appropriately acknowledged.
The theoretical analysis provided in the thesis relates to interpretation and understanding
of materials from books and articles published (mostly) in accredited journals. These
sources, which are all in English are also duly acknowledged in the bibliography attached
to the thesis.
'Before the establishment of the Ministry of Development in 1994, vide Royal Decree no. 2/94 issued on
5.1.94 (Oman, 1 995c) the Technical Secretariat of the Development Council had been responsible since
1975 for publication of all statistical information.
2 The English version of the plan was issued in the month of Ju1i 1997, however, references in our thesis
are based on the Arabic version.
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6. Scope and Limitations of the Research
The scope of our research is both broad and limited. It is broad in the sense that
the analysis of Oman's development processes and the role of the state and the market in
this are located within, and related to, the larger global processes and policies emanating
from the developed countries, the World Bank and the IMF. Similarly the development
processes of other developing countries are incorporated to give our research a
comparative dimension.
Clearly a study that focuses exclusively on Oman or any other developing country
as if it were a self-contained entity would be unviable. Especially so in the case of Oman
which depends so crucially on the global economy as a market for its oil resources.
Our study is nevertheless limited by the fact that the research is on Oman, and it is
not a comparative or a global study. It is also limited by the fact it does not focus in detail
on the technical aspects of formulation and implementation of policies and plans. Of
course these are very important. But these are taken as given especially since they have
been efficiently negotiated. If this were not the case then Oman's development would
have been less than successful. Similarly there is little systematic discussion of the
processes of the global economy. These are discussed meaningfully in so far as they affect
the price of oil, terms of trade, etc. and their consequent impact on the amount of
revenues accruing to Oman and hence its disbursible resources for development.
One point of classification is needed: It may be objected that in the chapters
dealing with empirical processes in Oman, especially Chapters VI, V, VI and VII, we have
made excessive use of statistical material. We have justified the use of statistics because
by quantifying Oman's development one gets the true measure of both the problems that
confronted the country and the extent to which these were solved - or remain.
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7. Organisation of the Thesis
This thesis is divided into eight chapters. Chapter I describes the changing
economic scenario in the developing world, and the shifts in development thinking from
the state and planning as the significant agent of change to the state as the problem and the
market as the panacea in securing development.
Chapter II discusses the major theories of development and the relevance of
strategies advocated by some of these theories for understanding Oman's development
policy and the implications for the role of state and market in adopting these strategies.
In Chapter III we examine critically the market mechanism and planning in the
development process. The reasons which justifj the role of development planning in
developing mixed economies are also discussed with reference to empirical evidence from
a number of developing countries.
Chapter IV analyses Oman's economic and social development during the period
1970 to 1995. After a brief historical background stating the initial conditions of
development, the chapter discusses the achievements of Oman in relation to growth of
national and per capita income, exports and trade balance, structural change, education,
health and development of infrastructures. The chapter also analyses the factors which
enabled Oman to achieve its present level of development and examines the constraints on
growth experienced in recent years.
In Chapter V we explain the rationale for adoption of planning in Oman in the
mid-1970s, the objectives of Oman's long-term development strategy and the nature of
Oman's planning authority. In respect of each of the four FYPs completed during 1976-
95, the chapter discusses medium-term objectives, growth targets and achievements, the
planned and actual pattern of investment allocation and an assessment of the
implementation of the plan policies.
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The objective of Chapter VI is to show that in the development process of Oman
the roles played by the state and markets have been complementary and not conflicting.
After discussing the basic approach of Oman's policy for combining the strengths of
planning and free market mechanism, the chapter examines the developmental functions
performed by the state in Oman. The chapter then analyses the policies adopted to
encourage private investment, strengthen private sector activities and expand the role of
market mechanism. With supportive empirical data the chapter analyses the importance of
the private sector in Oman's development and the manner in which the private-public
partnership functions in Oman.
In Chapter VII, we review the main problems that constrain Oman's further
development and the policies and planning responses formulated to overcome these
constraints within the 'Vision 2020' framework. The chapter examines the four 'pillars'
of Oman's New Development Strategy viz, diversification, development of private sector,
human resource development and macroeconomic stability and shows that achievement of
these objectives requires both strategic intervention of the state and the crucial role of the
market in Oman's future development.
Chapter VIII summarises the main findings and states briefly the main conclusions
of this thesis.
8. Oman's Geopolitics, Economy and Society
8.1 Geography
The Sultanate of Oman lies on the south east corner of the Arabian Peninsula
located between latitudes 16°40' and 26°20' north and longitudes 51°50' and 59°40' east.
It occupies a land area of 309,500 sq. km. with a coastline which extends 1,700 kilometres
(Oman, 1996c).
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Oman has borders with Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates (UAE) in the west
and with the Republic of Yemen in the south. In the east, Oman faces the Arabian Sea
and Gulf of Oman and in the north it overlooks the Strait of J-Iormuz.
Geographically, Oman is divided into eight administrative regions and 59 wilayats
(towns). These are: the Governorate of Muscat which comprises 6 wilayats, including the
city of Muscat, the capital of the country; Al Batinah comprises 12 wilayats and occupies
the coastal plains between Muscat to the south-east and UAE to the north; Ad Dakhiliyah
comprises 8 wilayats and lies in the interior of the country through which the oil and gas
pipelines run; Adh Dhahirah comprises 5 wilayats and borders the UAE in the north. It
joins the Empty Quarter from the west and Al Wusta region from the south; Ash
Sharqiyah comprises 11 wilayats and overlooks the Arabian Sea from the east; Al Wusta is
distinguished for having a large part of the oil reserves, it has 4 wilayats and is situated to
the south side of both Ad Dakhliyah and Adh Dhahirah regions and at the east side is
linked to the Arabian Sea; the Governorate of Dhofar is situated in the far south of the
Sultanate, and has 9 wilayats, it borders the Republic of Yemen from the south west; and
the eighth is the Governorate of Musandam which lies in the extreme north of the
Sultanate, it has 4 wilayats and overlooks the Straits of Hormuz (Oman, I 996b).
Of the vast land area that constitutes Oman, 82 per cent is sand and gravel desert,
another 15 per cent is occupied by mountains and the coastal plains represent only 3 per
cent of the country (Oman, 1996b).
Muscat is the capItal city of Oman. The official language is Arabic but English is
widely used in Oman. Currency is Omani Rial (RO) divisible into 1000 Baizas. The
exchange rate is pegged to US dollar at the rate of 1 RO = USS 2.60. Oman - one of
the oldest political entities in the Arabian peninsula - has always been at the centre of
the regional and international struggle for the control of international trading routes. In
the heyday of the Islamic empire, Omani ports were the gateway to Islamic civilisation and
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dominated the trade with Africa and India. From the late fifteenth century, Oman's
strategic location was coveted by the European powers such as the Portuguese, the Dutch,
French and British who were eager to control international trade routes (Oman, 1 989a).
At present 90 per cent of oil from the Gulf passes through the navigable stretch of
the Straits of Hormuz, which is in Omani territorial waters (ibid. :p.2O).
8.2 Climate
The climate varies from one region to another. In the coastal areas it is hot and
humid in the summer, whereas in the Interior it is hot and dry. In the mountainous area
the weather is moderate throughout the year.
Rainfall is generally irregular and low, though heavy rains fall at times. The Dhofar
region in the south is climatically different due to the Qara mountain range. Here not only
is the climate moderate for most parts of the year but, with regular monsoon between June
and October, the rainfall is heavy and predictable. Maximum temperature throughout
Oman varies between 330 to 50°C during summer, and minimum temperature varies
between 4° to 17°C in winter (Oman, 1996b).
8.3 Political system
Oman did not have a modern government machinery until 1970. One of the first
tasks accomplished by the present ruler, Sultan Qaboos, soon after he assumed power in
July 1970 was to establish a stable government with modern administrative system.
The present Omani political-administrative system is a monarchical government,
the executive head of which is the Sultan. The administrative system of the state derives
all its powers from the authority conferred on it by the Sultan. This system consists of: the
Diwan of Royal Court, the Ministry of Palace office, the Cabinet of Ministers, the
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Secretariat of the Cabinet, the Specialised Councils comprising: the Development
Council', the Financial Affairs Council, the Natural Gas Council 2 and the Majlis
Ash' Shura3 (Oman, 1 994b : pp.3 0-31).
The Cabinet is the highest executive authority deriving its powers from the Sultan
to whom it is collectively responsible. All laws, decrees, international treaties, agreements
and charters are authorised by the Sultan and come into effect from the date of their
publication in Oman's Official Gazette4.
The Majlis Ash'Shura was established in November 1990 to replace the Majlis Al
Istishari, originally established in 1981 and consisting of 35 nominated members, which
were subsequently increased to 55 members. Members of the Majlis Ash'Shura are
elected, with each wilayat with a population of less than 30,000 Omanis sending one
elected member to the Majlis and wilayats having a larger population sending two elected
members (ibid. :pp.34-3S).
The President of the Majlis is appointed by Royal Decree. Among the principal
duties of the Majlis is the reviewing of all social and economic laws and participation in
the formulation, evaluation and monitoring of the development plan (ibid.).
8.4 External relations
Oman has a long history of trade contacts and political relations with many
countries in the Arab world, the Indian sub-continent, the Far East and East Africa. Oman
was the first Arab nation to establish diplomatic relations with the United States of
America (USA) in the first half of 19th century when Oman was ruled by Sayyed Said bin
The Development Council was dissolved during 1996 and its authorities and responsibilities were
transferred to the Cabinet vide Royal Decree no. 7/96 (Oman, 1 996g).
2 The Financial Affairs and the Natural Gas Councils were dissolved in 1996, and the Financial Affairs
and the Energy Resource Council was set up in their place vide Royal Decree no. 60/96 (Oman, 1996i).
Majlis Ash'Shura is equivalent to a peoples representative body.
4 lssued twice a month in Arabic language by the M.mistiy of Legal Affairs.
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Sultan of Ya'aruba dynasty. By this time Oman also had treaty relationship with Great
Britain and friendly relations with France. However, for about four decades (193 2-1970),
under the rule of the previous ruler Sultan Said bin Taimur, Oman was completely isolated
politically and so when the present ruler His Majesty Sultan Qaboos came to power in
1970 Oman had to win diplomatic recognition from the international community
(ibid p.21).
The Sultanate of Oman joined the Arab League in 1971 and in the same year it was
admitted as a member of the United Nations, the IIMIF, and the World Bank. In the
following year Oman became a member of the Islamic Conference Organisation and in
1973 Oman became a member of the Non-Aligned Group of Nations. Oman was a
founder-member of' the six nation Arab Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) which was set
up in 1981' (Kechichian, l995:pp.55-56).
Oman is also a member of a large number of Gulf, Arab, Islamic and International
Organisations. It has diplomatic relations with about 122 countries, and has a large
number of bilateral agreements with a number of countries covering social, economic,
cultural and political aspects (Oman, 1994b:pp.49-56). It has an access agreement 2 with
the USA and has close military and political ties with the United Kingdom (Kechichian,
op. cit. :pp.89 and 147). Oman has been accorded observer status in the World Trade
Organisation and its application for membership of the organisation is being processed.
Although Oman's economy is oriented towards oil exports, Oman has never been a
member of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). But Oman has
always managed to apply the agreements reached within OPEC, to the extent they were
beneficial to Omani interests, in its dealings with the oil multinationals (Al Yousef,
1995 :p.3O).
'other members of the GCC are: Balirain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
2 This agreement provides propositioning of supplies and access to a limited number of military facilities
on a prior approval basis (ibid).
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8.5 Economy
Before the beginning of commercial exploitation and export of oil in 1967, Oman
was a typical low-income agricultural country. In 1965, agriculture and fisheries
contributed 61 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), whilst industry contributed 23
per cent of GDP and 16 per cent of GDP was derived from services (World Bank,
l987:p.2O7). In terms of employment, 62 per cent of the labour force was employed in
agriculture in 1965, while industry and services employed 15 per cent and 23 per cent,
respectively (ibid :p.265). And in 1960 only 4 per cent of the population lived in urban
areas (ibid :p.267).
Oil was discovered in commercial quantities in 1962 and production and exports
started in 1967. In 1995, average daily production reached 852,000 barrels, equivalent to
an annual production of 311 million barrels, of which 284 million barrels were exported.
Although four companies, PDO, Elf Aquitaine (ELF), Occidental Group (OXY) and Japan
Petroleum Exploration Company (JAPEX) were producing oil in 1995, about 90 per cent
was produced by PDO (Oman, 1 996b:pp. 185-202).
Approximately 242,266 million standard Cu. ft. of gas was produced in 1995, all of
which was consumed domestically (ibid).
According to the data obtained from the Ministry of Petroleum and Minerals,
estimates of expected oil reserves stood at 5.2 billion barrels at the end of 1996 and gas
reserves stood at 17 trillion cu. ft.
In 1995, the oil sector accounted for 38 per cent of nominal GDP, 77 per cent of
government revenues and 78 per cent of total export earnings' (Oman, 1996b).
'Compiled from Statistical Year Book 1995 (Oman, 1996b), also see Appendix table 1.
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From 1970 onwards Oman has followed a vigorous development policy to bring
about rapid socio-economic transformation. In 1976 Oman launched its First FYP and by
1995 Oman had executed four five-year development plans. Currently, the Fifth FYP
(1996-2000) is being implemented.
As a result of rapid economic growth, Oman had a Gross National Product (GNP)
per capita' of US$ 4,820 in 1995, which places it among the Upper-middle-income group
of countries (World Bank, 1997b:p.8). In terms of output, agriculture contributed 3 per
cent, industry 47 per cent 2 of which petroleum activities accounted for about 38 per cent,
and services contributed about 50 per cent of the value-added in 1995 in nominal GDP
(Oman, 1996b:p.384). The high priority accorded to education and health care facilities in
development planning has resulted in Oman's Human Development Index (HDI) standing
at 0.718 in 1994. This places Oman among countries with Medium human development
(UNDP, 1997:pp. 147 and 165).
The progress attained by Oman in the fields of economic and social development
since 1970 is shown by Appendix table 1.
8.6 Historical background
Though very little is known about Oman's pre-Islamic past, archaeological sites
dating back to the third millennium B.C. are believed to be contemporary with the region's
Berber culture and the great river cultures of Mesopotamia and Mohenjodaro (Oman,
1994b:p.17).
Although trading, farming and fishing settlements existed in Oman as far back as
the fourth millennium B.C., there is no evidence of any developed urban civilisation during
this early period (ibid. :p.18).
'This is according to the World Bank Atlas method.
2 Industry includes crude oil and gas (38.2 per cent), mining (0.3 per cent), manufacturing (4.6 per cent),
electricity and water (0.9 per cent) and construction (2.6 per cent).
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Farming and pastoral communities were flourishing in the mountains when the first
Arab people came to Oman from Southern Arabia some 2,000 years ago, and in the
foothills to the west and in the deserts nomadic people led their own distinct life. In the
highly cultivated Batinah coast lived farmers, fisherman, merchants and sailors who were
the people most exposed to the rest of the world by the nature of their trades and
geographical location.
It is believed that the first wave of Arab people came to Oman from Southern
Arabia some 2,000 years ago. Later, the Azad tribal group, from which the present ruling
family has descended, entered Oman from Yemen. Islam came to Oman in 630 A.D.
(Oman, 1989a).
From the seventh to the fifteenth century Oman's maritime trade flourished
throughout Persia, India, and South East Asia.
In the early 16th century, the Portuguese occupied Muscat for about 150 years but
they were expelled by Sultan bin Said Yaarabi in 1650. Thereafter no foreign power has
occupied Oman. Under the rule of Sayyid Said bin Sultan, (1807-56) Oman became a
major regional power with its borders extending to East Africa with Zanzibar as its second
capital. By sending a special envoy to the United States, Oman became the first Arab
state to establish diplomatic relations with the USA. By that time, Oman had already
concluded agreements and conventions with Great Britain, France, Holland and other
countries (Oman, 1994b:p.21).
However, after Sayyid Said's rule ended, Oman remained isolated from the rest of
the world for more than a century and stagnated socially and economically until 1970
when the previous ruler Sultan Said bin Taimur abdicated in favour of his son Sultan
Qaboos who assumed power on 23rd July, 1970 (ibid).
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It can be stated that systematic attempt at socio-political modernisation and
economic development of Oman began from the year 1970, when the present ruler, His
Majesty Sultan Qaboos bin Said, assumed office as the executive head of the state'. The
circumstances which forced Sultan Qaboos to take power away from his father arose from
the two threats that Oman faced in the late 1960s. The more pressing one was the
rebellion in Dhofar region which was about to break up the country. The other threat
emanated from the conservative, restrictive social and economic policies of the previous
ruler, Sultan Said bin Taimur.
Soon after assuming power, Sultan Qaboos announced his intention of initiating
the process of economic development of the country and providing the people with the
health care, education and other social amenities they so urgently needed (Oman,
1994b:pp 8-9).
To attain political integration of what was then a divided nation, the Sultan
announced on 9th August 1970 that the country would henceforth be known as the
"Sultanate of Oman" instead of the old name "Sultanate of Muscat and Oman"
(Kechichian, 1995 p.7).
In 1975, after five years of intense military campaign, the armed struggle in Dhofar
was brought under control and the south of the country was fttlly integrated with the rest
of the country (Oman, 1994b:p.64).
When Sultan Qaboos took over power in 1970, Oman was different from the other
underdeveloped countries of Asia and Africa. Unlike the latter, in the pre-1970 period
Oman had not shown any signs of being a 'developing' country. Not having been under
'The predecessor and father of Sultan Qaboos. Sultan Said bin Taimur who ruled the Sultanate of Muscat
and Oman from 1932 was deposed and abdicated in favour of his son on July 23, 1970 (Oman,
1994b:p.8).
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the direct colonial rule of any Western imperialist nation', it had been left almost
completely untouched by the usual elements of modern civilisation such as railways,
asphalt roads, telephone and telegraph, electricity, schools, colleges and universities2,
doctors, hospitals, established civil service, etc. The extent of economic and social
stagnation and backwardness of the pre-1970 Oman is clearly indicated by the fact that in
1970 there were only 10 kilometres of asphalt roads, 557 telephone lines, 3 schools with
900 students, 12 hospitals beds, a meagre supply of electricity and water and a per capita
income of about US$ 400 (Al Yousef, l995:pp.22-23).
8.7 Population and society
Oman's population, according to the 1993 census stood at 2,018,074 persons at
end of November, 1993, of which 73.5 per cent were Omanis and 26.5 per cent were non-
Omanis. In 1996, the population was estimated to be 2,135,000 persons of which 74.7
per cent were Omanis (Oman, 1996c:p.6).
According to the 1993 census results, females formed 52 per cent of the Omani
population. About 52 per cent of the Omani population were below 14 years, about 45
per cent were in the age group of 15-64 years and the remaining 3 per cent were above
that age (Oman, 1993a:pp.36-37).
About 39.7 per cent of males and 24.7 per cent of females below 19 years of age
were unmarried, 56.9 per cent of the males and 61.3 per cent of females in the population
were married, and 2.1 per cent of males and 4 per cent of females were divorced, while
1.3 per cent and 10 per cent of each group were widowed. The data from the census also
Despite the 1798 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation signed with the East India Company, the 1951
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation and the 1958 agreement that streamlined military,
technical and economic assistance to the Sultanate from the British government, Oman has always
remained an independent state. Indeed, Omani independence predated the British presence in the Gulf
region (Kechichian, l995:p.3).
2	 first university, Sultan Qaboos University started in Muscat only in 1986 (Oman, 1986a).
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revealed that 93.2 per cent of total married Omani males had one wife, while only 6.8 per
cent had more than one wife at the time of the census (ibid :pp.46-47).
Illiteracy in 1993 was 21 per cent among females in the age group of 15 to 29
years, 82.2 per cent in the age group of 30 to 49 years, and 97.6 per cent in the age group
of above 50 years. While the corresponding figures for males were 4.5 per cent, 38.8 per
cent and 79.5 per cent, respectively (ibid :p.52).
Because the majority of the Omani population is below the age of 14 years, the
rate of economically active population was 37.9 per cent for males. However, for females
it was much lower, 15.8 per cent (ibid:pp.52-54). In 1993, 55.7 per cent of the Omani
labour force was employed in public administration and defence, 9.9 per cent in health and
educational services, 9.3 per cent in agriculture and fisheries and 1.8 per cent in
manufacturing. For non-Omanis, the respective percentages were 6.0 per cent, 6.6 per
cent, 9.4 per cent, and 13.0 per cent, respectively (ibid :p. 59).
According to the Census, about 66 per cent of the Omani people were living in
urban areas in 1993, while 34 per cent were living in rural areas'. The average size of a
household was 8 members (ibid :pp.62-7l).
In terms of people's participation in political and social life, the Majlis Ash'Shura
referred to earlier is the peoples representative body. In addition, the Omani Chamber of
Commerce and Industry which comprises all registered companies in Oman works in close
co-operation with the government on all economic and social issues that relate to private
sector activities. Also, a number of women's associations have been established with the
support of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour (Oman, 1994b).
'In the census analysis, any settlement with more than 2,500 persons was considered urban, while all
settlements with population below 2,500 were considered rural (ibid. :p. 11). However, the definition of
urban population varies from country to countiy. Therefore, as per the World Bank estimates, only 18 per
cent of the Omani population lived in urban areas in 1995 (World Bank, 199Th:pp. 115-117).
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Oman is well known for its concern in paying careful attention to environment and
heritage. Oman is a member of the International Union for Conservation of Nature
(IUCN) and the United Nations Environmental Programme has cited the Sultanate as a
country with one of the best records in environmental conservation and pollution control.
Moreover, according to the 1982 Law for the Protection of the Environment and the
Prevention of Pollution, all industrial or structural projects must get a 'No Environmental
Objection' certificate from the Ministry of Regional Municipalities and Environmental
Affairs (ibid pp.56 and 204).
The tribal structure of Oman has undergone deep changes over the centuries.
Many nomadic tribes have arrived and sedentarised far from their original territory, while
other Bedouin 1
 tribes have adapted to changing circumstances and specialised in either
farming, fishing or become pastoral nomads (Chatty, l996:pp.8-l2).
At present the Sultanate has a small population of pastoral nomads not exceeding 7
per cent of the total population. The major pastoral tribes in Oman are the Wahiba, the
Duru, the Jeneba and the Harasiis. The Wahibas who number about 7000, are mainly
engaged in fishing while the Durus engage in camel, goat and sheep husbandry. The
Jenebas are pastoral nomads although in the past they had sea-faring interests up to the
Gulf, India and to East Africa. They number about 12,000. The Harasiis do not exceed
3,000 and are mainly pastoral nomads (ibid).
The government extends basic social services to the pastoral nomads of the desert
areas, without attempting either to settle them or change their traditional way of life. A
number of tribal administrative centres and community development centres have been
established by the government to provide services to these communities.
'The nomadic pastoral tribes of the Arabian peninsula are often referred to as Bedouin (ibid. :p. 5).
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The Sultan issued on 6th November, 1996 the Basic Statute of the State (Oman,
1996k). This Basic Statute lays down the rules and regulations for the State, the system
of government and the political, economic, social, cultural and security principles guiding
the State's policy. It also lays down the 'public' rights and duties, the authorities and
responsibilities of the Head of the State, the government and the specialised councils. In
addition, it establishes the methods and procedures for public participation and the
independence of the judiciary and the supremacy of the Law.
In terms of social principles, the Basic Statute stipulates that "Justice, equality, and
equality of opportunities for Omanis are the pillars of society and are guaranteed by the
State" (ibid :p.7). This then is the social, economic, political, ecological, and regional-
global level in which we carry out our analysis of the roles of the state and market in
Oman's development.
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Appendix table I
Main socio-economic indicators : Oman 190-1995
Indicator	 Unit	 Years
1970	 1995
Population	 (000)	 658	 2,135
Population density	 Persons per sq. km.	 -	 6.9
GDP at current prices	 RO Million	 104	 5,288
GDP per capita (in nominal terms)
	 RO	 158	 2,477
Real GNP per capita'	 US$	 -	 4,820
Human development index2
	From 0 to 1	 0.598a	 0.718c
Life expectancy at birth 	 Years	 44	 67.6
Infant mortality rate	 Per 1000 live births 	 64b	 20
Public expenditure on health3
	% of GDP	 -	 2.4
Per capita expenditure on health
services (Ministry of Health only) 	 RO	 4	 58
People per physician	 Persons	 33,333	 813
Gross primary enrolment ratio' 	 % of relevant age group	 4	 85d
Public expenditure on education3	% of GDP	 -	 4.8
Per capita expenditure on education
(Ministry of Education only)
	 RO	 2	 119
Access to safe water2	% of population	 15'	 82
Urbanisation'	 % of population	 Sb	 13
Total employment 	 Persons	 32,348 617,648e
Public sector	 Persons	 1,750 103,206
Private sector	 Persons	 30,598 514,442
Appendli table 1 contd...
56
Appendix table 1 contd...
Indicator	 Unit	 Years
1970	 1995
Merchandise exports3
	RO Million	 88	 2,333
3Share of oil exports	 % of total exports	 99.5	 78.0
3
Merchandise imports	 RO Million	 14	 1,684
Share of trade in GDP3	 % of GDP	 98	 76
Net barter terms of trade' 	 1987=100	 210"	 77
Share of oil sector in GDP3	 % of GDP	 69	 37
Share of (non-oil) manufacturing3 	 °" of GDP	 -	 4.6
Gross domestic investment	 % of GDP	 14	 15
Gross national savings	 % of GDP	 46	 9
GDP implicit deflator 1	average annual %
______________________________ growth 1990-95
	 -	 -2.9
Notes:
a) Data relates to 1990 and 1994 respectively.
b) Data for 1980.
c) Data for 1994.
d) Data for 1993.
e) Data do not include persons employed by Defence and Security units. Moreover, the data do not
reconcile with the 1995 Statistical Year Book. Reconciliation is under way.
Sources: Oman (1 996c) Socio-Economic A i/as for all, except for items stated below:
1) World Development Indicators 1997, World Bank (199Th).
2) Human Development Report 1997, UNDP (1997).
3) Data for 1970 from Statistical Year Book 1985 Oman (1986b) and data for 1995 from Statistical Year
Book 1995 (Oman, 1996b).
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CHAPTER I
THE STATE VERSUS MARKET DEBATE IT CONTEXT
1.1 Introduction
Most development economists 1
 writing in the post World War II era, visualised a
dominant role for the state in initiating and sustaining the development process.
Developing economies were viewed as being caught in an equilibrium variously described
as "vicious circle of poverty", "low-level equilibrium trap", and so on. The problem of
development was described as taking the economy out of this equilibrium and setting it on
a path of self-sustaining growth. A corollary of this view was the perceived necessity of
comprehensive national development planning under state auspices.
However, after almost two decades of state-led development planning and more
specifically since the 1970s, state interventions in the economy are seen to harm economic
growth and development. State action that goes as far as planning and political control of
the economy leads to economic disaster. Privatisation of state owned enterprises and
economic liberalisation have been at the forefront of policy in recent efforts to reduce the
role of the state and redefine its relationship with the market.
In fact the whole discipline of development economics2
 has come under attack
both from neo-classical and liberal economists. As Byres (1994:p.5) notes, "[a] large and
growing literature now exists, written by die-hard neo-classical economists, in which the
These include for example. Rosenstein-Rodan (1943 and 1955): Nurkse (1953); Lewis (1954); Kuzuets
(1955); Leibenstein (1957) and Hirschxnan (1958).
2 Development economics has been defined as the study of the economic structure and behaviour of poor
(or less developed) countries (Lewis, 1984a). It is generally agreed that "development" encompasses the
reduction of poverty, improvements in the health and education of the population, and an increase in
productive capacity as well as rising per capita income (Chenery and Srinivasan, l988:p.xi). We discuss
the evolution of the meaning of development in Chapter II.
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apparent absurdities and inefficiencies of planning are identified and the virtues of market
solution are proclaimed". The ideal of a free, self-regulating market seems to have
triumphed. The economic success of the Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs) of East
Asia, especially Taiwan and South Korea, and the collapse of the state socialist political
economies of Eastern Europe are used as compelling evidence of the pro-market view
point (Balassa and Associates, 1982; Wolf Jr., 1994; World Bank, 1991a).
However, as we shall see there is an alternative view held by other economists and
development thinkers who attribute the success of the NICs to the strong role played by
the state (Wade, 1990; Singh, 1994) and warn against minimising the role and ftmction of
states (Streeten, 1995). This view is supported by our research as we shall see.
As mentioned in the Introduction to the thesis, the significance of the debate on
State and Market lies, on the one hand, in the criticism levelled at the extent and style of
the role envisaged for the state in the dominant intellectual paradigm in the economics of
developing countries over the years 1950-80. On the other hand, it lies in the apparent
inability of the structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) to deal with many of the
difficulties that transition' and developing economies confront a decade after the "neo-
classical" or "market-friendly" packages were put together.
This debate is equally important for Oman's thture development strategy and
policy. Because, as we shall see in Chapters IV-VII, the state in Oman has played arid
continues to play an important role in promoting socio-economic transformation of the
country.
'The term 'transition economies' refers to countries with centrally planned economies in particular,
countries in Central and East Europe, the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, China and
Vietnani - which are in transition to market-oriented economies (see World Bank, 1996:p.iii).
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There is therefore a renewed need to examine the nature of the state-market
dichotomy of neo-classical economics', an approach which, as we shall see later, has
arguably encouraged a pendulum swing from the former institution to the latter.
However, as we shall argue in this and other chapters, it is misleading to view states and
markets as mutually exclusive, and it is desirable to examine the strengths and weaknesses
of both to see how they can co-operate in fostering development.
In this chapter we shall provide an overview of the main issues relating to the state
versus market debate, whilst Chapters II and HI will present an assessment of some of the
major theories and strategies of development as well as more concrete analysis of issues
involved in Plan and Market in the context of development. We first examine the
viewpoint favouring a dominant role for the state in development which became prominent
in the 1950s and 1960s. We then analyse the criticisms levelled at state-driven
development strategy at the end of the 1960s, which resulted in the call for redefinition of
development and reconsideration of the state's role. This is followed by a discussion of
the factors leading to the resurgence of the neo-classical, pro-market view point. After
taking up the question of whether the success of the East Asian economies really lends
support to a market-friendly approach, we discuss the consequences of the SAPs and
The term neo-classicai economics is used here to refer to that body of economic theoiy which uses
marginal analysis to show that if allocation of resources and pricing of goods, services arid factors of
production are left to be decided by freely competitive markets and free trade with the outside world, then
consumer welfare would be maxirnised, resources would be used fully and most efficiently and the
economy would grow harmoniously. The founders of neo-classical school were J. M. Clark, I. Fisher, F.
Y. Edgeworth, A. Marshall, V. Pareto, L. Wairas and K. Wicksell. The primary concern of the neo-
classical economics is to analyse the role of market system in allocation of resources and distribution of
output. The idea of a perfectly competitive economy is central to neo-classical pricing and distribution
theories. This microeconomic approach to describing an economy distinguishes the neo-classicals from
the classical economists (Smith, Maithus, Ricardo, etc.) whose main concerns were long run economic
growth and its relationship with distribution of economic surplus among different social classes.
However, what is common to both these schools of economists is the use of theoretical analysis to show
that social welfare and growth of output are maximised when prices are set right through freely operating
market system, without state intervention and monopolistic restrictions (Barber,1967:pp. 163-165). The
term neo-liberals, although it embraces broader political-economy connotations of rents seeking and
directly unproductive activities, is used interchangeably in this thesis with the term neo-classical.
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market-oriented reforms on issues of human development and trade performance of
developing countries. We also examine here the role of the state in Oman's economic and
social development and the way the state's intervention has helped to develop the market
in the country. We will conclude by attempting to identify a number of areas that can
promote co-operation, instead of conflict, between the state and market in development.
Before proceeding to examine the main issues relating to the state versus market
debate, first it is necessary to briefly discuss the concepts of the state and market which
figure greatly in our analyses of development in Oman.
State and Market: a definition
We use the words 'state' and 'governments' interchangeably in this research. The
term government is also used differently in other contexts, but without losing its essential
meaning. It can refer to the process of governing - to the exercise of power. It can also
refer to the exercise of that power, to a condition of "ordered rule". 'Government' often
means the people who fill positions of authority in a state, whereas, the 'state' in its wider
sense refers to a set of institutions that possess the means of legitimate coercion, exercised
over a defined territory and population, referred to as society. Thus the state monopolises
rule-making within its territory through the medium of an organised government (World
Bank, 1997a:p.20).
A market is the co-ordinating mechanism where the forces of supply and demand
in an economy determine prices, output and methods of production via the automatic
adjustment of price movements. At the point of market equilibrium, supply and demand
balance and no agent can get a better result than the outcome derived from the equilibrium
price. Thus under pure and perfect competition there are many sellers and buyers and, if
the nature of the commodity is well-defined, the outcome delivered by the market is
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among the best which can be realised. Conversely, any desired Pareto optimum 1 can be
reached by the interplay of markets and transfers via subsidies and taxation (Meier,
I989:p.5 16; Hayami, I997:p. 199; Boyer and Drache, l996:p.3).
Put another way the market is an institution 2, that co-ordinates people's activities
in seeking self-interest towards increasing social economic welfare. Thus the market is
supposed to solve all the economic problems of allocation of scarce resources between
alternative methods, and the argument is that a properly functioning market system would
tend to stimulate both economic efficiency and economic growth.
The word 'market' connotes other meanings as well. In addition to the market
being an institutional mechanism, it is also associated with a precise locale and time
schedule. Thus a market place is "an authorised public concourse of buyers and sellers of
commodities, meeting at a place more or less strictly delimited or defined, at an appointed
time" (Boyer and Drache, l996:pp.96-98).
The classical and neo-classical economists have given an even wider definition of
markets. To quote Marshall: "Economists understand by the term of market, not only
particular market places in which things are bought and sold, but the whole of any region
in which buyers and sellers are in such a free intercourse with one another that the price of
the same goods tends to equality, easily and quickly" (Marshall, 1890, as quoted in Boyer
and Drache, op. cit.).
'Pareto optimality is obtained if any departure from it cannot make anyone better off without making at
least one other person worse off (i.e. any departure from optimum can make some one better off only at
the ex-pense of someone else's loss of welfare (Pearce, 1992 :p. 324). Pareto in his work, Manual of
Political Economy (1906) suggested the following definition: "an allocation of resources in the economy
was optimal if there existed no other productively feasible allocation which made all individuals in the
economy at least as well-off, and at least one strictly better off, than they were initially" (Eatwell, et a!.,
1991 :p.81 1). More simply put, the distribution of income or welfare associated with a laissez-faire Pareto
optimuni could be highly unequal (Srinivasan, 1988:pp.3-4).
2 Douglas North (1994) defined institution as a 'rule in society' and orgamsation as a functional body or
group organised to act for a specific purpose.
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We will use the concept of market in terms of both as a place where exchange of
commodities takes place, and as a self regulating institutional mechanism involved in
production, investment, distribution and consumption of resources.
1.2 The Rise of Development Economics : Triumph of the Pro-state View 1950s-
1960s
1.2.1 Development strategies of the 1950s and 1960s
In the post-war years, diverse approaches to development were adopted by
developing countries as they struggled to shed the yoke of colonialism and nationalist
governments had to decide on an appropriate strategy for development as the social,
economic and political structures were all in a state of varying degrees of change'.
Despite the particular needs and conditions of each of these countries, they shared a
distinctive common feature - the growing involvement of the state in managing the
process of development.
Rapid socio-economic transformation of society and acceleration of the process of
development were the two basic objectives of economic policy in the newly independent
less developed countries (LDCs). To achieve these objectives most LDC governments
adopted development planning. As Waterston (1982:p.62), states "the national plan
appears to have joined the national anthem and the national flag as a symbol of sovereignty
and modernity". The developing countries put their faith in planning because, as we shall
discuss in Chapter III, in contrast to laissez-faire, it meant "rational, deliberate, consistent
and co-ordinated economic policy"(Rosenstein-Rodan, 1955 :pp. 19-22). Thus various
'India. for example, was one of the first countries, to stress even before Independence in 1947, the
importance of planning in economic and social transformation of the country. This objective is reflected
in the Bombay (flow called Mumbai) Plan of 1944 formulated by eight prominent industrialists (Byres,
l994:pp. 10-11).
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forms of centralised planning' took precedence over markets for resource allocation in
many developing countries.
In fact the World Bank itself became an important agency from about 1950 in
encouraging or helping to start organised national development planning in many
countries. The growing interest in the LDCs was also reflected in the United Nations
resolutions calling for international efforts to strengthen planning capabilities and in the
considerable number of international conferences and institutes devoted to economic
development of these countries (Waterston, l982:p.44). Thus the interventionist approach
based on development planning was actively supported by international and bilateral
agencies which, inter al/a, encouraged creation of planning machinery and allocated
investment funds to public sector projects. A clear statement of this viewpoint is reflected
in a 1965 report of a United Nations (UN) Conference on planning, which stated:
It is an integral task of planning to achieve the best possible
use of scarce resources for economic development The
need for using appropriate criteria for selecting projects
arose because of the failure of the market mechanism to
provide a proper guideline. In less-developed economies,
market prices of such factors of production as labour,
capital and foreign exchange deviated substantially from
their social opportunity costs and were not, therefore, a
correct measure of the relative scarcity or abundance of the
factor in question (UN, l965:p.l2).
'Because of differences in structure (social, economic and political), and stage of development, the scope
of planning at any time can and does range from the limited and piecemeal, project-by project approach
found in mixed economies in early phases of development to the comprehensive, centralised planning
found in socialised economies. Over time, with changes in a countiy's stage of development, socialised
economies shift gradually towards decentralisation of plan implementation and, for the mixed economies,
a movement towards greater centralisation of both plan formulation and implementation (Waterston,
1982 :pp.97-98).
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It is equally important to note that the early development literature (see Chapter II)
greatly influenced development thinking and practice in the two decades following the
Second World War'. Therefore to achieve economic development the LDCs adopted a
variety of strategies, whose main characteristics were:
a) adoption of economic planning to direct both public and private investment;
b) attention was focused on two primary goals, namely, raising the rate of capital
formation and promoting rapid growth of real per capita income;
c) import-substitution strategy for promoting industrialisation. Protection of domestic
industries against competing imports;
d) reliance upon the 'trickle down' mechanism to spread the benefits of growth to the
whole population2;
e) important role for state-owned enterprises in industrial development;
f) restrictions on foreign direct investment (FDI) and multinational corporations
(MNCs) to protect indigenous enterprises from "unequal" competition.
Economic development was therefore conceived as a national goal in the LDCs3,
since it was believed that only increasing prosperity would guarantee viable, independent
and democratic societies. Thus the Colombo Plan in 1950, encouraged its member
countries of South and South East Asia to formulate six-year development plans based on
a realistic assessment of available resources (Waterston, 1 982:pp.66-67; Yukawa,
l988:pp. 16-30).
The Marshall Plan enunciated by the USA in 1948 as a means for planned/strategic allocation of
resources for West European restoration after the Second World War underlines the crucial role of
planning in economic thought during this and later decades. Under the Marshall Plan, each participating
country was required to prepare comprehensive four-year and annual plans embracing its resources and
theiT utilisation, which became the basis for governmental policy and action (Waterston, 1982:pp.3 1-32).
2 This was based on the belief that in the long-run growth would result in higher income for everyone,
rich and poor alike, but in the short run emphasis had to be given to increased savings as a requirement
for "take-off" (Oman and Wignaraja, l991:pp.l5-l6).
The terms LDCs (less developed countries) and developing countries are used interchangeably in the
thesis.
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Similarly, as the economies of Latin America encountered increasing difficulties
towards the end of the 1 950s, the need for development planning began to be explored in
order to overcome internal as well as external problems. At the Punta del Este
Conference in 1961 all Latin American governments accepted that planning should be the
fundamental instrument for mobilising national resources, bringing about the necessary
structural changes, enhancing efficiency and productivity, and securing more international
co-operation. Although national planning was of interest only to technicians until the
beginning of the 1960s, with the formulation of the Alliance for Progress it became an
essential factor for acquiring foreign aid and consequently a common practice in many
Latin American countries. Thus one of the provisions of the Declaration of Punta del
Esie stated: "{E]ach of the countries in Latin America will formulate a comprehensive and
well-conceived programme for the development of its economy" (Waterston, op.
cit. :p.67).
By the mid-1960s almost every African country had a development plan. The
basic objective of the national plans of the new nations of Africa was: "[T]o fully realise
their economic potentialities not only in order to accelerate the rate of economic growth
and improve the level of living of the people but also to recover control over the
economy" (Yukawa, op. cit. :p. 17).
Therefore planning, along with, but sometimes in preference to, the market
mechanism, was favoured for a number of reasons. These included the fact that most
developing countries lacked the social overhead capital and a number of complementary
factors of production and intermediate goods which make private sector development
feasible. Therefore, by increasing investment in social overhead capital (SOC),
governments would provide the basis for private enterprises to invest in directly
productive activities (DPA), as we shall see in Chapter IV in the case of Oman. Also
because of the structural rigidities prevailing in developing countries - such as the
division of the national economy into two sectors, modern and traditional - the
governments had to assume a leading role in generating the fundamental structural
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transformations that economic development requires. In the case of India, for example,
structural backwardness was the main reason for promoting state-led economic
development (Chakravarty, l987:p.9).
Government intervention was also deemed necessary to foster more equitable
economic and social development, since it was believed that it would be difficult to
achieve these goals even with a well-functioning market. The reduction of inequality
between ethnic groups, for instance, has been one of the main objectives of planning in
Malaysia (Yukawa, op. cit. :p. 19).
Added to these arguments was the view emerging from the growth model of
Harrod (1948) that capital formation was the driving force of development. Therefore,
through a variety of measures which included nationalisation of foreign companies and
establishment of new enterprises, the public sector came to be used as a strategic
instrument for speeding up the process of development, with the government taking a
leading role in capital formation.
This certainly is the case with regard to Oman where the share of the public sector
in total capital formation has been significant. As we shall see in Chapter V, the share of
public sector investment was around 71 per cent of gross capital formation during the
First FYP' period (1976-80) but it declined to 65.1 per cent during the Fourth FY.P (199 1-
95). This decline reflected the growing role of the private sector in the country. In
Nigeria, for example, public sector investment in total investment was 67.0 per cent in the
First Plan (1962-68), 54.8 per cent in the Second Plan (1970-74), 71.9 per cent in the
Third Plan (1975-80) and 86.0 per cent in the Fourth Plan (1981-85), (Adeniyi, et al.,
l988:p.24). In the case of India it was on average 43.4 per cent during the Fifth Plan
(1974/75-1978/79) and about 46.4 per cent during the Sixth Plan (1980/81-1984/85)
(Ahiuwalia, l994:p.38l).
'Sectoral distribution of public and private capital formation is shown in table 5.3 of Chapter V.
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For reasons of both ideology and strategy the public sector was seen by
governments in developing countries as an important instrument for fostering rapid
economic progress and change. Public sector participation was mainly in sectors believed
to have significant linkage' effects and high positive externalities2. Basic industries such as
iron and steel, machine tools, chemical, heavy engineering, and large power projects were
seen as performing a catalytic function in the early stages of industrialisation by providiug
essential inputs to other manufacturing and agricultural activities3.
The dominant view in developing economies from the post-war period to the early
I 970s was that markets frequently failed to work efficiently under conditions of
underdevelopment because private entrepreneurship and capital markets were inadequately
developed and the economic infrastructure required for growth of the secondary and
tertiary sectors was lacking. It was therefore felt that the involvement of the public sector,
in the key areas of production of inputs and irifrastructural services, would make a positive
contribution to the cause of development and modernisation.
However, despite the dominance of these views, governments did not supplant the
market. Compared to socialist countries where governments had much greater control
over savings, investment, output and the structure of prices, the situation in mixed
economies was quite different. Japan and South Korea are often cited as examples of
successful private-public co-operation. However, as Bhagwati (l988:p.98) puts it,
although the state in these countries does not issue proscriptions, it does issue
prescriptions. In other words, they intervene by encouraging and promoting selected
activities, rather than by prohibiting and restricting.
Linkages is a term coined by Hirschxnan (1958). He argued that inducements to invest in the industrial
sector could be maximised if economies followed an investment path in which each stage of investment
generated, through backward and forward linkages to other branches of the economy, cumulative
inducements to invest in these branches also (Hirschinan, 1981:pp.63-65).
2 
xtemalities arise when there are circumstances in which the action (or inaction) by one party imposes
losses on (or yields benefits to) parties or agents external to the transaction (Nave, l992:p.42).
In the case of India, for example the importance that was attached at that time to the development of a
'machine tool sector' was based on the understanding that an efficient and diversified sector producing
machine tools was likely to help substantially the production of capital goods over a wide spectrum of uses
(Chakravarty, l987:p.64).
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According to Papanek (l992:pp.I3 1-167), Pakistan and Bangladesh had four
distinct periods of state intervention. Two (1949-60 and 1969-77) were characterised by
heavy intervention by the government in the economy in the forms of ownership of firms
and quantitative controls over the remaining private firms. While during the other two
periods (1960-70 and 1978-88) there was heavier reliance on market forces, with no
nationa.lisation of enterprises and greater reliance on price incentives and on indirect forms
of intervention or through taxes and subsidies. India's policy has been relatively
consistent. In contrast to its socialist rhetoric, subsidies for some producers and
consumers and tight control over the economy are accompanied by a vigorous private
sector.
In Sri Lanka, there were three periods of more dirigiste' (1950-60, 1961-65 and
1969-77) and two periods of less regulation (1966-70 and 1978-83). While Indonesia had
one fundamental shift from a controlled system under President Sukarno to substantial
deregulation under President Suharto (ibid.).
As Ranis (l992:pp.9l-92) argues, the empirical fact is that there seems to exist a
tendency, virtually everywhere, even if at different speeds to move toward policies that
tend to accommodate rather than replace or obstruct the market.
Therefore, throughout the period of the 1950s and 1960s grand theories and
strategies were formulated to guide the development process. As we shall see in Chapter
II, development planning2
 was adopted by most developing countries as a means of
accelerating the process of economic development through capital accumulation and
industrialisation based on import substitution. For a variety of reasons, including lack of
entrepreneurship, the importance of economising on scarce capital and skilled labour, and
As compared to the laissez-faire approach, the dirigise approach is based upon direct government
intervention to promote economic development (Lal, l985:p.5).
2 As Waterston states: "[C]ountries were considered to be engaged in development planning if their
governments were making a conscious and continuing attempt to increase their rate of economic and
social progress and to alter those institutional arrangements which were considered to be obstacles to the
achievement of this aim" (Waterston, l982:p.27).
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the desire to bring about rapid social and economic change, the state assumed a major role
in economic development activities.
1.2.2 Achievements of the state-driven development strategy
During the first two decades of the post-war period, development economics' was
inspired by a spirit of optimism which proved to be justified because the policies
advocated by development economists and planners led to many important and positive
changes in the developing world. Growth of gross national product (GNP) throughout the
developing world accelerated, infant mortality decreased considerably, and life expectancy
increased significantly; access to education was extended far beyond what could have been
imaginable in 1945. The following data from World Development Reports give a more
precise idea of the progress made in the developing countries during the period 1950-
1980.
'During this period development economics held sway over development thought; the latter culminated in
the more interdisciplinary subject of development studies which achieved ascendancy in the late 1960s
and early I 970s. We will use the terms development thought and development theory to incorporate both
development economics and development studies.
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Table 1.1
Basic indicators of development performance of developing countries (1950-85)
Description	 Years
1. GNP per capita (1980 dollars) 	 1950	 1960	 1980
Middle-income	 625	 802	 1,521
Low-income	 164	 174	 245
2. Growth of per capita GNP (average	 (1950-60)	 (1960-80)
annual growth rate - %)
Middle-income	 2.5	 -	 3.3
Low-income	 0.6	 -	 1.7
3. Life expectancy (years at birth) 	 1950	 1960	 1978
Middle-income	 51.9	 54.0	 61.0
Low-income	 35.2	 41.9	 49.9
4. Infant mortality (per 1000 Jive births) 	 1965	 1970a	 1985
Middle-income	 104	 74	 68
Low-income	 127	 108	 72
5. Adult literacy (per cent)	 1950	 1960	 1975
Middle-income	 48	 54	 71
Low-income	 22	 29	 38
6. Primary enrolment (per cent)	 1965	 1984
Middle-income	 85	 -	 104
Low-income	 74	 -	 97
Note:
a) Infant mortality data for 1970, from UNDP (1995) Human Development Report 1995.
Sources:
1) Items (1), (2), (3) and (5) from World Bank (1981) World Development Report 1981, pp.26-27.
2) Items (4) and (6) from World Bank (1987) World Development Report 1987.
Table 1.1 shows that the state-led development strategies secured significant
improvements in economic and social welfare. For example, in the Low-income
developing countries, GNP per capita increased from US$ 164 in 1960 to US$ 245 in
1980 and infant mortality declined during the same period from 127 to 72 per 1000 live
births, while in Middle-income countries progress was even better.
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Therefore during the first phase of the evolution of development economics
covering the first two decades of the post-war period (1950 to 1970), the protagonists of
state-driven development strategy dominated both the analytical and policy literature,
while the supporters of neo-classical economics were marginalised.
However during the late 1960s and early 1970s, development theory entered a
second phase, which focused more directly on poverty and inequality. It was argued that
growth in income had not been translated into reduction of unemployment, inequality and
poverty in developing countries.
In fact, as we shall see below, the very meaning of development was questioned,
and there were calls for redefinition of the meaning and content of development. The
World Bank 1 emphasised redistribution with growth, while the International Labour
Organisation (ILO, 1976) concentrated on provision of basic human needs.
Both the ILO and the World Bank urged the LDCs to pay more attention to
problems of poverty. The concern was part of a wider international process of reformist
thinking following the disillusionment that began to set in with 'state-led' development of
the 1950s and 1960s.
1.3 Between the State and the Market: the Period of Transition
It is necessary to discuss the paradigmatic shift from state-led to market-led
ideology and the strategy imposed by the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) on the
developing countries. This exercise is necessary because the neo-classical resurgence
'In 1973 McNamara, the then President of the World Bank, in his Nairobi speech placed the weight of
the World Bank behind the growing concern at the outcome of policies that focused chiefly on GNP
increase while ignoring their distributional implications (McNamara, 1973). Similarly, the study,
Redistribution with Growth (Chenery, et a!., 1974) prepared by a team drawn from the World Bank and
the Institute of Development Studies was intended to provide the analytical foundations for a new
approach to development analysis and planning.
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reproduced neo-classical theory as a self-evident scientific truth, as an axiomatic law of
nature constructed on the foundation of questionable facts. It was not at all considered
that this theory is ideological and value-laden and serves particular interests, especially
those of the developed countries.
The problem under consideration has two aspects. Firstly how the neo-classical
ideology of the "free-market as good" and the "state as bad" was constructed? And
secondly, why was this ideology constructed? And whose interests does it serve in spite of
pretensions of being neutral or objective? As we shall see the development and
articulation of neo-classical thought was constructed on a systematic selection of facts and
sometimes their distortion.
As we noted in sub-section 1.2.2 of this chapter, by the late 1 960s, the perceptions
that the UN Development Decade had failed, that 'growth' had resulted in social
dislocation, social and regional inequalities, and that the 'poverty gap' had widened were
widespread. There was a growing concern in the 1970s, based on empirical data obtained
for a number of developing countries, that the percentage of population living in absolute
poverty remained high, with the share of the lowest 40 per cent of the population
remaining very low. All this contributed to the growing impression that the 'trickle down'
mechanism was not working as it was intended to (Oman and Wignaraja, 1991 :pp.97-98
and Hunt, l989:pp.69-78).
A widely publicised lecture by Seers in 1969 signalled the shift from development
as economic growth to a broader concept encompassing reductions in poverty,
unemployment, and inequality which became the major themes of the 1970s. The message
was clear: Development must no longer be conftised with economic growth, otherwise by
simple per capita comparison Kuwait is more developed than West Germany or France.
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To quote Seers (1969:p.3):
The questions to ask about a country's development are
therefore: What has been happening to poverty? What has
been happening to unemployment? What has been
happening to inequality? If all three of these have declined
from high levels, then beyond doubt this has been a period
of development for the country concerned. If one or two of
these central problems have been growing worse, especially
if all three have, it would be strange to call the result
'development', even if per capita income doubled.
The call for a 'redemption of development' was heard far and wide. As Mahbub
UI Haq of Pakistan asserted:
The goal of development has to be a determined assault on
the worst forms of poverty. Development must aim at the
gradual elimination of malnutrition, disease, illiteracy,
unemployment and the lack of equal opportunity. We used
to be taught that we had to confine our attention to GNP
and that this would solve the problem of poverty. Now,
however, what we need to do is just the opposite: we have
to focus our attention on poverty. It is this which will
guarantee the solution to the problems of GNP (UI Haq,
1976 :p .3).
As mentioned earlier in the preceding sub-section, the World Bank too was shaken
out of its strait-jacketed approach to development. McNamara in his 1973 Nairobi speech
stated that the Bank had decided "to place far greater emphasis on policies and projects
which will begin to attack the problems of absolute poverty" (McNamara, 1973 :pp.9- 10).
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Countries such as India followed suit by adopting in its Fourth FYP a Minimum Needs
Approach in conjunction with accelerated structural changes for industrialisation.
Meanwhile the reformist's response to the increasing concern with poverty in the
1 970s essentially comprised three planks: employment-oriented strategies, redistribution
with growth and basic human needs strategies. The climax of this series of diverse yet
sharply focused initiatives was the approval by the ILO at its 1976 World Employment
Conference of a proposal that national development strategies should place high priority
on both the generation of employment and the satisfaction of basic human needs.
However, it is important to point out, that in addition to calling for the establishment of a
New World Economic Order', the conference recognised the need for an increased role
for government planning and possibly for the public sector as well. "[S]tructural changes
in such areas as the financial system, land tenure and the education system require direct
government intervention. Such policies cannot be implemented simply by influencing
market prices" (ILO, l976:p.53).
It was also in the 1 960s and early 1 970s that Import-Substituting Industrialisation
(ISI) began to come under heavy criticism from neo-classical economists. Among the first
to criticise 1ST were those writers, e.g., Viner (1953) and Bauer and Yamey (1957), who
argued that it interfered with the natural process of economic development based on
comparative advantage. Similarly, an OECD research study carried out in the late 1960s,
on industrialisation in India, Brazil, Mexico, Taiwan, the Philippines and Pakistan
embodied the core of the neo-classical critique of economic policy in developing countries
(Little, Scitovsky and Scott, 1970). The policy recommendation put forward by these
orthodox critics of ISI clearly reflected the general neo-classical view which stressed inter
alia the theory of international trade and the concept of 'comparative advantage', together
with the importance of relying on the price mechanism in competitive markets, rather than
The United Nations General Assembly in its Sixth Special Session in 1974 adopted a Declaration of
Principles and a Programme of Action on the establishment of a New International Economic Order
(NIEO). The proclaimed goal of the NIEO was to put North-South economic relations on to a basis of
'equality and co-operation' (Toye, l993:p.l79).
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administrative controls or planning, to achieve efficiency and maximum growth, (Hunt,
l989:pp.68-69; Oman and Wignaraja, 1991:pp.67-68). Their view was essentially that
developing countries should remain producers and exporters of primary products and
should encourage the growth of their agricultural and plantation economies.
Despite the neo-classical criticism against ISI, it is important to note, and as we
mentioned in section 1.2 of this chapter and as we shall see in Chapter V, in the case of
Oman, there were a number of compelling reasons which led almost all developing
countries to adopt 1ST strategies. In fact, the East Asian economies whose success is
attributed to strongly outward-oriented economies (World Bank, 1987), have been
successful because their governments have played and continue to play an important role
in protecting their domestic markets and promoting their export-led drive (Wade, 1990;
Dutt and Kim, 1994).
However, the concerns for a direct attack on poverty, provision of basic needs,
and redistribution with growth, which called for state action at the local level and
international action at the global level, were overtaken by a number of factors. These
included: (a) the debt-crisis of the 1 980s which almost forced a number of developing
countries to adopt the SAPs prescribed by the IFIs. As we shall see in the following
section, the terms on which assistance was provided under the SAPs are underpinned by
the neo-classical paradigm; (b) the coming to power of conservative administrations' in
the industrialised countries, most notably in 1979 in the United Kingdom and in 1981 in
the United States, while the rise to power of Gorbachev in the Soviet Union in 1985 was
the beginning of the end of the cold war competition of two large blocs headed by the
United States and the Soviet Union; and (c) the publication in 1981 of the World Bank
report Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa which emphasised the importance
of correct pricing policies and reduced government intervention in economic activities as
being two of the main elements to a revival in African growth rates (World Bank, 1981).
These were, for example the administrations of Margaret Thatcher (1979-90) and John Major (1990-
1997) in the UK and the Republican administrations of Ronald Reagan (1981-89) and George Bush
(1989-93) (Toye, 1993 :p.2O7).
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Thus the neo-classical philosophy was translated into 'Global Reagonomics', while
the NTEO and state-led development strategy were tacitly buried. The developing
countries were advised to liberalise their economies, privatise their SOEs, and concentrate
on their comparative advantages.
1.4 The Neo-classical Resurgence
The late 1970s and the 1980s witnessed a substantial change in the content of
development economics. This was characterised by the resurgence of neo-classical
economics. It was the time when privatisation and liberalisation were considered to be
indispensable to securing development, with mainstream academic economists, the World
Bank, the IMF and policy makers in most countries supporting this view (Dutt, et a!.,
1994: p.3).
The counter-revolution in development theory and policy (Toye, 1993 :pp.44, 70)
which has dominated the discourse on development since the 1980s can be understood in
part by examining what it was reacting against.
In fact this re-evaluation was dedicated to countering a previous revolution, which
was the work of Keynes, and its impact on the economic thought of the 1930s and 1940s.
The promise of the counter-revolution in development policy was to solve the problem of
inadequate development by neutralising three particular causes: a) the over-extended
public sector; b) the over-emphasis on physical capital fonnation; and c) the proliferation
of distorting economic controls.
Whereas Bauer (1972: p.'75) in his Dissent on Development, argued that the
development economics was wrong, politically motivated and corrupt, Lal (1985) in The
Poverty of Development Economics described it as theoretically wrong and practically
unsound: countries following these policies (mainly government intervention, such as
central planning and redistribution-with-growth strategies) have had bad economic records
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compared to those countries (mainly South Korea and Taiwan) which Lal argues followed
the neo-classical path. He concluded that "the demise of development economics is likely
to be conducive to the health of both the economics and the economies of developing
countries" (Lal, l985:p.lO9). La!, of course, is highly critical of the non-neo-classical
economists such as Hirschman, Nurkse, Myrdal and so on. In addition to his faith in
private enterprise, the clear policy prescription is that of 'getting the prices right' i.e.
relying on the price mechanism to promote an efficient allocation of resources.
In addition to the factors mentioned that contributed to the neo-classical
resurgence, it was being increasingly argued that the success of the East Asian economies
was due to a more limited and balanced role of the state, as well as to the more apt
'market-conforming' economic policies of governments (World Bank, 1993b).
Since we shall be reviewing the neo-classical approaches to development in
Chapter II, we will review briefly in this section the neo-classical views on the state and
markets and the methods through which these views have been imposed on a number of
developing countries. Because the 'market-friendly' approach advocated by the World
Bank falls within the neo-classical school, we shall also review this briefly.
1.4.1 The neo-classical views on the state versus market debate
As discussed in sections 1.2 and 1.3, while the early development economists
displayed an unquestioning faith in the ability of the state to correct market failures and to
effectively direct the economic process towards development goals, the neo-classical
economists 1 emphasised "public failures" of regulatory states.
With the renewed emphasis on neo-classical principles, markets, prices and
incentives became central (Meier, 1 989:p. 84). It was argued that markets are collections
These included for example Krueger (1974 and 1978); Balassa and Associates (1982); Little (1982) and
Lal (1985). The World Development Report 1987, also contains a full review of the studies carried out.
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of optimising, self-seeking buyers and sellers who interact with each other in trading
goods, services, and factors of production at prices 'determined' by impersonal market
conditions. These markets lead to pareto-optimum outcomes as the unintended
consequence of individual attempts to maximise profits or utility. The state, on the other
hand, is exogenous to the economic process, "it is simply that undefined organisation that
solves problems arising in markets" (Duff, eta!., 1994:p.4).
An equally important focus of the neo-classicals criticism is the role envisaged for
the state. The style and extent of interventionism favoured by early development
economists has been especially criticised, as has their apparent belief that governments
would and could intervene in order to improve the incomes and welfare of the poor. The
neo-classical economists allege that the slow progress made by developing countries has
been caused mainly by excessive intervention in the economy by government.
Trade policy is the core area for neo-classical reform. It is argued by the neo-
classicists (Little, Scitovsky and Scott, 1970; Krueger, 1978; Bhagwati, 1978; Balassa and
Associates, 1982) that export expansion has been associated with rapid economic growth;
countries that have tended to do well in terms of one of these variables have also tended to
do well in others. Import-substituting industrialisation which had shaped the development
effort of a number of developing countries since the 1950s, was put forward as the
primary cause of price 'distortions' and macroeconomic disorders. Thus, according to the
mainstream view (Balassa and Associates, 1986; World Bank, 1991a), the Latin American
failure is due to internal causes such as excessive government interference and
inappropriate government policies such as inefficient import substitution. Therefore, just
as import substitution was associated with a large and direct role for government and the
public sector, the outward looking approach has been linked to an emphasis on "minimal"
government and a strong reliance on the market over all sectors of the economy.
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1.4.2 Structural adjustment through pro-market reforms
The concepts of "economic reform" and "structural adjustment", therefore
emerged during the 1980s when developing countries were forced to adjust their
economic structures to respond to the debt crisis, and to the falling terms of trade'. These
SAPs were supposed to first stabiise the macro economy and then adjust the market so
that it could perform more efficiently.
Stabilisation is the domain of the IMF. Its policy prescription aims to reduce the
external deficit (and especially the volume of imports) by cutting aggregate demand.
Typical policies include cuts in public spending for both current purposes and capital
formation, high interest rates and credit restraints (especially for the public sector).
Exchange rate adjustment is the second main component of most of the Fund's packages
(Taylor and Pieper, l996:pp.7-9).
In conjunction with the World Bank package, the Fund usually pushes for
liberalisation of foreign trade restrictions, market deregulation (often with an emphasis on
curtailing labour power and cutting real wages) and privatisation. The basic aim of the
Fund's package is to reduce trade and fiscal deficits (ibid.).
Structural adjustment is the speciality of the World Bank and is aimed at improving
prospects for medium-term GDP growth. The Bank's main thrust has been to improve the
allocative efficiency of the price system. Producer output subsidies and consumer
purchase subsidies should be eliminated for all goods. Domestic prices should be driven
towards border prices (import or export dollar prices times the exchange rate). Labour
market "distortions" should be outlawed. The Bank's views rest on a fundamental
theorem of neo-classical welfare economics - referred to earlier - which asserts that a
'The heavily indebted developing countries experienced a strong terms-of-trade shock in 198 1-83 and,
after a brief reversal in 1984, deterioration in their terms of trade continued from 1985 to 1988 (Toye,
1993:p.2l7). The case was the same in Oman when its terms of trade declined sharply between 1980 and
1986, as we shall see in Chapters IV and V.
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fully competitive market will make an economy use its resources optimally' and on an
average everybody will be as well off as they possibly can be (ibid :pp. 10-1 1).
Other components of the Bank's package include: foreign trade liberalisation,
beginning with the replacement of import quotas by tariffs and the subsequent reduction of
the tariffs and export subsidies; removal of barriers to external capital flows - such as
controls on foreign exchange transactions and profit remittances; and a third target is
deregulation of the domestic financial market, the aim of which is to equalise rates of
return to different financial assets2 (ibid.).
Privatisation of SOEs3
 also became a major preoccupation of the Bank in the late
1980s. The irony of this is, as Cook and Kirkpatrick (1988) point out, that the
international agencies are advocating dismantling of publicly-owned institutions that they
themselves created in the I 960s.
Finally, by reducing state intervention and adding "transparency" to the economy,
all the above prescriptions are supposed to cut back on unproductive resource diversion
due to corruption and seeking "rents", the returns guaranteed from a state-assured market
position, such as the possession of an import quota (ibid p.12).
Under the cross-conditionality restrictions imposed under the SAPs, a country
which is not in compliance with the IMIF is usually denied access to credits from the World
'Despite its alleged origin from Adam Smith, supply-side economics has little relevance in practice. All
governments intervene in setting prices and some of the most interventionist ones, such as Taiwan and
South Korea have seen their economies grow the fastest. These issues are discussed in Chapter HI of this
thesis.
2	 view in the 1 980s was that raising previously "repressed" interest rates would stimulate savings.
As Taylor and Pieper (l996:p.7) state that "It is a phenomenon of a particular time and place,
amalgamating long-standing IMF macroeconomic stabilisation policies, the World Bank's sell-doubts
about its anti-poverty agenda of the 1970s (which led it to tiy to speed up output growth rates and income
"trickle-down" by adopting the market deregulation and supply-side economics ideas in vogue in
Washington after the turn of the decade) and London's zeal for privatisation of public enterprises which
emerged at about the same time ... [A] synthetic product of the 1980's the consensus appears less and less
capable of dealing with many of these difficulties as they persist a decade later".
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Bank or to the possibility of rescheduling its official debts and its commercial bank debts
(ibid. :p.8).
As the contents of the SAPs indicate, a central part of the neo-classical strategy
was, of course, to dismantle many institutions, particularly those of the state. "[T]he
theory was that changing the structure of incentives would empower market-oriented
groups and eventually make them sufficiently strong to enforce new role of behaviour in
both state and society to develop new institutions" (UNRJSD, l995:p.49).
However, towards the end of the 1980s, the evident failure of the orthodox neo-
classical strategy in both economic and environment terms and particularly the high cost of
social upheaval caused by the SAPs (as we shall see in section 1.5) was leading the IFIs to
rethink their approach. This confirms Toye's (l993:p.89) analysis that "over-simplified
'solutions', resting on little more than the political perceptions of a distant ideologue, are
incapable of resolving the real dilemmas of development satisfactorily". The contribution
that arguably has had the greatest impact is the UNICEF's sponsored report Adjustment
with a Human Face (Cornia, et a!., 1987). As a result, the World Bank started to move
away from economic idealism and pay more attention to social and political
considerations.
1.4.3 The market-friendly approach to development
The World Development Reports for 1991 and 1996 advocate a 'market-friendly'
approach to development as against the earlier themes of an almost complete 'rolling
back' of the state. The state's role in economic development in this 'market-friendly'
approach as set out in the 1991 World Development Report (World Bank, 1991a:pp.5-1 1)
is: 'intervene reluctantly' - that is, intervene only in cases where market mechanism
would either "fail" or produce perverse results (e.g. public goods, externalities, imperfect
markets, poverty relief programmes, education, health, population control and
environmental protection); apply checks and balances - that is, put interventions to the
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discipline of international and domestic markets (competition); intervene openly, - that
is, make governmental interventions simple, transparent and subject to rules rather than
official discretion; improve the climate for (private) enterprise - that is, provide
adequate infrastructure and institutions; and open the domestic economy - that is, apply
minimum restrictions on international trade and foreign investment.
The right macroeconomic policy, according to the report, is to keep fiscal deficits
at low level, check inflation and provide sufficient incentives for saving and investment.
There needs to be more investment in people by targeting government expenditure
efficiently on primary education, basic health care, nutrition and family planning.
A superficial reading of these elements of 'market-friendly' strategy makes them
quite appealing. And in view of the fact that in many LDCs 'government failure' has
done as much, if not more, harm to the cause of development, the appeal of the market-
friendly approach requiring 'rolling back', of the state is quite strong.
The market-friendly approach and the underlying neo-classical paradigm are based
on the concept of a society where the state and private enterprise are looked upon as
adversaries operating on the basis of mutual mistrust. While this may be true in the case
of highly individualist societies of the West (for example, British and North American)',
the same societal norms, values and attitudes are not applicable to many developing
societies. For instance, an important reason why state interventions succeeded in East
Asian countries is that the state and private business work in tandem, respecting each
other as partners interested in achieving common goals. Of course this is not to suggest
that the state and private capital relationship benefits all sections of society equally. This
may be the result of unintended consequences rather than of deliberate intent.
In fact there is considerable literature which shows the huge gap between the ideology of the free market
and actual state intervention of large proportions by US and Europe, e.g. in terms of subsidies, tariffs, etc.
(see for example, Streeten, 1995; Toye, 1993).
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Secondly, and as we shall discuss in Chapter III and as Toye (1993 :p.89) argues,
government failure is not just a matter of bureaucratic inertia or empire building, it is the
outcome of politIcal manoeuvring by vested interests to frustrate systematically the actions
of the organisations that are set up to regulate economic activity in the public interest.
The over-spending during the Second and Fourth FYP in Oman, clearly confirms this
argument, as we shall discuss in Chapter V.
Thirdly, in many LDCs the scarce supply of entrepreneurship, as much as shortage
of capital, has become an obstacle to industrial growth. In the absence of an adequate
supply of private entrepreneurs, the state has to play the role of Schumpeterian
entrepreneur (Toye, l993:pp.78-81). Also, evidence relating to large scale enterprises
suggests that what ensures efficiency is not ownership per Se, but the autonomy and
professionalisation of management. State enterprises tend to be mismanaged largely due
to political interferences. And their unrealistic prices are due to "political populism" and
not inherent inefficiency. As we shall see in Chapters V and VI, the role SOEs have
played in Oman in "kick starting" the industrialisation process, and their overall efficiency
both lead to these conclusions.
Despite these limitations, the World Bank's market-friendly approach and the
underlying neo-classical economics have become quite fashionable among policy makers
because the remarkable economic performance achieved by Japan, Korea and Taiwan is
interpreted as an example of the success of market-friendly approaches. In the following
section we discuss how this interpretation of the East Asian miracle is not only superficial
but to some extent even incorrect.
1.4.4 The East Asian miracle : the mythology of laissez
-faire questioned
The free market explanation of East Asian development has been enormously
influential in the discussion of development theory and strategy. Indeed, among many
economists, it is difficult to think of any contribution that does not locate unfettered
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enterprise at the core of its explanatory scheme. According to neo-classical economic
reasoning 1 , the East Asian economies (including Japan) have been successful because their
governments have followed 'market-friendly' policies and sought to maximise efficiencies
putatively resulting from market-based resource allocation (Balassa and Associates, 1971;
Lal, 1985; Krueger, 1980).
However, in the same World Development Report in which the World Bank
strongly advocated the adoption of market-friendly policies (i.e. 1991 Report) the World
Bank also admitted the proactive role of the state in East Asian development. It stated
"Selective state intervention has figured prominently in two of the impressive success
stories of development; Japan and Republic of Korea. Both countries employed taxes and
subsidies, directed credit, restriction on firm entry and exit, and trade protection to
encourage domestic industry" (World Bank, 199 la:p. 102).
Other studies conducted by Wade (1990); Dutt and Kim (1994); Singh (1994) and
even the World Bank (1993 a) have seriously questioned the mythology surrounding the
East Asian Economies as being laissez-faire economies. There is an increasing
recognition that "heavily interventionist and protectionist" states have guided the
development of the East Asian economies. To quote from the World Bank study, "In
most of these economies, in one form or another, the government intervened -
systematically and through multiple channels - to foster development, and in some cases
the development of specific industries" (World Bank, 1993a:p.5).
Korea's successful performance, for example, is often cited to extol the virtues of
free markets and the faults of state intervention (Lal, 1985). However, looking at the
recent development experience of Korea, it is very clear that the Korean state was highly
Commenting on the beneficent role of the market in the successful development of East Asian
economies, the high-priest of post-war neo-classical economics Milton Friedman stated "Malaysia,
Singapore, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Japan - relying extensively on private markets - are
thriving ... by contrast India, Indonesia and Communist China, all relying heavily on Central Planning,
have experienced economic stagnation" (Friedman and Friedman, l98O:p.57).
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interventionist, and contributed greatly to Korea's success. (Dutt and Kim, l994:p.2O9).
In fact, both during the inward-oriented phase of (1953-60) and outward-oriented phase
of (196 1-79), sustained intervention in major economic activities became the rule rather
than the exception. The emphasis on import substitution during the first period and the
targeting of 'strategic sectors' during the second period was carried out under four five-
year plans beginning with the first five-year plan in 1962 (ibid.).
Even when a major programme of macroeconomic stabiisation was launched in
the early 1 980s, in the context of economic liberalisation, to overcome the stagnation and
economic downturn of the late 1 970s, the basic characteristic of the state was still close to
a bureaucratic authoritarian state. "The goals of the state were to be attained at all costs
- social and economic" (ibid :p. 184).
Similarly, in the case of Taiwan, according to Wade (l99O:p.72) evidence shows
that the government has been intervening for decades, often aggressively, to alter the trade
and industrial profile of the economy in the way that it judges to be desirable. We thus
find that the government used its first two four-year plans (1953-1961) to overcome
foreign exchange constraint and capital shortage - "the Government should positively
undertake to guide and help private investments so that they do not flow into enterprises
which have surplus productivity and a stagnant market" (Wade, 1990:p.82). The Third
Plan (196 1-64) emphasised the need to accelerate the growth of heavy industry. Not only
were heavy and chemical industries targeted, but planning documents from the early 1960s
picked quite specific products in electrical appliances and electronics.
Again, like Korea, Taiwan's government asserted economic leadership and
political control even more strongly than before to carry out a package of reforms to deal
with the economic and social problems of the 1970s. For example, the Sixth Plan (1973-
76) not only renewed emphasis on export promotion but signalled a strong support for
advances in petrochemicals, computer terminals and other such products. The plan also
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expanded the role of public enterprises, with the result that the public sector's share of
investment rose from 28 per cent in the 1960s to about 33 per cent in the 1970s.
In fact, the new Six-year plan' of 1976-81 gave an even more prominent role to
the state in reducing Taiwan's vulnerability to fluctuations in the prices of key
intermediaries - which meant building even more capacity in heavy and chemical
industries (Wade, l99O:pp.96-98).
Since the role of the state in the East Asian development is further analysed (with
particular reference to Japan and Korea) in Chapter III, we can conclude by way of
summary, as Singh (l994:p.57) argues, that contrary to the World Bank's view
concerning the role of the state, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, neither adopted a
"market-friendly" approach to development nor sought or practised a deep integration
with the world economy during the formative periods of their development. Rather, the
state in these countries played a crucial role and followed a highly active development
policy. Moreover, these three East Asian economies integrated with the world economy
in the direction and extent to which it was useful for the state to do so.
1.5 The Neo-classical Resurgence and its Impact on Development
Since the neo-classical resurgence in development thinking during the 1980s was
supposed to achieve what pro-state development strategies had failed to do during the
1950s and 1960s, it is important to examine the consequences arising from neo-classical
policies and their associated package of market reforms, which have been undertaken by
almost all developing countries during the last 15 years.
It is obvious, and as the evidence produced in UNRISD (1995) report confirms,
that the SAPs proposed by the liFIs seem to have been based on a picture of an ideal
The Sixth Four-Year Plan (1973-76) had to be scrapped in the wake of 1973-74 disturbances (Wade,
ibid.)
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country: its economy would be self regulating through open competition, and its public
sector would do little more than provide the minimum services necessary for the conduct
of private business and the protection of society's weakest members. What they did not
take into account was that social damage could itself frustrate economic objectives. As a
result, the SAPs have implied hardship, and governments that have used deflationary
policies to deal with their economic crises have not been able to come out of recession,
while at the same time their people have had to endure the social upheaval caused by
radical free-market reorganisation.
Another major negative consequence of the adjustment process has been the
weakening of so many state institutions to the extent that they were incapable of making
the necessary contribution to ensuring the functioning of adjustment measures. Whereas,
as we noted earlier, many developing countries in the 1950s and 1960s, achieved, through
state intervention, a level of economic growth and social development far beyond what
would have been imaginable in 1945, even if the elimination of poverty proved too
overwhelming a task. Therefore, denial of any major role for the state in economic and
social affairs has resulted in national parliaments and governments losing control of their
countries' destinies. As UNRISD (ibid. :p. 128) states: "Globalisation and market-based
economic reforms have weakened many of the institutions that in the past have assumed
responsibility for human welfare - while passing on to others burdens that they cannot be
expected to bear".
In fact, as the experience of Korea 1 and Taiwan has shown, to achieve successful
economic reforms, states need high levels of internal cohesion and corporate autonomy.
That is, the concept of 'embedded autonomy' to capture the combination of both
independence and support that is required for the consolidation of successful economic
reforms (Evans, l989:pp.l39-l8l).
1 Korea wherever mentioned in the thesis refers to the Republic of South Korea.
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In terms of growth, it is apparent from the data available (Taylor and Pieper,
l996:pp.29-43) that SAPs have slowed growth rates in the case of countries in Sub
Saharan Africa and Latin America - the countries which introduced market reforms
rigorously. In Latin America, for example, the growth rates declined from an annual
average of 4.9 per cent during 1970-82 to 1.9 per cent during 1983-90 and then to 1.0 per
cent during 1990-93. Whereas in Sub-Saharan Africa they declined from 3.7 per cent to
1.3 per cent during the first two periods, but grew slightly higher to 1.8 per cent during
the third period, yet this rate was almost half the growth rates achieved during 1970-82.
In the Middle East, the average annual growth rates also declined from 3.7 per cent during
1970-82 to 0.9 per cent during 1990-93 (ibid:pp.32-33).
In terms of social welfare, according to the Human Development Report (UNDP,
1992), the human impact of privatisation has been dismal. In every country for which data
are available the proportion of population living in poverty has increased. In Bulgaria, the
Czech Republic, Poland, Romania and the Slovak Republic, the number of households
living below the poverty line has risen sharply.
In the case of Mexico, which is viewed by the IF Is as a showcase for debt
management and restructuring, average annual growth rate during the period 1980-90
declined to 1 per cent compared to an average annual growth rate of 6.5 per cent during
1965-80, while average annual rate of inflation increased to 70.3 per cent from 13.0 per
cent between these two periods (World Bank, l992:pp.2l9-22l). Meanwhile, its total
external debt increased from US$ 57 billion in 1980 to around US$ 97 billion in 1990
(World Bank, l992:p.259 and l997b:p.2l9).
Among the most serious consequences of the reform programmes is the rapid fall
in real wages. In Chile, for example real industrial wages in 1986 were 7.9 per cent lower
than they had been in 1980. In Mexico, the fall was 33.9 per cent and in Peru, 34.5 per
cent. The situation in parts of Africa was equally bad. In Kenya, for example, real non-
agricultural wages in 1985 were 22 per cent lower than they had been in 1980, whereas in
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the United Republic of Tanzania in 1983 the fall was 40 per cent. Only in Colombia and
Brazil real industrial wages were higher by 16.5 per cent and 12.8 per cent respectively in
1986 than they had been in 1980 (Griffin and Knight, 1992:p.584).
In Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS),
unemployment has ballooned (from zero) since the start of reforms in 1990, with wage
employment falling sharply by as much as 30 per cent in Bulgaria and Hungary. In Kenya
unemployment has risen to 29 per cent and in Algeria to 21 per cent (UNDP, 1996:pp.87-
89).
honically, the neo-classical economists and World Bank experts accept - albeit
with some qualifications - the need for government intervention to generate human
capital, and since in most LDCs the state has not withdrawn from this area, it is precisely
this aspect of development that has not suffered heavily from the neo-classical resurgence.
As the 1996 Human Development Report (UNDP, 1996) indicates, though Latin
America and Sub-Saharan Africa faced severe economic problems, in Latin America there
were considerable improvements in human development, in part as a result of deliberately
accelerated efforts through policies.
In Latin America, between 1980 and 1990, life expectancy increased from 63 to
70 years, adult literacy improved from 80 to 86 per cent, and infant mortality declined by a
third, from 69 per thousand live births to 45 (ibid p.l 7).
However, the picture is quite the reverse in countries which have seen the collapse
of communism and the retreat of the state. The magnitude of the social and economic
crisis in the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe is underscored by a
significant deterioration of health and education indicators. Taylor and Pieper
(1996:pp.76-77) study indicates that real incomes have gone down by 39.2 per cent in
Bulgaria and 38.3 per cent in Poland during 1989-93, while secondary school enrolment
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has gone down by 19.8 percentage points in Romania and by 12.0 percentage points in
Albania during the same period. In Russia male life expectancy has gone down by 5.2
years during this period.
An examination of export performance of the developing countries over the period
1970-1990 reveals very clearly that despite the widespread economic reforms instituted by
most of the developing countries, their share of world exports has either declined or
stagnated - with the exception of the countries of South and South East Asia, which
include the NICs, where these have increased.
For example, the share of developing countries in America' and in North Africa in
world exports declined from 5.5 per cent and 2.3 per cent respectively in 1980 to 3.9 per
cent and 0.9 per cent respectively in 1990; while the share of other African countries
declined from 2.4 per cent to 1.1 per cent during the same period. In the case of heavily
indebted countries2, despite the fact that it is this group of LDCs which had to adopt the
IFIs sponsored SAPs from the mid 1970s, their share of world exports declined from 6.5
per cent in 1980 to 4.6 per cent in 1990 (UNCTAD, 1991 pp.430-435).
Associated with the decline in their share of world exports, has been the
deterioration in their terms of trade. For heavily indebted countries, the index of their
terms of trade declined to 77 in 1990 (1980 = 100), for the developing countries in
America the index declined to 76, and for the North African nations it declined to 69,
while for other African countries it declined to 70 (UNCTAD, l994:p.42)
Thus economic and social development of the last 15 years in a number of
developing countries has been disappointing. In their quest for balancing the economy,
these policies have unbalanced the lives of their people. The counter-revolution in
'This includes, Chile, Brazil, Venezuela, Mexico, Argentina and so on (UNCTAD, 199l:pp.43O-438).
2 These are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Cote d'lvoire, Ecuador, Mexico, Morocco,
Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Uruguay, Venezuela and Yugoslavia (ibid.).
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development theory would appear to suffer exactly the same pitfalls and loopholes that the
old style development economics and development planning were accused of.
The problem of development is therefore, not simply one of reducing the role of
the state and increasing that of the market. On the contrary, on balance the case for
having a proactive state is strong. So rather than making states weak and passive,
initiating economic reforms actually demands strong and active states - as well as
effective mechanisms for agreement between the government, the business sector and
other interests in society such as the trade unions and citizens organisation. Therefore
both state and markets must act in tandem.
1.6 The Role of State and Market in Oman's Development
As stated in the introduction to this chapter, Oman provides an interesting example
of public-private partnership. It is, therefore, important to examine how Oman was able
to achieve successful socio-economic transformation at a time when the whole discipline
of development economics and development planning was under attack. Since Chapters
IV to VI will examine closely the process of development in Oman from the early I 970s,
this section will provide a brief analysis of the central issues of social and economic
development and the complementary roles of the state and market in Oman.
In order to put Oman's development in perspective two important points need to
be considered. First, that planning for development in Oman began when development
economics and development planning in particular, were under attack in the 1970s, both
from leading economists, for failure to address the problems of poverty and inequality, and
from the neo-classic counter revolution that was calling for, inter alia, the dismantling of
planning and the 'rolling back' of the state. Oman was able to achieve the dual goals of
growth and human development within this hostile environment, under the aegis of the
state, as we shall see. An important feature of Oman's development strategy has been the
'political will' and commitment on the part of the government to develop the country.
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This was done by adopting a state-led development strategy which aimed to tackle
problems specific to Oman and which, in the absence of this planned response, would
either not have been effectively dealt with or would have taken much longer to solve.
Second, although Oman's development strategy (Al Yousef, l995:p.55) - which
was approved by the Development Council in 1975 - emphasised the important role of
the market in the development process, the initial conditions of acute underdevelopment
then prevailing in the country detened Oman from adopting the doctrine of laissez-faire
advocated by the neo-classical school. It was thought that there was no alternative to a
substantial intervention by the state in order to achieve a satisfactory rate of resource
mobilisation for economic development.
As a result, Oman made significant progress in human development. Gross
primary enrolment in education, as a percentage of relevant age group, increased from a
very low level of 1 per cent for females in 1970 and 6 per cent for males, to 82 per cent
for females and 87 per cent for males in 1993 (World Bank, l997b:p.l2). Total
employment increased from 32,348 in 1970 to 617,648 in 1995. Life expectancy at birth
increased from about 44 years in 1970 to 68 years in 1995 while infant mortality declined
from 64 per 1,000 live births in 1980 to 20 in 1995 (Oman, 1996c:p.6).
Although growth is not identical with development it is nevertheless one of the
important elements that constitute the latter. Moreover, as Seers (1969) has argued,
growth was a necessary pre condition for sustained development - for how else could
mass welfare continue to rise over time? Therefore, associated with human development
has been the large increase in real per capita income. Oman is classified today by the
World Bank as an Upper-middle-income country, having a GNP per capita of US$ 4,820
in 1995. Real GDP has also grown at an impressive annual average rate of 8.3 per cent
during the period 1980-90 and 6.0 per cent during 1990-95, while inflation rate has been
below zero (World Bank, l997b:pp.8, 130 and 207).
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1.7 Conclusion
This chapter has shown that the dominant viewpoint regarding the role of the state
and the role of the market in governing developmental activities has swung from one
extreme to another. The economic performance of the East Asian countries has fuelled the
ideological discourse of free market economists and politicians who try to find in the
legendary success of the Asia Pacific, the lost paradise of 'laissez-faire' capitalism. On
the other hand, the low performance of a number of developing countries has been cited as
a proof that it does not pay the government to tamper with the market mechanism.
Moreover, the post-1980 geopolitical upheavals have brought the state versus market
debate to the centre stage in the developed world and in the IFIs. The aspiration of
developing countries to work towards alternative ends by alternative means is regarded as
illusory or misguided.
This chapter has discussed the evolution of state-led development from 1950
onwards. By drawing on the experience of Oman and a number of developing countries,
we have argued that it is quite misleading to view the market and the state as conflicting
entities. Instead they do and can co-exist in a state of co-operation and act in tandem to
promote development.
Moreover, we have shown that most developing countries have been able, through
a state-led development strategy, to achieve significant reduction in infant mortality,
increase in life expectancy and extension of education to levels far beyond what might
have been thought possible in 1945. Therefore, we would argue that it is totally
inappropriate to distinguish government failures from market failures. As Toye
(l993:p.89) argues:
All markets are made within some legal, social and political
framework of institutions ... [A]nd government failure is not
just a matter of bureaucratic inertia or empire building, it is
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the outcome of creating organisations to regulate economic
activity in the public interest which are then systematically
frustrated by the political power of interests which they
have been set up to regulate.
Among the lessons to be learnt from the ongoing state versus market debate in
development is that one should reconsider the basic issue of the 'content' of development
by treating it as a multi-dimensional phenomenon. Per capita income growth is only the
means to achieve the end objective of human development.
Once the multiple goals of development are accepted, the role of the state in the
promotion of human development in developing countries becomes clear. As we have
shown critics of state-driven development strategies would find it hard to refute the fact
that between 1950 and 1985 the developing economies in general and a country like Oman
in particular made enormous progress in relation to the three crucial criteria of human
development viz, school enrolment, life expectancy and infant mortality. The role of the
state was very crucial in this progress.
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CHAPTER II
THEORIES AND STRATEGIES OF DEVELOPMENT
2.1 Introduction
The policies and strategies formulated by the state to secure economic and social
development are derived from a range of theories that attempt to analyse the causes of,
and the means to overcome the lack of development. Therefore, a discussion of these
theories and strategies' is necessary to understand the conceptual underpinnings of the
major theories of development in the context of the state versus market debate. For
example, the pro-market, minimal state and structural adjustment policies discussed in
Chapter I are informed by the precepts of neo-classical economic theory. This chapter,
firstly, provides an analysis of the major theories and strategies of development from the
perspective of various schools of development thought. This is followed by a brief
examination of the relevance of these theories and strategies to the development
experience of Oman. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the role accorded to the
state by these theories and strategies in the context of development.
2.2 Concept of Development
Development is both an end and a means. It is an end in the sense that it tends to
prescribe certain normative order; it is a means in the sense that such normative order can
only be realised through specific policies and strategies. In either sense, the question of
development involves certain decisions by policy makers. The decision-making process
involves the following assumptions that adoption of one or another development policy
As we shall see in section 2.4 of this Chapter and as Hettne (l99O:p.3) states, distinctions between
'theoiy' and 'strategy' are in a real situation not easily drawn.
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involves a sequence of examining and preferring different alternatives and accepting an
alternative which is considered to be the most satisfjing to the decision-makers.
Be that as it may, there are contesting concepts of the meaning of development, as
its meaning or the items that comprise it have changed over time. This section provides an
overview of the meaning of development over time.
The subject of development economics has been among the oldest branches of
economics and it was the main, if not the only, concern of economists from late 18th to
19th century. As Lewis (1984b:p.121) points out, what Adam Smith, in his Inquiry into
the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations called "the Natural Progress of
Opulence" is what we would today call "development economics". However, from the
late 19th century up to the Second World War, growth and development were forgoften
as optimisation of allocative efficiency and maximisation of satisfaction and profits became
the prime, if not the only, concern of economists. Thus, the return to growth and
development did not take place until after the Second War. In fact, the term economic
development was rarely used before the I 940s.
The late 1940s and 1950s then became in many respects the pioneering' period for
development economics that focused on the problems and obstacles to development in the
underdeveloped world. During this period, most economists came to interpret economic
development as denoting growth in per capita real income in underdeveloped countries.
Meier and Baldwin (1957) defined economic development "as a process whereby an
economy's real national income 2 increased over a long period of time. And if the rate of
The post World War II period, 1940s and 1950s is regarded as the pioneering period when several
seminal works in development economics were published as the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin
America attempted to emerge from their pervasive and persistent poverty. These pioneers included, Peter
Bauer, Cohn Clark, Albert 0. Hirschnian, Arthur Lewis, Gunnar Myrdal, Raul Prebisch, Paul N.
Rosenstein Rodan, Walt W. Rostow, Hans W. Singer and Jan Tinbergen (Meier and Seers, 1984:p.ix).
2 
"Real national income" refers to the counliy's total output of final goods and services, expressed not in
money terms but real terms; the money expression of national income must be corrected by an appropriate
price index of both consumer and capital goods (Meier and Baldwin. op. cit. :p.3).
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development is greater than the rate of population growth, then per capita real income
would increase" (p.2).
Similarly, the group of experts appointed by the UN Secretary General suggested
in its report on Measures for the Economic Development of Under-developed Countries,
that the term, 'under-developed countries', be defined as those countries whose real per
capita income (in US dollars) was lower than real per capita income of USA, Canada,
Australia and Western Europe (Higgins, 1959:p.6).
As a result, the level and growth rate of real per capita' income came to be widely
accepted as the standard yardstick for assessing the level and pace of economic
development achieved by a country.
Following the recommendations made in the UN report, the World Bank has been
for years using per capita income as an index of development for classifying countries into
three main categories viz. Low-income, Middle-income and High-income. Almost all
developed countries belong to the High-income group whereas most developing nations
fall in the Low and Middle-income groups2 with a few exceptions like Hong Kong,
Kuwait, Singapore and UAE which fall in the High-income group. What is important to
note is that no developed country is in the Low-income category.
The main advantages of using sustained increase in real per capita income as the definition of economic
development are: its meaning is precise, it is easy to measure, and by comparing a country's economic
growth with population growth it indicates whether an average citizen's income is increasing or not.
Economic growth means increase in the real aggregate national income of a country. Thus economic
growth is a necessaiy but not a sufficient condition for economic development.
2 Oman, as we noted in Chapter 1, is classified as being an Upper-middle-income country (World Bank,
1996).
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To facilitate cross-country and inter-regional comparisons, the World Bank
converts a country's per capita GNP into US Dollars by applying what is called World
Atlas method 1 . The World Bank also provides data on per capita GNP for member
countries after adjusting them for Purchasing Power Parity (i.e. in ICP dollars)2.
Although not stated explicitly, it was generally assumed that as economic growth
would "trickle down" to the whole population, the objective of poverty reduction which
was at the heart of the concern for development, would be taken care of. However, by the
late 1960s, on the basis of empirical data obtained for a number of developing countries, it
was apparent that despite achievement of high growth rates, reduced infant mortality,
increased life expectancy and greater access to education, the problems of absolute
poverty, basic human needs and chronic under-utilisation of human resources remained
unaddressed.
As we noted in Chapter I, a number of development economists including Dudley
Seers (1969), Denis Goulet (1971), Mahbub UI Haq (1973), Paul Streeten (1981b) and
Amartya Sen (1983) called for a shift in emphasis from economic growth to a broader
concept of development. In their view, the strategies of development adopted had failed
to attack the fundamental problems of absolute poverty despite the fact that they had
'Under this method, for converting a countiy's income in local currency into US dollars the conversion
factor used is the average of a countiy's exchange rate for that year and its exchange rate for the two
preceding years, after adjusting for differences in rates of inflation for the concerned counny and five
developed countries. The formula for this method is given in Statistical Methods, Technical Notes given
in any annual World Development Report.
2 The purchasing power parity (PPP) of a country's currency is the number of units of that currency
required to purchase the same (or similar) representative basket of commodities that a US dollar
(reference currency) would buy in the USA. Real GDP per capita (PPP $) means real per capita GDP of a
country in purchasing power panty of that currency. The system of purchasing power parity has been
developed by United Nations, International Comparison Programme (ICP). Hence PPP $ is often called
ICP dollar. The details of these are explained in the Technical Notes, of the annual World Development
Report. For instance, since the purchasing power of a dollar (at prevailing exchange rate) in Oman is
much higher than in USA, Oman's per capita income in 1995 was US$ 4,820 but at PPP it was US$
8,140 (World Bank. l997b:p.8).
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succeeded in raising the real per capita income', rate of capital formation, import
substitution, total factor productivity, share of industrial output etc.
In 1990 TJNDP launched its first Human Development Report whose central
message was that while the developing countries have made significant progress towards
human development in the last three decades, development strategies for the 1 990s should
combine a number of objectives. Among these, "accelerating economic growth, reducing
absolute poverty and preventing further deterioration in the physical environment"
(UNDP, 199O:p.ôl) should be the principle ones.
The report also defined the basic objective of development as, "[t]o create an
enabling environment for people to enjoy long, healthy, and creative lives" (ibid :p.9). It
also introduced the Human Development Index2 (}IIDI) for measuring three essential
elements of human development - longevity, knowledge and decent living standards.
Despite its limitation, since the income per head conceals distributional aspects, the HDI is
a better indicator of human development than per capita income. Moreover, it focuses
attention of policy makers on important social sectors, policies, and achievements, which
are not caught by the income measure.
2.3 Historical Perspectives
While the problems3
 the early development economists set out to investigate were
distinct from the issues that constituted the subject matter of contemporary mainstream
economics, it was inevitable that they should bring to bear on these problems the elements
However, it is important to note that in the absence of other appropriate tools for measuring
development, using growth in real per capita income was the second best alternative. Moreover, since
most of the newly independent countries were in an acute stage of backwardness and underdevetopment,
they had to subordinate the distributional aspects of development to the urgent task of 'kick-starting' the
development process, although the pitfalls of using per capita income as a measure of development were
clearly raised by economists like Viner (1953).
2 The latest Human Development Index measures income per head (by using purchasing power parities
established by the World Bank) life expectancy, adult literacy and combined first, second and third level
gross enrolment ratios (UNDP. l997:p. 146).
These were problems relating to poverty in underdeveloped countries and the potential way forward to
achieve economic progress in these countries.
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of dominant paradigms of the past. There were, of course, certain problems related to
underdevelopment which most economists were ill-suited to conceptualise. These
problems can be subsumed under the term 'political economy'. By this was meant the
whole complexity of political and social processes and institutions which acted as 'inertia'
in the process of transformation of the developing countries.
Initially, the main preoccupation of these economists was largely to identify those
variables that could provide the key to future economic growth, and the analysis of
possible long-term growth paths and strategies. Therefore to determine the sources of
growth and delineate strategies of development to overcome the many obstacles to
development 1 , the development economists had to conceptualise, deduce principles, build
models, and establish conceptual and empirical relationships in this undertaking. Thus the
historical perspectives on development - which we shall review briefly - were
revitalised, and new attempts were made to produce a development theory most suited to
the needs of underdeveloped countries. The purpose, however, is not to provide a detailed
analysis, but to identify main elements of these theories.
2.3.1 The classical economists
The main approach of classical economists was to discover the causes of long-run
growth in national income and the process by which this growth occurs. Problems such as
the way a nation allocates a given supply of productive resources among alternative uses
or how individual consumers or business firms reach economic decisions were of little
interest to classical economists (Meier and Baldwin, l957:pp. 19-45).
'Obstacles to development are associated with characteristics of poor countries. These are: (i) they are
primary producing, (ii) they faces population pressures, (in) they have underdeveloped naturai resources,
(iv) they have an economically backward population, (v) they are capital-deficient, and (vi) they are
foreign dependent. Other obstacles to development, which are implicit in the above characteristics are:
(a) market imperfections, (b) vicious circles that are both a cause and consequence of poverty, and (c)
international forces relating to the role of poor countries in the world economy (Meier and Baldwin,
1957 :pp.273-333).
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Among the classical economists, the leading contributors were: Adam Smith
An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776), Ma.lthus - An
Essay on the Principle of Population (1798), Ricardo - The Principles of Political
Economy and Taxation (1817), Mill - Principles of Political Economy (1848), and
Young - "Increasing Returns and Economic Progress" (1928).
One of the essential features of the classical growth theories is an analysis of the
process by which a portion of the economic surplus available in the community is
employed for the purpose of capital accumulation.
Thus Smith strongly emphasised that saving was a necessaiy condition for
economic development. Therefore, his emphasis on the importance of capital accumulation
in the development process became a fundamental element in later development theories
as we shall discuss later.
While Smith is identified with the policy of laissez-faire, he nevertheless saw a role
for government: first, providing for national defence; second, administering justice through
the court system; third, maintaining public institutions and resources such as roads, canals,
bridges, educational systems, and the dignity of the sovereign (Smith, 1776).
For Ricardo and others of the classical school, free trade' enables the benefits of
specialisation and the division of labour to be reaped on an international basis. World
income is raised by more efficient utilisation of resources. However, a notable exception
to the free trade case is made in the "infant industry argument". "A protecting duty,
continued for a reasonable time, might sometimes be the least convenient mode in which
the nation can tax itself for the support of such an experiment" (Mill, l848:p.922, as cited
in Meier and Baldwin, l957:pp.4O-41).
'However, it is important to note that this was based on the assumption of international factor immobility
(Meier and Baldwin, op. cit.).
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However, the classical economists were discussing the growth of 18th century
European capitalism, not propounding a universal theory of global economic development
and under-development; moreover, analyses of most classical theorists are based on an
economic environment in which development occurs and - most important - where
institutions and attitudes favourable to development already exist. Since these conditions
did not prevail in most of the LDCs in the 1950s, their analysis and policy
recommendations required modification; as we shall examine later. Another aspect
relating especially to Ricardo is his theory of comparative advantage. This has been
misread and misinterpreted in its application to the present day developing countries and
their place in the global economy. Ricardo's theory of comparative advantage relates to
the structure of production and trade between similarly placed developed countries. He
was referring to England and Portugal which were at that time, similarly developed. In a
real sense, Ricardo's theory is not relevant to the relationship existing between the present
day developed and developing countries because these are not similarly placed.
2.3.2 The Marxian perspective
There are many aspects of Marx's theory which are of relevance for development,
including the colonial system, class interests, the development of one mode of production
to another'. For Marx, the capitalist mode of production and the rise of the bourgeoisie
are symptomatic of the development of productive forces and hence development.
However, our concern with Marx's theory of development is limited to our analytical
concerns rather than to providing a comprehensive discussion of this theory.
'According to Marx's economic (materialistic) interpretation of history, the development process consists
of various stages of which capitalism is one of the stages which is preceded by feudalism and followed by
socialism. Each of these stages of development is characterised by a particular 'mode of production' the
physical aspect of which relates to the accumulated capital and technology and the social aspect of which
the social relations arising from production process i.e. the class structure of society. In each mode of
production (i.e. at each stage of development) the class structure consists of two main classes; the
'dominant' class appropriates and uses 'surplus' produced by the 'oppressed' class. For instance, in
feudalism the two opposite classes are landlords and serfs (and bonded peasantry) and under capitalism
the class struggle is between the capitalists and the proletariat.
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Marx explained why capitalist system is characterised by cumulative growth' and
why this process is beset with contradictions 2 which bring about the downfall of
capitalism.
There are, however, two main strands in Marx's theoiy of development which are
of relevance for us. Firstly, there is the rather abstract analysis of the capitalist mode of
production which has brought about the transformation and development of the Western
economies. Central to this analysis is Marx's expanded reproduction scheme based on
circuit (and accumulation) of capital between Department I dealing with the production of
capital goods and Department II dealing with the production of consumption goods
(Nazir, 1991:23-28). Secondly, there is Marx's more concrete analysis of the
development of capitalism in the colonised countries. Relatively speaking, Marx's theory
is rather less systematic in analysing this situation (Maurice Dobb, 1960), though
developing socialist societies like China have made enormous progress utilising Marx's
theories and models of development. For Marx, a developed economy is characterised by
the presence of large indigenous capital goods and technology generating sectors;
conversely an absence or weak development of this characterises an undeveloped
economy. The process of development occurs when surplus is invested in Department I
sectors which then determines the other sectors of the economy i.e. Department H and
Department III, producing means of consumption and of luxury goods respectively. All
developing countries which have either achieved or nearly-achieved developed country
status such as South Korea, Taiwan, China and India have substantial Department I
'According to Marx, the difference between feudal lords and capitalists is that the latter reinvest most of
the surplus they "exploit" from the proletariat. This raises labour productivity and, th wages remaining
at subsistence level, increased productivity further enlarges capitalists' surplus. Thus accumulation leads
to more accumulation and growth becomes cumulative.
2 With capital accumulation growth of output increases, but since wages are kept at subsistence level
(through the reserve army of unemployed) income distribution moves in favour of capitalists and against
the working class. This leads to the underconsumption crisis and depression because compared to workers
the capitalists have relatively lower propensity to consume. Marx argued that these and other
contradictions inherent to capitalist development would result in intensification of class conflict which, as
workers get organised, would lead to socialist revolution and collapse of capitalism.
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production; i.e. capital goods, machine-building and technology generating sectors (Nazir,
op. cit.).
2.3.3 Neo-classical theory
Although we have examined closely the neo-classical paradigm and its approach to
policy making in developing countries in Chapter I, we need to summarise here its main
propositions, since this paradigm constitutes part of the historical legacy which influences
contemporary development thought and practice.
The neo-classical economists focus their attention on issues of allocative efficiency
- how resources come to be allocated to different uses, and the criteria which need to be
fulfilled if the value of the output generated from a given stock of resources is to be
maximised. The core of the neo-classical paradigm was systematically articulated in
Marshall's Principles of Economics (1890), as cited in Hunt (1989:pp.3 1-33). The
paradigm consisted of eight main elements.
First, it is desirable to maximise aggregate economic welfare. Second, the prices
for goods and services which are generated by the unimpeded operations of the market are
normally the correct prices for the purposes of guiding resource allocation. Third, factor
prices should be determined through the operation of the free market. Fourth, given
infinite technical choices and fully flexible factor prices, the maximum value of output and
hence, maximum social welfare, will always be achieved by full employment of all factors
of production. In equilibrium, there will be no involuntaiy, general unemployment
(emphasis added by the present author), though partial unemployment would occur.
General unemployment, when it occurs, is a temporary disequilibrium. Fifth, in the absence
of government intervention, factor prices combined with the distribution of asset
ownership determine interpersonal income distribution. Factor prices correspond to
marginal productivities which in turn are determined by relative scarcities. Sixth, the main
corollary of neo-classical theory is that, in any market, price distortion will lead to a
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distorted pattern of resource allocation with a consequent reduction in efficiency and
welfare, i.e. "get the prices right". Seventh, like classical economists, neo-classical writers
stress the advantages of unrestricted international trade which will allow a country to raise
its national income. And finally, growth is a gradual, harmonious process resulting from
'marginal' adjustments by innumerable, independent economic agents.
2.3.4 Schumpeterian analysis
In his The Theory of Economic Development, Schumpeter (1911) contends that
there is no immutable law of diminishing returns or Maithusian population pressure to
crush progress as in Ricardo's theorem; neither is there an inherent tendency towards a
maldistribution of income which produces increasingly severe crises as in Marx. On the
contrary, Schumpeter contends that capitalism can yield ever higher levels of real income
at the cost of nothing more than temporary interruptions in economic activity. While he
disagrees with the neo-classical description of development as a gradual, harmonious
process, he agrees with Marx that development is a dynamic, discontinuous process.
Schumpeter argues that successful capitalism implies not just the existence of
capitalists, meaning those who own capital, but more importantly entrepreneurs, meaning
those who innovate, who put various factors of production together and who take risks
and face uncertainties regarding the success of their innovations. To Schumpeter,
'development' means a change in output by a shift in production function resulting from
an innovation. Entrepreneurs are innovators by definition, so in a developing capitalist
society there must be a sufficient supply of successful entrepreneurs. In contrast, growth
means incremental (marginal) changes in output along the same production function
resulting from marginal changes in supply of factors.
Thus the central figure in development process is the entrepreneur. Innovation
may occur in the following forms: (a) the introduction of a new product; (b) the use of a
new method of production; (c) the opening of a new market; (d) the conquest of a new
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source of raw material supply; or (e) the reorganisation of any industry (Schumpeter,
1911 :p.66).
By emphasising the distinction between growth and development, between
entrepreneurs and capitalists, and between credit creation and mobiisation of savings for
financing capital formation, Schumpeter distanced himself from the classical economists as
well as from Marx.
As we shall see, Schumpeter's emphasis on the importance of entrepreneurship in
economic development had an important bearing on the role of the state in the
development process.
2.3.5 The Keynesian contribution
The great international economic depression of 193 Os witnessed what is widely
known as the 'Keynesian Revolution' in economic theory. During that period, Keynes
identified the role of effective demand in determining aggregate output and employment.
Keynes' General Theory (1936) was indeed innovative because it suggested that attempts
to cut wages during a recession may exacerbate the downward spiral of output and
employment, and that increased public sector spending during recession might be a virtue
and not a vice (ibid :p.26).
In his General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, Keynes assumed the
following elements as given and constant: "[T]he existing skill and quantity of available
labour, the existing quality and quantity of available equipment, the existing technique, the
degree of competition, the tastes and habits of the consumer" (ibid :p.245). In other
words, the factors on which long run economic growth depends were assumed as given by
Keynes. Hence, in contrast to classical economists, Marx and Schumpeter, who were
mainly concerned with problems of long-run growth, Keynes' approach was confined to
problems of income determination in the short-mn, particularly in tackling depression and
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large-scale unemployment. As is well known, in defence of his short-mn approach,
Keynes made the famous statement that "in the long run we are all dead".
In their endeavour to give a dynamic form to Keynesian economics, Harrod (1939
and 1948) and Domar (1947), provided rigorous theoretical models of growth in which
they analysed the conditions required for steady uninterrupted growth in real income with
full employment and price-stability.
It should be noted in passing that the Harrod-Domar model has influenced many
growth models in the developing countries, including the Mahalanobis model which has
influenced Indian plan models. The Harrod-Doinar model involves the familiar growth
equation:
G=SIV
Here, the rate of growth of output, G, is expressed as a function of the savings
ratio, S and the capital-output ratio, V. When the parameters are estimated
econometrically, the equation becomes a planning equation in which the target growth
rate, G (of GNP) is determined by the instruments S and V. It also gives the desired
savings rate to achieve the target value of G. The model emphasises a consistent pattern
of resource allocation between consumption and investment to ensure intertemporal
resource allocation, in order to reach a targeted GNP growth rate, and a particular level of
GNP by a certain date.
This model provided the elementary framework for considering the relationship
between the growth rate of output, the growth rate of population and the growth rate of
savings. Some aspects of this theory are discussed further below.
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2.4 Contemporary or Modern Theories and Strategies' of Development
Development economics arose both as a theoretical discipline within departments
of economics and development studies 2
 as a practical subject in response to the needs of
policy makers to advise governments of African, Asian, and Latin American countries on
strategies to enable them to achieve development. The question raised was how
development was to be achieved? For, while political independence could be legislated,
economic independence could not. Economists were, therefore, called upon to provide
advice on development.
In addition, there was the question of global political economy. The major
capitalist countries perceived that if there was little social progress in the newly
independent countries, they might fall under communist domination. If that happened then
investment opportunities, and access to markets and sources of raw materials for the
capitalist countries would be jeopardised. A political basis thus emerged in the early
1950s for a large-scale financial and technical aid from the richer countries. The IMF, the
World Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) established the
basic institutions of what may be called an international public sector, thus providing
additional international institutional support for national development efforts. Regional
commissions of the United Nations also assumed an active role in examining development
Since development involves structural transformation, development theory is by definition
interdisciplinary. Further more, development theory has from the start been closely related to
development strategy, i.e. changes of economic structures and social institutions undertaken in order to
find consistent and enduring solutions to problems facing decision makers in a society. Thus development
theory implies a set of integrated concepts which attempt to explain causes, whereas strategy is more
concerned with policy suggestions, and hence implies an actor, usually the state.
The closeness between theory and strategy, as Hettne (l99O:p.3) articulates is due to the fact that
problems were defined as national problems and that consequently development theorists particularly
pioneers - addressed themselves to governments. Consequently, distinctions between 'theory' and
'strategy' are in real situations not easily drawn.
2 Development studies is a wider concept involving inter-disciplinary approach to problems and strategies
of development. It therefore involves socio-political, cultural and economic aspects of the state of
underdevelopment and requires planners to take a holistic and practical view while suggesting
development strategies/policies.
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problems. Most notable, as we shall see later, was the Economic Commission for Latin
America (ECLA) established in 1948.
A spirit of policy-optimism thus characterised the early views of the development
theorists, in general, and development economists, in particular. As Paul Streeten
observes: "It is not easy to convey in the present atmosphere of gloom, boredom and
indifference, surrounding discussions of development problems, what an exciting time of
fervour these early years were" (Streeten, 1981 a:pp .61-62).
As stated in the introduction, a renewed interest in the development of the newly
independent countries after the Second World War gave rise to development theory with
its focus on the third world. The narrow theoretical framework prevailing at that time
could not adequately analyse the problems of these newly independent countries which
were specifically and qualitatively different from those of the industrial countries; thus
economists increasingly had to incorporate more complex processes and variables in their
theoretical perspectives, defining and redefining them as their understanding of the
development process deepened and new problems emerged which had to be solved.
It is not necessary to review all the approaches that attempt to explain economic
and social change in the developing countries. We shall identify the major schools of
development theory and the contributions of some individual economists within these
schools.
Whilst the various schools of development theory differ in what they consider to be
issues of significance for achieving development, there are nevertheless certain issues
which are common to all approaches. These are:
• the necessity of resource mobilisation for raising the rate of accumulation of physical
capital;
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. the need to industrialise instead of continuing with concentration on expansion of
primary exports in exchange for manufactured imports;
. the need to overcome problems of market failures and imperfections through state-led
development;
. the need to transform a subsistence, non-accumulative, primary production based
economy into a surplus generating, industrialised economy;
the importance of establishing an economically independent, self-sustaining economy
liberated from the compulsions of serving the needs of developed capitalist economies;
. the need to address the problems of mass poverty and widespread deprivation of basic
needs as the fundamental problems of underdevelopment;
the necessity to ensure efficient allocation of resources as the primary requirement for
self-perpetuating economic and social development.
On the basis of the conceptualisation and analysis of one or more of these issues,
one can categorise development theory literature into the following three major schools of
thought:
1. Capital Scarcity school';
2. Centre-Periphery (Structuralist) school (which includes the Dependency school 2); and
3. Neo-classical school
These schools can also be distinguished on the basis of a group of the above items
which constitute the 'causal factors' of development and underdevelopment.
It is difficult to fit these schools into a definite sequence of time periods, since their
emergence and prominence in the evolution of development thought did not follow any
chronological pattern. However, one can observe that in the 1950s and 1960s the first
school stressing capital scarcity as the primary cause of underdevelopment did exercise
This school is sometimes classified as 'modernisation' school, see for example Dube (1988), So (1990)
and Hettne (1990).
2 See footnote to the sub-heading of section 2.4.2.2.
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important influence over both the academic and policy-making economists. The
contributions of Nurkse, Rostow, Leibenstein, Hirschman, etc. broadly fall within this
school. These gained such prominence in the development literature that one can describe
this school as the founder of mainstream development economics, and as the precursor of
development studies as well.
Contributors in the second school of thought are often classified as "structuralists".
These too, gained prominence during the first two decades of post-war period particularly
in the developing countries of Latin America and in international organisations (with the
setting up of the UNCTAD), mainly because they provided non-Marxist alternative
theories of underdevelopment. The Centre-Periphery school stressed the relationship
between trade and development by attributing the continued underdevelopment of LDCs
to the composition and terms of trade between the developing countries (periphery) and
developed countries (centre). They blamed structural rigidities in LDCs for the anti-
developmental nature of this trade relationship. Broadly speaking, the neo-Marxian school
advocating dependency theory also falls within the Centre-Periphery school because it
attributes underdevelopment to the whole range of economic relationships between the
LDCs and the developed capitalist economies which make the former dependent upon the
latter.
These two schools occupied most of the space in development economics
literature during the first three decades - mid-1940s' to mid-1970s - of its evolution.
Although, there was considerable divergence of perspectives between these two schools,
there were important elements of common ground also. Firstly, there was a widespread
rejection of the neo-classical perspective based on equilibrium economics as a meaningful
insight into the problems of underdevelopment and development. On the contrary,
proponents of these schools considered economic development as a cumulative
disequilibrium process, as Schumpeter had done. Secondly, except for Bauer and Yamey
(1957), almost all theories belonging to these two schools rejected the static theory of
Taking Rosenstein-Rodan's article of 1943 as the beginning of development economics.
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comparative advantage as a basis for economic development. Lastly, most took the view
that achievement of satisfactory resource mobilisation required a substantial degree of
state intervention, but working in conjunction with market forces.
In fact, the overall tone was an optimistic one, in contrast to the pessimistIc
forecasts of the economists belonging to the classical, Schumpeterian and Keynesian
traditions, who were worried about diminishing returns in agriculture, population growth,
the undermining of the entrepreneurial spirit and falling marginal efficiency of capital
leading to secular stagnation (Singer, l978:p.2).
2.4.1 Capital Scarcity school
As we have noted earlier, sustained growth of real per capita income was treated
as a significant measure of economic development in the post-war period. Since real per
capita income is a function of capital per head, development was seen as a process of
increasing capital formation as determined by the rates of saving and investment. The
1951 UN report, Measures for the Economic Development of Underdeveloped Countries,
emphasised accumulation of capital as one of the obstacles which had to be overcome to
promote development:
It is a commonplace that economic progress is a function,
among other things, of the rate of capital formation. In most
countries where rapid economic progress is occurring, net
capital formation at home is at least 10 per cent of the
national income, and in some it is substantially more. By
contrast in most underdeveloped countries, net capital
formation is not as high as 5 per cent of national income,
even when foreign investment is included. How to increase
the rate of capital formation is therefore a question of great
urgency (UN, 195 l:p.35).
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In fact, the acute underdevelopment prevailing in most newly independent
countries is reflected by the low rate of capital formation in the 1950s which in countries
like India and Pakistan did not exceed 6 per cent (Rostow, l956:pp.l54-l89); while net
domestic savings in most of the third world countries was below 8 per cent in that period
(Meier and Baldwin, l957:p.3O5).
Development was, therefore, primarily seen in post-Keynesian as well as Marxian
economics as a process of capital formation determined by the rate of investment. The
importance of saving and investing as stated by Lewis provides a general perspective in
which the bulk of the development literature of the 1950s was produced.
The central problem in the theory of economic development
is to understand the process by which a community which
was previously saving and investing 4 or 5 per cent of its
national income or less, converts itself to an economy where
voluntary saving is running at about 12 or 15 per cent of
national income or more (Lewis, l954:p.l55).
Thus most of the pioneers in development approved of economic planning and
were mainly concerned with the mobiisation of domestic resources. The main message
was that development necessitated plans and strong, active governments to implement
them. "Development was an art of large-scale social engineering" (Hettne, l99O:p.48).
While it is not possible to review here all the theories and strategies that are relevant to
this school, we will examine some of the main contributions.
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2.4.1.1 Vicious circle of poverty and low level equilibrium trap
The basic problem in the underdeveloped countries, according to the capital-
scarcity school, is to break out of the vicious circle that perpetuates itself due to
insufficiency of capital.
Thus according to Nurkse, the low level of real per capita income in the under-
developed countries is a reflection of low productivity, which in turn is due largely to lack
of capital. The lack of capital is a result of the small capacity to save, which in turn, is due
to low income and so the circle is complete'. "A country is poor because it is poor"
(Nurkse, l953:p.4). On the demand side, too, there exists a vicious circle since the
inducement to invest is limited by the size of market and productivity is a crucial
determinant of the size of market since "capacity to buy means capacity to produce"
(Higgins, l959:p.397). As Nurkse says "productivity depends largely, though by no means
entirely, on the degree to which capital is used in production ... [B}ut for any individual
entrepreneur the use of capital is inhibited to start with, by the small size of market"
(Nurkse, 1953:Chapter 1, p.11). For Nurkse, the way out of the vicious circles was the
transformation of the domestic economy via a Big Push to industrialisation.
The low level equilibrium trap hypothesis of Nelson (1956) and the critical
minimum effort hypothesis of Leibenstein (195 7)2 also depend upon the relationships
between capital formation and per capita income. Real per capita income and increase in
capital stock (i.e. positive net investment) are mutually correlated, real income grows as
net investment increases and saving and capital accumulation increase as per capita income
grows.
Low income leads to low savings and investments hence low growth. Low income meant a lack of
aggregate demand, limiting the investment opportunities.
2 For a veiy good summary of the Nelson model and Leibenstein model, see Higgins, B. (1959:Chapter
16, pp.388-397).
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Since a moderate level of growth was eaten up by population' increase, a 'critical
minimum effort' was required to break out of a population trap into cumulative growth.
Liebenstein acknowledged that the effort would have to be substantial to make it possible
to reap the benefits of external economies and to achieve 'balanced growth'. Since
attainment of critical minimum effort would depend heavily on the development of
entrepreneurship, knowledge and skills, governments could help to foster the growth of
these factors (Leibenstein, 1957:pp.15-l7, 96-106 and 111).
2.4.1.2 The strategy of balanced growth
The strategy of balanced growth propounded by Rosenstein-Rodan (1943 and
1961) and Nurkse (1953) is based on the argument that the main factor inhibiting the
growth of investment in poor countries is lack of inducement to invest in plants of
minimum economic scale because of the limited size of the domestic market. The
problems of limited demand for individual industries can be resolved by the "balanced
growth" of several inter-dependent industries which according to Nurkse is a more or less
synchronised application of capital to a wide range of different industries (Nurkse,
1953: p.11). Nurkse argues that this strategy would lead to an overall enlargement of the
market and hence an escape from the deadlock. This basic complementarity of markets
arises on account of the diversity of human wants. As Nurkse puts it succinctly "The case
for 'balanced growth' rests on the need for balanced diet" (ibicL).
Both Rosenstein-Rodan and Nurkse observed that in an underdeveloped economy,
characterised by a 'vicious circle of poverty' the investment programme must be both
massive and balanced. Thus Rosenstein-Rodan suggested that if exports are to be
increased, production must follow a balanced growth path. This would be facilitated by
Both these models bring an additional causal relation viz, the relationship between per capita income
growth and population growth (using implicitly the theory of demographic transition). The relationship
between population growth and income growth depends upon the stage of development. In the initial
stage, population grows faster with income growth, then it tapers off and in the third stage population
growth declines as income continues to grow.
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issuing indicative plans and by small countries joining into customs unions within which
large scale industries might be operated more efficiently (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943).
Rosenstein-Rodan was therefore one of the first one to come in favour of the 'big
push' development strategy, involving government intervention to co-ordinate and provide
incentives for large scale investment. He argued that the crucial task of a development
programme was to achieve sufficient investment to mobilise unemployed and
underemployed for the purpose of industrialisation. And the area of industrialisation
should be sufficiently large if the industrial enterprises are to reach an optimum size. In
the same vein, he emphasised the importance of public investment in social overhead
capital (SOC) and the need for state action to overcome market imperfections especially in
underdeveloped countries. "[TJhe price mechanism in such imperfect markets cannot
therefore be relied upon to provide the signals that guide a perfectly competitive economy
towards an optimum position" (Rosenstein-Rodan, l984:pp.2O7-2l6).
Whilst Rosenstein-Rodan stipulated the need for state intervention to correct
market failures, he rejected a strategy of self-sufficiency or an inward-looking strategy of
industrialisation. As we shall see in subsequent chapters, Oman has also never adopted an
inward-looking strategy.
Similarly, Nurkse' s conclusion (as discussed earlier) is that the onus for breaking
out of the vicious circle of poverty in backward countries rests firmly on their
governments, with respect not only to planning a programme of balanced industrial
investment but also to mobilising domestic resources and ensuring effective use of foreign
and domestic resources through curtailing the growth of domestic consumption.
Similarly, Nurkse argued that developing countries could no longer rely on economic
growth being induced from outside through an expansion of world demand for their
exports of primary commodities, and that less developed countries must pursue balanced
growth conforming to the income elasticities of internal demand.
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Although, the theory of the 'big push" and balanced growth of investment in
several complementary industries sounds appealing in theory, in practice it is difficult to
put into effect in a developing country, simply because if a poor economy had sufficiently
vast capital and entrepreneurial resources to invest simultaneously in several industries at
minimum economic scale then it would not have been poor in the first place. Moreover, it
is very difficult to maintain a balance between supply and demand over a wide range of
sectors of the economy if there is no complete control over all the means of production.
Also if a developing country were to have access to resources through external borrowing
then the repayment of loans and consequent indebtedness would play havoc with the
national economy, mainly due to falling terms of trade; the problem would express itself in
balance of payment difficulties, dwindling foreign reserves, devaluation of the currency,
and so forth. This is exactly the scenario that most developing countries had to face:
borrowing more to pay interest on the loans.
2.4.1.3 Hirschman's strategy of unbalanced growth
Keeping in view the criticisms of the strategy of balanced growth, Hirschman
(1958) suggested the unbalanced growth strategy to achieve a 'big push' in investment
rate. He favoured raising the rate of investment through concentration in one or a few
industries, i.e. through deliberately created imbalances. According to Hirschman, in
advanced countries economic development has followed the path of unbalanced growth
with growth being communicated from the leading sectors of the economy to the
followers. Hirschman' s strategy stresses the creation of external economies through
interdependence of supply as opposed to balanced growth's emphasis on external
economies created by interdependence of demand.
'Rosenstein-Rodan laid great emphasis on indivisibilities and increasing returns. The saving counterpart
to his invesunent "big push" might come from decreasing costs. Thus he saw Soc as the most important
instance of indivisibilities and externalities. "The provision of such "overhead costs" for the economy as a
whole requires a large minimum size of investment in each infrastructure project ... A high initial
investment in SOC is necessaiy to pave the way for additional, more quickly yielding, directly productive
investments" (Rosenstein-Rodan, l984:p.2l4).
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Hirschman argued that economic development is more likely to result from the
more feasible strategy of unbalanced growth. Establishing modern enterprises creates
bottlenecks and shortages, offering high returns to people who can clear the bottlenecks,
i.e. creating incentives for entrepreneurs to emerge. The policy prescription is to foster
projects involving the most opportunities for profitable investment elsewhere in the
economy, or in Hirschman's terminology to establish projects with the most linkages -
backward and forward - (e.g. via the demand for inputs or activities using their output or
via their impact on aggregate demand).
Hirschman proposed that policy makers and planners should not attempt to
anticipate supply and demand imbalances, but rely on the market in revealing major
resource bottlenecks. He also identified an interventionist role for the government in
resource allocation. "Whereas assistance categories such as disease control and irrigation
may give the state a new taste for developmental activities, price stabilisation supplies both
the taste and, at some future time, the institutional mechanism to indulge it" (Hirschman,
198l:p.83).
While the development "theorists" have been debating the merits and demerits of
balanced and unbalanced growth prescriptions, a majority of developing countries have,
either by choice or by compulsion of circumstances, adopted the unbalanced growth
strategy at least in the initial stages 1 . In Oman, for example, and as we shall see in Chapter
V, it was not possible to adopt a balanced growth strategy. Thus the First and Second
FYPs concentrated on developing a limited number of sectors (economic and social
infrastructures) and regions (Capital area and the Southern region). Only in the Fourth
FYP were resources allocated in a more balanced manner between regions and sectors of
the economy and society.
'The classic and the oldest example of this is the socialist planning in Soviet Union which concentrated
on capital-intensive, basic or core industries (producing basic inputs and capital goods) and gave low
priority to investment in agriculture and agro-based consumer industries. india, too, followed the same
pattern in investment allocation and gave high priority to develop heavy and capital goods industries (see
Chakravarty, 1987:Chapters 1-3).
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2.4.1.4 Rostow's theory of economic growth'
Presenting his analysis as an alternative to Marx's theory of modern history,
Rostow (1960), in his "The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto",
posited his five stages of growth against Marx's modes of production comprising
feudalism, bourgeois capitalism, socialism and communism. Rostow attempted a synthesis
of the 'big push' and 'vicious circle' theories in his stages theory of economic growth.
Rostow's concept of take-oft into self-sustained growth is a crucial part of his
stages of growth theory. According to this, economic development in any country occurs
in five distinct but connected stages viz.: (i) traditional society; (ii) pre-conditions of take-
off, (iii) take-off into self-sustained growth; (iv) the drive to maturity; and (v) the age of
mass consumption. The essential factor that determines the stage at which a country is
placed is the rate of investment or capital formation 3 which is largely determined by the
rate of saving. For instance, in the first two stages, the investment rate is 5 per cent or
less, in the third stage it is between 10 per cent to 15 per cent and in the last two stages it
is above 15 per cent (Rostow, l96O:pp.4-l6).
Thus once any less developed country arrives at the take-off stage, it will
experience cumulative, self-sustaining growth which would transform it into a developed
country. (In terms of Nurksian analysis a country is caught in the vicious circle of poverty
before the take-off stage but after it progresses to the take-off stage, it will enter into the
virtuous circle of prosperity). For the LDCs, the most critical issue is to reach the take-off
stage. To accomplish this task it needs to meet the following three conditions: firstly, to
raise the rate of productive investment to over 10 per cent; secondly, to develop one or
more manufacturing sectors with high growth potential; and thirdly, to create a
Since Rostow's theoiy emphasised the importance of saving and investment as a crucial element in the
development process, it is classified under the Capital Scarcity school.
2 Corresponding to Rostow's take-off stage is Gerschenkron's "great spurt" (Gerschenkron, 1962).
3 As a per cent of national income.
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framework of social, political and economic institutions that would facilitate the
tendencies to expand the economy and obtain external economies of the modern sector.
For Rostow, the rate of investment of 10 per cent or above is a necessary but not a
sufficient condition. According to Rostow:
I1]t is nevertheless useful to regard as a necessary but not
sufficient condition for the take-off the fact that the
proportion of net investment to national income (or net
national product) rises from, say, 5 per cent to over 10 per
cent, definitely outstripping the likely population pressure,
and yielding a distinct rise in real output per capita
(Rostow, l96O:p.37).
Rostow's crucial stage - the take-off - features two main elements or
processes; one is the sharp increase (doubling) of the rate of capital accumulation and the
other is the concept of the leading sector. With its implied transformation of the
production structure, implicit in Rostow's theory is the necessity for governments to
assume responsibility for directing their country's development. Through government
action a more favourable environment for take-off might be created.
2.4.1.5 Theory of dualistic development
While definitions of dualism abound', we will examine briefly the major
contributions that deal with the obstacles arising from the 'dualistic' nature of
Eckaus (1955) and Higgins (1956) focus on the differences in technology between two sectors, one
traditional th variable technical coefficients, the other, modern with fixed coefficients. Others like
Singer (1950a and 1970) extend this notion to the international arena to trace the impact of international
dualism on domestic Third World development in the Myrdal (1968), Prebisch (1971) tradition (as cited
in Ranis, (l988:p.74).
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underdeveloped economies: the coexistence of an advanced modem sector with a
backward traditional sector.
The main advocates of the Dualistic Development theory are Boeke (1953), Lewis
(1954), Higgins (1956), Myrdal (1957) and Myint (1958 and 1985). The main features of
dualistic development prevailing in most developing countries include: (a) the economy is
divided into two sub-economies one which is superior or modem in terms of technology,
capital stock and economic organisation and the other which is inferior or traditional; (b)
the "development gap" between the two sub-economies tends to widen on account of
what Myrdal calls forces of "cumulative causation" and "backwash effects" (Myrdal,
1957); (c) the traditional sector does not benefit from the percolation or trickling down of
the fruits of the rapid growth experienced by the modern sector, and this is reflected in an
unequal provision of public services and social infrastructure that favours the modern
sector over the traditional sector; and (d) theoretically the modern (superior) sub-economy
is found in the urban, industrial sectors and the traditional one in the rural, agricultural
sector.
These theorists argued that the structural characteristics of the modern capitalistic
sector and the traditional subsistence sectors are such that despite vast differences in
rewards obtainable in the two sectors, labour, entrepreneurship and capital do not move
between the two sectors in such a way that in the long run equilibrium 1, the levels of
development in the two sectors would be equal, even though they may specialise in
differing branches of production. Therefore in designing appropriate strategies,
development economists had to address the ultimate question of how to expand the
modem exchange sector while the traditional sector contracts.
'According to the neo-classical equilibrium economics, surplus capital of modem sector should move to
capital-scarce traditional sector and surplus labour from traditional sector should move to high wage
modern sector. These equilibrating processes should in the long run equalise factor productivity, incomes,
and social development levels in the two sectors. But, as Myrdal (1957), Boeke (1953), Higgins (1956)
and Myint (1958) have argued, the dualistic character of a developing economy refutes the basic tenets of
neo-classical equilibrium economics (Meier and Baldwin, l957:pp.324-333).
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Similarly, in the structuralist view of development, rigidities of various kinds
preclude the rapid and quantitatively significant response of the economy to changing
incentives as conveyed by market signals. Therefore, as we shall see in subsection 2.4.2.1,
development will be hampered unless strategies (e.g. import substituting industrialisation)
that alleviate structural rigidities are adopted. Dualism between the traditional and rural
agricultural sector and urban and modern industrial sector is another example of structural
rigidities (Srinivasan, 1988:p.5). Similarly, Lewis (1954) recommended the transfer of
surplus labour from the traditional sector to the modern sector to increase savings and
accumulation.
2.4.2 Centre-Periphery school'
In addition to the growth and modernisation theories, referred to within the Capital
Scarcity school, the decades of 1950s and 1960s also saw the emergence of the Centre-
Periphery school, particularly among the Latin American development economists.
Because of the widespread pessimism about the prospects of exports, Prebisch (1950)
argued that reliance on exports of food and raw materials in Latin America - the
periphery - to the greater industrial centres would inevitably lead to a deterioration of
Latin American's term of trade, which would further affect its domestic accumulation of
capital. Similarly, the dualistic nature of the Latin American societies, consisting of one
traditional agrarian, and one modernised urban society, provided a fresh departure in
development theory: the ECLA school and the dependency approach.
'This school is sometimes called the Dependency school and according to Bloomstrom and Hettne (1984)
represents, "the voices from the periphery" that challenge the intellectual hegemony from the American
Modernisation school.
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2.4.2.1 The Economic Commission of Latin America' (The ECLA)
Unlike the neo-classical economists who assured a smoothly working market price
system, some of the early development economists - most prominently the Latin
American structuralists like Raul Prebisch and Celso Furtado - attempted to identify
specific rigidities, lags, uneven development, low elasticities of supply and demand, and
other structural characteristics of the developing countries that affect economic
adjustments and the choice of development policy (Chenery, 1975). In trying to find an
explanation of the nature, causes and dynamics of the inequality between the producers
and exporters of manufactured goods and the producers and exporters of primary
commodities, Prebisch put special emphasis on the international economic relations, which
he named the "Centre-Periphery" system (Prebisch, 1950). Convinced that the way
forward lay in the transformation of domestic economic structures, the ECLA economists
developed a new body of theory designed to explain that contrary to the principles of
mainstream (neo-classical) international trade theory, the primary export orientation has
been the basic reason why countries with this characteristic have remained
underdeveloped. Prebisch divided the world economy into two broad groups of trading
countries. The 'Centre' consists of industrialised developed countries which export
manufactured goods and import primary products. The 'Periphery' comprises the
developing countries which export primary products and import manufactures (ibid).
The main aim of the Centre-Periphery school is to point to the non-applicability of
the classical comparative theory of trade 2 to the development problems of less developed
countries and to show that free trade between primary-exporting developing nations and
The fonnulation of a distinctly Latin American school of development is intimately related to the ECLA
which was organised in 1948 by the United Nations and was based in Santiago, Chile. In 1950, Prebisch
was appointed executive secretary of ECLA (Meier and Seers, 1984 :p. 11).
2 In following the dictates of comparative advantage, the classical theory of international trade assumes
that all trading countries benefit, real income for the world is maximised, and the poor countries are
"beuer-off" than they would be without trade. However, many economists (Prebisch, Singer, Myint,
Myrdal), question whether the classical theory of trade is realistic for poor countries and whether it is
relevant under dynamic conditions (Meier and Baldwin, l957:pp.324-335).
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the manufactures-exporting developed nations has actually worked against the
development of the former.
Prebisch's strategy for Latin American development called for a change in the
international division of labour and for Latin America to industrialise through import
substitution. Initially domestic production was to be protected from foreign competition,
but once competitive ability had been achieved, local firms should not be protected. The
income earned from export of raw materials should be used to pay for imported capital
goods, and thus increase the rate of economic growth.
From this analysis emerged the conclusion that import
substitution stimulated by a moderate and selective
protection was an economically sound way to achieve
certain desirable effects ... import substitution by protection
counteracts the tendency toward the deterioration of the
terms of trade, by avoiding the allocation of productive
resources to primary export activities and diverting them
instead to industrial production (Prebisch, l984:p.l79).
Therefore, Prebisch argued that the structural changes inherent in industrialisation
require rationality and foresight in government policy. Planning was needed to help the
rate of internal capital accumulation and to establish certain basic conditions for the
adequate ulznctioning of the market in the context of a dynamic economy (ibid. :p. 180).
The diagnosis of the Latin American situation by Prebisch and others including
Singer (1950a and 1950b), Myint (1954), Lewis (1955) and Mydral (1956), (as cited in
Meier and Baldwin, l957:p.326) was based on the fact that while the type and extent of
trade of each peripheral country with the centre depended largely on its resources, the
international political economic relations enlarged the extent to which income was
siphoned off by the centres. Such a pattern of trade had resulted in terms of trade moving
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secularly against the peripheral countries' and the technology from the centre in
peripheral economies had penetrated mainly into activities connected with primary exports
while the effects of international factor movements had not been entirely beneficial.
2.4.2.2 Dependency school2
The main proponents of this school3 include P. Baran, A. G. Frank, T. Dos Santos
and S. Amin, who analyse the conditions of underdevelopment and the process of
development in ex-colonial (and semi-colonial) developing economies within the
framework of Marx's critique of the capitalist system. The paradigm which the Marxian
development economists have adopted differs from the non-neo-classical (orthodox) and
neo-classical schools of development theory. Dependency theory went beyond economics
in attempting to provide a general explanation of underdevelopment and the radical
dependency theorists incorporated aspects of political economy in their analyses. They
conceptualised dependency as a socio-economic and political phenomenon, which required
a more complex view of the centre periphery relationship than espoused by the ECLA
perspective (Hettne, l99O:p.88).
1 Prebisch (1950 and 1959), for example, had suggested that during the period 1870-1940 the trend of
barter terms of trade had declined for the primary exporting countries at the average rate 0.9 per cent per
annum. According to Thirwall and Bergevin (1985), during the post-war period, excepting the years
1971-74 and 1979-80, the terms of trade for non-oil primary products decreased at the annual (trend) rate
of 1.2 per cent for the period 1954-72 and again at the rate of 2.5 per cent for the period 1973-82. In the
case of Oman, as Appendix table 1 shows, its net barter terms of trade have declined from 210 in 1980
(1987 = 100) to 77 in 1995.
2 As already mentioned we have treated the Dependency school within the broader grouping of Centre-
Periphery school on the ground that the former also analyses the problems of LDCs in the context of
international division of labour - based on trade and capital flows - between the primary producing and
industrialised capitalist countries. In this view, the latter are dominant and the former are dependent
upon the capitalist world which drains the surplus from developing economies through trade and
investment.
It should be admitted that a brief account may not correspond to the way this intellectual process actually
was experienced by the founding fathers of dependency school. However, as Hettne (l99O:p.82) indicates,
this school emerged from the convergence of two major intellectual trends, one with its background in the
Marxist tradition and its main theoretical orientation - neo-Marxism, the other rooted in the Latin
American structuralist discussion on development which ultimately formed the CEPAL tradition (CEPAL
is the Spanish term for ECLA).
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A systematic and forceful analysis of the political economy of underdevelopment in
the Marxian tradition was first presented in the early 1950s by P. Baran (1952). Although
Baran did not work out any 'dependent' model of development in the LDCs, by
theorising the principal causes of underdevelopment, he was seen as the founder of neo-
Marxian and consequently to some extent the dependency school (Hettne, 1990).
Baran's main thesis is that the developing countries (Periphery) are
underdeveloped and will continue to remain so as long as their economies are linked to the
developed countries (Centre). Baran considers that the process of industrialisation in the
LDCs is hostile or contradictory to the interests and needs of (former imperialist)
developed countries. As Baran said "what is decisive is that economic development in
underdeveloped countries is profoundly inimical to the dominant interests in the advanced
capitalist countries" (Baran, 1957 :p.28).
Because of the large number of contributors to the dependency school and their
theoretical diversities, we will attempt to summarise their basic assumptions here, (Hettne,
l99O:p.91 and Dube, 1988:pp.42-43); although, we will be examining some of the
individual contributions in more detail later on.
•	 The most important obstacle to development are not lack of capital or
entrepreneurial skills, but are found in the international division of labour.
•	 The international division of labour was analysed within the context of transfer of
surplus from the periphery to the centre.
•	 Due to the fact that the periphery was deprived of its surplus, which the centre
instead could utilise for development purposes, development in the centre
somehow implied underdevelopment in the periphery. Thus development and
underdevelopment could be described as two aspects of a single global process.
•	 Since the periphery was doomed to underdevelopment because of its linkage to the
centre it was considered necessary to disassociate itself from the world market, to
break the chains of surplus extraction, and to strive for national self reliance. In
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order to make this possible more or less revolutionary political transformation was
necessary. Politics would take command.
.	 International dualism within the world itself creates small centres of wealth and
power while the periphery remains impoverished. International aid is an eye-wash.
It feeds the Third World with false paradigms which are not intended to, and
cannot, raise up the less developed - at any rate their masses - from
backwardness.
Frank (1966; 1967; 1972; 1979) takes the dependency analysis further to explain
the development of underdevelopment and predicts that under the capitalist world order,
underdevelopment is likely to be a permanent feature of developing countries. He sees
development and underdevelopment as two sides of the same coin, the former creating the
latter.
According to Frank, the three factors leading to dependent development are: first,
the countries in the periphery were incorporated into the world capitalist system from the
times they were turned into 'exploited' economies during the colonial period (i.e. 5 to 10
decades prior to end of Second World War); second, the process which incorporated the
(colonial) underdeveloped countries into the world capitalist system necessarily
transformed them into capitalist systems i.e. systems based on production for profits via
exchange or market mechanism; and lastly, this integration of LDCs into world capitalism
was created through a "satellite-metropolis" dependency relationship' (Palma,
1978:pp.88 1-924).
Thus the 'satellite' economy's development is determined by forces external to its
society, originating/derived from forces operating in the metropolis. In contrast,
development of the metropolis is determined by forces internal to its own society. This
asymmetry in the determinants of development creates an economic and exchange
l Terms used and preferred by Frank. These are same as Prebisch's Centre and Periphery. But Frank's
terminology stresses clearly the element of 'dependence' in the relationship between the two groups of
countries.
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relationship in which the satellite is weak and dependent whereas the metropolis is strong
and dominant. It is a relation of unequal economic power. It is clear from the above
exposition that Frank rejects the 'dualism' model implicitly applied by other Marxists
(Baran) to distinguish developed capitalist and underdeveloped pre-capitalist economies.
He also rejects the policies put forward by the structuralists. For Frank, the only
alternatives are either to break completely the metropolis-satellite nexus through social
revolution or to continue to 'underdevelop' within it (Meier, l989:p.IO6).
Frank's core idea of the "development of underdevelopment" is continued by Dos
Santos:
{dJependence is a conditioning situation in which the
economies of one group of countries are conditioned by the
development and expansion of others. A relationship of
interdependence between two or more economies or
between such economies and the world trading system
becomes a dependent relationship in which some countries
can expand only as a reflection of the expansion of the
dominant countries, which may have positive or negative
effects on their immediate development (Dos Santos,
1 97O:pp.289-9O).
Similarly, the views of Amin (1974) and Emmanuel (1972) emphasise that the
dependence relation based on unequal power relations between the dominant developed
countries and dependent underdeveloped countries takes the form of "unequal exchange".
For Emmanuel this unequal exchange arises on account of the difference in the 'given'
wages between the developed and underdeveloped countries. The workers in the LDCs
are subjected to "double" exploitation of surplus value - by the capitalist countries'
exploitative accumulation urge and the domestic capitalists' accumulative urge to extract
surplus for their growth. Amin goes a step further and argues that not only there are wage
differentials but these are larger than what would be justified by productivity differences.
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The core of Amin's and Emmanuel's analyses is that the prices (terms) of exchange
between dependent developing countries (periphery) and dominant developed countries
(centre) are so determined, that the surplus is transferred mainly to the latter. This drain
of surplus out of the periphery flirther reduces the investible surplus internally available in
the LDCs which further increases the wage productivity differentials. This, in turn, gives
rise to the continuing "unequal exchange" between the developed and underdeveloped
countries.
2.4.2.3 Policy implications of the dependency school
Compared to the capital scarcity school, which assumes the lack of capital, savings
and entrepreneurial skills as major obstacles to development, the dependency school
rejects these as being the most important constraints to development. The dependency
school thus sees the main obstacles to development to be located in the international
division of labour and in the unequal economic exchange between the periphery and the
centre. The dependency school is also regarded as a response to the failure of import
substitution industrialisation (1ST) strategies proposed by the ECLA school.
The dependency school placed great significance on the role of the state in
development. It suggested that peripheral countries should rely upon their own resources
and plan their own paths of development to achieve autonomous national development,
and that this process should be state-led. And in order to make this possible and
overcome the opposition to change of local elites, social revolution might be necessary for
a country to get rid of the old ruling elites. In the words of Chilcote and Edestein
(l974:p.21) "Development requires the profound alteration of economic, social, and
political relationships in the overthrow of the market and the mobilisation of domestic
populations in a nationally oriented effort".
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The dependency perspective has influenced development strategies at an
international level. The New International Economic Order, for example, referred to in
Chapter I, was also partly related to the influence of the dependency paradigm.
Dependency theory suffered a serious setback in the 1980s, not only because of the
criticisms levelled against it by the liberal economists (Lal, 1985; Little, 1982) but also
from analysts who are sympathetic, Lall (1975) for example, and from the dependency
camp itself, for example Cardoso, (1974). Dependency theory is alleged to have been
weakened by the transformation of the newly industrialised countries' into almost fully
developed status2. This, it is claimed, shows that by adopting appropriate policies
developing countries can overcome underdevelopment. Whereas the dependency theory
argues that the world economy perpetuates underdevelopment from which the
underdeveloped countries cannot escape3.
2.4.3 Development theories for primary exporting countries
The theories and strategies, which we have discussed earlier, deal with the
problems of underdevelopment and developing economies in general. However, there are
theories which were formulated specifically for development of primary exporting
countries4. These theories relate to the method by which economic rents from primary
production are captured, and once captured, how should they be used. Then there is the
'These are the "four tigers" of East Asia viz. Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan.
2 Although it is premature to link the currency and stock market crises, that have rocked the Southeast
Asian economies since July, 1997, to any one specific factor, but these recent experiences will perhaps
prove that dependency perspective is as relevant today as it was in the 1960s.
Some variations of the dependency or World Systems theories would suggest that individual countries
such as South Korea and Taiwan constitute semi-peripheries between the core/metropolis and
periphery/satellite countries. This is due to their privileged political relationship with the Western
countries. And that this fact does not overturn the basic soundness of dependency theory. For the purpose
of our thesis we need not dwell too much on this controversy. Suffice it to say that the role of the state has
been crucial in securing whatever forms of development South Korea and Taiwan have secured.
" That is, countries which are economically dependent upon exports of primary products such as
agricultural commodities, products of forestry, fishing, minerals and fuels (i.e. oil) mining. As we shall
see in Chapters IV and V, a number of these theories are relevant for Oman in developing its oil mining
sector.
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question of the appropriate trade policy to be followed in exploiting the primary produce.
Equally important is the issue of managing cyclical fluctuations - booms and depressions
- m pnmary exports.
Keeping in view the obstacles to development faced by these primary exporting
LDCs, in the 1950s and 1960s some leading development economists including Prebisch,
Singer, Myint, Lewis, and Watkins presented theories which are specific to these primary
exporting countries. The most prominent of these is the theory expounded by the
'structuralist' or ECLA school led by Prebisch and Singer and the dependency perspective
advocated by Baran, Frank, Santos and Amin which we have already discussed earlier in
this chapter under the Centre-Periphery school section. The two other relatively less well-
known theories are briefly described as the "vent for surplus" theory of Myint (1958,
1964) and the "staple theory" which is associated with Watkins (1963) who wrote about
Canada's economic development. The other theory which is strictly not a development
theory but deals with problems specific to primary exporting countries is called the theory
of Dutch disease syndrome.
Venifor Surplus Theory
Myint's "vent for surplus" theory of development for primary exporting countries
keeps in view the background of rapid expansion of international trade during colonial
era, i.e. from the late 18th century till the second World War. As a result of this trade,
countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia (and the so called "empty" countries like
Australia, USA and Canada), richly endowed with natural resources were exposed to new
set of economic activities involving the use of foreign capital and management (and in
many cases even labour) with local "land" to produce goods which were in demand
internationally and hence valuable but which were not consumed (or not fully consumed)
in the home country. Therefore, such primary products (e.g. metals, oil, tea, coffee,
rubber, jute, etc.) were in 'surplus' in relation to the non-existent or limited domestic
'Land in the wider sense of free gifts of nature.
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demand and external trade provided a vent for this surplus. Since the primary production
of these exportables brought in its wake foreign capital, technology, management and in
many cases even immigrant labour, the growth of domestic production got linked, directly
or indirectly, with this primary sector activity (Lewis Jr., l989:p. 1553).
The significance of this theory is that its application is confined not only to the
colonial era but extends to the present day mineral exporting countries, particularly the
petroleum exporting countries. Here the international movement of capital, management
and labour seek to exploit a primary resource-based industry, the main market for which
is not domestic but international. This industry, therefore, generates economic 'rents', in
the ense that it involves the use of local primary resources, the opportunity cost (supply
price) of which is very low (ibid). The problem of development policy here is with regard
to the management of these economic rents whether to use these to raise present
consumption or to invest it in development of non-primary activities, i.e. to diversifj. A
point we shall examine in detail, in relation to Oman, in Chapters IV and V.
Staple theory of development
While Myint's vent for surplus theory provides justification for a developing
country's specialisation in primary exports, it does not fully explore the question of
whether this activity devoted to providing vent for surplus, would result in sustained,
long-term growth and development in the primary exporting country. The staple theory of
development investigates the characteristics of the natural (primary) resource-based
exports and its effects on the rest of the economy. Accordingly, the theory suggests that
the developmental and growth impact of staple exports would depend upon the nature of
technology used in primary exports (capital or labour intensive) and the linkages of export
industry with the rest of the economy. The more labour-intensive (less capital intensive)
the staple export production is, the greater would be the growth impact. As regards the
linkage of staple export industry to the domestic economy, case studies of small petroleum
exporting countries and of a copper mining economy showed that the linkage effects are
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low'. Therefore, the question, is whether these low linkages are inherent to production of
staple exports or whether they arise on account of government policies. Secondly, even if
direct linkages may be low, indirect linkages could be created, as has been done in Oman,
through utilisation of economic rents from staple exports for investment in infrastructural
and income-generating developmental projects. Of course, as we shall see, the move from
indirect to direct linkages is not easy, and Oman has not completely been successful in
developing the latter.
Dutch disease theoiy
The theory of Dutch2
 disease syndrome which deals with adverse effects of boom
in primary export revenues has been propounded by Corden and Neary (1982).
In the Dutch disease model, the word "disease" is used to indicate that booming
primary product exports, instead of stimulating development, actually damage the
prospects for growth. The name of this model is derived from the fact that in Holland the
rapid growth in natural gas in the 1 970s actually led to rising inflation and declining share
of manufactures in exports and output3.
According to this theory the effect of booming primary exports on the tradables
sector comprising agriculture and manufacturing, operates through the change in real
exchange rate (RER).
The RER measures the real worth of (official) nominal exchange rate (NER) after
adjusting the latter for relative inflation rates at home and in rest of the world. If domestic
inflation rate is greater than world inflation rate then RER appreciates and vice versa. An
'These were the studies carried out in the 1960s by Seers on petroleum industry in small economies and
by Baldwin on Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) (as cited in Lewis Jr., op. cit. :p. 1554).
2 Named after the effect on Dutch industry in the 1970s, when the increase in natural gas prices and
associated balance of payments surplus resulted in appreciation of the guilder (Lewis Jr., l989:p. 1562).
Similar negative effects of boom in oil exports are believed to have occurred in Mexico, Nigeria and
Saudi Arabia (Gillis, eta!.: 1992).
134
"appreciation" of RER discourages exports and makes imports cheaper. Depreciation of
RER increases competitiveness of exports and makes imports costlier.
The rapid rise in primary exports leads to declining relative shares of agriculture
and manufacturing industries because of a number of processes mentioned below:
• The RER appreciates with increased inflow of foreign currency. This is because either
the NER appreciates if it is market-driven and allowed to float; or, if the NER is
pegged and kept constant (like the Omani Rial to US Dollar rate), then money supply
and domestic prices would increase. The appreciation in RER, on the one hand,
discourages exports of agricultural and manufactured goods and, on the other,
reduces profitability of the import-competing domestic production. Resources tend to
flow out of the tradables sector with the result that relative shares of agriculture and
manufacturing industries in national output tend to decline.
• The increased aggregate demand resulting from higher primary export incomes does
not make agriculture and industry sectors more profitable because production of
tradable goods have to counter actual or potential competition from imports, and the
world prices of tradables do not change in response to higher demand in one country.
Moreover, the appreciation in RER raises competitiveness of imports as they become
relatively cheaper in real terms.
• Since the supply of non-tradable services (including labour) is less elastic (as these
cannot be supplemented by imports), their prices rise as aggregate demand increases
with rise in primary exports. This raises the costs of non-tradables purchased by the
tradables sector. However, as we shall see in Chapters IV and V. in Oman the price of
labour has not risen, despite increased demand, because of the government policy of
employing expatriate labour.
For these reasons, booming primary exports result in slowing down the output
growth of tradables and accelerates the growth of non-tradables. Consequently, the
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relative shares of agriculture and manufacturing decline and the share of services
increases.
However, an important element in achieving successfiul structural change is the
type of institutional arrangements formulated by primary exporting countries to manage
the upswing and downswing of cyclical changes in primary exports. In the case of Oman.
and as we shall discuss in Chapters IV and V, the setting up of the SGRF as an adjustment
mechanism to manage the cyclical fluctuation in the price of oil greatly facilitated the
development process.
2.4.4 Neo-classical school
As discussed in Chapter I, for most of the post-war period to the early 1970s, in
most developing countries the state-led development strategy was the accepted paradigm
to overcome the problems of underdevelopment. During this period the neo-classical, pro-
market theories of development, especially in their simpler form, remained relatively
dormant.
However, the 1980s saw what might be termed as 'counter-revolution' in
development thinking. The neo-classical theory of growth - which was relatively
marginalised for almost three decades - made a comeback with enormous consequences.
A World Bank research publication of 1985 with the headlines: 'NEW RESEARCH
PRIORITIES - THE WORLD HAS CHANGED - SO HAS THE BANK' (World
Bank, 1 985b) clearly reflected a shift in perception about the development process.
The emphasis on redistribution with growth and a direct attack on poverty which
became a part of the Bank's strategy in the 1970s was almost forgotten. Instead the
emphasis shifted to the benefits of the market mechanism and the 'rolling back' of the
state. The neo-classicists held that efforts at comprehensive planning had failed and that
liberalisation of foreign trade regimes had shown positive results in both growth and
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welfare (Little, 1982). These views and the strategies based on them have been already
discussed in Chapter I.
In terms of the main components of the neo-classical economists' new vision of
growth, Toye (l993:p.69) summarises them into three main groupings: firstly, the benefits
of markets and the danger that government action will negate these benefits; secondly, the
relative unimportance of physical capital compared with human development policies; and
thirdly, the distorting effect of government policies.
The case for the neo-classical free market system rests not only on the ground of
allocative efficiency; it also rests on the argument that state intervention is inherently
inefficient, particularly in the developing countries. That is, the case for neo-classical
resurgence also rests on the grounds of "government failure" as advocated in the public
choice theory and theory of rent-seeking of Krueger (1974) and its extension in
Bhagwati' s (1982) theory of Directly Unproductive Activities (DUAs). We shall discuss
these issues in Chapter ifi.
2.4.4.1 Advocates of neo-classical policy prescriptions for LDCs
The main proponents of the neo-classical restoration for solving the problems of
developing economies have been, as we noted in Chapter I, the IMF, and the World Bank
through their SAPs. Whilst economists like Bauer (1971), Krueger (1974), Little (1982),
Bhagwati (1982), Lal (1985) etc., were its main theoretical ideologues.
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As Toye notes,
They are united in opposition to Keynes and neo-
Keynesianism, 'structuralist' theories of development and
the use of economic planning for development purposes.
On the positive side, they are united by the belief that the
problems of economic development can only be solved by
an economic system with freely operating markets and a
government that undertakes a minimum of functions. (Toye,
1993 :p.vii).
On the basis of this overall negative perception of the state's role in economic
affairs combined with optimistic perceptions of market forces working out "right prices"
and Pareto-efficient resource allocation, the neo-classicals advocate withdrawal or rolling
back of the state from those areas of economic activity which are best left to market
mechanism, and minimising its role only to areas of market failure. As explained in
Chapter I, using these propositions of neo-classical policy prescriptions, the World Bank
advises the LDCs to follow 'market-friendly' development strategy (World Bank,
1991a:pp.5-11). However, it will be noticed from our analysis in Chapter III that the
market-friendly approach to development as advised to the LDCs by the World Bank
provides for a role of the state which is much wider than that suggested in neo-classical
economics.
2.4.5 Development theories anti strategies recommended in development policies : an
overview
The three main schools of development thought encompass a number of
development strategies which include one or more aspects of a determinate number of
issues. These are briefly stated below:
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a)	 To accelerate the growth of physical capital formation by simultaneous and
balanced growth of several industries linked by complementarity of their markets.
b) To accelerate the rate of investment in physical capital through concentrated
investment in selected social overhead capita! or directly productive activity so
that the resultant unbalanced growth creates conditions favourable for induced
investment through forward or backward linkage effects.
c) To accelerate the rate of accumulation by using a particular sector or industry as
the lead sector so that investment in follower sectors would be induced.
d) To promote import-substituting industries to overcome the problem of adverse
terms of trade arising on account of heavy reliance on primary exports and imports
of manufactures from developed countries.
e) To increase investment, employment and productivity of a modern, capitalist
sector using a perfectly elastic supply of disguised unemployed and under-
employed labour i.e. subsistence agriculture.
f) To directly attack the problem of widespread human deprivation and absolute
poverty by providing basic needs to the whole population.
g) To liberate underdeveloped economies from their dependence upon exploitative
capitalist, developed countries through a socialist revolution.
h) To make state policies 'market-friendly' by creating institutions, environment and
conditions favourable for private investment ensuring efficient functioning of
markets and promoting free trade by following the principle of comparative cost
advantage.
With the exception of the neo-classical school, both the Capital Scarcity and the
Centre-Periphery schools advocated a major role for the state in implementing these
strategies. The extent of that role depended on the initial conditions in each country.
Moreover, such a role, as we shall see in the case of Oman, is not static. It evolves in its
scope, method, and intensity with each stage of development.
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In this context, Byres's (1994:pp. 12-33) analysis of development planning in India
suggests that capitalist transformation entails the development of productive forces
(technology, and other inputs). This, in turn, requires an acceleration and intensification
of the process of capital accumulation on a larger scale. The state's intervention is
therefore potentially critical, since the state may act in a variety of critical ways: as an
agent of technical change, in its fiscal role, as an arbiter and setter of prices, and so on.
Moreover, a state intent upon capitalist transformation must, on given conditions, act as a
promoter of change, as a creator of a large public sector; must initiate accumulation in its
own name; and must decide upon the pattern of that accumulation.
Within the neo-classical school, a greater emphasis is placed on the role of the
market in development; but a free, competitive market is a 'public good" and needs to be
developed and regulated by the state as well. In this sense the neo-classicists have a rather
restricted understanding of the market. The latter could never exist without the state
providing public goods such as infrastructure, legal framework (to protect property and
contracts), communication of information, etc.
2.5 Development Theories and Strategies in Oman's Development Experience
Oman has promoted accelerated development by following a well-co-ordinated
combination of several of the strategies mentioned in section 2.4 of this chapter.
In developing its primary resource, oil, Oman relied on the principles of free trade
and comparative cost advantage, as is suggested by the classical and neo-classical thinkers.
It did not adopt the policies of import-substituting industrialisation proposed by the
Centre-Periphery school. Nor did Oman look at the oil multinationals2 in an antagonistic
way as is suggested by the Dependency approach. These pragmatic policies, as we shall
see in Chapters IV and V, were suited to Oman's specific circumstances prevailing at that
'Because its use by one player does not preclude its use by another to any lesser extent.
2 Appendix 2-Al provides background information regarding Oman's policy towards oil companies.
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time, and enabled Oman to achieve the twin objectives of economic and social
development. Using the oil sector as Rostow' s (1960) "leading sector" the state in Oman
launched a large scale public investment programme to diversify the economy and develop
the market mechanism, and, at the same time, it was able to increase both production and
reserves of oil during the period 1976-95.
During the First and Second FYPs (1976-1985), Oman followed the 'unbalanced'
growth strategy by concentrating a major proportion of the non-oil sector investment in
what Hirschman (1958) and Rosenstein-Rodan (1984) described as Social Overhead
Capital. That is, in the creation of social and economic infrastructures consisting of
education, health, housing, roads, electricity, water supply and telecommunication
network. Only a small proportion of non-oil investment had been devoted to what
Rosenstein-Rodan and Hirschman called Directly Productive Activity such as (non-oil)
manufacturing industries, agriculture and fisheries' (ibid). Similarly, in terms of regional
development, an unbalanced strategy was adopted during the first two plans. As a result,
the main thrust of development was concentrated in the capital area in the initial stages.
This was done to remove a number of immediate bottlenecks, so that a more sectorally
and regionally balanced strategy of development can be followed in subsequent plans.
On account of the near-complete economic stagnation that prevailed in Oman
during the pre-1970 period, the supply of private entrepreneurship was quite scarce in
Oman during the first decade of development planning - 1976 to 1985. Hence the state
had to play the role of Schumpeterian entrepreneur by setting up a number of wholly or
partly owned enterprises for production of cement, copper, flour and petroleum refined
products, as we shall see in Chapters V and VI.
'This was not because of any intentional neglect of these sectors, but by investing in SOC the government
was creating/providing positive linkages for the development of these sectors. Moreover, in line with the
long-term development strategy, these were the sectors where the private sector involvement was
predominant.
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However from the Third and Fourth FYP onwards (1986-95), Oman shifted
towards a balanced growth strategy by giving priority to balanced regional development
and growth of directly productive activities or goods producing sectors. The share of
non-oil sector in GDP (at current prices) has grown from 41 per cent to 63 per cent
between 1976 and 1995 and the combined share of agriculture, fisheries, non-oil mining
and manufacturing increased from 2.6 per cent to 7.8 per cent during the same period
(Oman, 1986b, and 1996b).
On the lines suggested by the "basic needs" strategy, substantial investment in
social and economic infrastructure was aimed at directly approaching the problem of
enhancing human development, instead of waiting for the working out of the 'trickle
down' mechanism. As Appendix table 1 in the Introduction to the thesis shows, this direct
approach significantly improved life expectancy, substantially reduced infant mortality and
dramatically expanded school enrolment. Although income distribution and poverty data
for Oman are not available, the rapid growth in per capita income combined with equally
rapid expansion in health and education, and supply of public utilities like electricity,
water, transport and housing should have reduced both inequalities and absolute poverty.
In the sphere of foreign trade, following the neo-classical trade theory, it has kept
its domestic market almost completely open to imports of all types of manufactured
goods'. At the same time, without creating quota based protectionist barriers, it has also
promoted import substituting industries such as cement, food processing, packaging,
printing and stationery etc. through incentive-based promotion of private sector
investment in these areas. Thus the domestic producers in these areas have to compete
with imported goods (see Chapter VII).
In private sector investment, as we shall see in Chapters V and VI, the state's
attitude is more promotional than regulatory; the restrictions, where they exist, relate
'However, as we shall argue in Chapter VU, such a policy has not been veiy conducive for diversification,
and perhaps a more focused state-led industrial policy is warranted to achieve the diversification of the
economy.
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mainly to standards of quality and safety. In short, the state policy aims to use
development planning to develop a competitive and free market. Thus Oman's
development planning has managed to strike a balance between capital formation and
consumption, economic growth and human development, openness and import-
substitution, state intervention and market-based development.
However, development is a continuous and dynamic process and strategies have to
be continuously reviewed and redefined as understanding of the process deepens and as
new problems to be solved by 'development' emerge. As Streeten, (l978:p.34) has
observed, there is a solution to every problem but also a problem to every solution.
Therefore, based on the experiences gained over the last two decades, the New
Development Strategy proposed in Oman call for a change in emphasis. As we shall see in
Chapter VII, these call for a more proactive role for the state in achieving diversification
and human resources development, while at the same time, aim towards fostering a
dynamic and efficient private sector.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter has shown that although development economics has been among the
oldest branches of economics from the days of Adam Smith, it was not until after the
Second World War that a renewed interest in the sub-discipline evolved.
Therefore, to address the problems of poverty and backwardness, the pioneers in
development economics including Rosenstein-Rodan, Nurkse, Hirschman, Prebisch,
Lewis etc. had to conceptualise, deduce principles, build models and delineate strategies of
development to overcome the many obstacles to development.
Some of their ideas on development were derived from the five major groups of
theories: the classical economics of Adam Smith and Ricardo; the Marxian perspective;
the neo-classical and Schumpeterian analyses; and the Keynesian macroeconomics.
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We have also shown how development economics and development theory
evolved in the post-war II period in response to the needs of the newly independent
developing countries. In our attempt to classify the major schools of development
theories and strategies, we identified three main schools: Capital Scarcity; Centre-
Periphery; and the Neo-classical. Moreover, since oil export revenues have been the
principal source of finance for Oman's development, we have also provided the context of
theories specifically dealing with development of primary exporting countries and noted
that these theories are relevant to Oman. We also argued that development, as a concept,
has always been strongly associated with the state, and with national development
strategies. And since the theories and strategies advocated by the first two schools were
more relevant to the conditions prevailing in the developing countries, these two schools
formed the basis of most of the development process during the three decades following
the end of the Second-War.
The theories and strategies described in this chapter provided an inventory from
which Oman could draw its own policies and strategies of development in a pragmatic
manner and in relation to its economic and social conditions. This necessitated the state
taking a leading role in the development process including nurturing the private sector and
developing the market. In this sense Oman's strategies and policies of development were
a synthesis of different approaches that we have described in this chapter. The exact
nature of the synthesis depended on the specific problems that Oman had to confront at a
particular time. We analyse these issues in Chapters ifi, IV and V in particular.
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Appendix 2-Al
Oman's Policy Towards Oil Companies
Oman has never been a member of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting
Countries. In dealing with the foreign oil companies engaged in oil exploration and
extraction, Oman has followed its own independent policy. Accordingly, it has followed
OPEC actions only when its national interests required it to do so. While some OPEC
members like Iran, Iraq, Kuwait and Algeria nationalised their oil industry in the early
1970s (Findlay, l994:p.79) the Oman government, by an agreement in 1974, acquired a
60 per cent share in PDO and established a joint management committee to oversee the
operations of the joint venture (Al Yousef, l995:p.27). Thus, in relation to the foreign
partners of PDO' and other foreign oil companies engaged in oil exploration and
extraction, Oman's policy had two objectives: (a) to acquire, through negotiations, a
significant share in the oil operation that would enable it to influence the exploration and
production policy; and (b) to provide the foreign shareholders with sufficient incentives to
invest capital and introduce latest technology for the development of new and existing oil
reserves2.
Appendix 2-Al contd...
1 Presently, oil in Oman is extracted mainly, though not wholly, by a joint venture company called the
Petroleum Development (Oman) Ltd. PDO is jointly owned by the Government of Oman (60 per cent),
Royal Dutch Shell (34 per cent) Compagme Francaise des Petroles (4 per cent) and PARTEX (2 per
cent). PDO accounts for 94 per cent of the total extraction. The rest is extracted by three foreign
companies viz. Elf Acquitaine (ELF), Occidental Group (OXY) and Japan Petroleum Exploration Co.
(JAPEX). Oil produced by PDO, is distributed among its partners on the basis of their respective shares
in its ownership (Oman, 1996b:p. 189).
2 This approach was in the line with the neo-classical interpretations of multinationals' and their role in
the economic development of Third World countries (Jenkins, 1987). It is based on the assumption that
foreign capital is complementaiy to local capital rather than displacing it, and that increasing competition
between multinationals from different origins has increased the bargaining power of Third world
countries. The retention of foreign shareholders is expected to provide the host country not only with the
latest state-of-the-art technology, but also with a sharing of risks, foreign capital, management expertise
and the comfort that all new investments would be subject to a thorough cost-benefit analysis.
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Appendix 2-Al contd...
Oman government's pragmatic policy towards foreign oil companies has not only
contributed to a large increase in oil reserves and production but also allowed it to
influence their activities. In fact, the take-over of decision-making by the government was
also a crucial development. By virtue of the 1974 agreement the government was able for
the first time to influence - to the extent possible - the exploration and production
activities of PDO.
The agreement signed in May 1977 between the government and the foreign
partners of PDO, was designed to provide an incentive to the foreign partners to develop
the southern oil fields. The agreement had three main elements: an accelerated
depreciation of the foreign partners' assets (all investments were to be depreciated at 40
per cent in the first year, 30 per cent in the second year arid 10 per cent in each of the next
three years); a guaranteed income to the foreign partners (net of operation costs and
depreciation), of US$ 0.23, per barrel on all the oil produced, indexed to the buy-back
price of Omani crude; and a return of 7.5 per cent on their share of PDO's average assets
(Al Yousef, I995:p3l).
Another important factor in the development of the oil sector was the agreement
reached with the foreign shareholders of PDO in March 1986 whereby it was agreed that
effective from 1 January 1986 the government would pay the private shareholders of PDO
a fee, net of Omani income tax, of 40 US cents per barrel of the increase in the Expected
Ultimate Recovery in each year (Al Yousef, l995:p.33).
The logic of this agreement was to provide an added incentive to the foreign
shareholders to make experience, technology and know-how available so that PDO could
conduct an intensive programme of exploration and also conduct appraisal/appreciation of
oil reserves of PDO. The underlying objective was to increase the oil reserves of PDO, in
particular through exploration, and thus to increase the Expected Ultimate Recovery.
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CHAPTER ifi
PLAN AND MARKET IN DEVELOPMENT : A THEORETICAL AND
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
"In rejecting Lenin it is not necessary to embrace Milton Friedman" - Boston Globe'
3.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to provide a more concrete level of analysis of some of
the major issues that comprise the problem of plan and market in development. The
analysis is comparative and theoretically levelled at the 'middle range 2' for this will allow
us to bring comparative experience from a number of selected countries. This chapter also
lays the framework for a concrete analysis of the role of the state and market in Oman's
development in Chapter VI. Of course the issues discussed in this chapter follow from the
theories and policies, not to mention the debates, that we have analysed in the previous
chapter. In other words this chapter also concretises the issues we discussed in more
abstract terms in Chapter II.
The chapter provides an analysis of the complexity of elements that constitute
planning, including the concepts and definition of planning, and the levels and types of
planning. It then discusses the way planning has worked in practice by drawing on the
experiences of five selected countries, China, India, Japan, South Korea and Oman.
Thereafter, it takes up briefly the arguments put forward by some proponents of market-
led development strategies and the various issues in the plan versus market as they relate
to developing countries.
'As quoted in Nove, A. (1992).
2 By middle range we mean a level of theoretical analysis which can be connected to the empirical
phenomenon being analysed. That is, a level which is both more concrete and observable and around
which strategies and policies can be formulated to effect an outcome.
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This chapter shows that all developing countries, including the East Asian, have
incorporated systematic use of market mechanism and planning in promoting economic
development, and that the state has fostered and sustained the market where this has been
weak or absent. Thus the market and state do not work in isolation. Of course,
development is a dynamic process, and it needs an appropriate and dynamic approach.
And almost all developing countries pass through a number of stages (but not necessarily
schematically or in a uni-linear manner), because the degree of state involvement varies
from one stage to another. The degree and quality of involvement depends on the tasks
the state has to perform, from regulator of the economy to promoter of market and private
enterprise and from provider of basic infrastructure to meeting basic needs.
The chapter concludes that the case for rolling back the state in developing
countries is very weak because the roles that the state and markets play are
complementary and not conflicting, given the specific conditions prevailing in these
countries. The combination of the state and markets is larger than the sum of its parts; so
that more can be achieved by their working together than by each working separately; and
that co-operation rather than conflict between the two entities is more likely to assure
success in securing development.
3.2 Plan and Market in Development : A Comparative Analysis
Although available data in table 3.1 below provide no support for the proposition
that a higher share of government in national income is detrimental to economic
performance, yet the "rolling back" of the state and a free market is deemed to be a cure
for all diseases. For example, during 1980-93, with an average share of central1
government expenditure around 17 per cent of GNP, both South Korea and Thailand
achieved an average annual GDP growth of 9.1 and 8.2 per cent, respectively. Whereas
Central government expenditure comprises the expenditure by all government offices, departments,
establishments, and other bodies that are agencies or instruments of the central authority of a country. It
includes both current and capital (development) expenditure (World Bank, 1995a:p.235).
148
during this period, both Mexico and the Philippines with a similar share of government
expenditure of GNP, achieved an average annual growth of 1.6 per cent and 1.4 per Cent
respectively. On the other hand, United Arab Emirates, with an even lower ratio of
government expenditure to GNP, experienced an average annual growth rate of 0.3 per
cent. Oman, with the highest share of government expenditure in GNP, achieved an
average annual growth of 7.6 per cent, and Botswana which had the second highest share
of government expenditure to GNP after Oman, achieved the highest average annual
growth rate of 9.6 per cent of GDP. Thus there seems to be little substance in the
argument that growth rate of GDP is inversely related to the share of government
expenditure which is taken as an indicator of the state's involvement in economic
activities.
Table 3.1
GDP growth and central government expenditure (1980-93): Oman compared with
selected countries
Average	 Central
Country
	
	
annual growth Government
(%) of GDP expenditure as
______________ ________ % of GNr
Botswana	 9.6	 38.3
South Korea	 9.1	 17.3
Thailand	 8.2	 17.5
Oman	 7.6	 53.5
Malaysia	 6.2	 28.1
Indonesia	 5.8	 21.0
Chile	 5.1	 26.3
Israel	 4.1	 31.1
Mexico	 1.6	 17.4b
Philippines	 1.4	 16.7
United Arab Emirates	 0.3	 11.5 b
Trinidad and Tobago 	 -3.6	 32.Ob
Note:
a) Calculated as a simple average of the years 1980 and 1993.
b) Data for 1980 only, data for 1993 not available.
Source: World Bank (1995a) World Development Report 1995, pp.164-165 and 180-181.
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Coiclough (1991a:p. 16) also shows that there is no evidence to support the notion
that a reduction in public expenditure would accelerate growth, "[t]here is no apparent
relationship between GDP growth rates achieved and the proportional importance of
public spending" (ibid). Conversely, the results of the study carried out by Ram (1986),
indicate that the size of government expenditure is positively associated with economic
growth performance in a range of countries across the world. This is so in the
overwhelming majority of country cases, especially in developing countries.
A careful analysis shows that the roles of states and markets in fostering economic
efficiency are clearly intertwined in the sense that they are mutually reinforcing and both
are dependent on each other. For instance, as we have shown in the two previous
chapters, the development so often cited as convincing proof of the efficiency of the
market - the success of the East Asian economies and the collapse of Communism and
Socialism in Eastern Europe - actually provide the justification for the role of the state.
As Commack argues, a capacity for effective intervention on the part of the state is as
much a requirement for the pursuit of liberal economic policies as it is for intervention
aimed at resisting the pressure of market forces. In the case of Latin America', for
example, Commack argues that "[W]here a policy of active intervention has been
abandoned as a failure, this has not led to a process of reform which has strengthened the
capacity of the state to promote alternative liberal policies any more effectively"
(Commack, 1991 :p. 153).
Equally important is the fact that developing countries, in constructing their
respective paths to social and economic development, pass through certain phases, as we
shall see when we analyse Oman's development in Chapters IV to VI. These phases are
'For example, the modified shift to liberal policies in East Asia was preceded by substantial reforms
imposed by strongly interventionist states, which created the conditions for international competitiveness.
While in the case of Latin America, because the shift is being made from a position of weakness, reforms
have faltered. Both land reform and fiscal reform have generally been avoided, and academic
commentators have generally advocated the postponement of social and economic reform, including
measures for redistribution of income. The basic difference between the two lies in the ability of the state
to direct the accumulation process in the direction which is required by capitalist development at
particular points in time (Comniack, l99l:p.l52).
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determined by the conditions prevailing when the development process is initiated; but are
also strongly influenced by the volume of resources available, the organisational and
institutional arrangements existing at that time to put these to use and the prevailing
international political economy. The policy framework (strategy) is also crucial which is
dependent on a number of factors including those just mentioned.
However, as Byres (l994:pp.7-S) argues in his support of planning in India, any
assessment of the need for planning or otherwise, or the success or failure of planning,
must be seen within an historical perspective. Such an assessment must be carried out in
two overlapping senses: an analytical-political economy sense; and a chronological-
political economy sense. In the analytical-political economy sense, development planning
must be understood with respect to the 'laws of motion', or 'tendencies', which mediate
the social formation (in a country) and their attendant contradictions, especially as they
relate to accumulation and the sources of accumulation; secondly, the instrumentality of
development planning must be assessed in relation to the possibility of transition from
economic backwardness to a more developed mode of production; and thirdly, the
historical time within which one must operate, if the treatment is to be adequate, is, at one
level, that of the longue durée'.
The chronological-political economy dimension has three requirements. The first
is a careful account of the sequence in which particular institutions were set up, and by
whom. The second is a treatment of the manner in which plan fonnulation and planning
techniques have proceeded and evolved. And the third is an examination of the unfolding
of the historical experience of the vicissitudes of plan implementation in all their variety.
A full assessment of planning experiences in either the analytical-political economy
or in the chronological-political sense is not within the scope of our research, and since
definitive generalisation on the role of the plan versus market in development may be
This has been described as 'the least perceptible, and in a sense, the slowest of all forms of historical
time ... (whose) effectivity is staggered across centuries, and (whose) reality (is) only measured on that
scale' (Banaji, 1977:p.27, as cited in Byres, 1994:p.l).
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difficult to sustain, there is compelling evidence to support the necessity of a mix of public
and private activities. Therefore, we shall concentrate our discussion of the main issues in
the debate within the context of the theories and strategies of development outlined in
Chapter II.
These issues are: firstly, the presumed superiority (or inferiority) of the 'invisible
hand' of the market over the 'visible' arm of the government to maximise social welfare';
secondly, the efficacy or otherwise of invisible controls of the market mechanism over the
visible controls of state administered planning, in co-ordinating and reconciling conflicting
individual self interests for achieving the goals of economic and social development2;
thirdly, the appropriate role for government in macroeconomic management in the era of
globaiisation3; and fourthly, the quantity and quality of activity to be undertaken by the
market andlor the state. To put it succinctly, what should be the role of the state in
developing countries in the contemporary international economy, and the appropriate level
of public/private sector interaction4?
The question of whether consumption, production, disthbution and prices ought to be regulated to
maximise social welfare is not the point at issue in this debate. Nor is the case of the proponents of state
led planning that leaving the functioning of an economy to free play of market forces would lead to
anarchy and abandonment of the goal of social welfare. In fact both market mechanism and planning are
advocated as instruments to attain maximum social welfare.
2 As set out in Chapter II.
For the neo-liberals, the rise of globalisation realises the ideals of mid-twentieth century free-trade
liberals like Cobden and Bright, and means the end of the Keynesian era. While the dominance of
volatile, international markets, the change to flexible methods of production and the radical reshaping of
the labour force have made states less autonomous and reduced the centrality of national political process
(Hurst and Thompson, 1996:pp.l76-l78).
4The World Development Report (1996:pp. 110-111) similarly listed four groups of goods and services that
have features which tend to make private markets fail, or function inefficiently, creating a potential for
government intervention. These are: (i) Pure public goods such as defence, law and order and
environment protection; (ii) Goods with positive externalities, or spillover benefits, such as education
and health which are worth more to society than to one consumer, (iii) Natural monopolies such as gas
pipelines, local transport and other infrastructure, where unconstrained monopoly producers tend to
overprice and undersupply these services; and (iv) Imperfect information, on the part of either consumers
or providers, may make markets fail. Private commercial insurance, for example, cannot effectively insure
against risks like unemployment, longevity, etc., because these risks are influenced by characteristics and
behaviour of the insured that the insurer cannot observe, along with government policy, and they affect
large parts of the population equally and simultaneously.
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Implicit in the issues raised is that in no country has development been secured
completely by market mechanism or completely by state controls and planning. Even in
the case of to-day's developed market economies, during the second half of the 19th and
the first half of the 20th century, the usual pattern of development was a mixture of the
state providing (implicit or explicit) directions to the development process'; thereby
creating the conditions in which private entrepreneurs could operate (Johnson,
l989:p.5l6). According to Johnson (ibid.), the plan versus market debate pertains only
to the question of which institutional mechanism is best suited to regulate the functioning
of the microeconomy within the broad framework of developmental goals set out
explicitly or implicitly by the state.
3.3 The Relevance of Planning
There are a number of issues that need to be clarified that relate to the
effectiveness of Planning. These have implications for our study. These issues include,
for example, the extent to which planning has or does not have an effect on an actual
economy. The contention is that it is the system or structure of a country that is the main
determinant of an economy, and that policy and planning are marginal to the goals and
objectives attained in an economy.
The second issue relates to the size of a country as the main determinant of social
and economic development, and not policies or planning. It may be contended that
planning in Oman has been effective because it is a small country with a small population
of about 2 million.
'In the twentieth century, for example, states acquired the means to manage or direct national economies,
either through autarchy and state planning, as was the case with state-directed economies in Britain and
Germany in the two world wars, or through Keynesian measures using monetary and fiscal policy to
influence the decision of economic actors and thus alter economic outcomes (Hirst and Thompson,
l996:pp. 174-175). Thus in the advanced Western industrial states it was widely believed that national
economic management could continue to ensure both full employment and relatively steady growth. In
these societies, in which the majority of the population remained manual workers even into the 1960s,
uniform national services in health, education and welfare remained popular.
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The third contention is that countries with a valuable resource such as oil will
achieve development as a result of this resource and that policies and planning are
marginal to this development. Hence, it may be contended that Oman has oil, and
therefore its economic and social development is determined by this fact and that policies
and planning in Oman are marginal to its development.
If the system or structure of an economy, rather than policies or planning were the
more important determinants, then we would find Latin American countries - with weak
planning and policies for most part of their modern history to be at the forefront of
economic and social development.
In fact, one finds extremes of poverty and structural dislocation (debt, capital
flight, etc.) in some of the resource-rich countries such as Mexico, Brazil, Venezuela and
Colombia (Gilbert, 1990).
The impact that policy and planning can have on economic and social development
is illustrated by the case of Sri Lanka. In the 1960s and 1970s, this country had a per
capita GNP which was not too dissimilar to that of India or Pakistan. Whilst the latter
countries had a life expectancy of about 52 years, Sri Lanka's approached 70. In fact, life
expectancy in Sri Lanka rose from 43 years in 1946 to 67 years in 1980. In the same
period, infant mortality declined from 141 to 39 per thousand live births (Gutkind,
l988:p. 140). According to the Human Development Report 1993 (ITNDP, 1993), in
1990 India had per capita income of US$ 360 and life expectancy at birth of 59 years;
Pakistan with a per capita income of US$ 400 had a life expectancy of 58 years and Sri
Lanka' with a per capita income of US$ 470 had life expectancy of 71 years.
The results in Sri Lankan development are better compared to Pakistan and India
because of the systematic application of basic needs policies. Clearly, policies and
'In fact. Sn Lanka's rank of 86 in Human Development Index in 1990, among the 173 countries listed in
the Human Development Report of 1993, was 44 ranks higher than its GNP per capita rank (ibid. :pp. 135-
136).
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planning do have an impact on social and economic processes. It is most unlikely that Sri
Lanka with a lower per capita GNP (in the 1960s and 1970s) than Pakistan and India
would have achieved more favourable results than these countries without effective
planning (Gutkind, 1988).
Regarding the size of a countly - if this was the major determinant of
development, i.e. that a smaller country is better equipped to develop than a large one -
then one would find India achieving greater development than China, which has a larger
population than India. In fact as we shall see later one finds China's development
performance exceeding India's in almost every economic and social indicator.
The third contention regarding resources is weak. If resources alone were the
main determinants of economic and social development then one would find some African
countries such as Nigeria and Gabon at the forefront of development. But this is not the
case. Even more than African countries one would expect Brazil and Mexico, possessing
a variety of valuable resources (oil, minerals, forests, etc.), to be at the forefront of
economic and social development. In fact, as we have mentioned above, the resource-rich
Latin American countries are beset by numerous structural problems in their economy
which are reflected in, for example, great social inequality and poverty (Gilbert, 1990).
Hence, Oman's success in economic and social development cannot be simply
attributed to oil or size of population. As we shall see in Chapter V, without planning,
Oman would not have been able to carry out a successful structural adjustment
programme in the wake of the oil price collapse in 1986, without the interference of the
IFIs. Effective policies, strategies and planning have been crucial in enabling Oman to
achieve a far superior performance in economic and social development, especially during
the period 1980-90', compared to a number of other oil exporting countries.
This was the period when oil prices started theu decline and a number of oil exporting developing
countries among other countries, had to undertake SAPs under the supervision of the IFIs.
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3.4 Arguments for State Intervention through Planning
There are two types of state intervention that shape the process of economic
development. The state may intervene in economic affairs on an ad hoc basis to deal with
particular problems and cases of market failure. Alternatively, the purpose of state
intervention may be to implement a plan of development covering the whole or a large
part of the economy as has been the case, for example in Oman, China, India and the East
Asian economies. Many instances of the former type of state intervention are found in the
histoiy of economic development of USA, UK, Germany and other developed market
economies'. State intervention through planning relates to actions and policies of
governments to attain, within a given time-frame, certain pre-determined objectives and
targets of economic development. State intervention in the socialist economies (China,
Cuba, Vietnam, the former US SR2 and East European countries) and in the developing
mixed economies of Asia, Africa and Latin America belong to this second category.
In the post-war period, development planning was adopted as a means for
overcoming obstacles to development and for ensuring systematic economic growth at
high and constant rates. The theories and strategies of development discussed in Chapter
II provided the assumptions, tools and mechanisms for such activity. Moreover, this
activity was encouraged by the United Nations, the World Bank and foreign aid donors
(Waterston, l982:p.44).
As we shall see in the next section, the kind of planning a country adopts is
dependent on its political, social and economic context as well as its stage of development.
For instance, the series of legislative and adxnimstrative actions taken under "New Deal" by the
government in USA during 1933-37 to deal with the problems thrown up by the great depression of the
1930s. Similarly in the 1930s, the British government provided price support to agriculture, imposed
import quotas on meat products and encouraged, by specific legislation, cartel arrangements in the coal
industiy (Meier and Baldwin, 1957:pp.462-472). Likewise, Waterston (l982:p.4O) states that in Germany
several state governments already engage in planning and the Federal Ministries of Transport, Post offices
and Health have each prepared multi annual investment programmes in their fields of activity.
2 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Russia).
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Also, because of differences in these concepts in developing countries, the scope of
development planning varies accordingly. Thus, we shall see in section 3.5 that
development plans range from the limited and piecemeal, project by project approach
found in mixed economies in early phases of development, to the comprehensive,
centralised planning found in socialised economies. Similarly, the scope and content of
state intervention and market processes also change with each stage of development.
3.4.1 Case for development planning and state intervention'
The proponents of state intervention in economic processes in general, and for
securing development in particular, describe the conditions which necessitate intervention.
The main instrument of this intervention is development planning which concretises and
puts into operation economic development policies. Some of the issues involving state
intervention are identified below.
Firstly, the importance of a strong state - As we have noted earlier, the state has
an important role to play in social and economic change. However, the perceived or
actual need of governments to take care of things by across-the-board interventions will,
of course, differ markedly across time and space. It is the strong role played by the state
which has led to the success of the East Asian economies. Whereas the "softness" of the
states is blamed by Myrdal for failure to implement declared policy goals of socio-
economic development (Myrdal, 1968). Even the World Bank has started to realise the
importance of capable state institutions for implementing good economic policies (World
Bank, 1997a).
Secondly, competitive market as apublic good— Streeten (1995) argues that the
free, competitive market is a public good. There are indeed several ways in which
government intervention can contribute to a better functioning of the market. In addition
Based on Lewis, 1951 and 1966; Grossman, 1974; Rosenstein-Rodan, 1955 and 1984; Hirschman,
1981; Urrutia and Yukawa, 1988 and Cliakravarty, 1991.
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to providing a framework for regulation and promotion of private sector activity, in terms
of enforcement of contracts, property rights, anti-monopoly laws, the government can, in
certain cases, by getting prices "wrong" achieve the desired objectives of efficiency. In
Oman, for example, as we describe in Chapter IV, the government policy of pricing crude
oil to the domestic refinery at a price exceeding the international oil price2 was able to
achieve a number of development objectives.
Thirdly, complementarily of public and private investment - Government
intervention has also been blamed for "crowding-out" private sector investment.
However, it has been proved that government investment in roads, ports and industrial
estates has actually stimulated private investment. For instance, in Oman, the government
has encouraged the private sector to set up many industrial projects by establishing a
number of modern industrial estates. The same has been the case, throughout the semi-
industrial world (Taylor, l994:p.75).
Fourthly, state intervention to overcome market failures - A principal
justification for public policy intervention lies in the frequent and numerous shortcomings
of market outcomes. Although Lal (1985) for example, considers all development
economics to be misguided because it advocates a role for government in overcoming
market failure, Myrdal, (1968) sees the absence of intervention as inevitably causing
systems to deviate from both growth and equity because of the prevalence of market
failures. However, even the World Bank supports government intervention to rectify
market failures (World Bank, 1991a; 1996).
Fifthly, in many developing economies, the market is relatively undeveloped or
highly imperfect in some important sectors, for example, in subsistence agriculture,
'This has been the case in all late-industrialising countries, "states have intervened to get prices "wrong"
because initially firms could not compete even in labour-intensive industries on the basis of low ges"
(Amsden, 1992:p.6l).
2 About half of the crude oil supplied to the refinery is being charged at a fixed price of USS 30 per barrel,
while the other half, is charged at export prices charged for other buyers of Ornani crude oil. See for more
details Chapter IV.
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traditional small industries, finance, labour, etc. Here state intervention operates as a
surrogate market by intervening through allocation of resources, pricing, and so on.
Hence the concepts of market failure, particularly of externalities and public goods,
acquire much wider meaning. For example, government subsidies or direct provision are
justified in education and technology - because they yield positive externalities (benefits)
for society at large in addition to the benefits derived by the recipients; in increasing
returns industries - markets will fail to generate efficient outcomes where production is
subject to increasing returns (falling marginal costs), e.g. public utilities 1 , " [TJhe provision
of such "overhead costs" for the economy as a whole requires a large minimum size of
investment in each infrastructure project and an irreducible minimum industry mix of
different public utilities" (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1 984:p.2 14). In promoting distributional
equity, it is well acknowledged, that the distributional results of even well-functioning
markets may not accord with socially accepted standards of equity. Hence, state
intervention in markets is often required to correct adverse distributional effects, and
instances of market imperfections—these include problems of immobility of labour, capital
and entrepreneurship, absence or inadequacy of information, and high transaction costs2.
Sixthly, 'Big Push', market and planning - The market-mechanism is incapable
of handling big changes. Rosenstein-Rodan suggests that investment programming
(planning) is desirable because of the indivisibility of capital required in development
projects and where large rather than small changes are involved. According to him, the
price mechanism works perfectly only under the assumption of small changes (Rosenstein-
M Hirsclunan (1981 pp.80-Si) states about the provision of public goods by the state: "There are many
well-known public or semi-public goods of this sort, from power, transportation and irrigation to
education and public health often designated as "infrastructure", as though they were preconditions for
the more directly productive activities, these goods have been provided in response to urgent demand
emanating from such activities ... [Tjhese conditions point to the domain of public goods that must be
supplied by the state f they are to be supplied at all" (emphasis added by the present author).
2 As Toye (1993:p. 104) argues: "If, despite all the theoretical juggling, distortions in income distribution
and the price of labour in developing countries refuse to disappear, and if applied welfare economics
provides only an incomplete method of correcting for them in the direction of economic development,
what is to be done? Either economic events can be left to take their own course, or governments must
have recourse again to familiar techniques of macroeconomic planning to establish the overall framework
thin which microeconomic choices can be rationally made".
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Rodan, 1955:p.513). By their very nature, developmental projects involve big, massive
changes which cannot be absorbed through marginal adjustments. Small independent
economic agents cannot visualise the need for such changes. Nor do they have the
capacity or willingness to undertake the large risks and initial investment involved in these
projects'.
Seventhly, planning and macroeconomic managemeni - for some of the
arguments put forward by the proponents of 'market-friendly' development policies, for
example, the desirability of balanced budgets, free private capital flows to finance
development and balanced external current accounts, it is difficult to see how these can be
achieved without decisive action to remedy the weaknesses which made state intervention
relatively ineffective in the first place. Clearly the debt crisis of the I 980s and its pervasive
negative effects on development in highly indebted countries is a good example of market
failure.
Since most developing countries suffer from an investment gap, (shortage of
domestic savings to cover investment requirements) and a foreign exchange gap (inability
of exports to cover imports of goods and services), it is inconceivable to rely on market
mechanism to manage these gaps in a manner that would meet the multiple goals of
development. What is needed is a long-term macroeconomic planning framework to
ensure that growth rate is sustained, inflation is under control, fiscal deficits are
sustainable and external debt is manageable. At the same time, governments have to
ensure that the economy generates adequate savings to support the investments required
to achieve sustainable development and the real exchange rate is in line with the real rate
required for internal and external balances. "Governments have a clear responsibility to
ensure that growth prospects are not undermined by problems created by macroeconomic
According to Rosenstein-Rodan (l955:pp.5 13-515), in the case of big investment projects, the life time
of equipment is long (say 10 years) and so "the individual investor's risk may be higher than that
confronting an overall investment programme" based on complementarity of industries. Again, "because
of the indivisibility (lumpiness) of capital, large rather than small changes are involved"(ibid.).
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balances" (Weiss, l995:p. 1 1). Similarly, state intervention is considered necessary to
manage all the issues related to balance of payments, foreign aid and external borrowing,
regional development, countering the effects of the 'Dutch disease' and creating the
necessary mechanism for dealing with windfalls and volatility in the prices of primary
produce - as we shall see when discussing the experience of Oman in Chapters IV and
V.
Thus in the 1 950s and 1 960s, for most of the developing economies the only
escape route from the low equilibrium trap and vicious circle of poverty was to give a big
push to the economy through state intervention by substantially raising the rate of capital
formation and allocating the same to various sectors/industries in accordance with a plan.
This was to be achieved either through the application of a balanced or an unbalanced
growth strategy, adoption of import substituting or outward-oriented industrialisation
policies, or sequential combination of all, depending on the specific circumstances of a
developing country.
3.5 The Process and Organisation of Planning
It is important, here to examine the concept and definition of planning, the levels
and types of planning, the objectives planning is supposed to achieve, questions relating
to plan formulation, implementation, and the institutional arrangements needed to assure
success in the whole area referred to as planning practice.
3.5.1 Concept and definition of planning
Planning is a complex and multi-dimensional phenomenon, and since it is used in
so many different ways, there is often a confusion about its meaning. In the context of
defining planning, Waterston (l982:p.27) writes: "Planning has been defined in many
'For example, the obvious success of the NICs like South Korea and Taiwan is put down to avoidance by
their governments of serious errors in macroeconomic management (ibid :p.9).
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ways, but most authorities agree that it is, in essence, an organised, conscious and
continued attempt to select the best available alternatives to achieve specific goals.
Planning involves the economising of scarce resources".
Conyers and Hills (l984:p.3) adopt the following definition: "a continuous process
which involves decisions, or choices, about alternative ways of using available resources,
with the aim of achieving particular goals at some time in the near future". "Planning" as
Prime Minister Nehru of India succinctly put it, "is the exercise of intelligence to deal with
facts and situations as they are and find a way to solve the problems" (Nehru, 1961 :pp. 33-
34). Myrdal points out that basic planning ideology is essentially rationalist in approach
and interventionist in conclusions (Myrdal, l968:p.7O9). In fact, it is this view of planning
as basically interventionist that has evoked such debate among neo-classical economists
about the relevance of planning'.
Thus the main elements comprising the concept of planning are: to plan means to
choose; this involves control and allocation of resources, the making of decisions about
alternatives and planning for the future.
Since the subject matter of our discussion is planning for development, we will
concentrate our review on those aspects of planning which deal with socio-economic
development.
By development planning, we mean the deliberate shaping of the process of
economic development to achieve a set of inter-related objectives within a given period.
In contrast, a Market is the co-ordinating mechanism where the forces of supply and demand in an
economy determine prices, output and methods of production via the automatic adjustment of price
movements. At the point of market equilibrium, supply and demand balance and no agent can get a better
result than the outcome derived from the equilibrium price. Thus it is quite possible to see the attraction
of a theozy of pure competition. Under pure and perfect competition there are many sellers and buyers
and, if the nature of the commodity is well-defined, the outcome delivered by the market is among the best
which can be realised. Fiowever, any desired pareto optimum can be reached by the interplay of markets
and transfers via subsidies and taxation. The reality is that in sharp contrast to what conventional neo-
classical theory teaches, markets do not rule everything. More important is how states adapt to new
market pressures.
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While Waterston (1982:p.27) defines development planning in the following way:
"Countries were considered to be engaged in development planning if their governments
were making a conscious and continuing attempt to increase their rate of economic and
social progress and to alter those institutional arrangements which were considered to be
obstacles to the achievement of this".
And Meier (l987:p.6) provides the justification for planning as: "The case for
planning had been founded on a belief in pervasive market failures, the need for a
government to step up the rate of development by forcing up the level of investment, and
the need to promote external economies and, more generally, balanced growth" (ibid).
Most developing countries in the 195 Os, therefore, believed that basic questions
relating to how much to save, where to invest, and in what forms to invest could be best
handled with the help of a plan.
3.5.2 The levels and types of planning
An important aspect in planning is the relationship between 'policy-making',
'planning' and 'implementation'. Although planning and policy-making cannot be easily
separated, policy decisions tend to precede planning decisions in the same way that goals
have to be formulated before the policies to attain them can be implemented and planned.
However, policy-making is influenced by the political economy framework within
which planning is articulated; that is levels and type of planning will be influenced by a
number of political economic factors. These include the broader domain within which the
state operates and the reality that, "all societies have 'structures' and states have to obey
their logic and adapt to its compulsions" (Kaviraj, 1991 :p.73, as cited in Byres,
l994:p. 14). Then there is the question of the relative autonomy of the state, because as
Byres (1994:p.22) argues, such an autonomy "in principle allows planning as a possible
means of hastening capital transformation, in circumstances in which capitalist classes have
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not yet become dominant" and, as we shall discuss in Chapter V in the case of Oman, the
high degree of autonomy enjoyed by the state during the First FYP was crucial in igniting
the development process, while the subsequent emergence of vested interests frustrated to
a certain extent the objectives of the Second FYP. Of course classes other than capitalist,
may hinder or facilitate efficient development. Each situation has to be subjected to a
concrete analysis and not posited a priori1.
Therefore, one of the most significant implications of the inter-relationship
between planning and policy-making is the fact that planning cannot be considered in
isolation from the political ideology of the government in power and the social structure of
the society. Factors such as these have direct impact on the role, methods and
organisation of planning and on the contents of the plan, with the result that there are
inevitably enormous variations from one country to another. For example, the role and
nature of planning in a one-party African state such as Tanzania or Zambia, may be very
different from the highly populated and unequal society of India, while the situation in
India is entirely different from that in Oman.
The same differences apply to levels and types of planning. In terms of types of
planning, Waterston (1982:Chapter 2) identifies four broad categories. These are: (i) war-
time planning; (ii) town and country planning; (iii) anticyclical planning; and (iv)
development planning. Whilst the three most common levels are project planning, sectoral
planning and integrated area planning or regional planning. These levels are reflected in
the varieties of the plans.
There are many varieties of development plans2. Those that are used in socialist
countries are 'comprehensive' plans which are prepared in greater detail in order to
provide a basis for the mandatory quotas and instructions issued to state agencies for
For example, the present Sultan's father was clearly antagonistic to change; he was the ruler of a
Sultanate; the present Sultan is the ruler of the Sultanate of Oman - but he is very favourably disposed to
change and towards planning to secure this as efficiently and profoundly as possible.
2 See Waterston (1982:Chapter 5) for a detailed survey of varieties of development plans.
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implementation. These plans are typically divided into sectoral and regional plans which
have to be integrated in the national plan.
Comprehensive plans in mixed economies, generally, rely on broad aggregate
targets which are conceived as indicators rather than binding targets. The degree to which
comprehensive development plans of countries with mixed economies are divided into
detailed sectoral and regional programmes varies greatly among countries and among
sectors in a country. These may also vary in the same country over time, depending on
the stage of development'. Generally, the sectors of the plan in which public investment
predominates are worked out in greater detail than those in which private investment
prevails.
As a rule, plans in mixed economies such as Oman are binding on the public sector
where government has direct control, but not on the private sector where persuasion in the
form of incentives is mainly relied upon to influence the size and composition of private
investment within a plan 2. Public investment programmes although covering only a part of
an economy, are generally considered to be the development plans. As Waterston
(l982:p.11O) states "most national development plans are public investment plans".
Similarly, Yukawa (l988:pp.21-22) indicates, many countries with mixed
economies adopt the project-by-project approach to planning at the beginning of their
development. However, such an approach can lead to great difficulties in co-ordination,
as Oman's experience3
 discussed in Chapter V shows. Therefore, it may be desirable to
replace this approach with integrated public investment planning, combining individual
'The evolution of development planning, in Oman, as we shall see in Chapter V. through the successive
five-year plans, in its scope and coverage, resembles this typology.
2 The French plans have been called mandatory in the public sector and "indicative" in the private sector
(Waterston, l982:p. 117).
Oman adopted the project-by-project approach between 1970 and 1975, at the start of its development
process. However, the failure of co-ordination between these projects on one hand and between the
implementing ministries and the treaswy on the other, led to a severe financial crisis in 1974. This led to
adoption of formal planning in Oman (Oman, 1976a).
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projects into sectoral programmes and then into an investment plan for the public sector,
as has been the case in Oman's successive five-year plans. As a country moves into a
more advanced stage of development, comprehensive planning - the most complete form
of development planning - becomes feasible. Development plans differ as much in
duration as in form, but they may generally be classified as short-term, medium-term, or
long-term. Short-term plans are typically for one year, while medium-term plans are for
periods ranging between three and seven years, with five years as the most common case,
and long-term plans for periods often to twenty years (ibid).
Lewis (1951), Tinbergen (1967) and Yukawa (1988) suggest that planning should
start with a perspective plan, incorporating the country's long-term perspectives and
development objectives. "Perspective plans are recommended because they can promote
fundamental transformations in the social and economic structures which economic
development requires by its very nature and which a shorter-term plan would not be able
to bring about" (Yukawa, op. cit. :pp.2l-22).
3.5.3 Plan formulation and implementation
The concept of planning as a means of achieving goals raises issues about the
nature of the goals and the process of goal formulation. This, in turn, raises another
complex set of issues about who should be responsible for the formulation of goals and
whose interests should be represented when formulating these goals. Moreover, since
planning involves allocation of resources, the question of identification, mobilisation and
deciding on alternative courses of action becomes equally crucial.
Byres (1994) describes the manner in which plan formulation and planning
techniques have evolved in India since 1947; for example, the use made of successive
planning models to underpin economic strategy, the early progression to perspective
planning, and the manner of its development, and the procedures by which targets have
been set.
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An important aspect of the planning process' is selecting and co-ordinating the
best available alternatives in order to give desirable direction and to accelerate a country's
development. Therefore central to the process of plan formulation is the question of the
policies formulated to tackle particular issues facing a country at a certain time.
Again as mentioned before, the type of policies and strategies a country adopts
depends on its initial conditions, resource endowment and political context. Therefore,
between 1950 and 1970, many LDCs adopted planning as an escape route from the low
level equilibrium trap by substantially raising the rate of capital formation and allocating
the same to various sectors and industries. As Tani (1988) in his analysis of the arguments
and benefits of economic planning in Japan states:
It was the economic plans of the second post-war decade
that established effective procedures for comprehensive
indicative economic planning which mobilised the nation to
build an independent national economy through rapid
industrial transformation ... [T]he second economic plan
noted market forces hindered voluntary adjustment among
private enterprises and argued that these limits necessitated
indirect government intervention in the market ... [T]he
market mechanism is not perfect, but has defects identified
by recent developments in economic theory with policy
implications for sectoral policy frameworks (Tani,
l988:pp.28O and 293).
'Benhakker (1980, cited in Conyers and Hills, 1984:p.72) identifies 10 stages. These are: (i) appraisal of
the current state of affairs: (ii) assessment of future directions for progress and preliminaiy priorities
among direction; (iii) preliminaiy formulation of objectives and estimation of available funds; (iv)
consideration of alternative courses of action; (v) specification of objectives and sub-objectives; (vi)
identification of alternative programmes, projects, policies and strategies; (vii) search for the best
solutions; (viii) derivation of evaluation criteria; (ix) application of evaluation criteria; and (x)
determination of action plan and budget.
167
The works of a number of authorities on economic planning [Lewis, (1951 and
1966); Grossman, (1974); Waterston, (1982); Chakravarty, (1987 and 1991); and Urrutia
and Yukawa, (1988)] identifj the following items which they suggest are the essential
requirements of a development plan:
1) Planning requires first the creation of a public authority which is empowered by the
government to prepare the plan and review its implementation and achievements.
In most developing mixed economies, the plan is implemented by the executive
branch of the government i.e. by the ministries and departments of the government.
These may operationalise the plan through public and private sector organisations.
In the case of Oman, the Development Council was set up in 1975 to provide
strategic guidance and political impetus to the plan, while a technical secretariat
was established at the same time to prepare the plan and provide technical support
to the Council and to the implementing ministries.
ii) A survey and diagnosis of the existing economic situation and stock of available
resources must be included in a plan.
iii) A plan must clearly set out the objectives or the goals of development to be
achieved by the plan. Since the objectives may be in conflict or be mutually
exclusive, they have to be prioritised in relation to investment allocation. These
objectives have to be translated into quantitative targets.
iv) A plan must be based on a development strategy or a set of strategies to achieve
the plan goals. The strategy identifies the means-ends (cause-effect) relationships
as well as the political blockages to development. It also involves a strategy for
resource mobilisation. The strategy indicates the economic theory on which the
plan model is based. In mathematical language, the strategy or the model is shown
by a set of equations. The strategy must be internally consistent and reconcile
conflicting objectives.
v) A plan must provide macroeconomic projection for the whole economy showing
projections for thture growth rates of population, national income, employment,
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savings, investment, exports, imports, private sector outlays, broad sectoral output
growth, etc.
vi) A plan is incomplete if it does not state the policy instruments to be instituted to
implement the different components of the development strategy. The plan
strategy can be achieved through two types of policy instruments viz. (a)
administrative directions and controls i.e. planning by direction; and (b) invisible
controls of price mechanism i.e. planning by inducement (Lewis, 1951 :pp. 14-26).
vii) Since a plan implies time-bound actions, it should provide a time schedule and
sequencing of implementation of policies and achievement of targets. The
sequencing of implementation should be incorporated in the plan strategy or
model.
In the case of Oman, as we shall see in Chapters IV and V, a ten point long-term
development strategy has guided the planning process since 1975 and the five-year plans'
documents have identified short - and medium-term objectives that need to be achieved
within the framework of this long-term strategy. A package of policies, measures and
projects to achieve the established goals is also laid down in each plan.
Associated with the formulation of the plan is its implementation. Until recently,
as Waterston (1982 :pp. 333-336) indicates, it was thought that the key element in the
planning process was the formulation of an economically consistent plan. It was not
generally realised that a consistent plan does not ensure implementation any more than an
inconsistent one. Thus failure to implement the policies and required actions contained in
plans, programmes or projects is widely recognised to be one of the main if not the only,
weakness of contemporary planning in Third World countries (Waterston, 1982).
Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) define implementation as a process of interaction between
the setting of goals and actions geared to achieving them; while Grindle (1980) suggests
that the task of implementation is to establish a link that allows the goals of public policies
to be realised as outcomes of government activity.
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In the same vein, Chakravarty (1987) concludes that the dichotomy which is seen
to exist between theory and planning in practice in India can be viewed in terms of the
neglect of the 'feasibility of plans'. He suggests that "a good plan must minimally attempt
a proper appraisal of the feasibility of what it normatively postulates" (ibid :p. 132). A
second interpretation of this dichotomy would be in terms of the level of aggregation
involved in macro-economic planning and its inability to influence the very large number
of actors involved in implementation of plans, i.e. the failure to capture the true state of
underlying structural relationships.
There are a number of other factors that affect plan implementation such as the
nature of the planning process and the contents of the plans. The two most important
ones are - organisation of planning and implementation, and management of the
implementation process. The importance of the first factor lies in the fact that many of the
problems of plan implementation can be attributed to organisational factors, including
inadequate co-ordination between professional planners and others involved directly or
indirectly in the planning process and the lack of co-ordination between these and other
individuals or organisations, especially the various components of the government's
administrative machinery (Waterston, 1982:Chapters 8 and 9).
An important aspect of the management of the planning process is the mobilisation
of resources - finance, manpower and equipment - needed to undertake actions
embodied in plans. Many plans are not implemented as planned because these resources
are not available in the right quantity, at the right place, and at the right time (Conyers and
Hills, 1984). Another important part of the management process is monitoring and
evaluation. A variety of techniques have been developed to assist the planners to improve
the management process such as critical path analysis, bar charts, programme evaluation
and review technique'.
'Conyers and Hills (l984:pp. 154-175) give full details of these techniques
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In addition to the internal factors that impinge negatively upon plan
implementation, there are external factors that can also have either a negative or positive
influence on the outcome. These include, inter alia, the international political
environment, fluctuations in terms of trade, international boom or recession, which as we
shall see in Chapter V, have influenced both the formulation and implementation of
successive five-year plans in Oman.
3.5.4 Institutional arrangements in planning
Effective planning means not only having 'good' plans but also an appropriate and
efficient organisation' for implementation and evaluation. "The successful implementation
of a plan is largely a matter of proper organisation and administration" (Waterston,
l982:p.339). Similarly, Waterston emphasises the need for plans to be realistic in terms of
the resources available for plan implementation and the political and administrative
capacity required to support and implement them. "A good plan" he says, "is realistic and
a realistic plan does not set unsustainable targets" (ibid :p.344). Thus Waterston finds
that:
The available evidence makes it clear that in countries with
development plans, lack of adequate government support is
the prime reason why most are never carried out.
Conversely, the cardinal lesson that emerges from the
planning experience of developing countries is that the
Waterston (1982) provides in Part Two of his study a full review of the Organisation of Planning.
However, the kind of planning machinery a country adopts, depends largely on its political, social and
economic institutions and its stage of development. Establishment of a central planning agency is seen as
normal in most developing countries as development proceeds. In many mixed economies, the budget
office located in the ministry of finance acts as a de facto planning authority. A central planning agency
is normally responsible for (i) the formulation and revision of national development plans; (ii) the
preparation of annual plans; (iii) recommending policies and measures required to implement plans; (iv)
monitoring and evaluating implementation; and (v) co-ordinating foreign technical assistance. Some
countries have added the central statistical office as a part of the planning agency as is the case in Oman,
where the statistical office is part of the Ministry of Development. Experts differ on the appropriate
location of a planning agency, but in a country where planning is accorded high priority, such an agency
is almost invanably located close to the chief executive; again, this has been the case in Oman.
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sustained commitment of a politically stable government is
sine qua non for development. Where a country's
leadership makes development a central concern, the people
can also be interested through the judicious use of economic
incentives (ibid.: p.367).
Streeten (1995 :pp.236-23 8) explains that institutions determine the organisational
basis from which the energy, commitment and enthusiasm of the beneficiaries can be
enlisted. He thus finds that too much centralised decision-making may fail altogether, or if
successful, will prove extremely expensive; too much reliance on "bottom-up" initiatives
will be frittered away or be taken over by local power elites1.
In the same vein, an evaluation of the Indian Planning System (Byres, l994:p.532)
found that the problem of planning in India was not one of technical capabilities and
functionaries but had to do with the nature and levels of a decision-making process which
was too bureaucratic and centralised.
3.6 Planning in Practice
We shall now examine the way planning has worked in practice and the manner in
which the institutional factors have influenced the outcome. This will be done by first,
reviewing the experience of China and India followed by the case of Japan and South
Korea. We shall then examine how planning and market in Oman have worked together in
practice.
'The way economic and social processes evolve has been a source of some debate. Polanyi (1957) argues
in The Great Transformation that conscious political action is required to transform market activities into
a market economy. "The step which makes ... regulated markets into a sell-regulating market, is indeed
crucial. The nineteenth century ... naively imagined that such a development was the natural outcome
It was not realised that the gearing of markets into self-regulating system ... was the effect of high
artificial stimulants administered to the body social" (Polanyi, I957:p.57 as quoted in Palan, et a!.,
1 996:pp.28-3O).
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3.6.1 The case of China and India
China and India provide a good basis for comparing the experience of planning.
oth countries are large and had strong structural similarities at independence for India
(1947) and China at Liberation (1949). Both adopted planning as a major means of
accelerating the process of socio-economic development (Conyers and Hills, l984:pp.4l-
61).
The economic structures of India and China at that time, as Byres and Nolan
(1976) state, were weakly developed. In both countries, technology was backward with a
negligible amount of per capita agricultural output and only a minor part of industrial
output was produced with modern techniques, hence per capita output was low. The
economy was dominated by agriculture which generated the major part of national income
and employed an overwhelming majority of the working population.
In 1950-51, agriculture contributed 50 per cent of total national income in India
and employed 70 per cent of the working population. In China in 1952, agriculture
contributed an estimated 47 per cent of national product and employed between 75 and 83
per cent of the population (ibid .p.11).
However, an important difference that existed between the two systems was the
nature of the state and the respective 'modes of production' and the quality and
effectiveness of planning that was possible. On the one hand, an effective planned
economy in China operated through near state monopoly of internal and external trade,
predominantly state-owned industry and collectively run agriculture; these were brought
into being by the political revolution of 1949, which swept away the class interests of a
semi-feudal society, pre-empted the possibility of capitalist development and made
possible a socialist path for China (ibid).
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On the other hand, planning in India has been essentially ineffective (excellent at
the level of formulation, very weak at the level of implementation, as we noted in section
3.5.3) and there has not been that firm rooting and growth of capitalism that planning has
sought to achieve. In terms of autonomy of the state, Byres (l994:p.22) argues that in
India, in the aftermath of independence, a capitalist class or capitalist classes, were weakly
developed and could not effect the transformation of the economy in both town and
country and society without state support.
In both countries there was a commitment to economic and social progress - in
terms of development and reduction in inequality. In terms of strategies chosen, there was
a recognition in India that a doctrine of laissez-faire must be replaced by a commitment
to economic planning in order to promote (capitalist) development and furthermore, in
certain sectors, public enterprises would suitably complement the development of private
enterprise.
In terms of economic performance although China's overall pattern of economic
growth has been uneven,' its overall rate of growth has been higher than India's. China's
gross national product grew at a compound annual rate of growth of 5.6 per cent between
1952 and 1970, while in India net national product grew by about 3.7 per cent between
1950 and 1970; the equivalent annual per capita growth rates were 3.4 to 4 per cent and
1.5 per cent respectively. Industrial production in China grew by a compound annual rate
of 11.9 per cent, while in India it grew by 6.5 per cent during the same period.
Agricultural production during this period grew at a compound annual rate of 2.5 per cent
in China, while in India the growth rate was 2.3 per cent (Byres and Nolan, 1976:p.5l).
In terms of inequality, again Byres and Nolan's (1976) study finds that China has
had a higher degree of success in reducing inequality. This they ascribe to the
transformation in economic structure that followed the liberation, with the establishment
'This was because of the economic collapse from 1959 to 1963 after the Great Leap Forward, and by the
less severe decline in output in 1967 and 1968 during the Cultural Revolution (Eckstein, 1973, as cited in
Byres and Nolan, l976:p.Sl).
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of predominantly state owned industries and collective ownership in agriculture. In India,
despite the policy statements included in successive plans, the net effect has been rather
inegalitarian. This is ascribed to the hierarchical class structure in the Indian political
economy.
Again, the recent experience of these two countries, in the wake of market-reforms
and liberalisation undertaken by them, is quite different. In the case of China, which began
to liberalise its markets and privatise its economy in the late 1 970s, the expansion of rural
agriculture and industrial output had a significant effect on income poverty'. The
incidence of poverty in 1978-85 fell from 33 per cent to 9 per cent and the number of rural
poor fell from 260 million to 97 million (UNDP, l997:p.49).
However, with a shift in development strategy, after the mid 1980s, towards
industrial and export sectors, and a redirection of public investment and fiscal incentives to
the coastal regions, the progress in human development went into reverse. By 1989 the
number of income - poor people in rural areas increased to 103 million, adult illiteracy
increased between 1982-87 from 24 per cent to 27 per cent and disparities widened
(ibid.).
Being concerned about the increase in poverty and widening regional disparities,
the government in China started in the early 1 990s to take measures to reverse the trend.
A Poverty Reduction Programme, which aims to eradicate absolute poverty by the year
2000, was also launched in 1994. By 1992, this renewed commitment by the state was
already showing results. Between 1991 and mid-1995 the number of people living in
income poverty fell from 94 to 65 million (ibid :p.5O).
In the case of India, during the period following economic reform in 1991,
although there was firstly a rise, then a fall in income poverty, but by 1993-94, the
A person is poor if, and only if, his/her income level is below the defined poverty line. Often the cut-off
poverty line is defined in terms of having enough income for a specified amount of food (UNDP,
l997:p. 16).
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incidence of income poverty in rural areas had increased to 39 per cent, compared to 34
per cent in 1989-90. To address this question, the Ninth FYP (1997-2002) calls for
eradicating poverty by the year 2005. However, as the 1997 Human Development Report
states, a cause for concern is the emphasis given in india, to deficit reduction and state
minimalism, which is leading to the abdication of state responsibilities in key areas
affecting the lives of poor people. "India needs sustained public action if it is to eliminate
the worst forms of poverty and promote an equitable expansion of social, economic and
political opportunities" (ibid :p.52).
Thus as table 3.2 below indicates, China with its emphasis on integrating the
market within the planning system, with the state taking a direct role in ensuring a more
equitable distribution of social services, has continued to out-perform India. In 1994 for
example, illiteracy in China was 19 per cent and income poverty incidence was 7 per cent
whereas, in India the percentage was 48 per cent for the former and 39 per cent for the
latter.
Table 3.2
Comparison of main socio-economic indicators : China and India 1970-1994
Indicators	 China	 India
1970	 1994	 1970	 1994
Adult illiteracy (%)
	 34	 19	 66	 48
Under-5 mortality rate (per 1000
live births)	 209a	 47	 236k	 115
Real GDP per capita (PPP$) 	 723a	 2,604	 617a	 1,348
Income poverty incidence (%)
	 33"	 7	 54C	 39
Human development index 	 0.248a	 0.626	 0.206a	 0.446
External debt as % of GNP (1994)	 -	 19	 -	 34
Notes:
a) Data for 1960; b) Data for 1978; c) Data for 1974.
Source: UNDP (1997) Human Development Report 1997, pp.49-52.
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3.6.2 The case of Japan and South Korea
Japan's economic growth in the post-war period is generally cited by development
textbooks as a shining example of what an outward-oriented and market-based economy
can achieve. Few Western economists generally highlight the fact that economic planning
has played a vital role in the structural transformation of the Japanese economy (Wade,
1990:pp.22-24)'.
With the end of Korean war2, the second decade (195 5-64) of post-war recovery
in Japan began with acute foreign exchange shortage and vast unemployment. To deal
with these problems the First FYP prepared by the Economic Council was launched with
two basic policy objectives: economic self-reliance (through external balance equilibrium)
and removal of unemployment (Tani, l9S8:p.263-31O). The plan provided two sets of
policies viz, comprehensive macro-economic policies and sectoral industry - specific
policies.
Industrial revival necessitated large scale imports of capital goods and technology.
But foreign exchange supply was limited because in the absence of competitiveness,
exports could not grow. The self-reliance plan i.e. the First Plan (1956-60) provided
intensive policy guidelines for industries to confine use of scarce foreign exchange to
enhance productivity. Close consultations between administration and private business
dispensed with the need for direct controls and enabled the Ministry of International Trade
and Industry (MTTI) to provide clear strategic directions for overcoming supply-demand
gaps.
Wade (1990) cites names of several economists whose works emphasise the role of markets and private
enterprise and underplay the "supportive" role of the state and planning.
2 Japan was used as the main supplier of non-militaiy requirements for the Korean war. "When the
Korean war broke out and relieved Japanese industiy from deepening depression, the goveriunent resumed
the advancement of industrial policy ... [i]n response to the economic upswing triggered by the Korean
war" (Tani, l988:p.297).
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The first two plans and the Third Nine Year National Income Doubling plan
(1961-70) established procedures for indicative planning to achieve macroeconomic as
well as sectoral objectives and targets. The planners stressed the compatibility of planning
with a market economy. The defects of the market system were identified as economic
disorder (fluctuations), inflation, balance of payments problems and general
unemployment. These problems needed to be solved through achievement of collective
targets indicated in the plan (ibid).
The publicity of plan targets served the purpose of gaining peoples' co-operation
in the development process. They communicated to the private business the methods and
objectives of comprehensive and sectoral policies so that they could extend voluntary co-
operation to achieve these targets (ibid.).
Since the private sector was involved in the formulation as well as implementation
of plan and policies, its co-operation in achievement of objectives and targets was assured.
Hence the plan was implemented through the operation of the market mechanism.
In contrast to the spontaneous, uncoordinated free market economy of the neo-
classical theory, the economy of Japan is a 'planned' economy which operates through the
market mechanism to achieve pre-determined objectives (targets) and which uses market-
related instruments to implement a preconceived development strategy with an elaborate
scheme of inter-sectoral priorities. Between 1955 and 1990, the Japanese government has
adopted ten economic plans, each of which had a time frame of five to ten years with
revisions made every three years on an average (ibid :pp.28O-28l).
In fact, as Tani (1988) finds in his analysis, economic planning in Japan has been
used to devise macro-economic policy guidelines which have been successfully used to
integrate individual sectoral policies. And as economic planning succeeded in
transforming the economy to self reliance in the final stage "[t}he economic policy was
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oriented towards liberalisation of a market which had been isolated from international
competition, thus preparing the way for a filly open market economy" (ibid. :p.3O9).
A close examination of South Korean development strategy suggests that Korean
economic development was anything but market-led. As Duff and Kim (l994:p.l86)
point out "the selective promotion of infant industries and the upgrading of the country's
competitive advantage by articulate industrial policies, all this through the concerted
efforts for resource mobilisation, were the key elements of state activism in Korea".
It was during Park's regime (196 1-79) that planning achieved ascendancy. The
state established its supremacy and autonomy in matters of economic policy.
The government selected 'strategic' industries for support under a series of five-
year plans. In the initial plans, labour intensive industries were selected. But as
development took place, the later plans selected heavy and capital extensive industries (for
example steel, chemicals, ship building, etc.) for strategic targeting. Long-term finance
and credit were deliberately channelled to industries which could access globally
competitive technology. Korea's outward-oriented trade policy emphasised exports but
this was combined with protection to selected domestic industries, particularly in capital
and intermediate goods sector so that the selected private as well as state enterprises could
achieve scale economies combining the most modern technology.
According to Dutt and Kim (l994:p.l76) "in the case of Korea, import
substitution and export promotion proceeded together, possibly with some time lag. Its
expression in outward orientation must not be interpreted as an example of trade
liberalisation in the neo-classical sense".
Underlying Korea's structural transformation and outward-oriented rapid
economic expansion was the decisive economic planning which directed the market forces
'In this study Korea and South Korea are used interchangeably.
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to move in pre-determined strategic directions and achieve state determined objectives and
targets. The variety of incentives that the state provided for industries and firms involved
in export promotion included: tariff exemptions on imports of raw materials and spare
parts, tariff and tax exemptions granted to domestic suppliers of exporting firms, indirect
tax exemptions, lower direct taxes on income earned in exporting, accelerated
depreciation allowances, import entitlement linked to exports, reduced public utility rates,
monopoly rights granted in new export markets, credit subsidies through lower interest
rates, and automatic access to bank loans for working capital.
Consequently, both Japan and South Korea have combined planning with market
to achieve rapid economic development. And these two economies could successfully and
effectively synergise plan and market mainly because the state was pragmatic and had a
purposeful, decisive, competent, and single-minded administration which was clear in its
vision, objectives and priorities. The state co-ordinated the activities of the administration
and private business, and it secured the acquiescence and co-operation of society to
implement its planned strategy of development. Of course, resources in the form of aid
(loans and grants) to Korea from the USA greatly facilitated the operation of the state in
this context (Nazir, 199l:pp.28-3l). But having resources in itself does not guarantee the
use (good or bad) to which these are put. Thus appropriate policies and planning are
crucial, in addition to having access to resources in securing economic and social
development.
3.6.3 Planning and market in Oman
Among the developing economies, Oman provides a notable example of the state
combining the market and planning strategies to secure long-term development objectives
with minimal generation of conflict. The attainment of these objectives and the means by
which they were secured are discussed in Chapters IV, V and VI. Here only a brief
summary of the roles of planning and market in Oman's development is necessary.
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As in other oil exporting countries, economic rents earned from production and
export of oil constitute a substantial share of national income in Oman, and this is realised
through the state. The resources generated by oil exports are used by the state for the
development of the economy through development planning. The benefits flowing from
national assets created by the plans (electricity, water, industrial infrastructure, gas,
petroleum products, etc.) are distributed through the functioning of the price system. The
use of these basic inputs and access to state sponsored financial institutions encourage
growth of private enterprises in agriculture, industry, and a relatively large service sector.
The revenues derived from the export of oil have enabled the government in Oman
to maintain an open economy, with imported consumer goods, capital equipment and
technology flowing into the economy without any significant tariff barriers. Quota
restrictions are almost non-existent. The exchange rate of the Omani Rial is pegged to the
US dollar and the Rial is freely convertible, without any foreign exchange restrictions.
Exports are encouraged while imports are not discriminated against. As a result, high
consumer welfare has been achieved so far without the creation of any substantial
industrial sector. In other words, the welfare-oriented approach of the state complements
both plan and market to secure social and economic development.
From the mid 1970s, Oman has adopted development planning which is
implemented through successive five-year plans. The methodology of planning in Oman is
briefly explained in Appendix 3-Al. The main long-term strategic goals underlying these
five-year development plans are (Oman, 1976a):
a) to bring about sustained improvement in the quality of life,
b) to reduce dependence upon oil exports by diversifying the economic base through
accelerated growth of the non-oil sector,
c) to develop human resources,
d) to promote balanced regional development,
e) to sustain a free market and competitive economy,
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f)	 to follow a free trade policy, with minimal restrictions on inflow and outflow of
goods, services, capital and technology.
The purpose of development planning in Oman is not to supplant but to
supplement and stimulate the market. Attainment of plan objectives in Oman does not
involve any physical or price controls or any fiscal "carrots and sticks" for private sector
activities. Nor does it involve any strict demarcation of areas of activities for the public
and private sector. Apart from some restrictions on the inflows of foreign capital and
labour, the economy of Oman is almost completely open to the rest of the world so far as
the flow of goods and non-factor services are concerned.
The essential role of development planning in Oman is to promote investment in
sectors providing public goods, to formulate and execute projects involving large scale
externalities, and to build up social overheads entailing low rates of return. Since the
private sector would be disinclined to undertake these activities, the growth of public
investment through development plans did not result in 'crowding out' private investment
in the relevant activities. In fact, the income-generation and threshold-creating effects of
public investment has led to 'crowding in' of private investment as we shall see in the
following three chapters. It is in this sense that planning in Oman has supplemented and
not supplanted the market mechanism and the private sector.
In addition to socio-economic development, planning in Oman has also facilitated
regional development. Within the framework of the long-term development strategy a
general policy for town planning was approved by the Cabinet' in 1988. The main
elements of town planning policy include: specification of standard physical planning
criteria and policies; harmonisation of policies and measures relating to land use;
provision of social structures and public utilities on a national, regional and local level; and
planning and programming of available resources. The policy intends to provide
consistent physical and regional development plans and realise the long-term development
'The Council of Ministers.
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objectives, including protecting the environment and preserving natural resources (Oman,
1991a:pp.223-25 1).
To facilitate implementation of town planning policy a "Main Town Strategy" has
been adopted. The strategy aims to direct investments to a number of main towns to
increase the effectiveness and efficiency of these investments through economies of scale
and also to create on the one hand, backward and forward linkages between the main
towns and on the other, between the regions and the local centres and the main towns.
As a result, both the Third and the Fourth FYP allocated large amounts for
development of a number of main towns, such as Nizwa, Sur, Al-Rustaq and Sohar
(ibid pp.359-363).
To monitor implementation and provide overall guidance, the Supreme Committee
for Town Planning was set up in 1985 (Oman, 1995c:p.99) and a number of regional
committees, such as the Musandam Development Committee and the Regional
Development Council were established by the Development Council.
3.7 Market-led Deve'opment Strategies
The three areas where neo-classical economists would consider state intervention
justifiable are: (a) in cases of market failure; (b) when there is desire to change income
distribution; and (c) when an infant industry needs short run protection till it can compete
in the open market.
The proponents of development through the market-mechanism believe that with
the exception of only the above mentioned cases, the state should confine its role to
protection of property rights, enforcement of contracts and anti-monopoly laws. The post-
Second War literature on the neo-classical political economy provides theoretical reasons
for the argument that state intervention in the free play of market forces would result in
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wastage of scarce productive resources. State intervention from a neo-classical
perspective is analysed in the context of market failure and the operation of interest group
politics.
These theoretical analyses with significant contributions by Olson (1965), Krueger
(1974), Buchanan (1980), Bhagwati (1982) and Srinivasan (1985) apply standard neo-
classical rules of individual optimisation to voters, politicians, lobbies and interest groups
involved in the making of social or collective choices and decisions through the
instrumentality of governmental mechanism. Accordingly, voters are utility maximisers
voting for politicians and parties who will satisf,' their own individual (sectional) interests
regardless of the interests of the whole society. Politicians who influence government and
civil servants are vote maxirnisers interested only in acquiring or holding on to power.
They will provide policies or social choices that will bring maximum votes regardless of
their effects on overall development. Lobbies and interest groups would bribe or
pressurise politicians to influence government decisions on social choices with a view to
fulfil their narrow sectional interests. The result is an inefficient and inequitable allocation
of resources, general impoverishment and reduced freedom,
Therefore, when the government interferes with free play of market forces and
price mechanism through actions such as import quotas, restrictions on investment in
particular (licensed) industries, rationing and allocation of consumer goods or raw
materials, price controls etc., it creates 'rents' of various forms' or 'unearned' profits.
According to Krueger, Bhagwati and Srinivasan, state intervention induces rent seeking
activities using real productive resources in setting up lobbies, election campaigns,
influencing political parties, etc. Such use of resources earns profit and hence it is rational
from the viewpoint of private individuals but it does not result in increased output of any
good or service and hence such activity is socially undesirable. Such activity is therefore
described as directly unproductive profit seeking activity. This DUP results in loss of
Rent in economics means any payment to a factor which is in excess of what is necessary to engage it in
its present employment i.e. payment in excess of its transfer or next best alternative earnings. Rent is thus
a surplus arising on account of relative scarcity (Meier, l989:pp.535-536).
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welfare in the sense that resources used in rent-seeking activity could have been used
alternatively to produce some goods or services. The theories of 'rent-seeking', therefore,
argue that various types of state interventions in the free play of market forces work
against development by leading to 'unproductive' use of scarce productive resources.
These theories of optimising politicians, public choice, rent-seeking and DUP are
used to provide theoretical support in favour of leaving the market mechanism free from
state intervention for promoting development in the LDCs.
3.7.1 Rethinking the state
As we noted in Chapter I, from 1980 onwards the neo-classical views on economic
policy' and market reforms have dominated the development debate. The SAPs
undertaken by a number of developing countries under the auspices of the IMF and the
World Bank have become the main conduit for promoting the neo-liberal2
 development
models. As a result, governments have adopted policies to reduce the scope of state's
intervention in the economy. Market-friendly strategies - as propagated by the World
Bank (World Bank, 1991 a) - have taken hold in most parts of the developing world.
The 1997 World Development Report (World Bank, 1997a) is, therefore, an
important point of departure for the World Bank concerning the appropriate role of the
Both Chapters I and II provide details of the policy prescription of the World Bank and the IMF and
their 'market-friendly' approach to economic development.
2 The term neo-liberal refers to those economists who have revived liberalism in its new form. Both in
theoiy and practice liberalism has, over the last two centuries, advocated the central idea of individual
liberty under the rule of law. People must be allowed to pursue their own interests so long as they observe
the rules of not encroaching upon liberty of others. In economics, liberalism was closely associated with
market capitalism based on free competition and free trade. However, under the Keynesian influence, in
the post-world War II era, the character of market capitalism changed significantly, with the state
assuming responsibility to ensure full employment and social welfare. Leading the attack against this
state regulation of market capitalism, the neo .-liberal economists like Milton Friedman and James
Buchanan revived liberalism in its new form by providing theoretical arguments to show that government
intervention - except in provision of public goods - is generally contrary to public interest and, through
rent seeking activity, it leads to unproductive use of scarce resources (See Eatwell, et. al., 1991 :pp. 173-
175). The terms neo-liberals and neo-classicals are used interchangeably in this thesis. Although the
former has broader political-economy connotations.
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state in development 1 . The report confirms the evidence that the success of today's
industrialised world and the post-war "miracles" of East Asia is not due to a minimalist
approach to the state. Instead, it argues that these examples have shown that development
requires an effective state, one that plays a facilitating, encouraging and complementing
role to the activities of private business and individuals.
"[C]ertainly, state-dominated development has failed. But so has state-less
development - a message that comes through all too clearly in the agonies of people in
collapsed states such as Liberia and Somalia ... Without an effective state, sustainable
development, both economic and social, is impossible" (World Bank, I 997a:p.11I).
Our analysis in this chapter of country specific development confirms the revised
views of the World Bank which contradict the neo-classical approach to development
management and its call for 'rolling back' the state.
3.8 Conclusion
This chapter has provided a theoretical and empirical analyses of planning and the
market in development. The role of the state in using the plan and market in securing
development have been shown to be intertwined and mutually reinforcing. The
effectiveness of planning in securing development has been demonstrated in relation to
particular countries, e.g. the impact of planning on achieving higher standards of living in
Sri Lanka.
We have shown that the path of development a countly adopts depends on a
number of factors which include its initial conditions and its resource endowment. And
that the outcome of development planning is similarly influenced by a number of historical
The Report states that "the state's potential to leverage, promote, and mediate change in pursuit of
collective ends is unmatched. Where this capacity has been used well, economies have flourished. But
where it has not, development has hit a brick wall" (ibid. :p. 157).
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factors the political economy of the country, external factors and the context of
international political economy in which it embarks on its development process.
We have shown that there are compelling reasons for developing countries to
adopt development planning in dealing with problems of capital scarcity, poverty,
unemployment, income distribution, market failures and unfavourable terms of trade.
However, we have shown that planning and market need not be seen in mutually exclusive
or static terms. They can be complementary and their relationship may change over time
depending on circumstances.
An important factor which influences the path of development selected and the
possible outcome is the nature of the state in each country and the quality and
effectiveness of planning. In the case of China, planning has enabled it to establish a high
degree of self-reliance which has in turn given it freedom of manoeuvre in relation to
domestic political, social and economic policies. Planning also has enabled it to achieve a
qualitatively better development than India, where planning and the market have been
utilised.
Similarly, in the case of Japan and South Korea, the strong commitment of the
state and favourable external factors, enabled a combination of planning and the market
mechanism to secure very high levels of development.
In Oman too the combination of plan and market has been crucial in securing
socio-economic development through two decades of development planning.
In a world divided by large disparities within countries and between countries,
where comparative advantages are being gradually eroded, and new competitive
advantages are created, the case for 'rolling back' the state is indeed very weak. On the
contrary, a strong and effective state is required to negotiate the obstacles which impede
the development process in the developing countries. In fact, development is a dynamic
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process, and it invariably is a process in which planning and direction on the one hand, and
freedom of private enterprise on the other play mutually reinforcing roles, albeit with the
level and intensity of the one or the other changing with each stage of development.
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Appendix 3-A!
Planning Methodology in Oman
In the First and Second FYPs (1976-80 and 1981-85), the basic methodology of
planning was that of investment programming of projects. The planning machinery
prepared a balance of financial resources by estimating expected annual revenues and
expenditures under broad headings. This provided the aggregate funds for public
investment. Within these broad parameters, the development projects prepared by
different government departments were approved and resources were allocated according
to their priorities, derived from the basic development goals. By using the development
projects as the basic units of economic planning, the government was quite effective in
implementing a number of projects relating to economic infrastructure, education and
training, and health.
The First Plan was quite successful in creating a wide ranging network of
economic and social infrastructure. This not only established a strong foundation for non-
oil sector's growth and enhanced the absorptive capacity of the national economy but also
led to an increase in private sector's capacity and the growth of the market (Oman,
1981a:p.31). The Second Plan not only continued with this project-based investment
allocation but also focused on creating the necessary mechanism for dealing with the oil
price volatility and mitigating the impact of the 'Dutch disease'. This was achieved by
creating the State General Reserve Fund. Contributions to the SGRF were to be made out
of gross oil revenues and the SGRF serves the purpose of a 'buffer' to be used for budget
deficits in years of low oil prices, or receiving oil windfalls in periods of high oil prices
(Oman, 1981a:pp.38-39). The method of formulating the Third FYP was similar to that
of the Second FYP. However, the Third FYP was focused on stabilising the economy in
the wake of the 1986 oil price collapse and hence it was more oriented towards achieving
fiscal balance.
Appendli 3-Al contd...
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During the First, Second and Third FYPs, project programming was not derived
from sectoral and regional targets for investment and production. Actually, the regional
and sectoral investment patterns emerged as the outcomes of projects-based planning
(Oman, 1991a:pp.34-35).
The Fourth FYP (1991-95)
The technical expertise in planning and management built up over the previous
three plans at both the level of technical secretariat and the various units of the
government made possible important changes in the planning methodology for the Fourth
FYP. This was further helped with the progressive improvement in the availability of
statistical information. The Development Council in 1989 (after a series of preliminary
steps in preparing the plan and after a series of meetings) approved the report prepared by
the technical secretariat "The Improvement of the Comprehensive Planning Techniques
and Objectives Proposed for the Next Phase (1991-2000)" (Oman, l991a:p.27).
This report, which was based on a comprehensive analysis of the experience of the
previous three plans, contained recommendations to improve planning processes,
monitoring techniques and data collection and analysis systems. Special emphasis was to
be given to sectoral and regional dimensions of development in the planning process, in
addition to expanding the participation of different actors, namely, Majlis Ash'Shura, the
private sector, Central Bank of Oman, executing ministries and the Specialised Councils
and Committees - in the formulation of objectives and strategies of the Fourth FYP.
Appendix 3-Al contd...
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In order to expand participation in plan preparation, the Development Council
formed five committees. These were: 1) Macro-economic committee, whose task was to
examine, integrate and co-ordinate the work of the other four committees; 2) Commodity
(or Goods Producing) Sector committee 3) Trade and Financial Services committee; 4)
Public Services committee; and 5) Human Resources committee.
The methodology for the preparation of Fourth F'YP was new and distinct in three
respects. First, for preparing a comprehensive and internally consistent plan, a
macroeconomic model was designed for estimating the basic national aggregate variables
such as gross domestic product, final consumption expenditure, savings, capital formation,
exports, imports, government expenditure and revenues, etc.
Secondly, in order to speed up economic diversification and promote regional
development, sectoral plans and regional plans were prepared to serve as the basis for
investment programming' and allocation of development expenditure.
Third, the planning process was to be regarded as continuous, connecting each
successive five-year plan with the long-term planning perspective covering 15 to 20 years.
Hence the planners (Development Council) and the implementing agencies were expected
to continuously introduce corrections in the development programmes and update the
planning framework for the next five years on a regular basis in the form of a roIling
plan2.
Appendix 3-Al contd...
As already explained, in the first three FYPs sectoral and regional distribution of investment
(development expenditure) were the outcomes (results) and not the criteria (determinants) of project-based
programming.
2 However, due to technical difficulties, the concept of rolling plans did not materialise.
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As in the previous three five-year plans, the unit for allocation of investment
expenditure in the Fourth FYP was also individual projects (which included construction
of fixed assets, facilities for education, health, training etc.). Each project was classified
according to the main sector and the sub-sector which it would serve, the planning region
in which it would be located and the implementing authority of the project (i.e. the
ministry or department responsible for the implementation and management of project).
However, unlike previous three five-year plans, in the Fourth FYP the basis or
criteria for selection of a project for inclusion in the Fourth FYP was its importance in
sectoral investment plans and inter - and intra sectoral and regional priorities. Thus
the sectoral and regional distribution of public investment in the Fourth FYP was
determined prior to the selection of individual projects. In other words, in the Fourth FYP,
the sectoral and regional distribution of investment was the determining factor, and not an
outcome of the project-based planning, as was the case in the First, Second and Third
FYPs.
The Fifth FYP (1996-2000)
The Fifth FYP is a point of departure for the planning process. Having
implemented four FYPs, the state in Oman initiated during 1993-95 a number of studies to
cany out a detailed critical appraisal of achievements and problems of Oman during the
quarter century of development experience - 1970-95. This was done with the aim of
formulating a broad vision for the Omani economy for the year 2020, whose principal aim
is to sustain living standards in real terms at their present level, as a minimum, and to
attempt to double the present real per capita income by the year 2020. In other words,
the Fifth FYP is Oman's preparation for 'take off' to the 21st century (Oman,
1 996a:p. 168).
Appendix 3-Al contd...
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The Fifth FYP differs from the previous four plans because it envisages two types
of major quantitative shift in Oman's development strategy. The development process
which till the Fourth FYP involved dominant, proactive and spending role of the state is
now to be shifted to pivotal role of private initiative and investment under strategic
guidance of the state. Secondly, development during the first four plans was based
substantially on income from non-renewable resources of oil and expatriate labour,
whereas from the Fifth FYP onwards development is to be based on renewable resources,
and national labour.
In view of this shift in strategy, the methodology of planning is also changed.
From the detailed planning of investment and project programming, the Fifth FYP entails
addressing the main issues and formulating appropriate policies and strategies to tackle
them. It is based on a macroeconomic model involving structure of output and demand,
savings and investment, external current account, government revenue and expenditure,
interaction of commodity and service sectors and forecast of alternative scenarios. It
also envisages a much larger role for the private sector in capital formation in particular,
and in the development process in general, as will be elaborated in Chapter VII.
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CHAPTER IV
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF OMAN : A COMPARATWE
AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
4.1 Introduction
This chapter analyses the economic and social development of Oman during the
period 1970-1995. This analysis is carried out in relation to the policies and strategies of
development adopted in Oman, and within the context of the regional and global policies
in which this change was achieved.
After providing a brief historical background of the initial socio-economic
conditions that prevailed in Oman till the year 1970, this chapter examines the results
achieved by Oman in relation to growth of income, stability of prices, export performance
and trade balance, and structural change. It then proceeds to examine social development
by analysing a number of indicators in the field of education, health, infrastructure and
inequality. Wherever possible, Oman's socio-economic indicators are compared with
those of Upper-middle-income economies' and countries classified as having medium
human development. In addition, comparisons are also made with a number of selected
developing countries.
'Countries are classified by the World Bank according to income. For example, countries having GNP
per capita income between US$ 3,025 and US$ 9,385 are classified as Upper-middle income countries
(World Bank, 1997a:pp.206-207).
Similarly, countries are classified by the UNDP according to their Human Development Index (HDI).
Countries with HDI values of 0.500 to 0.799 are classified as medium human development (UNDP,
1997:p.144). Oman is classified as an Upper-middle-income economy, having medium-hwnan
development.
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The chapter then analyses briefly the factors that enabled Oman to achieve
considerable success in economic and social development between 1970 and 1995,
particularly during the two decades of development planning, 1976-95. Before concluding,
a comparative note is provided on Oman's development compared with Trinidad and
Tobago and Gabon, two oil producing and small 1 countries like Oman.
The aim of this chapter also is to describe the economic and social development
that has taken place in Oman so that the role of development policy and planning, the
subject of the next chapter, can be analysed with specific reference to empirical evidence
presented here. As we have stressed in the Introduction, a comprehensive use of statistics
has been necessitated in the present chapter and also in Chapters V, VI and VII, that is the
chapters dealing with the empirical analyses of Oman, by the nature of the process being
analysed. Without statistical quantification Oman's economic and social development in
terms of achievements and failures would be rendered rather impressionistic. A purely
qualitative analyses may not be able to capture the magnitude of change in Oman.
4.2 Historical Background : Initial Conditions and the Evolution of Development
Planning
As mentioned in Chapter I, the socio-political modemisation and economic
development of Oman began in earnest from the year 1970, when the present ruler, H. M.
Sultan Qaboos bin Said assumed office as the executive head of the state2. The extent of
economic and social stagnation and backwardness of pre-1970 Oman is described in the
Introduction and in the Appendix table 1 of Introduction. A country of about 658,000
people and spread over 309,500 sq. km. had in 1970 only 10 kilometres of asphalt roads,
3 schools with 909 students, 12 hospital beds, meagre supplies of electricity and water,
and about 1 telephone line for every 1,000 persons. Oman's gross domestic product in
Small in terms of the size of their population.
2	 predecessor and father of Sultan Qaboos, Sultan Said bin Taimur who ruled the Sultanate of Muscat
and Oman from 1932 was deposed and abdicated in favour of his son on July 23, 1970 (Oman, 1994b).
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1970 at current prices was RO 104 million and per capita nominal GDP was about RO
158 (Oman, 1996c:pp.4-5).
One of Oman's immediate concerns after 1970 was the establishment of the
institutions required to initiate a process of economic and social development. These
institutions were established in phases during 1970-74. First, a modern administration was
established to carry out the different administrative and executive functions of government
in general, and to plan and execute the economic development schemes in particular'.
Second, in order to initiate a process of rapid economic and social development, a
Supreme Council for Economic Planning and Development was set up in 1972, which was
superseded in 1974 by the creation of the Development Council 2. The main functions of
the Development Council were to set objectives and a strategy for economic development,
to propose policies and measures to carry out these objectives and to lay down
development plans in harmony with these (Oman, 1976a:pp.8-1 1).
Prior to the introduction of development planning and commencement of the First
FYP in 1976, the task of promoting development was carried out on the basis of the
implementation of individual developmental projects which were formulated without
reference to a wider framework of the economy. However by early 1974, lack of co-
On 28th June, 1975 the Law of Administrative Organisation of the Government was issued by Royal
Decree no.26/1975. The Law defined the means of organising the government administration and the
powers and functions vested in the heads of the administrative units (Oman, 1976a:pp. 115-124.)
2 The economic planning and development units underwent several changes between 1970-1974.
Following his accession, The Sultan dissolved the Development Board formed by his father and formed
the Department of Planning and Development. The temporary Planning Council which was formed in the
early 1970s was replaced in 1972 by the Supreme Council for Economic Planning and Development. In
April 1973, a General Development Organisation was formed which was replaced in November by the
Ministry of Development. In November 1974, the Ministry of Development was dissolved and in a cabinet
reshuffle, a number of ministries were created to take over its functions. At the same time, to separate
executive functions from planning, the Development Council was formed. By 1976, the structure of the
government organisation comprised the Council of Ministers presided by H. M. The Sultan and four
specialised councils: The Development Council, The Financial Affairs Council, The Natural Gas Council,
and The Defence Council (ibid. :pp.8-lO). The Development Council was dissolved in 1996 and its
responsibilities were transferred to the Cabinet (Oman, 1996g).
The Ministry of Development before its dissolution in 1974 combined both planning and executive
functions relating to sectors of agriculture, irrigation and fisheries, mining and petroleum, commerce and
manufacturing. In 1994. a new Ministry of Development was formed.
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ordination between different projects, on the one hand, and, on the other, between the
Ministry of Finance (which funded the projects) and the ministries implementing these
projects led to a deep financial crisis. A large number of projects had been initiated
without budgetary cover. Therefore, one of the first tasks of the Development Council
was to carry out a full and detailed appraisal of all ongoing development projects and to
ascertain their budgetary implications (ibid.).
From 1976 to the present, economic and social development is being promoted
through a series of five-year plans. Four five-year plans have been completed between
1976 and 1995. Currently, the Fifth FYP (1996-2000) is in the process of implementation.
The underpinnings of the successive five-year plans have been provided by the
objectives' of Oman's long-term development strategy which the Development Council,
keeping in view the longer term perspective of 15 to 20 years, had announced in 1975.
However, apart from these long-term strategic objectives, each successive five-year plan
contains a set of its own medium-term objectives to be achieved through investment
programming, and economic, fiscal and monetary policies specifically provided in each of
these plans.
Since Oman started exporting oil in 1967 (Al Yousef, 1995:p.28), oil has
continued to be the prime mover of Oman's economic growth and though, as we shall see
later, in the last two decades Oman's dependence on oil has declined, Oman continues to
remain a primary resource-based, mono-export economy with the petroleum sector (crude
oil and gas) providing in 1995 about 77 per cent of government revenues 2, around 38 per
cent of nominal gross domestic product and more than three-quarters of total exports
(Oman, 1996b). However, Oman's oil reserves, even after new discoveries, have been
These are: to achieve sustained improvement in peoples' quality of life, expansion and diversification of
the non-oil sectors of the economy, to reduce dependence upon oil exports, establishment of a country-
wide network of modern infrastructures, development of local (Omani) human resources to reduce
dependence on immigrant labour force, promotion of freely competitive markets and free trade, promotion
of equality in regional and personal incomes (Oman, 1976a:pp.3-5).
2 Government revenues are net of transfers to state reserve funds.
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quite small, relative to both the world oil reserves' (Al Yousef, 1995 :p. 50) and in terms of
their average expected life which was estimated to be 12 years in 1975 and 16 years in
1995 (Appendix table 4-All).
Thus Oman's meagre oil resources, compared to its neighbours and the initial
conditions of stagnation and backwardness prevailing in the early 1 970s led Oman to
adopt development planning as a means to achieving socio-economic transformation. The
policy makers in Oman could not rely on the neo-classical approach, as discussed in the
previous three chapters - marginal adjustments and piecemeal improvements to patch up
the market - because such an approach would have been unable to jerk such an
underdeveloped economy out of the vicious circle2
 of low rates of savings and investment
in the face of rapid population growth. This could only be done by mobilising resources,
internal and external, through government intervention, to launch a "big push" in the form
of a massive investment programme.
However, as we shall see later and as we discussed in the preceding chapters,
while Oman rejected the neo-classical approach to development, it did not supplant the
market. Instead, it used planning as a means of developing the market mechanism and
promoting an active private sector.
4.3 An Assessment of Oman's Economic Development
Oman's economic development is assessed by examining a number of leading
indicators. These are: the growth of national income and per capita income; control of
inflation and public debt; export performance and trade balance; structural change and
'Oman's share in the world oil reserves was only 0.5 per cent in 1995 compared to Saudi Arabia's share
of 25 per cent and UAE's share of 9 per cent (OPEC, 1996:p.36).
2 As we discussed in Chapter II, both Rosenstein-Rodan (1943 and 1961) and Nurkse (1953) observed that
in an underdeveloped economy, characterised by a 'vicious circle of poverty' the investment progranune
must be both massive and balanced. Moreover, Nurkse (1953) advocated that the onus of breaking out of
the vicious circle rests firmly on the government not only for launching the investment programme, but
also for mobiising both domestic and foreign resources to fund the programme.
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sectoral composition of GDP. We shall also attempt to compare Oman's experience with
other selected developing countries'.
4.3.1 Growth of national income2 and per capita income: 1970-95
As we noted in Chapter 11, in strictly economic terms 'development' has
traditionally meant the capacity of a national economy, whose initial economic conditions
have been more or less static for a long time, to generate and sustain an annual increase in
its gross national product.
Using this criteria, it can be seen from tables 4.1 and 4.2 that Oman achieved
considerably rapid growth in tenns of its nominal GDP ever since it started its
development in the 1970s. Between 1970 and 1995, GDP at current market prices grew
by as much as 51 times (or 5,004 per cent), i.e., it increased from RO 104 million to RO
5,288 million recording a compound average annual growth rate of 17.0 per cent during
the period.
These are the countries either falling within the Upper-middle-income group, or are oil exporting
countries, or are countries with good development performance such as China and Botswana.
2 National income is measured by gross domestic product or gross national product. Gross domestic
product is the sum of the gross value-added by all resident and non-resident producers in the economy
plus any taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. While GNP is the suni of
GDP plus (or minus) the net receipts (or payments) of primaiy income-employee compensation and
property income - from non-resident resources (World Bank, l997b:p. 19 and p.133).
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Table 4.1
Growth of GDP and per capita income at current and constant prices - (1970-95)
Year	 Population GDP at	 GDP at Per capita Per capita	 GDP	 Index of
	
estimatea
	current	 constant	 GDP at	 GDP at	 deflator	 GDP
	
prices"	 1988	 current	 constant	 deflatorc
	
pricesb
	prices	 prices
___________	 (000)	 (RO Mn.) (RO Mn.)	 (RO)	 (RO)	 (1980=100)
1970	 658	 103.6	 -	 158	 -	 -	 -
1975	 824	 721.8	 -	 876	 -	 -	 -
1980	 1052	 2,063.5	 13829d	 1,962	 1,315	 149.2	 100.0
1985	 1,408	 3,590.6	 3,124.2	 2,550	 2,218	 114.9	 77.0
1990	 1,626	 4,493.0	 3,599.0	 2,763	 2,213	 124.8	 83.7
1995	 2,135	 5,288.2	 4,772.7	 2.477	 2,236	 110.8	 74.3
Cumulative
growth
rates (%)
	
1970-95	 224.5	 5,004.0	 -	 1,467.7	 -	 -	 -
	
1975-95	 159.1	 632.6	 -	 182.8	 -	 -	 -
	
1980-95	 102.9	 156.3	 245.1	 26.3	 70.1	 -25.7	 -25.7
Notes:
a) Data from Oman (1 996c) Socio-Economic Atlas.
b) In 1995, the Ministiy of Development, based on a number of socio-economic surveys, updated all
GDP estimates for the years 1980-94, both at current and constant prices to correspond with U. N.
System of National Accounts (SNA, 1993). The main change was in GDP estimates at constant
prices. Therefore, data from 1981 onwards are based on the new SNA.
c) GDP deflator shows annual price movements for all goods and services produced in the economy (and
included in GDP). It is obtained by the ratio of GDP at current prices to GDP at constant prices in
national currency (World Bank, l996:p.226).
d) In order to provide inter-plan comparisons till 1980, GDP estimates for 1980, both at current and
constant prices, have been recalculated using the old National Accounts Methodology. Under the
1993 SNA, GDP estimate for 1980 at current prices is RO 2,185 million and at constant prices, it is
RO 1,619 million. All GDP estimates used here are at market prices and not at factor cost.
Source: Compiled from Oman (1986b and 1996b) Statistical Year Book 1985 and 1995.
200
Table 4.2
Average annual growth rates of GD and per capita income
at current and constant prices - (1970-95)
	
_____________ ________________________	 (per cent)
Period	 GDP - average annual 	 GDP per capita - average
growth rate	 annual growth rate
(%)
	
________ __________	 (0/0)
At current	 At constant	 At current	 At constant
____________	 prices	 1988 prices	 prices	 prices
1971-75	 47.3	 -	 41.0	 -
1976-80	 23.4	 -	 17.5	 -
1981-85	 11.7	 17.7	 5.4	 11.0
1986-90	 4.6	 2.9	 1.6	 -0.1
1991-95	 3.3	 5.8	 -2.2	 0.2
1981-95	 6.5	 8.6	 1.6	 3.6
1976-95	 10.5	 -	 5.3	 -
1971-95	 17.0	 -	 11.6	 -
Note:
a) Data for GDP are at market prices (inclusive of imputed bank charges and indirect taxes) and not at
factor costs.
Source: Derived from table 4.1, average annual growth rates are average compound growth rates.
Before development planning commenced in 1976, that is, between 1970 and
1975, the nominal GDP grew by as much as 7 times mainly because of the increase in the
average oil price in 1974 and the consequent buoyancy in the non-oil sector'. Another
reason for such a large increase in GDP in a short span of time was due to a massive
investment programme undertaken by the government in the initial period, when the
economy was in a state of relative stagnation.
'The average oil price which was USS 1.8 per barrel in 1970 rose to US$ 3.6 in 1973 and then to USS
12.3 per barrel in 1974 (Oman, 1976b). Also see Appendix table 4-All.
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Under the two decades of development planning - from 1976 to 1995, the
average annual growth rate in nominal GDP has been similarly quite high at 10.5 per cent,
with GDP growing by almost 633 per cent - from RO 722 million in 1975 to RO 5,288
million in 1995.
However, the growth of nominal GDP experienced in the successive five-year
periods, corresponding to the four five-year plans, indicates that the average annual
growth rates from the First FYP period to the Fourth FYP have shown a declining trend.
Whilst the average annual growth rate in nominal GDP was as high as 23.4 per cent
between 1976 and 1980, it fell to 11.7 per cent during 198 1-85. Whereas between 1986
and 1990, the growth rate declined further to 4.6 per cent and during the period 1991-95
(the period of the Fourth FYP), it was still lower at 3.3 per cent. However, as we shall
see in Chapter V, part of the reason for the declining trend in growth rates has been due to
the continuous decline in the oil price since 1980, resulting in deterioration of Oman's
terms of trade.
Another reason which can be responsible for the decline is due to gradual
economic maturity. In the initial stages of development, it is possible to achieve relatively
high rates of growth, since the economic base is low and there are plenty of idle resources.
As experience of other developing countries shows, it becomes much more diflicult to
maintain high growth rates in later phases of development, especially in an unfavourable
international economic environment - as has been the case with Oman in the period of
declining oil price.
A notable feature of Oman's growth experience is that for the 15 year period,
1981-95, the performance of the economy in real terms was much better than in nominal
terms. Reflecting Oman's low rate of inflation during this period, the average growth in
real GDP (at 1988 constant prices) was considerably higher than the growth in nominal
GDP. As table 4.1 indicates, while the real GDP increased from RO 1,383 million in 1980
to RO 4,773 million in 1995, thereby recording an increase of about 245 per cent during
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the period, the nominal GDP grew from RO 2,064 million to RO 5,288 million between
these two years, thereby recording an increase of about 156 per cent only during the same
period.
During the twenty-five year period, 1970 to 1995, as table 4.1 indicates, GD? per
capita at current prices increased by about 15 times from RO 158 to RO 2,477, giving an
average annual growth rate of 1 1.6 per cent. During the two decades of development
planning, 1976-95, nominal GD? per capita grew by 183 per cent, recording an average
annual growth rate of 5.3 per cent.
Since the nominal GDP is greatly influenced by the oil price and hence is beyond
Oman's control, it is important to examine the developments in real GDP. As tables 4.1
and 4.2 show, over the 15 year period, 1981-95 real GD? per capita grew by about 70
per cent - from RO 1,315 to RO 2,236 - whereas nominal GD? per capita increased
by 26 per cent from RO 1,962 to RO 2,477 because the inflation rate was negative in 9
out of 15 years and the index of GDP deflator (1980=100) declined during 1980-95 by
about 26 percentage points. Thus the average annual growth rate in real GDP per capita
during this period covering the Second, Third and Fourth FYPs was higher at 3.6 per cent,
compared to the average annual growth rate of 1.6 per cent in nominal GDP per capita.
Comparing Oman's rates of growth with other developing countries, as table 4.3
shows, Oman recorded comparably high rates of growth in GDP compared to the group
of Upper-middle-income countries and the world as a whole. For example, during the
period 1965-80, Oman's growth rate was more than three times the average growth rate
in the world, while during the period 1980-90, it was more than two and half times that of
the world, and during the period 1990-95, it was three times higher.
All growth rates shown in the World Development Reports and the World Development Indicators are
computed from constant or real price series (World Bank, 1997b:p.xxiv).
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However, a comparison with Oman's growth rates with those of individual
countries reveals a slightly different picture. Whilst only Botswana achieved higher
average annual growth rates than Oman during 1965-80, Oman recorded lower growth
rates than a number of other developing countries during 1980-90. As table 4.3 shows,
Botswana, China and South Korea all recorded higher average annual growth rates during
that period, although Oman achieved the fourth highest growth rates among the 148
economies with populations of more than one million listed in the World Development
Indicators (World Bank, 199Th:pp.130-132). Similarly for the period 1990-95, in
addition to China, Chile, South Korea and Malaysia which recorded much higher average
annual growth rates than Oman, there were other ten developing economies out of the 148
economies mentioned earlier, like Jordan, Indonesia etc., which also recorded higher
growth rates than Oman during that period (ibid).
Table 4.3
Average annual growth rates in GDP, 1965-95 (at constant prices)
Oman compared with the world and selected developing countries
Oman
Upper-middle-income
World
Botswana
China
Chile
Gab on
South Korea
Saudi Arabia
1965-80
13.0
5.6
4.1
14.2
6.4
1.9
9.5
9.6
11.3
7.3
1980-90
8.3
1.3
3.1
10.3
10.2
4.1
0.5
9.4
-1.2
5.2
(per cent
1990-95
6.0
2.6
2.0
4.2
12.8
7.3
-2.5
7.2
1.7
8.7
Source: Column 1, World Bank (1990) World Development Report 1990, pp.180-181; Columns 2
and 3, World Bank (199Th), World Development Indicators 1997, pp.130-132.
Because of Oman's heavy reliance on expatriate labour, (a point we shall discuss in
Chapters V and VII) and purchase of services from abroad, it is also important to examine
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its performance in terms of GNP'. Another important element for comparison is the rate
of population growth since it also influences per capita income growth. Since Oman is in
the second stage of its demographic transition2, modernisation associated with improved
public health measures has led to a marked reduction in mortality rates and increased life
expectancy, while such improvements have not yet been accompanied by a decline in
fertility rates3 . The growing divergence between high birth rates and falling death rates
has led to a sharp increase in population growth, while the fact that a large proportion of
its population is in the young age group 4
 has increased Oman's reliance on expatriate
labour.
The impact of Oman's high population growth rate on growth of GNP per capita
is shown in table 4.4. Along with Botswana and China, Oman during the period 1980-93
achieved almost the highest growth rates in GNP among the 174 economies listed in
Human Development Report 1996 (UNDP, 1 996:pp. 186-87). But Oman's rate of growth
of GNP per capita was much lower than these two countries during this period. While
GNP per capita in Botswana grew at 6.2 per cent and in China, it increased at the rate of
8.2 per cent, Oman achieved an average annual growth rate of 3.4 per cent in its GNP per
capita due to its high population growth rate. In fact, in addition to the five countries
shown in the table below, there were fourteen other developing countries that recorded
higher GNP per capita annual growth rates during 1980-93 (ibid.). Although Oman's per
capita income growth was in line with the world average, it was very much below the
annual average growth rate of 5.5 per cent achieved by the group of countries with
This is the sum of gross value-added by all resident producers plus any taxes (less subsidies) that are not
included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income from non-resident sources (World
Bank, l997b:p.l9) (emphasis added by the present author).
2 According to the theory of demographic transition, population growth, as a function of (real) per capita
income passes through three stages. In the first stage of a traditional society with low per capita income,
population growth is quite low because both birth and death rates are high. In the second stage, as per
capita income grows with development taking place, population growth tends to be high because while the
birth rate remains high, death rate declines rapidly with spread of modern medicines, public sanitation
and education. In the third stage of a developed economy enjoying high per capita income, both the birth
and death rates are low and hence population growth tends to be quite low (Todaro, 1992 :pp.2 14-217).
3 This point is discussed further in Chapter VII.
As we shall see in Chapter VII, about 52 per cent of Oman's population were below the age of 14 in
1993 (Oman, 1993a:p.39).
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medium-human development. This is, as can be seen from table 4.4, due to Oman's much
higher population growth rate. However, Oman's performance was much better than
Saudi Arabia, which also has a high rate of population growth, but has a much larger oil
income. Whilst Saudi Arabia's GNP per capita grew by only 0.6 per cent during the
period 1965-80, and declined by 3.6 per cent during 1980-93, Oman's GNP per capita
grew by 9.0 per cent and 3.4 per cent respectively during these two periods.
In absolute terms, Oman's GDP 1
 has grown from US$ 5,982 million in 1980 to
US$ 12,102 million in 1995 while its GNP per capita reached US$ 4,820 in 1995 (World
Bank, 1997b:pp.9 and 135).
'GDP is always calculated by the World bank at pqrchasers' prices. And all dollar figures are current US
dollars unless otherwise stated (World Bank, l997b:pp.xxi).
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Table 4.4
GNP, GNP per capita and population: average annual growth rates (1965-2000)
Oman compared with the world and selected developing countries
________________________ __________ 	 ___________________	 (per cent)
Economy/Region	 GNP	 GNP per capita	 Population
____________________ 1980-93 1965-80 1980-93 1960-93 199320002
Oman	 9.3	 9.0	 3.4	 3.9	 4.0
World	 2.8	 3.0	 3.3	 1.9	 1.5
Medium-human
development	 4.9	 3.9	 5.5	 2.1	 1.4
Botswana	 9.5	 9.9	 6.2	 3.3	 3.0
China	 9.6	 4.1	 8.2	 1.8	 1.0
Chile	 4.6	 NA	 3.6	 1.8	 1.5
Gabon	 0.1	 5.6	 -1.6	 2.9	 2.8
South Korea	 8.7	 7.3	 8.2	 1.7	 0.9
Saudi Arabi&'	 -	 0.6	 -3.6	 4.4	 3.1
Malaysia	 6.4	 4.7	 3.5	 2.6	 2.1
Note:
a) Estimated growth rates.
b) Data for GNP growth for 1980-93 are not available.
Source: IJNDP (1996)Huinan Development Report 1996, pp.l'78-l79; 186-187.
4.3.2 Control of inflation and public debt
Unlike many other developing economies, including the oil exporting ones, Oman
has been able to control inflation' for more than a decade. As we shall discuss in Chapters
V and VI, this is partly due to the fact, and that Oman has never relied on inflation tax2
 to
finance fiscal deficits because the deficits have been within financeable limits.
As chart 4.1 below shows Oman had a high average annual inflation rate (of 25 to
30 per cent) during the period 1970-80, due to the emergence of the economy in 1970
'International experience suggests that macroeconomic stability entailing maintenance of inflation rate
below 20 per cent (World Bank, 1993b:p. 110) - a level not crossed by Oman since the late 1970s -
for long periods is a corollaiy to fiscal prudence.
2 That is, to increase the money supply without corresponding increase in currency reserves.
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from a stagnant 'traditional' stage to a 'modern' forward-looking one. However, since
the I 980s, inflation, as measured by GDP implicit deflator, has recorded a negative
growth. According to the World Bank data, during 1980-90, the GDP implicit deflator in
Oman recorded an average annual decline of 3.6 per cent, while for the period 1990-95,
the average annual rate of decline was 2.9 per cent (World Bank, 1997b:p.207).
Comparing Oman's inflation rate with other countries in the Middle East and
North Africa, the World Development Indicators (ibid) identified Oman as having the
lowest rate of inflation in this region during the period 1990-95.
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Chart 4.1
Average annual rate of inflation (%): Oman compared with selected economies
(1970-95)
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Source: World Bank (1995a:pp.162-163; 1997b:pp.207-208),World Development indicators 1995; 1997.
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There are several reasons for Oman's success in keeping the rate of inflation at
very low levels during 1980-95. These include: firstly, revenues from oil exports enabled
Oman to have a very liberal import policy, with a minimum level of customs duty - not
exceeding 6 per cent' for most of the items - with food items and building materials
being exempt, quota restrictions are almost non-existent. Therefore, shortages in
domestic production of tradables are compensated for through imports.
Secondly, protection for infant industries was not only very selective but, in most
cases, it took the form of increased custom duty - about 25 per cent of the value of
competing imported goods - instead of import quotas and bans, which were the norm in
a number of developing countries. However, although the protection provided by the
developing countries to domestic industries under the import-substituting industrialisation
strategy has come under heavy criticism since the 1 970s (as discussed in Chapters I and
II), we would argue that the absence of such protection for domestic industries has been
one of the reasons for Oman's limited success in diversifying its economy. This point is
discussed further in Chapter VII.
Thirdly, although development planning was adopted as a means of transforming
the economy and society, the government, in line with its policy of promoting the market
and working in tandem with it, relied almost exclusively on the markets in trade and
production by adopting a 'market-oriented' strategy. This was very clearly emphasised in
the development strategy referred to earlier. And lastly, foreign exchange earnings
brought in by oil exports enabled Oman to adopt a liberal exchange rate system and at the
same time maintain a stable currency.
'These have remained unchanged throughout the period 1983. For example, Oman's mean tariff during
1989-93 was 5.7 per cent, with standard deviation of tariff rates not exceeding 9.2 per cent during that
period (World Bank, l997b:p.253).
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In the case of public debt, Oman's conservative borrowing policy has ensured self
reliance in financing the development process. Thus despite large fiscal deficits', Oman's
total external public debt has remained low compared to some other oil exporting
developing countries like Mexico and Nigeria which borrowed heavily during the years of
the second oil price increase of (1979-80) for ambitious development programmes2, in
expectation of continued increases in oil revenues, (James, et. al., l989:p.IO7). Oman has
been able to resist this temptatIon. As table 4.5 shows, in 1995, the present value of
Oman's external public debt, amounting to 45.8 per cent of its exports of goods and
services and 28 per cent of its GNP, was low compared to a number of selected
developing countries and the group of Upper-middle-income economies. As a result, in
1995 its total debt service ratio of 7.5 per cent of exports of goods and services, and of
4.6 per cent of its GNP was accordingly very low. While there are no absolute rules on
what values are too high for these ratios, according to the World Development Indicators
(World Bank, 199Th), empirical evidence has shown "[t]hat debt service difficulties
become increasingly likely when the ratio of the present value of debt to exports reaches
200-250 per cent and the debt service ratio exceeds 20-25 per cent"(ibid :p.225).
'As we shall see in Chapter V. Oman's fiscal deficits during the Third and Fourth FYP have been large
by developing countries standards.
2 As we discussed in Chapter 1, the large expansion in external borrowing by a number of developing
countries in the 1970s led to a debt crisis in the 1980s which in turn provided the pretext for neo-classical
re-emergence and the adoption of the neo-liberal agenda by the JFIs.
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Table 4.5
External debt management: Oman compared with selected developing economies
Present value of debt as %	 Total debt service as %
Economy/Region	 of GNP	 of exports	 of goods	 of GNP	 of exports of goods
________ ______ 
and services	 _______ ______ and services
________________ 1993
	 1995	 1993	 1995	 1980	 1995	 1980	 1995
Oman	 26.5	 28.0	 43.4	 45.8	 4.7	 4.6	 6.4	 7.5
Upper-middle-
income
economiesa
	26.3a	 b	 110.3a	 b	 3.6	 4.9	 b	 19.4a
China	 17.5	 16.4	 84.2	 70.6	 0.5	 2.2	 8.4	 9.9
Chile	 43.8	 41.3	 156.9	 138.5	 10.2	 7.8	 43.1	 25.7
Botswana	 13.4	 13.1	 -	 -	 1.7	 2.2	 2.1	 3.2
Malaysia	 37.6	 38.6	 42.1	 33.6	 4.0	 8.1	 6.3	 7.8
Morocco	 73.9	 61.7	 206.8	 180.7	 7.9	 11.3	 33.4	 32.1
Mexico	 33.0	 67.2	 174.2	 163.8	 5.8	 9.9	 44.4	 24.2
Nigeria	 109.9	 132.3	 240.6	 88.8	 1.3	 6.3	 4.1	 12.3
Note:
a) Data relate to 1993 and are from World Bank (1995a:p.207) World Development Report 1995.
b) Data for certain years are not available for the Middle-income (Lower and Upper-middle-income)
groups.
Source: World Bank (l997b:pp.222-224) World Development Indicators 1997.
In addition to the external public debt of RO 1,000 million, Oman has also an
internal public debt of RO 377 million, thus bringing total public debt to RO 1,376
million', as at end of 1995 (Oman, 1996a:p.94). Oman's low public debt has provided it
with the flexibility for carrying out a structural adjustment programme without the
involvement of IFIs, as we shall discuss in Chapter V. Moreover, the low indebtedness
makes Oman a good credit risk2 and hence enables it to borrow at favourable terms from
the international financial markets; this in turn enables Oman to pursue privatisation as a
means to an end rather than as an end in itself, as we shall discuss in Chapter VII.
'Does not include short-term borrowings by the treasuiy. If these were included, total public debt would
amount to RO 1,500 million as at end of 1995.
2 As per Standard and Poor's sovereign long-term debt rating, Oman has been awarded a BBB-rating..
Ratings of AAA through BBB are categorised as investment grade. While ratings of BB through C are
specified as speculative grade (World Bank, op. cit. :265-267).
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The terms of Oman's external borrowing also compare very favourably with those
of Middle-income group of countries. In 1993, for example, the average interest rate for
Oman was 4.5 per cent per annum, while the average rate for the Middle-income countries
was 6.7 per cent; the average maturity for Oman was 16.8 years while for the group it was
12 years (World Bank, op. cit. :pp.249).
On the one hand, controlling public debt to ensure macroeconomic stability, and
on the other, avoiding "crowding out" of private investment through excessive public
sector borrowing, has always been a main element in Oman's development policy. Thus,
for example, the Fourth FYP stipulated that external public debt throughout the plan
period (1991-95) should remain at the same level as at the end of the Third FYP.
Additional net external borrowing could not be resorted to without the approval of the
Council of Ministers (Oman, 1991a:p.409). Similarly, the Fifth FYP (1996-2000) has
frozen the total public debt (external and internal) at the level of RD 1,500 million
throughout the plan period, which was the stock of total public debt as at end of 1995
(Oman, 1996a:p,566).
4.3.3 Oman's export performance and trade balance
In line with Oman's long-term development strategy of promoting a free market,
the government has adopted a free trade regime with relatively low tariffs and without
other protectionist measures, as table 4.6 shows. There are no taxes on exports and the
Omani Rial is a freely convertible currency. Thus, Oman's trade policies compare
favourably with the policies adopted by those developing countries, which are classified in
the 1987 World Development Report as "moderately outward oriented countries"
(Appendix table 4-AT). However, Oman's performance in achieving structural change in
its export trade has been poor compared to other countries. As the table below shows, in
the case of export growth, Oman's annual average growth rate of 6.3 per cent during the
period 1988-89 to 1993-94 has been almost 60 per cent lower than that of Thailand and
Malaysia, countries classified as moderately outward oriented. Similarly, Oman's market
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share of its traditional exports has declined at an annual average rate of 2.4 per cent
whereas the other four countries in table 4.6 have raised their market share in traditional
exports at the rate of 1.0 to 3.4 per cent. Because of the constant decline in Oman's terms
of trade, the ratio of its trade to GDP in real terms has been declining at an annual average
rate of 1.61 per cent since the period 1981-83.
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Table 4.6
Trade performance, trade policies, competitiveness and GDP growth: Oman
compared with a selected number of countries (1980-1995)
Item	 Oman_ Malaysia Chile
	 Tunisia Thailand
Growth of merchandise trade
Export volume - (1 99O95)a	9.8	 17.8	 10.5	 7.7	 21.6
Import volume(199O95) a	 18.5	 15.7	 14.5	 6.4	 12.7
Net barter terms of trade b
(1987=100) 1995
	
92	 94	 91	 100
Income terms of tradeb
(1987= 100) 1995	 151	 229	 153	 155	 352
Trade policies: AU Products (1990-93)
Mean tariff %	 5.7	 14.3	 11.0	 30.0	 23.1
Standard deviation of tariff ratesc	9.2	 14.0	 0.7	 11.7	 16.9
Covered by non-tariff barriers (%)
	 -	 2.1	 0.1	 32.7	 5.5
Export competitiveness
Nominal export growth 1988-89 to
1993-94 (%)
Annual average	 6.3	 17.0	 7.7	 9.8	 17.4
from world demand	 8.0	 8.7	 3.1	 5.8	 8.7
frommarketshare	 -2.4	 1.9	 1.6	 3.4	 1.0
from export diversification	 0.9	 5.6	 2.8	 0.3	 6.8
Integration with the global economy)
Real trade as a share of GDPd
Initial level % (1981-83) 	 51.3	 31.0	 42.3	 24.6
Annual average difference
from 1981-83 to 1990-93 	 -1.61	 5.74	 0.97	 -0.27	 3.25
Manufactured exports as a
share of total exports
Initial level % (1981-83)	 4.2	 20.8	 8.4	 36.9	 27.7
Annual average difference
1981-83 to 1991-93	 0.6	 3.80	 0.59	 3.34	 3.83
Gross domestic product
Average annual % growth
1980-90	 8.3	 5.2	 4.1	 3.3	 7.6
1990-95	 6.0	 8.7	 7.3	 3.9	 8.4
Notes:
a) Average annual % growth.
b) Net barter terms of trade are the ratio of the 1987 (base year) export price index to the corresponding
import price index; while income terms of trade are the ratio of the 1987 (base year) export value
index to the corresponding import price index (World Bank, 1997b:p. 157).
c) Standard deviation of tariff rates measures the average dispersion of tariff rates around the mean
(ibid :p.255).
d) Real trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured in constant prices
(ibid. :p.295).
Source: Compiled from World Development Indicators 1997 (World Bank, 1997b:tables 4.1. 4.7, 5.6, 5.7
and 6.1).
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The question which arises is: why, in spite of liberal trade policies, Oman's export
performance is poorer than that of other outward-oriented countries? The study carried
out by Syrquin and Chenery (11989) suggests that small, outward-looking and
manufactures-oriented countries had the highest growth rates of per capita income over
the sample period (1950-83); and that outward orientation led to faster rates of growth for
both large and small countries, whether oriented to primary or manufactured activities.
However, Oman shows different results because, as we noted earlier, it adopted mainly a
laissez-faire approach towards industrialisation.
Perhaps the answer lies in the fact that in contrast to the East Asian countries like
South Korea who carried out a 'hands on' intervention policy, Oman had relied on liberal
trade policies. While in the case of South Korea, as Evans states "[t]here has been much
more import substitution induced by targeted, made-to-measure protection than is
captured by the available indices of protection" (Evans, l989:p.297). Similarly, as Evans
argues, the typically applied rules of thumb in evaluating infant industry protection'
"would seem to be much too conservative, judging at least from the historical experience
of South Korea and Taiwan" (ibid. :p.3O9). Equally important, as reported in Aghazadeh
and Evans (1988), is macroeconomic management of both the exchange rate and of
income distribution. In the case of the exchange rate, although the fixed parity of the
Omani Rial vis-a-vis the US dollar has provided exchange rate stability, the issue is
whether Oman can afford such an exchange rate stability and whether the present parity is
conducive for export promotion. And a similar question relates to Oman's ability to
sustain the present parity when its net barter terms of trade have deteriorated by about 23
per cent since 1987, as table 4.6 shows.
Associated with the question of trade and global integration are the changes in
Oman's trade and current account balances with the external world. Although Oman has
That is, a learning period of about five years and a maximum effective protection of 10-20 per cent,
optimally administered through subsidies rather than tariffs or import controls (ibid.).
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been able to protect oil revenues from the adverse consequences of deterioration in its
terms of trade by increasing oil production and minimising its domestic consumption, its
continued reliance on the purchase of services from abroad is clearly unsustainable. As
table 4.7 below demonstrates, Oman's average trade surplus (exports minus imports of
merchandise) has remained fairly constant at around RO 2,900 million for each of the
successive five-year plan periods since 1981, but its current account has on average
recorded a significant deficit during the period 199 1-95. A 'hands on' government policy,
no doubt, is warranted to adjust the worsening balance of payment situation if macro-
economic stability, in terms of low inflation and a freely convertible currency, is to be
maintained.
Table 4.7
Oman's balance of payments : trade and current account balances (1976-95)
(RO Million)
Item	 1976-80	 1981-85	 1986-90	 1991-95
Trade balance	 1,350	 2,959	 2,901	 2,877
Less: (a) payment for other
services	 514	 994	 1,081	 1,551
(b) expatriate remittances	 436	 1,182	 1,413	 2,657
Current account surplus(+) or
deficit(-)	 +400	 +783	 +407	 -1,331
Source: Compiled from Oman (1 986b; 1 996b) Statistical Year Book 1985 and 1995.
Despite the substantial trade surplus, the current account has been in deficit during
the period 1991 to 1995 mainly as a result of rapid growth of expatriate remittances. The
negative impact of these large remittances is also reflected in the decline in national
savings. As we shall see in Chapters V and VII, while the ratio of Oman's domestic
saving to GDP is high, Oman's rate of national savings is quite low and it is this issue that
needs to be addressed by the New Development Strategy.
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4.3.4 Structural change and sectoral composition of GDP
An important indicator of Oman's economic development is the structural change
which has taken place in the Omani economy through achieving high average growth rates
in agriculture, non-oil industry and services. As table 4.8 shows, in all the main sectors of
the economy average annual growth rates achieved by Oman are impressive and very
much higher than the growth rates achieved by Upper-middle-income countries.
Agriculture in Oman recorded an average annual growth rate of 7.9 per cent during 1980-
90, arid 6.9 per cent during 1980-93, which compared to weighted average of growth
rates of Upper-middle-income countries, are almost three to four times higher. Similarly,
in the case of industry the annual growth rates of 10.3 per cent and 9.2 per cent, achieved
by Oman during these two periods, and the growth rates of 20.6 and 17.2 per cent
recorded in Oman's non-oil manufacturing sector were much higher than growth rates
experienced by Upper-middle-income countries. The very high growth rates recorded by
Oman's non-oil manufacturing sector, compared to the average for Upper-middle-income
group can be attributed to two factors: the support this sector has received from the state
throughout the two decades of development planning; and the fact that this sector in
Oman started from a zero base and till as late as 1980, its relative share in GDP was only 1
per cent.
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Table 4.8
Growth of agriculture, industry, manufacturing and services and their relative share
in GDP: Oman compared with Upper-middle-income countries - 1970-93
(per cent)
Item	 Agriculturea	 Industryb
	Manufacturingc	Servicesd
Average annual growth rate:
Oman
1980-90	 7.9	 10.3	 20.6	 6.0
1980-93	 6.9	 9.2	 17.2	 6.2
Uppermiddleincomee
countries
1980-90	 2.4	 0.7	 1.2	 2.0
1980-93	 1.8	 2.3	 2.5	 2.9
Relative share of valueaddedh in
gross domestic product:
Oman
1970	 16	 77	 0	 7
1980	 3	 69	 1	 28
1993	 4
Upper-middle-income countriese
1970	 12	 38	 25	 49
1980	 8	 47	 20	 43
________________________________ 	 8	 37	 20	 53
Notes:
a) Agriculture includes fisheries.
b) Industzy includes oil, gas, manufacturing, quarzying, electricity, water and construction.
c) Because of the importance of manufacturing, it is also shown separately.
d) Services include all real estate, financial intermediation, trade, tourism, public administration and
defence, health, education and any other activities not classified in the first three headings. Also
included in services, are custom duties, while imputed bank services are deducted.
e) Data for Upper-middle-income countries are weighted averages.
f) Because aggregate data for 1993 are not available, data for 1994 have been used (World Bank,
I996:p.21 1).
g) The changes in the relative share of the various sectors over the period 1980-93 do not correspond to
the growth rates achieved by each sector. The reason for this is, whereas average growth rates are
based on constant 1987 prices the relative share of GDP is based on current US dollars (World Bank,
I 996:p.232).
h) Relative shares of GDP are based on current price series; while average annual growth rates are based
on 1987 constant prices (World Bank, 1995a:pp.230-232).
Sources:
1) Data relating to 1970, 1993 and 1980-93 are from World Bank (1995a:pp.164-167), World
Development Report 1995.
2) Data relating to 1980 and 1980-90 are from World Bank (1997b:pp.l3O-l32 and 134-136) World
Development Indicators 1997.
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As regards the relative share of these sectors in GDP, table 4.8 shows that while
the value-added by agriculture in Oman recorded a sharp decline from 16 per cent to 3 per
cent between 1970 and 1980, it has maintained its relative importance of 3 per cent of
GDP since 1980. The decline in the importance in agriculture reflects the structural
change that has been engineered by the state from the mid-i 970s through adoption of one
or more of the development strategies discussed in Chapter II. However, as we shall see in
Chapter V, the significant decline in the relative share of agriculture is not due to its
neglect by the state, but because of the limited potential for growth in this sector 1 , the
higher growth potential of the other sectors and the need to develop a diversified modern
economy. Thus the relative share of agriculture has declined because other sectors have
grown much more rapidly.
Table 4.8 also shows that while the growth in industry has been equally significant,
its relative share has declined from 77 per cent in 1970 to 53 per cent in 1993. The large
decline in the share of industry is a clear manifestation of the impact of global political
economy on Oman's domestic economy. Thus, despite recording impressive growth rates
in real terms, over the period 1980-93, the value-added by industry in nominal terms
(current US dollars) has declined by about 23 per cent between 1980 and 1993 because of
a continuous decline in Oman's terms of trade2 . While in the case of services, although
the growth rates recorded are lower than those recorded in industry, yet its relative share
of GDP in nominal terms has increased from 28 per cent in 1980 to 44 per cent in 1993.
Again, the reason for this large difference in performance of these two sectors, is because
the services sector is not directly affected by the terms of trade and Oman's inflation rate
This is because of scarcity of water. Oman had fresh water resources of only 911 cubic meters per capita
in 1995; in comparison to South Korea, which had 1,474 cubic meters and Malaysia which had 22,642
cubic meters per capita. The average for Upper-middle-income countries was 22,930 cubic meters (World
Bank, 1997b:pp. 102-104). Another problem is the topography of Oman, where desert and mountains
occupy almost two thirds of the land area and only 5 per cent of the land is suitable for permanent pasture,
compared to the average of 32 per cent in Upper-middle-income countries (ibid. :pp.94-96). Moreover, the
decline in the relative share of agriculture is in line with the empirical findings of Syrquin (1988) which
show that while agriculture provides the initial stimulus for transformation, its importance declines with
development. The share of agriculture in output and employment tends to fall with industrialisation.
2 Oman's terms of trade declined by about 16 per cent between 1987 and 1993 (World Bank, 1995a:p.187)
and between 1980 and 1986, they declined by about 63 per cent (World Bank, l988:p.243).
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has registered a continuous decline since 1980. As a result, Oman's diversification efforts
have to a certain extent been frustrated by the forces operating in the centre, on which
peripheries like Oman have no influence. This would be in conformity with the Centre-
Periphery school which we discussed in Chapter II.
Since the diversification of the economy has been one of the principal elements of
Oman's long-term development strategy formulated by the Development Council in 1975,
it is necessary to focus on the activities of these three main sectors of the economy.
As can be seen from table 4.9 below, structural change in Oman has been
associated with rapid growth of national income. Value-added by crude oil, representing
the primary output in the case of Oman, has declined in relative importance continuously
between 1976 and 1995. In 1976 the relative share of this activity in GDP at current
prices was 59 per cent, when nominal GDP was RO 884 million. But in 1995 its relative
share declined by about one-third to 37 per cent, when nominal GDP, had increased to RO
5,288 million.
In relation to other activities, we find that the highest growth has occurred in the
value-added in manufacturing, which increased its relative share in GDP from a meagre
0.5 per cent in 1976 to 4.6 per cent in 1995. The growth in the value-added by the
various services like public administration and defence, and wholesale and retail trade, has
led to a large increase in the relative share of the services. As table 4.9 shows, the relative
share of services in GDP has increased from 28 per cent to about 50 per cent of GDP.
Although this growth reflects the rising standard of living in Oman and the wide range of
services that are being provided by the economy, a point of concern, which we shall
discuss briefly later and in more detail in Chapters V and VII, is that this large increase in
the services sector is perhaps premature. As an oil producing country, Oman needs to
diversiFj more into tradable sectors of the economy like agriculture and fisheries,
manufacturing, and tradable services that can increase its non-oil export earnings and thus
contribute towards reducing the current account deficit in its balance of payments.
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Table 4.9
Structure of the economy: production at current prices - 1976 and 1995
Relative share
Value-added by activity	 GDP	 GDP
1976	 1995	 1976	 1995
_________________ ROMn.
	 ROMn.	 %	 %
1. Agriculture and fisheries 	 18.3	 152.0	 2.1	 2.9
Agriculture	 12.3	 100.1	 1.4	 1.9
Fisheries	 6.0	 51.9	 0.7	 1.0
2. Industry	 616.7	 2,465.6	 69.7	 46.6
2.1 Crude oil	 517.5	 1,974.1	 58.5	 37.3
2.2 Natural gas
	 -	 46.8	 -	 0.9
2.3 Mining and quarrying 	 -	 17.2	 0	 0.3
2.4 Manufacturing	 4.3	 240.8	 0.5	 4.6
2.5Electricityandwater 	 6.4	 49.1	 0.7	 0.9
2.6 Building and construction 	 88.5	 137.6	 10.0	 2.6
3. Services	 244.8	 2,625.3	 27.7	 49.5
3.1 Wholesale and retail trade and
restaurants and hotels 	 76.5	 716.1	 8.7	 13.5
3.2 Transport and communication 	 13.5	 332.9	 1.5	 6.3
3.3 Financial intermediationa
real estate and business activities 	 81.1	 441.1	 9.2	 8.3
3.4 Public administration and	 59.5	 705.6	 6.7	 13.3
defence
3.5 Education	 6.1	 222.3	 0.7	 4.2
3.6Health	 3.7	 92.1	 0.4	 1.7
3.7 Other community, social and
personal services	 4.4	 115.2	 0.5	 2.2
4. GDP at producers' prices 	 879.8	 5,242.9	 -	 -
5. Plus: import taxes	 4.5	 45.3	 0.5	 0.9
6. GDP at market prices 	 884.3	 5,288.2	 100.0	 100.0
Note:
a) Net of imputed financial intermediation charges.
Source: Compiled from Oman (1986b:pp.396-404 and 1996b:pp.380-384) Statistical Year Book 1985
and 1995.
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Although Oman adopted a minimal intervention policy to achieve industrialisation
and did not adopt an autarkic' industrial policy based on import substituting
industrialisation strategy, as was favoured by Prebisch (1950 and 1959) and the ECLA (as
examined in the preceding three chapters), Oman's achievements in industrialisation are
much below than required for effective diversification. Similarly, while Chenery's
(l988:pp.2O5-268) study shows an increasing role for manufacturing during the transition,
before the growth in services takes over and industrial maturity occurs, we find in the case
of Oman, that the share of services has risen prematurely. Therefore, while the neo-
classical approach focuses on "getting the prices right", one would argue that because
industrialisation is a process of technological change, with learning related to experience
as a major source of externality, there is no alternative to a well targeted state-led
industrial strategy. As Bienefeld (1996) argues, economic liberalisation, under the present
imbalances in the global political economy, is not necessarily beneficial, and protection, or
intervention is not necessarily detrimental.
Comparing Oman's experience with other developing countries at a similar level of
income, it is obvious from table 4.10 that the services sector has grown much more rapidly
than the manufacturing and the agriculture sectors. This is a clear manifestation of the
Dutch disease2 as articulated by Auty (l995:p.66):
The size of the competitive tradable sector (as distinct from
the protected tradable sector) vis-à-vis the rest of the
economy lies at the root of the divergent economic
performance under ... alternative industrial policies. If
industrial maturation is delayed ... {t}hen the burden of
generating foreign exchange remains with the primary sector
whose relative size shrinks as development proceeds.
Moreover, the primary sector may even encourage
An autarkic industrial policy (Al?) is more oriented towards inward looking industrialisation compared
to an outward looking competitive industrial policy (CI?) (Auty, 1995 :p.6 1).
2 The concept and theory of the Dutch disease has been discussed in Chapter II.
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subsidisation of manufacturing ... [S]uch subsidies may
appear to be temporarily justified in order to offset what is,
in effect, Dutch disease (which manifests itself in the
premature shrinkage of agriculture (crude petroleum in the
case of Oman) and under-expansion of competitive
manufacturing) (emphasis added by the present author).
Table 4.10
Structure of the economy: production: Oman compared with selected developing
countries - 1994
Region	 - GNP per capita Agriculture Industry
	 Manu-	 Services
facturing'
__________	 US$	 _______ % _______ %
Oman	 5,140	 3	 53	 4	 44
Gabon	 3,880	 8	 52	 11	 40
Malaysia	 3,480	 14	 43	 32	 42
Mexico	 4,180	 8	 28	 20	 64
South Korea -	 8,260	 7	 43	 -	 29	 50
Note:
a) Because manufacturing is generally the most dynamic part of the industrial sector, its share is also
shown separately.
Source: World Bank (1996 :pp. 189 and 211) World Development Report 1996.
The data in table 4.10 reveal that while the share of the services in Oman may be
comparable with other developing countries, it is the relative share of agriculture and
manufacturing that is very low. This confirms Auty's (1995) analysis that the primary
sector - crude oil in the case of Oman included under industry in the above table, is
the one which bears the main burden of generating the foreign exchange required for the
functioning of Oman's economy.
Thus, although Oman has succeeded in reducing its dependence on the oil sector
as a source of its national income, its efforts in diversifying the non-oil sector by
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expanding the relative size of the (non-oil) manufacturing sector has met with only limited
success. In comparison with other primary-exporting developing countries like Malaysia,
Mexico and Gabon, the value-added by Oman's manufacturing industry of a mere 4 per
cent is quite small. This reflects the fact that despite a favourable policy environment,
there was no active policy of diversification in favour of tradables. Moreover, despite the
growth constraints facing the agriculture sector, one can argue that development planning
should have placed more emphasis on developing this sector. As a result, Oman has not
succeeded in enhancing the non-oil exports and the burden of earning foreign exchange
still falls heavily on the primary producing oil sector.
4.4 Progress in Social Development
"Ultimately", Amartya Sen argues, "the assessment of development achieved
cannot be a matter only of quantification of the means of that achievement. The concept
of development has to take note of the actual achievements themselves" (Sen. 1988 :p. 15).
These "achievements" which Sen labels as "flinctionings" include the length of life (life
expectancy), the "nature of life" and what people value as important to their well-being
(nourishment, good health, clean air and water, the ability to move freely).
On the other hand, while relying on growth of national income in measuring
development performance might not reveal a true picture, both Dasgupta and Weale
(1992) show a strong correlation between the rankings of 48 developing countries for
GNP per capita and their rankings for five other indicators (life expectancy, infant
mortality, adult literacy, political rights and civil rights).
The ultimate objective of development is to improve human well-being in a
substantial and sustainable way. And therefore, while discussing the meaning of
development in Chapter H we stated that it is a multidimensional concept and a country's
development perfonnance has to be measured in terms of the basic indicators of human
development. That is, in addition to growth of per capita income, development should be
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measured in terms of enhancement of people's capabilities through improvements in basic
education and health care and provision of public amenities like water, electricity, roads,
communication, etc. which, in a modern society, are essential for improving peoples'
physical quality of life.
As stated earlier as late as 1970, Oman's level of development was very poor in
terms of all the above criteria. When Oman embarked on the process of development
planning, it was much more underdeveloped than the other ex-colonial developing nations
in Asia and in the Middle East. Taking into consideration this background, Oman has
made good progress during the last two decades (1975-1995), as table 4.11 indicates, in
enhancing people's capabilities and improving their quality of life through rapid and
widespread expansion of basic education and health care systems and establishment of a
country-wide network of modern infrastructure.
Development of human capital is the product of education, and improvements in
health and nutrition and these three elements are the most important factors which
influence the development process. We will, therefore, review how the state in Oman has
been able, through a series of five-years plans, to attain significant social development.
We shall do so by examining the progress achieved in education, health, supportive
physical infrastructure and equality. Oman's experience is also compared with a group of
other developing countries'.
'These are the countries classified by UNDP as having medium-level of human development like Oman,
or are oil exporting countries like Oman, or are countries classified as Upper-middle-income countries by
the World Bank.
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Table 4.11
Main social indicators: Oman compared with Upper-middle-income countries
1970-1995
Weighted
Main social indicators
	 average for
Upper-middle-
income
	_____________________________________________ _________ __________	 countries
1970	 1995	 1995
GNP per capita ussa	 -	 4,820a	 4,640
Average annual % growth (1970-95)
	
-	 3.3	 -
Health:	 -	 -	 -
Infant mortality rate: per 1000 live births
	 119	 18	 35
Life expectancy at birth (years)"	 48	 70	 67c
Population with access toc:
Health services (%) 1990-95	
-	 96	 87
Safe water (%) 1990-96 	 15e	 82	 69
Sanitation (%) 1990-96 	
-	 78	 36
Education:
Gross primary enrolment ratio(% of relevant age group)
1993	 85	 107
Gross secondary enrolment rates (% of relevant age
group) 1993	
-	 61	 55
Urban population (% of total population)
	 8e	 13	 73
Paved roadi (kilometre) 	 10	 6,213	 -
Normalised road	 -	 211	 -
Private consumption (per cent of GDP)
	 28e	 42	 61
Television sets (per 1000 people)	
-	 654	 256
Electricity consumption (per capita kilowatt hour)
	 161	 3,782	 895
Notes:
a) Calculated using the World Atlas method, see World Bank, (l997b:pp. 18-19) for definition.
b) Data for life expectancy in 1970 and 1995 as per Omani data are 44 years and 67.6 years respectively
for the two years. However, World Bank data are used here to facilitate comparison with data for
Upper-middle-income countries which are based on World Bank data.
C) Data from UNDP (l997:p. 164) Human Development Report 1997. Here the comparison is with
countries classified as having medium-human-development.
d) Calculated from World Bank (l997b:p. 12) World Development Indicators 1997.
e) Data for 1980, from World Bank (1997b:p.79).
f) Data from Oman,(1976b:p.10; l996b:p.345) Statistical Year Book, 1975;1995.
g) A value of 100 is normal (World Bank, 1997b:p.279).
Source: World Bank (199Th) World Development Indicators. 1997 (unless otherwise indicated).
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4.4.1 Education
In the field of education, a year before the beginning of development planning (i.e.
1975), there were only 183 schools (of general education) for a population of 824,000
persons. This number has increased by almost 6 times to 965 schools in 1995 to serve a
population of 2,135,000 which has increased by about one and half times since 1975
(Oman, 1996b:p.581). As a result, the population per school declined by more than one-
half, from 4,503 to 2,212 persons. The number of pupils in schools increased more than
10 times from 49,578 in 1975 to 490, 482 in 1995. And between 1975 and 1995 the
number of teachers grew by more than 11 times from 2,115 in 1975 to 22,506 in 1995
(ibici). Despite the enormous expansion in the student population in just 20 years, the
student-teacher ratio did not worsen and remained constant at around 22 students per
teacher. Reflecting the growth in educational services, the share of expenditure on general
basic education, as a percentage of total government expenditure rose from 1.6 per cent in
1975 to 7.9 per cent in 1995 (ibid).
Another important feature of Oman's education policy has been that males and
females are provided equal access to all publicly provided services including education.
Although in the early years, female enrolment rates were low, these have now increased to
levels close to those of males. As a result, the percentage of female population in the
relevant age group enrolled in primary education which was only 36 in 1980, increased to
82 in 1993 (World Bank, 1996:p.2Ol). During the same period, the percentage of females
of relevant age group enrolled in secondary education also rose from only 6 per cent to 57
per cent. Similarly the percentage of male population, in the relevant age group, enrolled
for primary education also grew from 69 per cent in 1980 to 87 in 1993 and for
secondary education it rose from 19 per cent to 64 per cent (ibid.). However, it is
important to point out that Oman's gross primary enrolment ratio of 85 per cent is still
below the ratio of 107 per cent achieved by countries in Upper-middle-income, but as
table 4.11 shows, Oman has seriously attempted to improve the situation, because the
ratio in 1970 was as low as 4 per cent.
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In terms of quality of school education in Oman, a UNICEF report (UNICEF,
l994:pp.2O and 48), shows that as many as 93 per cent of female children reached at least
grade 5 in 1992. This is an important indication of the improved status of women in
Oman as it shows that Omani families do not have to withdraw their female children from
schools for economic reasons before completing grade 5. This is unlike the situation in
many developing countries. Taking both male and female children together, in 1992 the
percentage of children reaching grade 5 was 91 per cent in Oman. This was higher than
the 89 per cent expected from Oman, on the basis of its GNP per capita (ibid.).
Similarly, the ratio of female students to total students which stood at 48 per cent
in 1995, corresponds closely to the percentage of females, in the Omani population, which
was around 52 per cent in 1993 (Oman, 1993a:p.45).
The first University in Oman, Sultan Qaboos University at Muscat, was opened in
1986. All this progress in the field of education was possible because of progressively
increasing public expenditure in Oman. Thus education's share of central government
expenditure increased from 5.3 per cent in 1980 to 12.5 per cent during 1992-95, while
public expenditure on education as a percentage of GNP increased from 2.1 per cent in
1980 to 4.5 during 1993-94 (UNDP, l997:pp.180 and 186)
4.4.2 Health
As the World Development Indicators volume (World Bank, 1997b:p.32) state,
improvements in health status and nutrition directly alleviate the worst aspects of poverty.
Access of the poor to health services is important both for increasing their income (illness
reduces people's capacity to work) and for raising living standards even if income remains
at poverty levels. Therefore, one of the main objectives of planning policies in Oman has
been to provide universal access to health services. Table 4.11 shows that compared to
the Upper-middle-income countries, where about 87 per cent of the population had access
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to health services during the period 1990-95, in Oman the percentage was as high as 96
per cent.
As a result, and as the above table indicates, life expectancy at birth in Oman has
increased from 48 years in 1970 to 70 years in 1995. This level is better than countries
with medium level human development. The rate of infant mortality, per 1000 live births
has also fallen rapidly from 119 in 1970 to only 18 in 1995, while the rate for Upper-
middle-income countries was 35 in 1995. Similarly, the mortality rate among children
under the age of five in Oman declined from 86 in 1980 (Oman, 1996d:p.3-5) to 22 in
1995, whilst the weighted average for the group of Upper-middle-income countries was
45 in 1995 (World Bank, 1997b:pp.87-88). Immunisation against measles and DPT
reached a level of about 98 per cent in Oman in 1995 for children under 12 months,
compared to a level of 87 per cent achieved by Upper-middle-income countries
(ibid. :pp.79-8O).
The impressive results achieved in health indicators are also reflected in the
expansion of health services. We find that the number of people per physician declined
from 2,142 in 1980 in Oman to 1,131 in 1995. While during the same period, people per
hospital bed declined from 617 in 1980 to 398 in 1995 (World Bank, l997b:p.75).
Table 4.11 shows that the percentage of people having access to safe water and
sanitation is better in Oman compared to other similar countries; while 82 per cent of the
Omani population had access to safe water and 78 per cent had access to sanitation, only
69 per cent of the population in countries with medium level of human development had
access to the former and only 36 per cent had access to the latter.
4.4.3 Development of infrastructure
Peoples' physical quality of life is greatly improved by having access to easy and
affordable basic public and private amenities provided through economic infrastructure in
230
the form of electricity, piped water supply, paved (all weather) roads, post and
telecommunication facilities, etc. Considering that in 1970 Oman had extremely poor
infrastructure, its development after this period has been significant. It now has a country
wide, well-maintained, modern infrastructural network, which in quality is as good as that
available in any developed country.
Table 4.12 shows Oman's performance in the development of infrastructure during
the last twenty-five years. In order to overcome the bottlenecks and constraints that
impede the functioning of a market economy and to achieve the various objectives of
development strategy, notably the achievement of equitable distribution of the benefits of
development among various regions of Oman, particular emphasis has been given to
infrastructure development in the successive five-year plans.
Table 4.12
Indicators of infrastructure development
Indicators	 Unit	 1970	 1975	 1980	 1985	 1990	 1995
Paved roads	 Km.	 10	 708	 2,157	 3,701	 4,893	 6,213
Graded roads	 Km.	 2,168	 5,495	 14,703	 18,280	 18,686	 24,276
International airports 	 Number	 Nil	 1	 1	 1	 1
Electricity produced	 Mn KWIH	 8	 154	 818	 2,498	 4,504	 6,500
(annual)
Electricity connections 	 Number	 1,000	 12,622	 52,693	 157,214	 241,122	 335,074
Water production (annual) 	 Million	 156	 359	 2,458	 6,364	 11,624	 16,755
gallons
Water connections	 Number	 456	 5,020	 16,645	 31,546	 69,448	 88,100
Post offices	 Number	 2	 27	 41	 63	 71	 90
Telephone connections	 Number	 557	 3,701	 15,044	 41,320	 107,409	 177,655
Telephones per 1000 	 Number	 1	 4	 14	 66	 66	 83
persons_______________ ________ ________ ________ _________ _________ _________
Sources: Compiled from Oman, Statistical Year Book, 1985, 1990 and 1995 (Oman, 1986b; 199 ib;
and 1996b).
For example, annual production of electricity increased by 40 times, from 154
million kilowatt hour in 1975 to 6,500 million kilowatt hour in 1995. And during this
period the number of electricity connections grew from 12,622 to 335,074, that is, almost
27 fold increase. Because high priority has been given to providing an adequate supply of
fresh water as a basic necessity, the total annual supply of water grew by 45 times, from
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359 million gallons in 1975 to 16,755 million gallons in 1995. The number of water
connections rose from 5,020 in 1975 to 88,100 in 1995. The number of telephone lines
grew by 48 times - from 3,701 in 1975 to 177,655 in 1995. As a result, the number of
telephones per 1000 persons increased from only 4 in 1975 to 83 in 1995.
The above table also shows that in 1975 there were only 27 post offices whereas in
1995 this number had risen to 90. Paved roads in Oman extended to only 10 kms in 1970
and in 1975 this had increased to 708 kms; but by 1995, length of paved roads increased
to 6,213 kms, so that almost the entire country has been covered by paved roads. In
addition to paved roads, the country is serviced with a large network of graded roads that
have increased from 5,495 kilometres in 1975 to 24,276 kilometres in 1995.
4.4.4 Equality
A central theme of Oman's development strategy has been to ensure that access to
education and health is provided equally to male and female population within different
regions of the country. Often the poor are unable to have access to such services;
therefore, the state has to mobiise the necessary resources for human capital investments.
This has been the case in Oman, as we shall see in Chapter V.
Female education is an essential element of any poverty reduction strategy. In
Oman enrolment rates in education for females are fairly close to those for males. In
terms of primary enrolment, female enrolment rate in 1993 was 82 per cent of the relevant
age group and, for secondary education it was 57 per cent, and in 1988 about 96 per cent
of females were completing grade 4 of basic education. For males, these figures were 87
per cent, 64 per cent and 97 per cent respectively (World Bank, 1996:p.2Ol).
In terms of distribution of basic amenities, about 94 per cent of rural people had
access to health services during 1985-95, compared to 100 per cent for the urban
population (TJNDP, l996:p.l52). Whilst in the initial five-year plans provision of
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electricity, water and roads, was concentrated in the main centres of population, the
Fourth FYP, as we shall see in Chapter V, marked a policy shift towards regional
distribution of amenities. According to the 1993 census, 74 per cent of the Omani
population own the houses they live in and about 93 per cent of these houses have access
to safe drinking water, while 86 per cent of these houses are connected to the public
electricity network (Oman, I 993a:pp.223-229).
4.5 Factors Responsible for Oman' s Socio-Economic Development
Some of the factors responsible for the social and economic development of Oman
have already been mentioned in this and previous chapters. These include the enabling
factor of oil revenues, a necessary but not sufficient condition for ensuring the quantity as
well as quality of development achieved. There is also the political will and commitment
on the part of the state via the policies and planning for development which provide the
complementary 'necessary' conditions for the pace and directions of development in
Oman. These crucial elements are analysed in Chapters V and VI.
4.5.1 The state and development: a comparative note
It may be argued that the role of the state in Oman's development has not been as
important as suggested by our research, but that the most significant factor in securing
development in Oman has been a valuable natural resource, oil, which many other
developing countries do not possess. Whilst it may be true that oil is a valuable resource,
its price does fluctuate enormously in the same manner as those of other primary
commodities such as rubber, tea, copper, etc. Hence good or bad policies and planning
need to cope with this situation, or allow the situation to control the oil producing
economy. Therefore, the policies, plans and institutional arrangements making good use
of oil resources are as important as having the resource in the first place. Lack of
appropriate state intervention through planning might well have taken Oman along a
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different path of development with different economic and social consequences 1 . A
comparison with Trinidad and Tobago and Gabon, two countries somewhat comparable
to Oman (small2 oil exporting and open economies) in the area of economic and social
development may be instructive.
As we shall see in Chapter V. the planning framework enabled Oman to overcome the problems caused
by the collapse of oil prices in 1986 in a much more organised manner and with minimum of social and
economic hardship.
2 Small in terms of size of population.
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Table 4.13
Trends in social and economic development: Oman compared with Trinidad and
Tobago, and Gabon
Oman	 Trinidad	 Gabon
and
___________________________________________ ________ Tobago_ _________
Estimated population (millions)1
1960	 0.6	 0.8	 0.5
1994	 2.1	 1.3	 1.0
Annual population growth rate (%)'
1960-94	 2.7	 1.2	 2.3
Life expectancy at birth (years)'
1960	 40.1	 63.3	 40.8
1994	 70.0	 72.9	 54.1
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)1
1960	 214	 56	 171
1994	 28	 15	 91
Population with access to safe water (%)1
1975-80	 -	 93	 -
1990-96	 82	 97	 68
One-year-olds fully immunised against'
Tuberculosis (%) 1992-95 	 96	 -	 73
Measles (%) 1995	 98	 84	 56
Gross enrolment ratio for all levels1
(% age 6-23 years)
1980	 28	 59	 -
1994	 60	 67	 -
Real GDP per capita (PPP$)'
1960	 2,040	 4,754	 1,373
1994	 10,078	 9,124	 3,641
GNP per capita2
 (average annual % growth) 1970-95 	 3.3	 0.1	 2.8
Growth of output' (average annual % growth)
GDP 1980-90	 8.3	 -2.5	 0.5
1990-95	 6.0	 1.0	 -2.5
Agriculture:
1980-90	 7.9	 -5.8	 1.7
Industiy:
1980-90	 10.3	 -5.5	 1.0
Manufacturing
1980-90	 20.6	 -10.1	 9.8
Services:
1980-90	 6.0	 -3.3	 -0.3
Table 4.13 contd...
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Table 4.13 contd...
Oman Trinidad Gabon
and
__________________________________________ ________ Tobago _________
Production of oil and gas3
 (million of tonnes)
Oil 1983	 19.6	 8.2	 7.8
1993	 39.1	 7.5	 14.6
Gasa 1983
	
_b	 2.7	 -
1993	 _b	 5.6	 -
Trade2 (% of GDP)
1970	 93	 84	 88
1995	 89	 68	 101
Present value of debt2
 (as % of GNP) 1995	 28.0	 52.2	 89.1
Debt service as % of exports of goods and services2
1980
1995	 6.4	 6.8	 17.7
________________________________________________ 	 7.5	 14.8	 15.8
Net foreign direct investment 2(as % of GDP)
1980	 1.6	 3.0	 0.7
1995	 1.2	 5.6	 -1.1
Terms of trade2 (1987= 100)
1980	 210	 146	 152
1995	 77	 86	 90
Consumption2 (as % of GDP) 1995
Private	 42	 62	 42
Public	 31	 13	 10
Government current revenues 2 (as % of GDP)
1980	 38.2	 42.5	 35.5
1994	 31.7	 -	 -
GDP implicit deflator2 (average annual growth %)
1980-95	 -3.6	 4.1	 1.9
1990-95	 -2.9	 7.2	 13.0
Note:
a) This is calculated in equivalent tonnes of crude oil.
b) Oman's gas production has been veiy small upto now and has been used mainly for domestic
purposes.
Sources:
1) UNDP (1997) Human Development Report 1997.
2) World Bank (199Th) World Development Indicators 1997.
3) British Petroleum (1994) Statistical Review of World Energy.
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Table 4.13 shows some areas in which Oman's policies and strategies have been
rather more successful in securing development than those of Trinidad and Tobago and
Gabon. Between 1960 and 1994 life expectancy at birth in Oman increased from 40.1 to
70 years; for Trinidad and Tobago and Gabon for the same years the figures are 63.3 and
72.9 and 40.8 and 54.1 years, respectively. This shows that life expectancy in Oman
increased both absolutely, compared with Gabon, and relatively compared with Trinidad
and Tobago. Infant mortality rate (per 1000 live births) decreased from 214 in 1960 to 28
in 1994; the figures for Trinidad and Tobago and Gabon are 56 and 15 and 171 and 91,
respectively. Here again Oman's achievements have been relatively and absolutely better
than Trinidad and Tobago and Gabon.
In the specifically economic aspects of development, the development of particular
sectors of the economy reflect the crucial process of diversification and structural
transformation of a country. Data in the World Development Indicators (199Th) show
some interesting trends in sectoral development in the three countries. During 1980-90
output of agriculture in Oman grew at an average annual rate of 7.9 per cent; while during
the same period it declined by an average annual rate of -5.8 per cent in Trinidad and
Tobago and in Gab on the average annual growth rate was only 1.7 per cent during the
same period. Growth of industry during 1980-90 reached an average of 10.3 per cent
annually in Oman; whilst it declined on an average by 5.5 per cent annually in Trinidad and
Tobago, and Gabon. In Gabon during the same period, industry grew at an annual
average rate of 1.0 per cent. During 1980-90, the services sector in Oman grew at an
average annual rate of 6.0 per cent whilst in Trinidad and Tobago it declined at an average
annual rate of 3.3 per cent and in Gabon, it declined at an average annual rate of 0.3 per
cent.
The differences in social development and the fluctuations in the economy
(less in Oman, more in Trinidad and Tobago, and Gabon) cannot be simply accounted by
fluctuations in the price of oil or volume of its output. The effects of these are mediated
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by state intervention - through policies and planning. And this is relatively more
systematic in Oman than in Trinidad and Tobago and Gabon.
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter has described Oman's rapid progress in the spheres of education,
health and provision of basic infrastructure as indicated by the marked improvement in
primary school enrolment, female education, life expectancy, infant mortality and
provision of paved roads, electricity, safe water and so on. Importantly, improvements in
the economic and social conditions have proceeded relatively evenly without serious
fluctuations in the pace and direction of economic development and its ramifications for
social welfare. This is in spite of the fact that the price of oil and terms of trade have
fluctuated mainly against Oman's favour. Of course, there are as yet no data on income
distribution and levels of poverty in Oman. However, as we have shown the relatively
easy access to economic infrastructures, education and health care, which are well
developed in the country, preclude the possibility of the high incidence of poverty and
social inequality that are found in some developing countries.
There is of course serious cause for concern and this relates to the fact that the
Omani economy is crucially dependent on oil exports; the attempt at diversification has
been less than successful and this is likely to create structural constraints in Oman's
economy in the future.
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Appendli table 4-Al
Trade orientation and real GNP per capita (average annual percentage growth)
______	 Outward oriented	 ____ _________Inward oriented 	 _____
Period	 Strongly	 % Moderately %	 Moderately	 %	 Strongly	 %
1963-73 Singapore	 9.0 Brazil	 5.5 Yugoslavia	 4.9 Turkey	 3.5
	South Korea	 7.1 Israel	 5.4 Mexico	 4.3 Dominican
Republic	 3.4
	
Hong Kong	 6.0 Thailand	 4.9 Nigeria	 4.2 Burundi	 3.2
Indonesia	 4.6 Tunisia	 4.0 Argentina	 3.1
Costa Rica	 4.6 Kenya	 3.9 Pakistan	 3.1
Malaysia	 3.8 Philippines	 2.2 Tanzania	 2.7
Ivory Coast	 3.5 Bolivia	 2.0 Sri Lanka	 2.3
Colombia	 3.3 Honduras	 1.9 Ethiopia	 1.9
Guatemala	 2.7 El Salvador	 1.4 Chile	 1.7
Madagascar	 1.1 Peru	 1.5
Nicaragua	 1.1 Uruguay	 1.5
Zambia	 1.2
India	 1.1
Ghana	 0.4
Cameroon	 -0.1 Senegal	 -0.6 Bangladesh	 -1.4
Sudan	 -1.9
Period	 Strongly	 % Moderately %	 Moderately	 %	 Strongly	 %
1973-85 Singapore	 6.5 Malaysia	 4.1 Caineroon	 5.6 Bangladesh	 2.0
	
Hong Kong	 6.3 Thailand	 3.8 Indonesia	 4.0 India	 2.0
	
South Korea	 5.4 Tunisia	 2.9 Sri Lanka	 3.3 Burundi	 1.2
Brazil	 1.5 Pakistan	 3.1 Dominican
Republic	 0.5
Turkey	 1.4 Yugoslavia	 2.7
Israel	 0.4 Colombia	 1.8
Uruguay	 0.4 Mexico	 1.3
Chile	 0.1 Philippines	 1.1
Kenya	 0.3
Honduras	 -0.1 Ethiopia	 -0.4
Senegal	 -0.8 Sudan	 -0.4
Costa Rica	 -1.0 Peru	 -1.1
Guatemala	 -1.0 Tanzania	 -1.6
Ivory Coast	 -1.2 Argentina	 -2.0
El Salvador	 -3.5 Zambia	 -2.3
Nicaragua	 -3.9 Nigeria	 -2.5
Bolivia	 -3.1
Ghana	 -3.2
Madagascar	 -3.4
Source: World Bank (1987) World Development Report 1987, Washington, D. C.
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Appendix table 4-All
Production, reserves, exports and average price of oil (1967-96)
Year	 Daily	 Annual Reserves Life of Exports Average	 Domestic usea
	
extraction	 production	 reserves	 price
(000	 (millions (millions (years)	 (in	 ($Ibbl) (millions	 (% of
barrels)	 of	 of	 million	 of barrels)	 annual
_______ _________ barrels) barrels) ________ barrels) ________ _________ production
1967	 57	 23	 1,935	 86	 22	 1.8	 -	 -
1968	 241	 88	 1,832	 21	 88	 1.8	 -	 -
1969	 328	 120	 1,709	 14	 120	 1.8	 -	 -
1970	 332	 121	 1,455	 12	 121	 1.8	 -	 -
1971	 294	 107	 1,741	 16	 106	 2.2	 -	 -
1972	 282	 103	 1,669	 16	 103	 2.5	 -	 -
1973	 293	 107	 1,810	 17	 107	 3.6	 -	 -
1974	 290	 106	 1,638	 15	 106	 12.3	 -	 -
1975	 341	 125	 1,487	 12	 125	 12.4	 -	 -
1976	 367	 134	 1,280	 10	 134	 12.5	 -	 -
1977	 340	 124	 1,379	 11	 122	 13.0	 -	 -
1978	 314	 115	 1,514	 13	 116	 13.1	 -	 -
1979	 295	 108	 2,480	 23	 108	 20.0	 -	 -
1980	 283	 104	 2,484	 24	 102	 36.9	 -	 -
1981	 328	 120	 2,899	 24	 120	 36.9	 -	 -
1982	 336	 123	 2,982	 24	 119	 34.4	 2	 1.6
1983	 389	 142	 3,494	 25	 129	 29.2	 14	 9.7
1984	 416	 152	 3,844	 25	 135	 28.0	 16	 10.7
1985	 498	 182	 3,869	 21	 165	 27.0	 18	 10.0
1986	 560	 204	 4,015	 20	 187	 13.5	 19	 9.5
1987	 582	 213	 3,991	 19	 197	 17.3	 13	 6.2
1988	 619	 227	 4,144	 18	 212	 13.5	 16	 6.9
1989	 638	 234	 4,187	 18	 215	 16.3	 15	 6.3
1990	 684	 250	 4,161	 17	 229	 20.7	 17	 6.9
1991	 708	 259	 4,250	 16	 235	 17.4	 18	 6.9
1992	 742	 270	 4,349	 16	 253	 18.0	 14	 5.3
1993	 780	 285	 4,604	 16	 267	 15.6	 11	 3.9
1994	 810	 296	 4,828	 16	 271	 15.2	 18	 6.2
1995	 853	 311	 5,038	 16	 285	 16.4	 20	 6.3
1996	 883	 323	 5,112	 16	 296	 19.4	 15	 4.6
Note:
a) Oman Oil Refinery started production in 1982.
Source: Compiled from internal data, Ministry of Development, Oman. With the exception of the data
regarding reserves, all other data are available in the annual Statistical Year Book published by
the Ministry.
240
CHAPTER V
DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND PLANNDG IN OMAN'S DEVELOPMENT
5.1 Introduction
The lack of a diverse range of resources in Oman and the need to accelerate the
process of development compelled the government in Oman to adopt development
planning as a means to achieve a strategic allocation of resources among competing ends.
Specifically the need for development planning arose because of the absence of basic
economic and social infrastructure, poorly developed market mechanism, limited resources
and risk-taking capacity of private entrepreneurs, weak linkages in the economy and
untapped potential of large externalities of core industrial and infrastructural projects. The
outcome of the strategic allocation of resources through development planning, that is
economic and social development, has been described in the previous chapter. It is now
necessary to analyse the means by which such economic and social development was
secured. These means consist of two main parts: the management aspects which deal
with managing the resources and maintaining stability of the economy; and the
transformational aspects which deal with developing sectors which are weak or do not
exist. Clearly both are necessary for securing development.
Oman launched its development planning process when the role of the state-led
development strategies and the development theories supporting these was in disrepute'.
This chapter analyses the reasons why policy makers in Oman considered it necessary to
adopt planning, together with the planning machinery and other institutions that were set
This was because of disenchantment th the results achieved in terms of reducing poverty, inequality
and unemployment in a number of developing countries, as was discussed in Chapters 1 and 11. This led
to what might be termed as a crisis in planning' - As Seers (l972b:p.19) states: "the experience of the
last decade suggests that we now need to think out again the purpose of planning and its procedures".
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up to facilitate the process. After discussing briefly the process of plan formulation and
implementation, an overview is provided of the growth of the economy and of gross fixed
capital formation during 1976-95. We then analyse each five-year plan, its objectives,
outcome and a brief assessment of its impact on the development process. The conclusion
provides an overall assessment of these plans and the way development planning has been
instrumental in both transforming the economy and society and managing the oil booms
and the crises that followed.
5.2 Oman's Adoption of Development Planning
The necessity of planning as an instrument for promoting economic and social
progress, on the basis of development experience of the pre-plan period of 1970-1975, is
clearly brought out in the Development Council's February 1975 resolution on Oman's
long-term development policy, which stated:
Economic development policy during the past four years has
achieved great success. Efforts have been concentrated
during that period on meeting urgent requirements and on
constructing infrastructure projects needed for increasing
productivity and hence national income ... [Hjaving laid
down a suitable basis for the growth of a developing
national economy, the country starts a new phase of
economic development. There is obvious need for a
comprehensive economic development plan ensuring the co-
ordination between different investment projects and the
carrying out of feasibility studies of projects before
implementation. The plan should also give priority to
income generating projects to supplement oil receipts. It
should also effect a wider geographical distribution of
investments in order that the benefits may be shared by
different regions of the country. The plan should cover a
reasonably long period of time, taking into account the
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economic conditions of the country and its thture prospects.
The more we succeed in formulating such a development
plan and in rationalising the use of our present oil revenues,
the more secure our economic future and our progress will
be (Oman, 1976a:pp.106-107).
Between 1970 and 1975 economic development was effected in the form of
projects incorporated in the annual state budget. However, because of the lack of an
organised approach to development, a number of large scale civil and defence projects
were initiated during 1974 and 1975 for which no budget allocations existed. This led to a
series of large fiscal deficits' during 1974 and 1975 and an emerging financial crisis. A
number of studies were initiated during 19742 and 1975 to help identify an appropriate
course of development. Most notable of these studies was the one conducted by the
World Bank in 1974 which recommended adoption of development planning as the most
appropriate course of action (Townsend, 1977).
These studies prompted the setting up of the Development Council and the
Financial Affairs Council in November 1974, and the enactment of the Economic
Development Law of 1975 which provided the legal underpinning for development
planning in Oman. During 1975, a number of tasks were carried out by the Development
Council to prepare the First Five-Year Plan (First FYP). Among these were a detailed re-
appraisal of all ongoing development projects, the preparation of the law relating to the
organisation of Government administration, and the setting up of a number of committees3
to study topics of importance for economic development (Oman, 1976a:pp. 10-12).
For example, the 1974 deficit reached almost 10 per cent of GDP (Oman, 1976a:pp.4-7).
2 These were: the Report and Recommendations to the Executive Directors of the World Bank, dated 15
Februaiy, 1974; the World Bank report Current Economic Position and Prospects of Oman, May, 1974:
Oman: Recent Economic Developments, June, 1974, prepared by the IMF; and the report Economic and
Financial Position of Oman, prepared in March, 1975 by a group of British banks led by Morgan
Grenfell, London (Townsend, 1977 and Skeet, 1992).
These included a committee for following up the implementation of Al Khaboura Region Projects, a
committee for studying flue! problems in the Sultanate, a committee for following up the implementation
of irrigation projects and the maintenance of falajs, and a committee for town planning and industrial
zoning (ibid.).
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5.3 The Planning Machinery: the Development Council
The kind of planning machinery a country establishes, like the kind of development
planning it adopts, depends largely on its political, social and economic institutions and its
stage of development (Waterston, l982:p.37l). Planning and development organisations
in Oman have undergone several changes since 1970. In the absence of fully operational
government executive units in the early 1970s, most of these organisations exercised both
the planning and executive functions'. A clear break came with the establishment of the
Development Council in November, 1974 to exercise planning functions. In the planning
process, this was the most important first step, because of the important role a planning
agency plays in shaping the development process and influencing its outcome. As Seers
(1972b:p.33) argues, the role of the planning agency is to serve as "the nerve centre of the
government machine, continually scanning experience and helping the government adjust
its policies accordingly, in the light of a long-term strategy".
The Sultan has been the Chairman of the Development Council since its inception,
while The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs - who in 1982 became the Deputy Prime
Minister for Finance and Economic Affairs - has been its Deputy Chairman 2
 (Oman,
1995c:Decree no. 43/82). The membership of the Council had been changed from time to
time, however, at its dissolution in 1996, its members included the Chairman of Majlis
Ash' Shura, and a number of senior government officials3.
The Development Council was supported by a technical secretariat until 1994,
when the Ministry of Development was formed. Most of the functions relating to planning
and development of the technical secretariat were transferred to the Ministry and the
'Oman's First FYP (Oman, 1976a:p.9) gives a detailed account of t.he orgamsations involved in planning.
Chapter IV of this thesis also gives brief details of the evolution of the planning institutions.
2 With the death of the Deputy Chairman in September 1995, the Development Council was dissolved in
January, 1996, and its responsibilities were transferred to the Cabinet (Oman, 1996g).
These were Ministers of: National Heritage and Culture, Petroleum and Minerals, Adviser to His
Majesty for Economic Planning Affairs, Communications, Electricity and Water, Agriculture and
Fisheries, Housing, Health, Regional Municipalities and Environment, Commerce and Industiy, Social
Affairs and Labour, Education, Development Affairs, and Secretaiy to the Cabinet. Other members were
the Undersecretary for Finance in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, the Economic Adviser to
the Ministry of Diwan, and the Secretary General of the Development Council, (Oman, 1995c):Decree no.
29/81; Decree no: 29/92).
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Secretariat's functions were confined to co-ordination and secretarial services for the
Council (Oman, 1995c:Decree no. 2/94 and 19/94).
The Sultan's Chairmanship of the Council ensured, on the one hand, that it was
fully attuned to current government policy, which provided the framework within which
plans were prepared, while on the other, it provided the Council with the political weight
needed to co-ordinate and direct the activities of different agencies of government. This
has a few similarities with the importance given to the planning agency in India. To quote
Mazoomdar:
When planning was first undertaken in India, the decision to
have the Prime Minister as the Chairman of the Planning
Commission had both a personal and an institutional
significance. Jawaharlal Nehru was clear in his perception
that development must be the primary goal of national
policy after independence had been achieved, and that
planning was the key to development; he lent his whole
weight to this endeavour (Mazoomdar, 1994:p.82).
However, an important difference between Oman's Development Council and
India's Planning Commission is that the members of the latter body are independent (non-
government) public figures or experts and the Prime Minister, as the ex-officio
chairperson, is only the nominal head. The executive chief of Indian Planning Commission
is the Deputy Chairman who is not a member of the Government. In contrast, most of the
members of Oman's Development Council are executives of the Government.
Under the Economic Development Law of 1975, the period of each plan was set at
five years, with the first development plan covering the period 1976-80. Under Oman's
planning system, the Development Council is responsible for setting long-term goals and
objectives of development and formulating the five-year plans; the Financial Affairs
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Council 1 is responsible for short-term and medium-term fiscal policies, with the Ministry
of Finance and Economy2 being responsible for raising the resources for public
expenditure (current and capital) and expenditure control; and the Central Bank of Oman
is in charge of monetary policy.
The annual state budget provides the fiscal linkages between the economic rents
generated from oil and the rest of the economy. It also acts as an instrument for linking
short-term fiscal management with the medium - and long-term objectives articulated
within the five-year plans.
An important element of Oman's planning system is that formulation and
implementation of five-year plans is closely co-ordinated with the medium - and short-
term economic and fiscal policies because the Sultan was the head of the Development
Council and the Financial Affairs Council and the Deputy Prime Minister for Finance and
Economic Affairs3 was the Deputy Chairman of these councils. This factor has, on the
one hand, contributed significantly to the successful implementation of public investment
programmes laid down in successive development plans. On the other hand, one can
argue that the continuing over-runs in current public expenditure and the addition of
several unplanned projects to the Second Plan, were the consequences of this close
relationship between the Development Council and the Ministry of Finance and Economy.
5.4 Other Institutions Facilitating Development Planning
In Chapter II, we discussed the importance of selecting appropriate strategies and
policies for managing the revenues accruing from the export of a primary resource.
Equally important is the management of the cyclical fluctuations in the export price of
commodities. This is even more crucial for oil exporting countries like Oman which have
comprehensive development programmes over long periods of time. Without effective
'Now the Financial Affairs and Energy council th its scope broadened to include energy affairs. The
Sultan continues to be its chairman and the Minister of Economy, who also supervises the Ministry of
Finance acts as its Deputy Chairman (Oman. 1996i:Decree no. 60/96).
2 Now the Ministry of Finance (Oman, 1995d:Decree no. 69/95).
The Deputy Prime Minister for Finance and Economic Affairs was also in charge of the Ministry of
Finance and Economy (Oman, 1995c:Decree no. 13/82).
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management, the great volatility that has characterised oil prices since the late 1 970s, can
have a deleterious impact on the finding of these economic and social programmes. Chart
5.1 illustrates the fluctuation and volatility in the price of oil in Oman.
Chart 5.1
Omani oil price volatility (1970-96) USS per barrel
1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996
Note:
1) $ money of the day is the market price in a particular year while $ 1996 is the price of that particular
year calculated in 1996 dollars.
Source: Data provided by Petroleum Development of Oman Ltd.
Specifically the volatility may result from the Dutch disease whose effects we
described in Chapter II. This is characterised by a cyclical resource boom including, inter
alia, inflation, currency appreciation in real terms, and spending ahead of implementation
capacity. The downswing poses equally serious problems. Decline in prices of primary
produce lead to decreases in government revenue, which, in turn, lead to reductions in
both development and recurring expenditure'. Therefore, policies initiated to manage the
fluctuations in primary exports are crucial for managing the development process in a
country like Oman.
In addition to the negative consequences of the reduction in public expenditure on the economy, to the
extent that the mining industzy is integrated with the domestic economy, serious reduction in primary
export prices would lead to widespread unemployment and/or reduction in real wages (Lewis Jr.,
l989:pp. 1562-64).
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The impact of the Dutch disease on diversification in Oman will be discussed in
Chapter V.11. Here we need to discuss briefly the policies and mechanism adopted by the
government of Oman to manage the volatility in oil prices especially from 1980 onwards,
when the price of oil recorded a sharp increase during 197919811, and a sharp decline
during 1982-86.
5.4.1 Establishment of the State General Reserve Fund (SGRF)
The establishment of the SGRF marked an important phase in establishing the
institutions of the management aspect of Oman's development. This was established in
the wake of the second oil price increase2
 in 1979 and 1980, when the government
decided in 1980 to put a part of the additional revenues into a reserve, known as the State
General Reserve Fund. It was established by Royal Decree no. 1/80 issued on 6 January,
1980 (Oman, 198 la:pp.243-246). Article Eight of the decree stipulated that 15 per cent
of each sum received from oil revenues should be transferred to the Fund. In addition, all
income from the investments of the SGRF assets was to be reinvested in the Fund. Article
Six stipulated that there should be no withdrawals from the SGRF except for the purpose
of financing a deficit in the state budget in the years which may require such withdrawals.
Chart 5.2 below indicates the percentage of gross oil revenues that have been transferred
into the SGRF from 1980 onwards.
'As Appendix table 4-All shows, the average oil price per barrel increased from US$ 20 in 1979 to about
US$ 37 between 1981 and 1982. While during 1983-86, the average price varied between TJS$ 29 and
US$ 13.5.
2 The increased oil revenues from the ftrst oil price increase from US$4 per barrel in 1974 to USS 12 per
barrel in 1979 (cI. Appendix table 4-All) were added to the government accounts, giving a much needed
boost to an economy just emerging from a state of long stagnation. In addition, larger funds had to be
allocated for the purpose of defence and national security, since the government was fighting an
insurgency in southern Oman.
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Chart 5.2
Percentage of gross oil revenues transferred to the SGRF (1980-95)
Source: Oman, Ministry of Development internal data.
The proportion of gross oil revenues transferred to the SGRF followed the trend
of oil prices and oil revenues accruing to the government. Transfers into the SGRF
reached almost 25 per cent in 1980, when the average price of oil increased to US$ 36.9
from US$ 20 per barrel, but these transfers declined in the mid-eighties and plunged to 3.6
per cent in 1986 when the average oil price collapsed to an average of US$ 13.5 per
barrel.
The government's objective in setting up the SGRF was two-fold. The first was to
provide a source of income for the future, to be used to finance the state budget in the
years which might require such withdrawals, in other words, to provide a mechanism for
mitigating the difficulties brought by downswings in the oil price. The second objective
was to minimise the adverse effects of the Dutch disease in a period of upswing. As we
shall see later in this chapter, the existence of such a fluid has greatly facilitated the
development process and has enabled Oman to adjust to the falling oil prices in the 1980s
in a more planned manner. There were other relatively minor reserve funds set up which
supplemented the SGRF, such as the Contingency Reserve Fund and the Petroleum
Reserve Fund, which we need not discuss at length.
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5.5 Formulation and Implementation of the Five-Year Plans
The role of the government in the socio-economic development of Oman and the
government's economic, social, fiscal and monetary policies have been crystallised through
the formulation and implementation of development plans since 1976. Four five-year plans
have been completed and the Fifth FYP (1996-2000) is under implementation. These
plans, as we noted in Chapter III, have generally articulated the medium-term objectives
and targets to be achieved within the framework of the basic objectives of Oman's long-
term development strategy adopted by the Development Council in 1975'.
Oman's long-term development strategy and objectives2 indicate that it has
benefited from some of the criticisms of state-led development planning adopted by many
LDCs by shedding the negative aspects associated with that strategy. As stated in
Chapters I, II and HI, development planning was criticised in the 1 970s because of its
failure to address directly issues relating to social (human) development, inequality and
the role of the market. In view of this criticism, Oman's long-term strategy was much
wider in its scope and less regulatory in its intent. In other words, at the outset Oman
incorporated into its development planning those features whose neglect by other
developing countries had created problems of increased inequality, poverty and stifling of
entrepreneurial initiative. This is clearly brought about by three crucial aspects of this
strategy (Oman, I 976a:pp. 107-108).
First, on human development, Para 6 of this strategy emphasised that: "Care
should be taken to develop the local human resources in order that they may be able to
play a more active role in the national economy".
The text of Development Council's resolution (dated Februaiy 9, 1975) on aims and objectives of
Oman's long-term development strategy is given in Appendix C of the Five-Year Development Plan
(1976-80) (Oman, 1976a).
2 These are: (i) to ensure sustained improvement in people's physical quality of life; (ii) to reduce the
dependence upon oil exports by expanding and diversifying the non-oil sector, (iii) to develop a countly
wide network of modem economic infrastructure; (iv) to develop human resources through investment in
social infrastructure; (v) to promote balanced regional development; (vi) to sustain a free market and
competitive economy; and (vii) to allow free trade in goods, seMces, capital and technology with
minimum restrictions (Oman, 1976a).
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Secondly, in relation to equitable distribution of the benefits of development, Para
5 of the strategy stated: "It is necessary to effect a wider geographical distribution of
investments in order that the benefits may be shared by different regions to the greatest
possible extent and to narrow the gap in the standards of living in different regions ..."
Thirdly, to ensure that planning did not suppress private enterprise and restrict
competition, Para 4 and 12 of the long-term strategy emphasised the complementary roles
of the state and private sector in the development process. "The basis of our development
policy should be to achieve the basic requirements of a free economy in which an efficient
and capable private sector plays a leading role" (ibid :p. 107).
Of course, statements similar to this may be found in similar resolutions and
documents of intent in other countries. It is one thing to make policy statements and quite
another to put these into practice. In Oman, as compared to other countries, the gap
between theory and practice, between public statement and real intent has been extremely
narrow. In contrast this gap has been rather wide, for example, in Pakistan or its next-
door neighbour India (Chakravarty, 1987:Chapters 3 and 4). Such broadening of the
scope of development planning has given Omani planning the balance and flexibility absent
in other countries and also removed the paranoia so notably prevalent among the private
sector in those countries.
While the basic framework of all the five-year plans was established within the
context of the Development Council's 1975 Resolution, the medium-term objectives of
each five-year plan were decided on the basis of the economic, social, financial and even
the political situation prevailing at the time of the preparation of the concerned five-year
plan'.
For instance, establishing the State General Reserve Fund in the wake of the second oil price increase
was one of the main objectives of the Second FYP (Oman, 198 la:p.32).
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5.5.1 Implementation of the five-year plans
Implementation of the plan is a crucial element of the complex totality referred to
as planning practice. This has been discussed in sections 3.4 and 3.5 of Chapter III. The
significance of implementation of plans lies in the fact that without proper
operationalisation or implementation, plans remain mere documents of intent. According
to Waterston (1982) the implementation of plans is often the Achilles heel of planning in
the developing countries. While good policies and plans need sound and efficient
implementation, this task can be rather difficult because there are a large number of factors
that affect the implementation of plans.
There are two distinct but related aspects to implementation. Firstly there is the
machinery or institutional arrangements for implementation. This consists of various
ministries, departments and sections of departments, as well as ad hoc bodies set up to
execute plans at different stages of their implementation. Quality of personnel, degree of
integration and co-ordination between implementing bodies determine the quality and
efficiency of implementation. This is the relatively static aspect of implementation.
The second aspect of implementation consists of relatively more dynamic
processes. This involves allocation and re-allocation of resources between patterns of
investment, production and consumption, re-arrangements of sectoral priorities, and so on.
This dynamic or processual aspect is affected by changing and unpredictable domestic
and/or international conditions such as increase or fall in revenues resulting from a rise or
down-turn in the terms of trade; change of policy; political situation, and environmental
or ecological factors and drought, floods, etc. These may affect the targets and the
sectoral balance or priorities of the plans. Some of these factors have affected the
implementation of planning in Oman.
In Oman, the Development Council' is responsible for formulation of the plans in
co-ordination with other government ministries and departments, while implementation is
'Although the Development Council was dissolved in 1995, its functions will continue to be exercised by
the Cabinet as has been the case in the past. Therefore, all references to the Development Council and its
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the responsibility of individual ministries and departments. However, the Development
Council is responsible for co-ordinating between implementing bodies, in addition to
monitoring and evaluating the outcome on a regular basis1.
It is necessary to provide an overview of the growth of the economy and capital
formation over the last two decades of development planning before we discuss each plan
individually.
5.6 An Overview of the Growth of the Economy and of Gross Fixed Capital
Formation: 1976-1995
Since we have provided a detailed analyses of the leading economic and social
development indicators in Chapter IV, we will limit our review to providing a comparison
of the targets set in each five-year plan and their outcome. This will comprise the growth
of the economy and its structure of production and demand. Moreover, since socio-
economic development is a function, among other things, of the rate of capital formation,
it is important to analyse the sectoral distribution of public and private investments and the
level of capital formation that was undertaken during the four five-year plans, i.e. 1976-
95. The plan-wise data relating to the growth and structure of production are given in
table 5.1, whilst table 5.2 provides an overview of the changing structure of the demand in
the economy. Tables 5.3 and 5.4 show sectoral distribution of both public and private
investment2.
5.6.1 Growth of the economy: planning in uncertainty
Planning is needed especially in situations of uncertainty. And uncertainty has
characterised the achievement of targets under planning in Oman. Thus targets and actual
functions, also refer the Cabinet. The Ministry of Development continues to provide the technical input to
the planning process. That is recommending goals, objectives and policies for socio-economic
development, plan monitoring and evaluation.
This is being done through brief quarterly follow-up reports and a detailed annual report (Oman.
1996a:pp.548-549).
2 The terms investment and capital formation and gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) are used
interchangeably in this chapter.
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outcomes of five-year plans have differed sometimes considerably. For example the actual
average growth' rate of 23 per cent in the First FYP and of 3.4 per cent in the Third FYP
turned out to be much higher than the planned growth rates of 2.2 per cent and -2.4 per
cent respectively. In contrast, for the Second FYP and Fourth FYP the actual growth
rates of 10.9 per cent and 2.8 per cent were much below the targets of 13.1 per cent and
6.3 per cent respectively.
As table 5.1 indicates the main reason for the divergence between planned and
actual growth rates is the volatility of the oil prices, as reflected in the activities of the
petroleum sector, where the impact of the volatility is felt most. While planning can
protect the non-oil sectors against fluctuations in the oil market through the adjustment
mechanism (SGRF), it has little influence on events taking place at the international level
which affect the value-added in the petroleum sector and through it the external sector. In
other words planning can mitigate, deflect and cushion shocks. As we shall see later,
planning did succeed in raising actual level of oil production above the targeted levels, but
the average annual growth rates realised in the petroleum sector declined continuously
and steeply over successive plans; from 21.3 per cent in the First FYP, they fell to 5.5 per
cent in the Second FYP, then to 4.2 per cent in the Third FYP, and in the Fourth FYP
petroleum activities shrank at an average annual rate of 2.8 per cent.
The success of the planning in gradually reducing Oman's dependence on the oil
sector is reflected in the high annual growth rates achieved by the non-petroleum activities
in all the plans except the Third FYP2. More importantly, in all the four five-year plans,
the actual growth rates realised by the non-petroleum activities exceeded the planned
growth rates (cf. table 5.1).
The analysis of the growth rates of the GDP carried out in this chapter might differ slightly from that in
Chapter IV, since, to facilitate comparison of the outcome with targets set in each successive plan, GDP
estimates based on old SNA methodology have been used in this chapter, because the targets in each plan
have been based similarly on the old methodology.
2 In the First, Second and Fourth FYPs the non-oil sector's GDP grew at the rates of 27 per cent, 18 per
cent and 7 per cent respectively compared to the plan targets of 8 per cent, 13 per cent and 7.3 per cent
respectively. In the Third FYP its growth rate was 2.7 per cent compared to plan target of 0.7 per cent (cf
table 5.1).
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Achievement of high growth rates in the non-petroleum activities has been a
central tenet of the development policy to diversify the economy. The result of this policy
is shown in table 5.1. This indicates that while value-added in the petroleum activities
contributed 58.5 per cent of total output in the first year of the First FYP (1976), its
contribution in the last year of the Fourth FYP had declined to 38.0 per cent. Thus the
outcome of the policies initiated within the four five-year plans, was that the value-added
in the non-petroleum activities of manufacturing, construction, agriculture and fisheries,
and services increased from 41.5 per cent in 1976 to 62.0 per cent in 1995.
However, this desirable process has been offset by the premature expansion in the
services sectors. As table 5.1 indicates, while the relative share of value-added in the
services sector has grown substantially from 28.2 per cent in 1976 to 47.3 per cent in
1995, the value-added in manufacturing and non-oil industrial activities and agriculture
and fisheries has increased only marginally from 13.3 per cent to 14.7 per cent during the
same period. This phenomenon is an outcome of a large increase in public expenditure
which has made investment in services more profitable and a liberal trade policy which has
deprived the real sectors' of the economy from needed protection.
are the manufacturing, agriculture and flsheries sectors.
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Table 5.1
Growth and structure of the economy : productiona
plan compared with actual (1976-95) at current prices
Item	 First	 Second Plan Third Plan Fourth Plan
________________________ ______ Plan __________ _________ __________
Growth of the economy:
production
(Average annual growth rate %)
Nominal GDP at market prices
Plan	 2.2	 13.1	 -2.4	 6.3
Actual	 23.3	 10.9	 3.4	 2.8
Petroleum sector- oil and gas
Plan	
-1.3	 13.0	 -6.3	 5.0
Actual	 21.3	 5.5	 4.2	 -2.8
Non-petroleum activities
Plan	 8.1	 13.4	 0.7	 7.3
Actual	 27.0	 17.8	 2.7	 7.4
Manufacturing
Plan	 64.1	 34.2	 15.2	 12.7
Actual	 49.3	 39.5	 12.9	 11.8
Other industrial activitiesb
Plan	
-2.2	 12.5	 -6.8	 12.1
Actual	 13.2	 16.4	 -8.0	 6.0
Agriculture and fisheries
Plan	 8.2	 15.6	 3.3	 7.6
Actual	 21.1	 12.2	 6.3	 5.9
Servicesc
Plan	 10.1	 12.2	 0.2	 6.0
Actual	 32.5	 17.7	 3.5	 7.2
Public1
Plan	 13.5	 11.0	 0.1	 3.5
Actual	 29.7	 19.7	 6.6	 4.4
Private
Plan	 7.9	 13.1	 0.3	 7.7
Actual	 34.0	 16.7	 1.6	 9.1
Memo: Industryc
Plan	
-0.6	 13.3	 -4.6	 6.4
Actual	 20.6	 7.4	 3.2	 0.8
Table 5.1 contd...
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	___________________________________ ________ ________ ________ 	 Table 5.1 contd...
Structure of production	 1976	 1980	 1985	 1990	 1995
Nominal GDP (RO Million)
Plan	 758	 806	 3.375	 3,059	 4,777
Actual	 884	 2,063	 3,454	 4,084	 4,679
Distribution of GDP (%)
Petroleum activities - value-added
Plan	 66.6	 56.5	 67.6	 38.8	 42.3
Actual	 58.5	 62.0	 48.5	 50.3	 38.0
Non-petroleum activities - value-added
Plan	 33.4	 43.5	 32.4	 61.2	 57.7
Actual	 41.5	 38.0	 51.5	 49.7	 62.0
Manufacturing
Plan	 0.4	 3.1	 2.3	 7.4	 5.8
Actual	 0.5	 0.8	 2.4	 3.7	 5.7
Other industrial activitiesb
Plan	 10.7	 8.1	 6.6	 6.7	 7.2
Actual	 10.7	 6.5	 8.3	 4.6	 5.4
Agriculture and fisheries
Plan	 2.4	 3.7	 2.2	 3.7	 3.8
Actual	 2.1	 2.5	 2.7	 3.1	 3.6
Servicesc
Plan	 19.9	 28.7	 21.3	 43.5	 41.0
Actual	 28.2	 28.2	 38.1	 38.2	 47.3
Public1
Plan	 8.0	 12.4	 9.4	 15.7	 15.5
Actual	 7.8	 9.4	 13.8	 16.1	 17.4
Private'
Plan	 11.9	 16.3	 11.9	 27.8	 25.5
Actual	 20.4	 18.7	 24.2	 22.2	 29.9
Memo: LnduStrye - value-added
Plan	 77.7	 67.6	 76.5	 52.9	 55.3
Actual	 69.7	 69.3	 59.2	 58.6	 49.1
Notes:
a) Data based on GDP estimates on old national accounts methodology. Although the Ministry of
Development has changed the GDP estimates from 1993 onwards to SNA 1993, we have used only
the old estimates to facilitate comparison with planned estimates, which are based on old SNA
methodology.
b) Include mining, quarrying, electricity and water, and construction.
c) Imputed financial charges and import taxes have been adjusted from this item.
d) Represents producers of govermnent services.
e) Industry includes petroleum activities, manufacturing and other industrial activities.
Sources: Data for Oman compiled from Oman (1976a; 1981a; 1986a and 1991a). Data for actuals
from 1) Oman (1986b:pp.395-404); 2) Oman (1988 and 1991b:pp.375-388) and 3) Data
provided by the Omani Ministiy of Development.
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The structure of demand in the economy', reflects the large increase in the
government's current expenditure 2, so that the share of public consumption grew from
27.2 per cent of GDP in 1976 to 33.1 per cent of GDP in 1995, whereas the plan target
for the latter year was only 25.0 per cent. As we shall see later, from the time of the
unplanned expansion of public expenditure in the Second FYP, the government's efforts
to control the growth of public current expenditure, and hence public consumption have
been largely unsuccessful.
As a result the level of gross domestic savings has declined from 52.2 per cent of
GDP in 1976 to 25.9 per cent in 1995 whereas the target for 1995 was 32.6 per cent (cf.
table 5.2). This reflects the growing dependence of the economy on purchase of goods
and services from abroad and the large increase in production of non-traded services
compared to the production of physical tradable commodities. As a result, the level of
gross national savings has declined from 35.5 per cent of GDP in 1976 to 8.8 per cent in
1995, whereas the target set for that year was 20.3 per cent.
The decline in national savings ratio is also reflected in the deterioration of the
current account of balance of payments. Table 5.2 shows that in 1995, the small planned
deficit of RO 9 million had grown to RO 342 million, representing 7.3 per cent of GDP for
that year. The steep decline in the ratio of national savings to GDP has also caused
significant decrease in gross fixed capital formation which, as a percentage of GDP fell
from 36 per cent in 1976 to 16 per cent in 1995, much below the Fourth FYP target of
20.5 per cent for 1995.
Sometimes referred to as "expenditure on GDP".
2 This point is discussed later, particularly in section 5.10.2 (on implementation of Fourth FYI').
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Table 5.2
Structure of the economy: demanda
plan compared with actual (1976-95) at current prices
Item	 1976	 1980	 1985	 1990	 1995
Nominal GDP (RO Mn.)
Plan	 758	 806	 3,375	 3.059	 4,777
Actual	 884	 2,064	 3,456	 4,084	 4,679
Distribution of GDP
Final consumption (RO Mn.)
Plan	 411	 426	 1,532	 2,381	 3,218
Actual	 422	 1,076	 2,066	 2,698	 3,469
Relative share of GDP (%)
Plan	 54.2	 52.9	 45.4	 77.9	 67.4
Actual	 47.8	 52.1	 59.8	 66.1	 74.1
Public (%)
Plan	 41.6	 39.2	 28.1	 28.3	 25.0
Actual	 27.2	 24.1	 25.9	 28.5	 33.1
Private (%)
Plan	 12.6	 13.7	 17.3	 49.6	 42.4
Actual	 20.6	 28.0	 33.9	 37.6	 41.0
Gross domestic saving (GDS) (RO Mn.)
Plan	 347	 380	 1,843	 678	 1,559
Actual	 462	 988	 1,390	 1,386	 1,210
Relative share of GDP (%)
Plan	 45.8	 47.1	 54.6	 22.1	 32.6
Actual	 52.2	 47.9	 40.2	 33.9	 25.9
Public (%)
Plan	 -	 11.9	 8.1	 10.4	 14.8
Actual	 -	 25.3	 15.9	 11.4	 3.6
Private (%)
Plan	 -	 35.2	 46.6	 11.7	 17.9
Actual	 -	 22.6	 24.3	 22.5	 22.3
Less: Factor income and transfers (RO
Mn.)
Plan	 -1.35	 -102	 -	 -	 -587
Actual	 -148	 -212	 -399	 -417	 -800
Table 5.2 conid...
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Table 5.2 contd...
Item	 1976	 1980	 1985	 1990	 1995
Gross national saving (GNS) RO Mn.
Plan	 212	 278	 -	 -	 972
Actual	 314	 776	 991	 969	 410
Relative share of GDP (%)
Plan	 28.0	 34.5	 -	 -	 20.3
Actual	 35.5	 37.6	 28.7	 23.7	 8.8
Public
Plan	 -	 11.9	 -	 -	 14.8
Actual	 -	 25.3	 15.9	 11.4	 3.6
Private
Plan	 -	 22.6	 -	 -	 5.5
Actual	 -	 12.3	 12.8	 12.3	 5.2
Gross fixed capital formation (GFCF)
(RO Mn.)
Plan	 314	 201	 863	 527	 981
Actual	 317	 466	 953	 508	 752
Relative share of (3DP (%)
Plan	 41.4	 24.9	 25.6	 17.2	 20.5
Actual	 35.9	 22.6	 27.6	 12.4	 16.1
Public
Plan	 33.8	 13.2	 16.4	 11.6	 13.5
Actual	 29.4	 14.8	 20.3	 7.5	 11.1
Private
Plan	 7.7	 11.8	 9.2	 5.6	 7.0
Actual	 6.5	 7.8	 7.3	 4.9	 5.0
Saving surplus (+) or gap (-) (GNS-
GFCF) RO Mn.
Plan	 -102	 +77	 -	 -	 -9
Actual	 ..3	 +310	 +38	 +461	 -342
Note:
a) Data based on the old SNA methodology, and not SNA 1993 methodology, to facilitate comparison
with plan estimates which are all based on the old SNA methodology.
Sources: Data for plan figures complied from Oman (1976a; 1981a; 1986a; 1991a).
Data for actual figures compiled from: 1976, 1980 and 1985 (Oman, 1986b:pp.429-434);
1990 (Oman, 1991b:pp.407-411); and 1995 (Oman 1996b:pp.428-43l).
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5.6.2 Gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) : sectoral distribution and public-
private shares
Table 5.3 provides a breakdown of public and private gross fixed capital formation
implemented during the period 1976-95. As the table indicates, the combined public and
private capital formation, which in the First FYP period, was RO 1,682 million, i.e. more
than doubled during the period to reach RO 3,857 million in the Fourth FYP period.
Between these two periods, private sector investment grew by 171 per cent, from RO 495
million in the First FYP to RO 1,344 million in the Fourth FYP while public sector
investment increased during the period by only 111 per cent, from RO 1,187 million to RO
2,513 million respectively. Moreover, as the private sector expanded, its share in GFCF
increased from about 29 per cent in the First FYP to about 35 per cent in the Fourth FYP
whereas the share of public investment declined from around 71 per cent to 65 per cent
during this period.
Comparing the actual level of public investment with the plan, it is very clear from
table 5.3 that the outcome is indeed very impressive. The overall cumulative level of
implementation was almost 100 per cent over the period of the four plans.
In the goods producing sector it was about 91 per cent, whereas, in the infrastructure
sector it was 107.6 per cent. And although the targets set in the plan for the private sector
are indicative, the cumulative level of implementation - ratio of actual to plan - of 96.9
per cent clearly suggests that planning in Oman has been successful in promoting private
sector development and 'crowding in' private investment.
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Table 5.3
Public and private gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) by main sectors (1976-95)
plan compared with actual
P = Planned, A Actual, I Implementation (ratio of actual to plan)
___________________ ________ ___________ __________ (Amount in RO Million)
Sector	 First Plan	 Second Plan	 Third Plan Fourth Plan Cumulative of
(1976-80) (1981-1985) (1986-90) (1991-1995) Four Plans
_______________________ __________ _____________ ____________ _____________ (1976-1995)
Public GFCF
Plan	 935	 1,961a	 2,277	 2,778	 7,951
Actual	 1,187	 2,165 b	 2,065	 2,513	 7,930
Implementation (%)	 126.9	 110.4	 90.7	 90.5	 99.7
Goods producing
Plan	 235	 790	 727	 1,121	 2,873
Actual	 267	 680	 677	 975	 2,599
Implementation (%)	 113.4	 86.1	 93.1	 87.0	 90.5
Services
Plan	 193	 456	 485	 470	 1,604
Actual	 190	 549	 385	 469	 1,593
Implementation (%)	 98.2	 120.4	 79.6	 99.7	 99.3
Infrastructure
Plan	 507	 715	 1,065	 1,187	 3,474
Actual	 730	 936	 1,003	 1,069	 3,738
Implementation (%)
	
144.1	 130.9	 94.1	 90.1	 107.6
Relative share of total
(GFCF %)
Plan	 69.0	 62.7	 69.1	 67.8	 67.0
Actual	 70.6	 65.6	 71.5	 65.1	 67.6
Private GFCF
Plan	 420	 1,168	 1,017	 1,319	 3,924
Actual	 495	 1,137	 825	 1,344	 3,801
Implementation (%)	 117.8	 97.3	 81.1	 101.9	 96.9
Goods producing
Plan	 255	 853	 748	 947	 2,803
Actual	 284	 770	 602	 822	 2478
Implementation(%)	 111.5	 90.3	 80.5	 86.8	 88.4
Services
Plan	 165	 315	 269	 353	 1,102
Actual	 211	 367	 223	 522	 1,323
Implementation (%)
	
127.7	 116.5	 82.9	 148.0	 120.0
Infrastructure
Plan	 -	 -	 -	 19	 19
Actual	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -
Implementation (%)
	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -
Relative share of total
(GFCF %)
Plan	 31.0	 37.3	 30.9	 32.2	 33.0
Actual	 29.4	 34.4	 28.5	 34.9	 32.4
Table 5.3 contd...
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Table 5.3 contd...
Sector	 First Plan	 Second Plan	 Third Plan	 Fourth Plan
	
Cumulative of
	
(1976-80)	 (1981-1985)	 (1986-90)	 (1991-1995)	 Four Plans
_______________________ ___________ _____________ ____________ ____________ (1976-1995)
TotaJ GFCF
Plan	 1,355	 3,129	 3,294	 4,097	 11,875
Actual	 1,682	 3,302	 2,890	 3,857	 11,731
Implementation (%)	 124.1	 105.5	 87.7	 94.2	 98.8
Goods producing
Plan	 490	 1,643	 1,475	 2,068	 5,676
Actual	 551	 1,450	 1,279	 1,797	 5,077
Implementation (%)	 112.4	 88.3	 86.7	 86.9	 89.4
Services
Plan	 358	 771	 754	 823	 2,706
Actual	 401	 916	 608	 991	 2,916
Implementation(%)	 111.8	 118.8	 80.7	 120.4	 107.8
Infrastructure
Plan	 507	 715	 1,065	 1,206	 3,493
Actual	 730	 936	 1,003	 1,069	 3,738
Implementation (%)	 144.1	 130.9	 94.2	 88.6	 107.0
Notes:
a) This figure does not include RO 135 million allocated for the private sector as loans and grants and
RO 59 allocated to finance the specialised banks both included in the Second FYP under
Development expenditure (Oman, 1996a:p.23), since actual expenditure has been treated as financial
investments and hence excluded from GFCF.
b) Exclusive of RO 591 million expenditure on defence and national security for civil purposes (ibid.).
c) Total public GFCF will not reconcile with total development expenditure shown in table 5.5 and
elsewhere within government accounts, because GFCF also includes investment expenditure of self-
financing SOEs and capital expenditure incurred by defence and national security units which is
included under First, Third, and Fourth plans, but excluded from Second Plan because it was not
originally included in the plan.
Sources: Data for Plan figures compiled from: First plan (Oman, 1976a:p.25); Second Plan (Oman,
1986a:pp.22-23 and 30-31); Third and Fourth Plan (Oman, 1991a:p.178);
Data for Actual figures compiled from: First Plan (Oman, 1986a:p. 19); Second Plan (Oman,
1986a:pp.22-23 and 30-3 1); Third and Fourth Plan (Oman, 1996b:pp.430-431) and based on
SNA 1993, with detailed sectoral breakdown obtained from the Oinani Ministry of Development
data.
In Chapter II, we stressed the importance of the sectoral distribution of capital
formation as one of the main instruments through which the state can promote structural
transformation. Therefore, (as Appendix tables 5-Al and 5-All detail) the pattern of
sectoral distribution of investment has changed from one plan to another in line with the
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changing priorities and dynamics of the development process. However, the aggregate
sectoral allocation of government investment does not reflect the developmental priorities
of the five-year plans because the capital intensity varies greatly from one sector to
another. For instance, health, education, agriculture, fisheries, etc. are sectors with
relatively low capital intensity whereas oil and gas have very high capital intensity. As we
saw in Chapter IV, both health and education were given high priority, and the results
were commensurate with these priorities although the proportion of government
investment allocated to these sectors was relatively small.
Table 5.4 below shows that under the four five-year plans completed during the
period 1976-95, the cumulative total of actual investment amounted to RO 11.7 billion of
which about 35 per cent was invested in production of oil and gas, 8 per cent was invested
in (non-oil) mining, agriculture, fisheries and manufacturing and 25 per cent in provision
of services like public utilities, housing, trade and tourism, communication, finance and
transport. A relatively large proportion, about 32 per cent was invested in building the
networks of economic infrastructure (roads, ports, etc.) and social infrastructure
(education and health) and this infrastructural investment was funded almost entirely by
the government1.
Private investment was mainly in oil and housing and manufacturing. Out of the
total private investment of RO 3.8 billion undertaken during the period 1976 to 1995, 50
per cent was invested in oil, 27 per cent in housing, 13 per cent in agriculture, fisheries
and manufacturing and 8 per cent in trade, tourism, financial institutions and transport.
Out of a total of public investment of RO 7.9 billion, undertaken during 1976-
1995, 28 per cent was invested in oil and gas, 4 per cent in agriculture and manufacturing,
13 per cent in public utilities (electricity, water and post, telephones and telegraphs), 6 per
cent in housing and tourism, 20 per cent in roads, ports and airports, 4 per cent in health,
'The terms public sector and the government are used interchangeably.
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6 per cent in education and vocational training and around 17 per cent in public
administration'.
In terms of its overall outcome, planning in Oman has been successftil because it
has developed those sectors which were, till the mid-1970s almost non-existent (e.g.
manufacturing and tourism) or were very weak (e.g. trade and construction). By raising
the contribution of these non-oil activities to the national income, it has reduced the
relative importance of petroleum activities in the economy. Thus planning has succeeded
in bringing about a structural change in the economy. However, in terms of diversifying
and expanding the non-oil productive sectors of the economy, agriculture, fisheries mining
and manufacturing, the success has been rather limited. The main reason for this seems to
be Oman's neo-classical approach to industrial and trade policies. Another shortcoming
has been the failure of the government to control its current expenditure which has
indirectly reduced the rate of capital formation and has led to building up of large fiscal
deficits. These points are discussed below in our analysis of individual FYPs.
The analyses of the four five-year plans that follows is not meant to be exhaustive
in detail in their objectives, outcome and imp'ementation. The aim rather is to focus on
some of the salient features of each plan and the way this reflects the effectiveness or
otherwise of Omani planning and the uncertain circumstances that this planning bad to
negotiate.
This includes expenditure of a civil nature incurred by the various Defence and Security units, for
example, construction of roads, schools, hospitals. etc.
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5.7 The First FYP (1976-80) : Restoring Stability and Sustaining Development
5.7.1 Objectives of the First FYP: growth and development
The First FYP was meant to restore financial stability and maintain the momentum
of development which started in 1970, but in a planned and systematic manner and within
the framework of the long-term development strategy.
A number of factors influenced the formulation of the objectives of First FYP.
These included, first, the need to extend government services to the South with the end of
civil war in that area; second, the threat to Oman's financial stability arising on account of
the debt burden created by the large financial commitments of the pre-plan period; third,
the fiscal burden of meeting the progressive increase in civil current expenditure; and
fourth the expected decline in oil production and its impact on the government's ability to
maintain the development momentum (Oman, 1976a:pp.8-11).
Thus the six major objectives of the First FYP (ibid. :pp.l3-43) were: (i) to achieve
high annual average growth rates of 8.1 per cent in the value-added by the non-petroleum
activities, to compensate for the expected decline, at an annual average rate of 1.3 per cent
in the petroleum sector activities; (ii) to achieve a balance between government revenues
and expenditure, by planning for a gradual reduction in government investment through
the plan period, from RO 256 million in 1976 to RO 106 million in 1980; (iii) to keep
government borrowings within narrow limits, with the aim of reducing government
indebtedness by 1979; (iv) to increase the share of private sector investment in total
investment from 17.8 per cent in 1974 to an average of 31.0 per cent during the plan
period, in order to compensate for the expected decline in the level of government
investment; (v) to initiate the industrialisation process by setting up a number of
manufacturing industries such as an oil refinery, a cement company and a flour mill, as
state owned enterprises or joint ventures with private sector and setting up a development
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bank to provide long-term finance for private sector activities; and (vi) to achieve by the
year 1980 a rate of GFCF, equal to 25 per cent of the nominal GDP, which was expected
to reach RO 806 million in that year.
To achieve the above objectives, a number of policies and measures were included
in the plan. These included for example, the establishment of special agricultural and
fisheries development funds to co-ordinate public investment in these sectors and to act
as a policy review board for facilitating development of these sectors; the provision of
incentives for the promotion of industry and so on (ibid :pp.44-47).
The sectoral distribution of planned public investment2, as shown in table 5.3,
reflects the priority accorded in the plan to fostering the growth of non-oil activities.
Hence about 54 per cent of public investment was allocated to infrastructure projects like
roads, port, education and health facilities. And to facilitate private sector investment,
about 21 per cent of public investment was allocated to provision of services like
electricity, water, hotels and telecommunications, and for setting up a development bank.
To diversif' the economy and expand its productive base, RO 235 million,
constituting 25 per cent of total planned public investment, was allocated to the goods
producing sector3 . This amount included RO 88 million to cover the government's share
in PDO's development expenditure 4, RO 41 million was to be invested in development of
the agriculture and fisheries sector, while RO 106 was to be invested in developing the
national gas sector and setting up a number of manufacturing units like a refinery, a
cement company and a flour mill (ibid :p.29).
'The First FYP emphasised the dominant role of the private sector in agriculture and fisheries: "activities
in this sector (agriculture) are mainly left to the private sector and that government invest.ment is meant to
assist the private sector and provide guidance to it... [TIJhe development policy in respect of this sector
(fisheries) should include among its principal aims the protection of the traditional fishermen and the
development of their production" (Oman, 1976a:pp.39 and 47).
2 Appendix table 5-Al shows sectoral and sub-sectoral distribution of public investment
These included oil, gas, non-oil mining and quarrying, agriculture, fisheries and manufacturing.
This was in line with the government's share of 60 per cent in P1)0 (Oman, 1976a:p.37).
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Although the plan was only indicative for the private sector, it was expected that
public investment and the various policies and measures included in the plan would
"crowd in" private investment. Hence, the plan envisaged that the private sector's
investment would reach RO 420 million, representing 31 per cent of total planned
investment for the period 1976-80, so that at the end of First FYP in 1980, the ratio of
private investment to GDP would reach 11.8 per cent compared to 6.5 per cent achieved
in 1976 (cf. table 5.2).
As table 5.3 indicates, private sector was expected to invest RO 420 million in the
goods producing and services sector'. This was almost equal to public investment of RO
428 million planned for these two sectors. Thus, the plan envisaged that by the end of the
First FYP in 1980, the share of private investment in total investment 2 in goods producing
and services sectors would reach about 49 per cent (ibid :p.27).
The plan recognised the prevalence of regional inequalities in the country and
therefore 32 per cent of the planned public investment was allocated for the capital area,
27 per cent for the Southern region and 41 per cent for other regions (cf. table 5.5). This
pattern of regional allocation reflected the population distribution of the country. In fact
Speece's (1989) prognosis which we discussed in the Introduction has proven to be overly
pessimistic.
It will be noticed from table 5.3 that private sector was not expected to make any investment in economic
and social infrastructures.
2 That is the combined public and private investment.
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Table 5.5
Geographical distribution of public investment - 1976-80
Region	 Planned	 Actual
_______________ ROMn.	 %	 ROMn.	 %
Capital area	 300.3	 32.1	 334.8	 27.8
Southern region
	 253.6	 27.1	 300.9	 25.0
Other regions	 380.9	 40.8	 567.9	 47.2
Total	 934.8	 100.0	 1,203.6	 100.0
Sources: Data for plan from First FYP, Oman (1976a:p.34). Data for actual investment from Second
FYP' (Oman, 1981a:p.55).
5.7.2 Outcome of the First FYP: stabilisation and growth
The period of the First FYP coincided with the period of rising oil prices 2. As a
result, the value-added by the petroleum activities which was expected to decline at an
average rate of 1.3 per cent during the years 1976-80, in fact grew at an average annual
rate of 21.3 per cent. And whilst its relative share of GDP was expected to decline to 57
per cent in 1980, it actually increased to 62 per cent. Consequently, the nominal GDP
grew at an annual average rate of 23.3 per cent, compared to the planned target of 2.2 per
cent, and in 1980, total GDP reached RO 2,064 million, compared to the planned target of
RO 806 million (cf table 5.1).
However, within the non-oil sector, the performance at sectoral and sub-sectoral
level was quite uneven. Thus while the average annual growth of 49.3 per cent in the
manufacturing sector was below the targeted rate of growth of 64.1 per cent, the services
sector's annual average rate of growth of 32.5 per cent was more than three times its
targeted growth rate of 10.1 per cent. Similarly, while the rate of growth of 21.1 per cent
recorded by agriculture and fisheries was almost two and half times its targeted growth
'The data in the Second FYP about the actual level of public investment of RO 1,203.6 million are based
on preliminary estimates of 1980 public accounts. These estimates were revised to RO 1,187 million later
on, as table 5.3 shows, however, since no geographical distribution is available for the later amount, we
have used the geographical distribution available for the former.
2 Because of the Iranian revolution in 1979. and the Iran-Iraq war in 1980 the average oil price per barrel
increased from US$ 13 in 1976 to US$ 37 in 1980 (see Appendix table 4-All of Chapter IV).
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rate of 8.2 per cent, yet its performance was below that of the petroleum and services
sector.
In terms of the demand in the economy, both final consumption and capital
formation grew very rapidly. As table 5.2 shows, about 52 per cent of the demand in
1980 was contributed by final consumption. Final consumption was planned to grow by 4
per cent between 1976-80 (from RO 411 million to RO 426 million), but actual final
consumption between these years grew by about 155 per cent (from RO 422 million to
RO 1,076 million). The expenditure on GFCF was planned to decline by 36 per cent
(from RO 314 million to RO 201 million) between 1976 and 1980, but it actually
increased by 47 per cent, from RO 317 million to RO 466 million during the period.
The financial position of the government, as table 5.6 below shows, also improved
during the First FYP. The large fiscal deficits experienced during the period preceding
the First FYP were wiped out and public finances actually showed a surplus of revenue
over expenditure of RO 265' million.
Employment also grew substantially. The number of persons employed in the civil
service increased from about 19,123 in 1975 to 38,840 in 1980. Expatriate employment
in the private sector doubled from about 65,000 persons in 1975 to about 130,000 persons
in 1980 (Oman, 1986b:pp.99 and 114).
This is before transfer to reserves. Actual deficit, after transfer of RO 274 million to reserves, was RO 9
million (cf table 5.6).
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Table 5.6
Public finance-total revenues, expenditure and deficit - plan compared with actual
(1976-95)
P = Planned, A = Actual, I = Implementation (ratio of actual to plan)
	_____________________ __________ ___________ __________ 	 (Amount in RO Million)
Item	 First Plan	 Second Plan	 Third Plan	 Fourth	 Cumulative of
(1976-80) (1981-1985) (1986-90) Plan Four Plans
_______________________ ___________ ____________ ___________ (1991-1995) (1976-1995)
Total Revenues
Plan	 2,393	 6,947	 6,491	 8,571	 24,402
Actual	 3,116	 6,605	 7,098	 8,598	 25,417
Implementation (%)
	 130.2	 95.1	 109.4	 100.3	 104.2
Gross Oil Revenues
Plan	 2,236	 7,501	 5,045	 8,156	 22,938
Actual	 3,125	 6,649	 6,016	 7,282	 23,072
Implementation (%)
	
139.8	 88.6	 119.2	 89.3	 100.6
Less: Transfer to
reserves
Plan	 -	 1,125	 -	 1,570	 2,695
Actual	 274	 920	 405	 779	 2,378
Implementation (%)
	 -	 81.8	 -	 49.6	 88.2
Net oil revenues
Plan	 2,236	 6,376	 5,045	 6,586	 20.243
Actual	 2,851	 5,729	 5,611	 6,503	 20,694
Implementation (%)
	
127.5	 89.9	 111.2	 98.7	 102.2
Other revenues
Plan	 157	 571	 1,446	 1,985	 4,159
Actual	 265	 876	 1,487	 2,095	 4,723
Implementation (%)
	
168.8	 153.4	 102.8	 105.5	 113.6
Total expenditure
Plan	 2,631	 7,368	 8,164	 9,450	 27,613
Actual	 3,340	 7,872	 8,616	 10,953	 30,781
Implementation (%)	 126.9	 106.8	 105.5	 115.9	 111.5
Current expenditure
Plan	 1,820	 5,138	 6.055	 7,214	 20,227
Actual	 2,348	 5,518	 6,726	 8,674	 23,266
Implementation (%)
	
129.0	 107.4	 111.1	 120.2	 115.0
Defence
Plan	 971	 2,973	 2,716	 2,904	 9,564
Actual	 1,449	 3,247	 3,181	 3,714	 11,591
Implementation(%)	 149.2	 109.2	 117.1	 127.9	 121.2
Civil
Plan	 774	 2,026	 2,890	 3,778	 9,468
Actual	 824	 2,132	 3,125	 4,475	 10,556
lmplementation(%)	 106.5	 105.2	 108.1	 118.4	 111.5
Table 5.6 contd...
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Table 5.6 contd...
Item	 First Plan	 Second	 Third Plan	 Fourth	 Cumulative
	
(1976-80) Plan (1981-	 (1986-90)	 Plan	 of Four
1985)	 (1991-1995) Plans (1976-
	
_______________________ _________ ___________ ___________ ___________	 1995)
Interest on loans
Plan	 75	 139	 449	 532	 1,195
Actual	 75	 139	 420	 485	 1,119
Implementation (%)	 100.0	 100.0	 93.5	 91.2	 93.6
Development
Plan	 811	 1,961	 1,932	 2,107	 6,811
Actual	 903	 2,088	 1,719	 2,148	 6,858
Implementation (%)
	
111.3	 106.5	 89.0	 101.9	 100.7
Oil
Plan	 88	 544	 578	 761	 1,971
Actual	 205	 456	 561	 739	 1,961
Implementation (%)
	
233.0	 83.8	 97.1	 97.1	 99.5
Civil
Plan	 723	 1,417	 1,354	 1,346	 4,840
Actual	 698	 1,632	 1,158	 1,409	 4,897
Implementation (%)	 96.5	 115.2	 85.5	 104.7	 101.2
Equity participation and
support to private sector
Plan	 -	 269	 179	 129	 577
Actual	 89	 266	 171	 131	 657
Implementation (%)	 -	 98.9	 95.5	 101.6	 113.9
Surplus (+) or Deficit (-)
Plan	 -238	 -421	 -1,673	 -879	 -3,211
Actual	 -224	 -1,267	 -1,518	 -2,355	 -5,364
Implementation (%)	 94.1	 +300.0	 90.7	 267.9	 167.0
Less: Aid received
Plan	 116	 37	 -	 -	 153
Actual	 215	 179	 3	 21	 418
Implementation (%)	 185.4	 483.8	 -	 -	 273.2
Net deficit
Plan	 -122	 -384	 -1,673	 -879	 -3,058
Actual	 -9	 -1,088	 -1,515	 -2,334	 -4,946
Implementation (%)	 7.4	 283.3	 90.6	 265.5	 -161.7
Sources: Data for Plan figures compiled from: First plan (Oman, 1976a:p. 19); Second Plan (Oman,
1981a:p.40); Third Plan (Oman, 1986a:p.35) and Fourth Plan (Oman, 1991a:pp.84-85). Data for
Actual figures compiled from: First plan (Oman, 1986b:p.378); Second Plan (Oman,
1986b:p.379); Third Plan (Oman, 199 la:pp.84-85); and Fourth Plan (Oman, 1996a:pp.85-89).
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During the First FYP, considerable progress was made in the provision of basic
infrastructural services (such as ports, roads etc.), public utilities (electricity, water, post
and telecommunications), educational and health facilities which we described in Chapter
Iv.
A number of income-generating projects were also completed during the First FYP
by the state on its own or jointly with private sector. These included - one flour mill,
two factories for processing of dates, a fishing company and an animal husbandry
company. Other projects which were started included a copper mining and smelting
project, one cement factory and one oil refinery (Oman, 198 la:pp.4-6). The Oman
Development Bank, a fishermen's support fund, and a farmers' support fund were also set
up, as planned. The Oman Housing Bank 1
 was also strengthened and its activities were
expanded. The public debt, which consisted mostly of short-term debt before the First
FYP was also reconstructed through increased recourse to grants and concessional
medium- and long-term loans. In 1980 this amounted to RO 178 million (Oman,
1 996a:p.25).
Another positive effect of the oil price increase was that a number of southern oil
fields which were hitherto unfeasible, became commercially viable for the first time. As a
result the government was able, through the agreement 2
 signed in May 1977, to provide
additional incentives to the foreign partners in PDO to develop the southern oil fields (Al
Yousef, l995:p.3l).
This bank was set up in 1973 under the name of "The Omani National Company for the Development of
Housing". During the First FYP, in 1977, the company was converted to the "Oman Housing Bank"
(Oman, 1981a:p.121). The objective of the Bank is to provide long-term low cost loans to Oinanis for
building their own houses.
2 This agreement in fact did not relate only to the southern oil fields but covered all the areas falling under
the concession area operated by PDO including the existing producing fields. In fact the agreement could
be construed as very generous, since it allowed for all investments by the foreign partners to be recovered
in less than five years. a guaranteed income of US 23 cents per barrel on all oil produced, indexed to the
buy-back price of Omani crude, and a return of 7.5 per cent on their share of PDO's average assets (Al
Yousef, l995:p.3l).
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The increase in oil prices also enabled the government to increase the level of
planned investment for the oil sector from RO 88 million to RO 205 million in the First
FYP (cf. Appendix table 5-AT). Consequently oil reserves increased from 1,280 million
barrels in 1976 to 2,484 million barrels in 1980 (cf. Appendix table 4-All, Chapter IV).
5.7.3 First FYP and the oil boom
An important contributory factor in achieving the goals of the First FYP was the
increase in the price of oil. The consequent rise in oil revenues enabled the government to
expand public services and increase the level of public investment. However, despite the
overall positive outcome of the First FYP, there were also a number of shortfalls which
could partly be attributed to the oil price increase and the consequent expansion in public
expenditure.
An important negative implication of the increase in oil price that reflected the
Dutch disease syndrome was that both the agriculture' and the manufacturing sectors
could not achieve the plan targets of their contribution 2 to GDP. In 1980, the actual
contribution of agriculture to GDP was 2.5 per cent compared to the plan target of 3.7 per
cent. Similarly, in 1980 the manufacturing sector's actual contribution of 0.8 per cent to
GDP was far lower than the plan target of 3.1 per cent.
The oil boom also had the negative effect of increasing Oman's reliance upon
purchase of services from abroad and expatriate workers. In 1980, the actual payments on
account of these two items jumped to RO 212 million compared to the target of RO 102
million (cf. table 5.2). This was primarily due to a large increase in the number of
expatriate workers both in the civil service and in the private sector3.
'Agriculture includes fisheries, whenever it is not explicitly mentioned.
2 This means the value-added in these sectors contribute to the production in the economy as measured by
GDP.
Between 1975 and 1980, the number of expatriates in clvii service increased from 4,000 to 15,384 while
in the private sector their number increased by about 65,000 to reach 130,208 during the same period
(Oman. 1986b:pp.99 and 114).
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The large expansion in public current expenditure that was ftielled by rising oil
revenues, is another negative aspect of the oil boom. As table 5.6 shows, whilst the actual
development (investment) expenditure during the First FYP was 11 per cent above the
planned target, the current expenditure exceeded the target by about 27 per cent.
Inspite of shortcomings of the First FYP, it did meet many of its objectives. This
indicates the important role the state can play, in promoting development through
planning. By launching an effective public investment programme and "crowding in"
private sector investment, the state in Oman was able to achieve high growth rates without
neglecting the social dimension of development, as we discussed in Chapter IV. Many oil
producing developing countries such as Algeria, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela and
Ecuador spent the oil windfalls on expanded programmes of subsidies and transfers to
hold down the rate of inflation and support loss-making firms (Geib, 1986:p.86). These
programmes proved hard to curb when oil revenues fell. In contrast, the discipline
imposed by the planning system prevented Oman from indulging in such practices.
Similarly, a number of oil producing countries were reluctant to raise domestic oil prices,
to conform to international prices, and chose to pass part of the windfall to domestic
consumers in the form of lower prices' (ibid). But in Oman, before the Oman Refinery
started in 1982, domestic oil prices fully reflected international prices. And to rationalise
domestic consumption and maximise oil exports, a tax 2 of 50 per cent was imposed on
domestic consumption when the refinery started its operations (Al Yousef, l995:p.39).
'Energy subsidies in 1980 were estimated to be equivalent to almost 10 per cent of household income in
Ecuador, while fiscal subsidies rose sharply in Trinidad and Tobago to around 7 per cent of GD? or 11 per
cent of non-mining GDP (GeIb, op. cit.).
2 Half of the crude oil supplied to the refineiy - i.e. the quantity estimated for domestic consumption is
priced at US$ 30 per barrel, almost twice its 1994 international price for example, while the other half is
priced at prevailing price (ibid.).
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5.8 The Second FYP (1981-85) and the Crisis of Planning
5.8.1 Objectives of the Second FYP - spending the oil windfalls
The objectives of the Second FYP were influenced by a number of favourable
factors. These included: first, the newly explored oil fields had become economically
viable due to the rise in oil prices during the late 1 970s; second, the consequent increase
in oil revenues enabled the government to spend more on development as well as on the
maintenance of an expanded bureaucracy; and third, the comprehensive infrastructural
investment undertaken during the First FYP period had augmented the absorptive capacity
of the economy by removing bottlenecks in ports and transportation and thereby
contributing to the growth of the markets and increased competition (Oman, 198 la:p.3 1).
The setting of challenging targets for the Second FYP and establishment of new
institutions like the SGRF' and soft loan schemes for private sector were also influenced
by the strong oil market prevailing 2 in 1979-80.
Within this context the Second FYP (Oman, 198 la:pp.32-33) set out to achieve
six major objectives of which the main ones were:
i) to achieve an average annual growth rate of 13.1 per cent in Gross Domestic
Product at current prices during the Second FYP period, 198 1-85 (cf table 5.1);
ii) to raise the ratio of GFCF to GDP to 25.6 per cent in the last year of the Second
FYP, 1985, about two thirds of this was planned to be contributed by the public
sector, and the remaining 35 per cent by the private sector (cf. table 5.2);
This was established in 1980 but formalised within the framework of the Second FYP (ibid. :p.32).
Section 5.4 provides more details about the operation of the SGRF.
2 In view of the Iraq-Iran war, it was expected that the high oil prices then prevailing ie., USS 36.9 per
barrel, would continue and even move upwards. Although the prices at which oil revenues were estimated
are not shown in the plan, it appears that the price estimated for 1985, for example, was about US$ 39 per
barrel.
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iii)	 to provide a strong stimulating push to the private sector engaged in productive
activities in agriculture, fisheries, manufacturing, mining and handicrafts, a new
programme of financing was introduced for this purpose.
The plan also laid down objectives for education, health and other social sectors.
5.8.2 Performance of the Second FYP: fiscal expansion and the neglect of planning
All the problems that affect economies based on export of primary commodities
which we have discussed previously, especially in Chapter II, are manifest during
implementation of Oman's Second FYP.
The very high average annual growth rates in nominal GDP targeted in the plan
could not be achieved mainly because of a large decline in the average oil price. After
continuing at its average peak price of US$ 36.9 per barrel in 1981, the oil price declined
to US$ 34 in 1982 and further to US$ 27 per barrel in 1985 (Oman, 1996a:p.22).
As table 5.1 shows, the average annual growth rate of 10.9 per cent in the GDP
during the Second FYP period was much lower than the targeted average annual growth
rate of 13.1 per cent. For the petroleum sector, the shortfall was even much greater. The
average annual growth rate of 5.5 per cent was less than half the targeted growth rate of
13.0 per cent.
In contrast, average annual growth rate realised in the non-oil activities of about
17.8 per cent was much higher than the targeted growth rate of 13.4 per cent. Within the
non-oil sector, with the exception of agriculture, the growth rates recorded by all other
activities were higher than planned.
The paradoxical role of oil in Oman's economy is reflected in the fact that because
of the decline in the petroleum sector, the relative share of the value-added by non-oil
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activities in nominal GDP increased to about 52 per cent in 1985 compared to the plan
target of 32 per cent. But as table 5.1 shows, a major part of the increase in the value-
added in these activities was recorded by the services sector whose relative share in GDP
increased to 38.1 per cent compared to the plan's target of 21.1 per cent. The relative
shares of agriculture and fisheries, and manufacturing, which stood at 2.7 and 2.4 per cent
respectively in 1980 exceeded their targeted shares of 2.2 and 2.3 per cent respectively.
However, the increase in these sectors was much smaller than the increase in the services
sector.
Associated with the unplanned increase in the share of services in the production
of the economy was the large unplanned growth of final consumption. As table 5.2
shows, while the final consumption was planned to contribute around 45 per cent of the
total demand in the economy in 1985, its actual contribution reached around 60 per cent
of GDP. Therefore, most of the demand had to be satisfied by way of additional purchase
of goods and services from abroad because the increase in domestic production of
agriculture and manufacturing, as noted earlier, was not high enough to meet this demand.
Total GFCF of RO 3,302 million recorded during the Second FYP period
exceeded the plan target of RO 3,129 million by 5 per cent because actual public
investment of RO 2,165 million exceeded the plan target of RO 1,961 million by 10 per
cent. Private sector investment of RO 1,137 million was lower than the targeted level of
RO 1,168 million by 3 per cent. As a result, the share of private sector in total investment
was 34 per cent compared to the plan target of 37 per cent (cf. table 5.3).
The success in implementation of public investment programme among different
sectors varied from one sector to another. As Appendix table 5-Al shows, the rate of
implementation i.e. ratio of actual to planned investment in agriculture was 72 per cent
and in fisheries it was only 35 per cent. In the manufacturing sector implementation seems
to have improved with experience, since the implementation rate was 94 per cent whereas
in the First FYP it was only 11 per cent. This was partly due to the completion of a
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number of large industrial projects, started in the First FYP, such as the oil refinery and
the cement factory.
The performance of the private sector in implementing the investment programme
followed the pattern of the public sector. Thus actual total private investment was 97 per
cent of planned investment in Second FYP. But between different sectors, the rate of
implementation of private investment was quite uneven. As Appendix table 5-All shows,
for the services sector 1
 actual private investment exceeded planned private investment by
16 per cent. But in the goods producing sector - with the exception of investment in
petroleum sector - the record of implementation of private investment in the agriculture,
fisheries and manufacturing sectors - as shown by the ratios of actual to planned private
investment - was even poorer than what it was in the First FYP2. The low level of
implementation in these sectors may, to some extent, reflect the low implementation rates
of public investment in these sectors.
During the Second FYP, total export earnings (including re-exports) increased by
33 per cent, from RO 1,294 million in 1980 to RO 1,717 million in 1985, recording an
average annual growth rate of 5.8 per cent. Oil exports grew at an average annual growth
rate of 5.1 per cent, while the growth rates of non-oil exports of Omani origin and re-
exports were much higher at 35.7 per cent, and 16.6 per cent respectively (Oman,
1 986b:p.28 1).
However, despite the increase in oil exports, Oman's terms of trade started to
decline along with the decline of oil prices that started in 1982. Thus, Oman's terms of
trade declined by 14 per cent in 1984 compared to their level in 1980 (World Bank,
l988:p.243). To compensate for this decline, Oman increased its oil production between
The rate of implementation i.e. ratio of actual to planned private investment in the sub-sectors of
services was: Financial Institutions, 278 per cent; Transport, 260 per cent; Trade and Tourism, 115 per
cent; and for Housing, implementation rate was 108 per cent.
2 agriculture the implementation rate was 78 per cent (compared to 81 per cent in the First FYP); for
Fisheries it was 26 per cent and for Manufacturing it was 43 per cent (95 per cent in First FYP) (see
Appendix table 5-All).
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1,267 million'. About 48 per cent of this large deficit was financed through withdrawals
from the SGRF, 38 per cent was financed by loans from international commercial banks
and Export Credit Agencies, while 14 per cent was funded through aid received from
friendly countries (Oman, I 986b :p. 379).
In terms of other objectives of the plan, the outcome was very positive. In the
agriculture and fisheries sector, for example, a number of measures were undertaken by
the government to develop this sector2. Similarly, a number of industrial projects 3 were
completed during the Second FYP.
In the private sector also many units for production of soft drinks, mineral water,
beverages, cooking oil, petrochemicals, plastic and insulators (polystyrene), detergents,
packing materials (cartons) and fishing boats were established during the Second FYP.
The government also started providing, as planned, for the first time subsidised long-term
finance to the private sector industry, mining and quarrying - this was in addition to the
loans provided by the Oman Development Bank (Oman, 1986a:pp.3-8).
Between 1981 and 1985, 3,374 low cost houses were built, and the Oman Housing
Bank extended loans of RO 85 million for construction of houses during this period
(ibid.). In education, health care, provision of infrastructure and public utilities
considerable progress was made during the Second FYP period.
'As table 5.6 shows, about 40 per cent or RO 342 million of the increase in the deficit was contributed by
the fall in revenues, while the remaining 60 per cent, RO 504 million, was the result of the increase of
public expenditure over the planned level.
2 Establishment of agricultural research stations and extension service centres, provision of subsidies to
fanners for improved seeds, insecticides and fertilisers, repair and maintenance of many falajs, and
digging of deep wells. For fisheries, the government extended support to the private sector by participating
in the formation of the Oman National Fisheries Co. (Oman, 1986a:p.3). Similarly, the Oman Bank for
Agriculture and Fisheries was set up in 1982, and between then and 1985, the Bank extended soft-loans
amounting to RO 13.2 million.
These included, the oil refineiy, two cement factories, (one wholly owned by the government - Oman
Cement Company and the other Raysut Cement Company a public-private joint venture) and the animal
feed factory (a joint venture with private sector) (Oman, 1986a:pp.3-8).
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5.8.3 The importance of planning during the Second FYP period
The experience of Second FYP suggests that adoption of the neo-classical policy
of unrestricted imports of goods and services, including expatriate labour, has led to
certain adverse consequences for the Omani economy. These included, for example, a
large increase in expatriate remittances, which grew by 139 per cent from RO 137 million
in 1980 to RO 327 million in 1985 (Oman., 1986b:p.323). These remittances had two-fold
effects: they reduced substantially the external account surplus and widened the gap
between gross domestic and gross national savings. Moreover, the better trained and
relatively low cost expatriate labour created an unfair competition for the Oma.ni labour
who could not accept the same level of wages 1 . Similarly, the liberal trade policy of
providing minimum protection to domestic producers led to an unfair competition for the
Omani infant industries as well as the agriculture and fisheries sector. This not only led to
a surge in imports but also encouraged the private sector to invest more in the services
sector, which did not face similar competition. Hence, as we noted earlier, actual private
investment in services sector was higher than planned investment whereas in agriculture,
fisheries and manufacturing, actual private investment was much lower than planned (cf
Appendix table 5-All).
Moreover, a lax fiscal policy and the neglect of planning during the years 1983-85
eventually led to a large increase in fiscal deficit, a consequent increase in final
consumption, a decline in gross national savings 2, and erosion of the current account
surplus.
'The expatriate labour would accept low wages because of the supply exceeding demand in their home
countries, and because the value of Omani Rial compared to their home currencies was much higher. In
fact, the Omani Rial compared to these currencies is over-valued. For example, while the purchasing
power panty of the Omani Rial compared to the US Dollar was about 1.8 (units of the US currency) to 1
(unit of the Omani currency) in 1987, for India it was 2.55 to 1, Pakistan 5.1 to 1, Bangladesh 4.2 to 1,
and Sri Lanka it was 5.0 to 1 in 1987 (calculated from UNDP, 199l:pp.152-l53).
2 As table 5.2 shows, gross national savings declined from 37.6 per cent of GDP in 1980 to 28.7 per cent
in 1985. Although such a level of savings is much higher than the level of 10-15 per cent of national
income suggested by Lewis (1955) and Rostow (1956), as we discussed in Chapter II, but it is the
declining trend which is of concern.
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Oman's experience during the Second Plan is instructive about the applicability of
free trade policy advocated by the neo-classicals. In a country like Oman where the
private sector is underdeveloped, the economy is reliant on a single primary produce, and
the markets and their supportive institutions are in their infancy, this policy has adverse
implications.
During this period (1982-85) political support and commitment to planning
weakened somewhat. So that whilst the Development Council would meet at least three
to four times a year to review the progress in plan implementation, because of waning
political support for planning' during 1982-85, the Council held only two meetings in
1982 and did not meet in 1983, 1984 and 1985.
An irony of the crisis in planning faced during the Second FYP lies in the fact that
while the crisis was due to the neglect of the planning institutions and processes2, the
resolution of this crisis was found within those very processes and institutions. Thus the
facilitating institutions, such as the SGRF, which were set up within the planning
framework, enabled the government to overcome the problems of large unplanned fiscal
deficit during the Second FYP. Without planning the Omani economy would have
experienced greater shocks and much less continuity.
5.9 The Third FYP (1986-90): Stabilisation with a Human Face
5.9.1 Objectives of the Third FYP: managing external shocks of the 1980s
The situation prevailing at the time of the formulation of the Third FYP in 1985
and the unfolding of oil crisis in 1986 were a real testing time for development planning in
The waning support for planning in these years was not due entirely to any perceived failure of the
planning system. It was the euphoria created by the oil windfalls of the early 1980s which led a number
of policy makers to believe that relying on planning mechanism would frustrate the speed of development.
Hence a last track of public investment programme was advocated.
2 In the form of inclusion of non-plan projects and consequent increase in public expenditure leading to
unplanned increase in fiscal deficits.
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Oman. The Third FYP had on the one hand, to take due cognisance of the possibility of
continued recession in oil trade by making the necessary macroecnomic adjustments, and
on the other, it had to ensure that adequate resources were available for completing the
large number of ongoing projects' started during the Second FYP2.
Anticipating the continuation of the downward trend in the world oil prices, the
planners in Oman prepared the Third FYP estimates of oil revenues, export earnings and
oil sector's contribution to GDP on the basis of an expected average oil price of US$
23.65 per barrel which was much lower than the average price of US$ 27 per barrel
realised in 1985 (Oman, I 986a:p. 75). To offset the effect of this decline, it was planned
to increase the daily oil production gradually from 498,000 barrels in 1985 to 575,000 in
1990 (ibid:p.48).
However, subsequent to the approval of the Third FYP on January 1, 1986, oil
prices declined much faster than expected and plummeted to US$ 8 per barrel in 1986
compared to the projected price of US$ 24 (Oman, 1986a:p.50). As a result, it was
estimated that oil revenues would drop by almost 50 per cent if the trend of low prices
was to continue. Because of oil's strong fiscal and monetary linkages to the rest of the
economy this meant that the latter was to experience negative repercussions (ibid).
In order to minimise the negative consequences of the oil crisis on the economy
and the society as a whole, the government undertook a number of policy measures,
including reformulation of the Third FYP to take account of the severe recession in oil
market; devaluation of the Omani Rial by 10.2 per cent in 1986 against the US dollar3;
'The cost to complete these ongoing projects was RO 733 million and in fact represented almost 50 per
cent of the total development expenditure programme for the Third Plan. About 30 per cent of the cost of
the ongoing projects related to projects which had been added to the Second Plan, which we discussed in
the preceding section, while a large part of the balance related to projects that had been postponed during
the Second Plan (Oman. 1986a:pp.48-49).
2 Because the Third Plan was basically a fiscal consolidation plan, the Third FYP was the first plan to be
discussed and formulated by the Financial Affairs Council instead of the Development Council, which was
normally responsible for plan formulation and evaluation.
The parity of the Rial was thus reduced from US$ 2.89 to USS 2.60 on 25th Januaiy, 1986 (ibid.:p.50).
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reduction of transfers to the SGRF from 15 per cent of gross oil revenues to 5 per cent;
curtailment of all public expenditure except expenditure on education, health and social
affairs 1, by 10 per cent. The last measure shows Omani policy makers' commitment to
social welfare in Oman (Oman, 1986a:p.50).
The revised Third FYP, like its original version, had to take into account the cost
of completing several on-going projects started during the later part of the Second FYP.
Two other policy changes with long-term implications included, measures to enhance the
scope of private sector activities in development and sale of some government assets.
Thus privatisation as a part of macroeconomic stabilisation was introduced for the first
time in Oman.
The Financial Affairs Council2 prepared the revised version of the Third FYP in
October 1986 which in effect was a structural adjustment plan. As table 5.7 shows,
because of the collapse in oil prices from the beginning of 1986, oil revenues were
expected to be 30 per cent lower than the original estimates. On the expenditure side, the
alternatives available to the government were limited by the decisions 3 made during the
Second FYP. It was therefore difficult to reduce public current expenditure substantially
without causing large scale redundancies and social hardship. Keeping in view the policy
decision of not reducing expenditure on health, education and social affairs, the revised
estimate of total expenditure was lower than the original by only 12 per cent. As a result,
fiscal deficit during the Third FYP period was allowed to increase from RO 596 million to
RO 1,673 million, representing a 180 per cent increase.
It is most significant that Oman did not reduce expenditure in these areas. In most other countries -
developing and developed, reduction in expenditure on education, health and social affairs is only too
readily made in times of fiscal crisis.
2 In view of the wide-ranging fiscal implications of the oil crisis, the revised Third FYP was also
formulated by the Financial Affairs Council and not by the Development Council.
These included on the one hand, the financial burden of completing a large number of ongoing projects
and the cost of maintaining and operating them, and on the other, the increasing cost of maintaining a
large bureaucracy and a wide range of public services that had been significantly expanded during the
Second FYP.
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Table 5.7
Comparison between estimates of government revenue and expenditure:
original Third FYP compared with revised Third FYP (1986-90)
____________________________ ______________ ______________ 	
(RO Million
Original plan Revised plan Percentage change
Revenues
Oil	 7,171	 5,045	 -30
Others	 1,485	 1,446	 -3
Total revenues	 8,656	 6,491	 -25
Expenditure
Current	 6,818	 6,055	 -11
Development	 2,211	 1,932	 -13
Support to private
sector and participations	 221	 177	 -20
Total expenditure 	 9,250	 8,164	 -12
Deficit	 594	 1,673	 +182
To be financed through: 	 -	 -	 -
Grants and Loans	 294	 298	 -
Withdrawals from reserves 	 300	 1,026	 +242
Sale of government assets	 -	 100
Total financing of deficit	 594	 1,424	 +139
Uncovered deficit 	 -	 249	 -
Source: Oman, Third F/P (1986a:pp.51-52).
During the first half of 1987, the Development Council' took an active role in
defining the plans targets, outlining the policies required to achieve the necessary
adjustment and selecting the projects that need to be implemented during the Third FYP.
The revised plan and as table 5.1 shows, envisaged an average annual decline of
2.4 per cent in nominal GDP. With the expectation of continuing depression in the oil
market, the value-added by the petroleum sector was forecast to decline at an average
annual rate of 6.3 per cent. This was planned to be partly offset by the growth in the
value-added by the non-oil sector, at an average annual rate of 0.7 per cent.
In fact, for this purpose. the Council held 18 meetings in 1987. more than the number of meetings held
in any year since its formation in 1974.
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Consequently, the contribution of the petroleum sector to nominal GDP was planned to
decrease to 39 per cent at the end of the Third FYP (1990) compared to 48 per cent
recorded in the last year of the Second FYP (1985), whereas the contribution of the non-
oil sector was planned to rise to 61 per cent in 1990 compared to 51 per cent in 1985.
The ratio of gross capital formation to GDP in 1990 was targeted to decline to
17.2 per cent compared to the ratio of 27.6 achieved in 1985 (cf. table 5.2). As table 5.3
shows total planned investment during the Third FYP was envisaged to be lower at RO
3,294 million compared to the investment expenditure of RO 3,302 million incurred during
the Second FYP period'.
5.9.2 Performance of the Third FYP: growth with adjustment
As mentioned earlier, the revised Third FYP was essentially a structural
adjustment plan whose basic goal was to enable the economy to adjust to the sharp decline
in oil prices, and their consequent adverse effects on government revenues, with minimum
dislocation.
The outcome of the Third FYP, clearly shows that the policy measures undertaken
at the outset of the oil crises were largely successftil. These enabled Oman to absorb the
shock of oil price collapse without losing the momentum of development and without
curtailing the public expenditure on social services. While the success of these policies was
proven by the speed with which the economy adapted to the new circumstances, the
resilience shown by Oman's economy to the oil crisis proved the soundness of the national
economic base and the suitability of planning as a method of achieving economic
In fact, actual investment expenditure in the Second FYP was RO 3,893 million and not RO 3,302
million as shown in table 5.3. The reason for this anomaly is that since the plan's estimates of public
investment excluded any forecast of capital expenditure of civil nature to be incurred by Defence and
Security Units during the plan period, the actual capital expenditure of these units has therefore been
excluded from table 5.3, when compiling the data for the outcome of the Second FYP. Whereas, the
Third FYP estimates of RO 3,294 million of total public investment include an amount of RO 175 million
to be spent by these units on capital expenditure of civil nature (Oman, 1986a:p.67).
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development in a primary resource-based economy like Oman. In contrast to the
imbalances created during the Second FYP through unplanned development, the
favourable outcome of the Third FYP showed that it was possible to deal with external
shocks by taking remedial measures within the framework of development plans. In the
absence of the planned response to the sudden emergence of unfavourable external
factors, the Omani economy and society might well have experienced the dislocation and
imbalance suffered by other developing countries.
The Third FYP's outcome also reflects the control exercised by the government in
the management of public finance. Although gross oil revenues realised during the Third
FYP, because of lower oil prices', were lower than the revenues realised during the
Second FYP by about 10 per cent, the government did not fail in its commitment of
transferring a part of oil revenues to the SGRF 2
 (cf. table 5.6). This indicates the
importance given to the sustenance of these reserves as an instrument for managing oil
price fluctuations, and the discipline which planning imposed on economic management in
Oman.
The government's control over financial policy is also shown in its cautious
approach to public debt observed during the Third FYP. Despite the fact that the Third
FYP period coincided with the worst oil crisis, the government of Oman did not resort to
heavy public borrowing. Only 20 per cent of the fiscal deficit arising during 1986-90 was
financed through loans (Oman, 1991a:p.85). Thus compared to 1985, total public
external debt increased only from 24.1 per cent of GNP in 1985 to 29.4 per cent of GNP
in 1990 (cf. table 5.8).
The government also maintained its policy of allocation of adequate funds for
developing the oil sector. The consequent increase in oil reserves enabled the government
During 198 1-85. the average oil price realised was USS 31.1 per barrel, whereas, during 1986-90, the
average price realised was US$ 16.3 per barrel (Oman, 1996a:p.22).
2 Of course, this was at a reduced rate of 5 per cent of gross oil revenues compared to the rate of 15 per
cent during the Second FYP period.
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to compensate the substantial decline in oil price with increased production, without
excessive depletion of oil reserves. As Appendix 4-Al! of Chapter IV shows, oil reserves
increased from 3,869 million barrels in 1985 to 4,161 million barrels in 1990, while the
average oil production of 684,000 bId in that year was much higher than the targeted level
of 575,000 bId.
However, as was the case in the Second FYP, the control on current public
expenditure could not be maintained during the Third FYP. Table 5.6 shows that actual
development expenditure of RO 1,719 million was lower than the revised plan target of
RO 1,932 million. However the current expenditure increased to RO 6,726 million as
against the planned target of RO 6,055 million. In fact, total current expenditure in the
Third FYP was higher by almost 22 per cent than total current expenditure of RO 5,518
million in the Second FYP. The overruns in current expenditure, as we also noted in the
preceding section, have been a permanent aspect of Oman's lax fiscal management.
5.9.3 The Third FYP : the impact of the structural adjustment on growth and
human development
Unlike many oil exporting developing countries 1 which implemented structural
adjustment programmes prescribed by the [FIs, Oman had the freedom to design its own
adjustment measures. It was able to do so because Oman used planning as an instrument
to achieve adjustment with growth and human development. Similarly, planning did not
preclude Oman from using the neo-classical approach of policy reform wherever it was
considered appropriate, neither did planning lead Oman to abandon its liberal trade and
exchange rate policy, by introducing exchange controls and import restrictions.
'With the exception of Oman, Trinidad and Tobago and Saudi Arabia, all countries listed in table 5.8
underwent either one or more structural adjustment programmes. Some of these were supported either by
stabilisation loans from the IMF or by structural adjustment loans from the World Bank or from both of
these institutions (Thomas, eta!., 1991).
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Moreover, Oman's experience is rather unique in that, while most of the IF Is
sponsored SAPs concentrate on improving the economic variables' at the expense of
social welfare, Oman's main concern was to protect education, health and social welfare
programmes from any negative impact of its adjustment programme.
In comparing Oman's growth performance during the period 198O9O2 with a
selected number of oil exporting developing countries, we find from table 5.8 that Oman
achieved the highest average growth rate of the countries listed in the table below.
Oman's performance was even better than that of Indonesia 3, (which is regarded as a
success story) which achieved an average annual growth rate of 6.1 per cent.
In terms of human development, Oman was able to add 12 years to the average life
expectancy between 1985 and 1990, more than any other country listed in the table below,
and in 1990, (with the exception of Trinidad and Tobago) Oman had the lowest infant
mortality rates among these countries. Similar progress was made between 1985 and
1990 in the percentage of students enrolled in primary education 4, which reached 103 per
cent in 1990.
These include, for example, external debt, inflation, growth, public finance and external accounts
(Thomas, eta!., 1991).25 is the period covered by the Second and Third FYP. And this is the period that coincided with the
increase in oil prices in 1981 and their subsequent decline.
Indonesia is regarded as a country that has managed its oil resources well and has also carried out
structural adjustment programmes and policy reforms rather successfully (Thomas, eta!., 1991).
The data shown in table 5.8 for primary enrolment are based on estimates of children of all ages enrolled
in primary education. Therefore, the gross enrolment ratios may exceed 100 per cent because some pupils
are younger or older than the country's standard primary school age. Hence, an alternative measure used
by the World Bank to capture the effectiveness of the educational system is to estimate the number of
children enrolled in the educational system as a percentage of the relevant age group "primary net
enrolment" (World Bank, 1993a:p.319).
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Table 5.8
Output, health, education and external debt indicators : Oman compared with
selected oil exporting developing countries (1980-90)
Coimtry	 Growth of	 Life expectancy	 Infant mortality rate Percentage of age	 External debt as a
	
output -
	 at birth	 group enrolled m	 percentage of GNP
GDP	 primary education
average
annual %
growth	 (years)	 (per 1000 live births) ________ _______ ________ _______
	
19S019901 	 9852 i go3	 19so	 1o5	 iss	 i990	 19858	 io9
Oman	 8.3	 54	 66	 41	 33	 89	 103	 24.1	 29.4
Algeria	 2.8	 61	 65	 98	 67	 94	 95	 24.0	 53.1
Ecuador	 2.0	 58	 66	 67	 55	 114	 122	 60.9	 120.6
Indonesia	 6.1	 55	 62	 90	 61	 118	 117	 32.0	 66.4
Mexico	 1.0	 67	 70	 51	 39	 115	 112	 43.0	 42.1
Nigeria	 1.6	 50	 52	 99	 98	 92	 72	 17.2	 110.9
Trinidad and
Tobago	 -2.5	 69	 71	 35	 25	 95	 95	 15.2	 50.8
Venezuela	 1.1	 70	 70	 36	 34	 108	 92	 35.2	 71.0
Saudi Arabia	 -1.2	 62	 64	 65	 65	 69	 78	 -	 -
Sources: 1) World Bank (1997b:p. 130-132); 2) World Bank (l987:pp.2O3-2O4); 3) World Bank
(l992:pp.2l8-219); 4) World Bank (1997a:pp.294-295); 5) World Bank (l992:pp.272-273);
6) World Bank (l988:pp.28O-28l); 7) World Bank (1993a:pp.294-295); 8) World Bank
(1987:pp.238-239); 9) World Bank (l992:pp.265-266) except for Oman from World Bank
(1993a:p.285).
These improvements in health and education reflect the policy decisions made by
the government to protect these services from cuts in public expenditure. In fact, between
1985 and 1990, expenditure on health as a percentage of central government expenditure
increased from 4.2 per cent to 4.6 per cent, and on education it increased from 7.7 per
cent to 10.7 per cent respectively. Whereas in the case of Indonesia and Ecuador,
expenditure on education went down in the former from 11.3 per cent in 1985 to 8.4 per
cent in 1990; and in the latter it declined from 27.7 per cent to 18.2 per cent respectively
during the period (World Bank, l987:pp.246-247 and 1992:pp.238-239).
292
Moreover, both inflation and external public debt were kept under strict control in
Oman. In case of inflation, the GDP implicit deflator 1 registered an average annual decline
of 3.6 per cent during the period 1980-90 (World Bank, 199Th:p.207). With regard to
public debt, table 5.8 shows that between 1985 and 1990, Oman's external public debt, as
a percentage of GNP, increased from 24.1 per cent to 29.4 per cent, whereas, with the
exception of Mexico, external public debt for all oil exporting developing countries listed
in the above table either doubled or trebled between the two years.
5.10 The Fourth FYP (1991-95): Reinforcing the Development Process
5.10.1 Objectives of the Fourth FYP: strengthening the planning mechanism
When the Fourth FYP was under preparation, the major part of economic and
social infrastructure was already established. Education and health services were made
universally accessible and the structure of the output and demand in the economy had by
1990, changed significantly. In addition, the linkages in the economy between oil and
other sectors had become stronger and private sector activities had expanded
considerably.
Thus, the objectives of the Fourth FYP were formulated in the context of
development already achieved, the conditions prevailing in Oman in the late 1980s and the
challenges that had to be met in the 1990s. Moreover, in view of the changed situation in
the world oil market on account of the Gulf War, the planners in Oman were optimistic in
their expectations about the trend of oil prices in the first half of the 1 990s.
Special emphasis was also given during the formulation of the Fourth FYP to
broaden the participation of different actors in the society, namely the Majlis Ash' Shura,
the Chamber of Commerce and other interested parties in the planning process. For the
first time, a number of sectoral committees were formed for this purpose. Appendix 3-Al
'GDP deflator measures the average annual rate of price change in the economy as a whole (ibid :p.209).
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in Chapter III shows that selection and approval of projects were for the first time based
on intra-regional and sectoral priorities.
The Development Council identified the following tasks that Oman needed to
resolve at the end of the Third FYP: a) to widen the base of the Omani economy and
diversify the non-oil sector; b) reduce dependence on oil revenues and strengthen the
mechanism set up for managing oil price volatility; c) conserve natural resources; d)
expand the participation of Omanis in the labour market; e) enhance the role of the private
sector; 0 control public current expenditure; and g) achieve a balance between
government revenue and expenditure' (Oman, 1991a).
The Fourth FYP accorded high priority to raising the level of investment in the
economy during 199 1-95. The target of total investment for the Fourth FYP period was
42 per cent higher than the investment expenditure incurred during the Third FYP. The
ratio of GFCF to GDP was planned to rise to 20.5 per cent in 1995, the last year of the
Fourth FYP. The ratio of public investment to GDP was planned to increase to 13.5 per
cent compared to 7.5 per cent achieved in 1990, while the ratio of private investment to
GDP was expected to rise to 7.0 per cent in 1995 compared to 4.9 per cent recorded in
1990 (cf. table 5.2).
The targets set for the growth of the GDP and its main components were
challenging. The target for the average annual growth rate of nominal GDP for the Fourth
FYP period was set at 6.3 per cent. The value-added in the petroleum sector was planned
to grow at an average annual rate of 5.0 per cent and in the non-oil sector it was planned
to grow at an average annual rate of 7.3 per cent. Thus the relative share of the oil sector
in GDP was planned to decline to 42 per cent by 1995 compared to 50 per cent recorded
See the Fourth FYP (Oman, 1991a:p.27). These tasks were identified in the Technical Secretariat's
1989 report "The Improvement of Comprehensive Planning Techniques and Objectives Proposed for the
Next Phase (1991-2000)" to the Council. The report aimed inter a/ia, at accelerating the pace of structural
change and diversification and strengthening the planning methodology and techniques to assist in that
process.
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in 1990, and the share of the non-oil sector was planned to increase to 58 per cent by 1995
compared to 50 per cent achieved in 1990 (cf. table 5.1).
In view of the high priority given to diversification of the economy, the value-
added in the manufacturing and the agriculture and fisheries sectors was planned to grow
at an average annual rate of 12.7 per cent and 7.6 per cent respectively, while in the
services sector, the targeted average annual growth rate was 6.0 per cent.
The regional dimensions of development were given special emphasis in the Fourth
FYP. For this purpose, and departing from past practice, the countly was divided into
seven planning regions 1 . Moreover, a regional development plan for each region was
prepared to guide the selection of investment projects in a manner that was consistent with
each region's growth potential, population and area.
To reinforce the institutional mechanism created to deal with volatility in oil prices,
a number of measures were adopted. The main ones included raising the rate of transfer
to the SGRF to 15 per cent of oil revenues, from the rate of 5 per cent which was applied
during the Third FYP; creating a contingency reserve ftind2
 to which a certain portion of
net oil revenues shall be transferred; and all oil revenues earned beyond the price of US$
25 per barrel to be transferred to the SGRF3
 (Oman, 1991a:pp.81-82).
'In the previous three plans, the country was divided for planning purposes into three regions. Muscat,
Al Janubia, Musandam and other wilayats. In the Fourth Plan, and with availability of statistical data on
the growth potential and developmental requirements of each region, and with the evolution of planning
experience, the country was divided into seven regions. These seven regions were: Muscat, Al Janubia,
Ad Dakhliyah, Ash Sharqiyah, Al Batinah, Adh Dhahira and Musandam. However, in 1991 a new
administrative division was carried out by Royal Decree. As a result, the Sultanate was divided into eight
administrative regions. These were: Governorate of Muscat, Al Batinah, Govemorate of Musandam, Adh
Dhahirah, Ad Dakhliyali, Ash Sharqiyah, Al Wusta. and the Governorate of Dhofar (Oman, 1996b:pp.8-
17).
2 per cent of net oil revenues - after the transfer to the SGRF - were to be transferred to the fund if
the oil price realised was between US$ 18-20 per barrel. This rate of transfer was to be increased to 10
per cent if the price realised was between USS 20-22 per barrel (Oman, 1991a:p.81).
It was planned that oil revenues earned between the price of US$ 22 and USS 25 per barrel would be
used to expand the level of public expenditure - both current and development (ibid. :pp.8 1-85).
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Moreover, the plan froze external public debt at the level outstanding at the end of
the Third FYP, which was about RO 1,000 million. However, it was planned to issue
development bonds' to the extent of R.O 429 million during the Fourth FYP to cover part
of the fiscal deficit. Thus the level of total public debt, expected to be outstanding on
completion of the plan, was set at around RO 1,500 million (ibid).
Among the objectives of the Fourth FYP was to expand the socio-economic data
available in the country, through conducting the first national census in 1993. At the same
time, it was planned to introduce the concept of rolling plans, whereby the five-year plans
would provide on a rolling basis an updated framework of development priorities and
programmes, within the context of a 15-20 year perspective (ibid :pp.35-37).
5.10.2 Implementation of the Fourth FYP: further decline of oil prices
The optimism prevailing at the time of formulation of the Fourth FYP, on account
of the expectation of a sustained increase in oil prices, was short lived. The oil prices
which had increased considerably in 1990 started to decline from 1991 onwards. As a
result, the average oil price of US$ 16.5 per barrel realised during the 1991-95, was lower
by about 18 per cent than the average price of US$ 20 per barrel, on which the plan
forecasts were based (Oman, 1996a:p.22).
Thus, as table 5.1 shows, the growth of the economy at an average annual rate of
2.8 per cent during the Fourth FYP, was lower than the planned growth 2 rate of 6.3 per
cent and was even lower than the growth rate of 3.4 per cent realised during the Third
FYP. This decline in growth, as table 5.1 indicates, was due to an average annual decline
of 2.8 per cent in the petroleum sector during the period compared to a planned annual
growth rate of 5.0 per cent. Whereas the growth rate of 7.4 per cent in the non-petroleum
activities exceeded slightly the planned growth rate of 7.3 per cent.
This was the first time the government intended to raise money through a domestic bond issue. The
main objective behind the idea was to mobilise national savings (thid. :p. 128).
2 All growth rates are average annual rates of growth.
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However within the non-petroleum activities, it was the value-added by the non-
traded sector of the services that recorded a major increase, because the combined value-
added of 9.3 per cent in the manufacturing and agriculture sectors was even lower than
their planned target of 9.6 per cent in 1995 (cf. table 5.1). Thus while the Fourth FYP
ended with a reduced dependence on the oil sector, it did not see much change in the share
of tradable goods sectors of manufacturing and agriculture.
The main casualty of decline in oil prices that we have mentioned and unchecked
expansion in current public expenditure was the rate of savings. At the end of the Fourth
FYP (1995), the ratio of gross domestic savings to GDP was 25.9 per cent compared to
33.9 per cent achieved at the end of the Third FYP period (1990). The ratio of gross
national savings (GNS) to GDP was even lower at 8.8 per cent in 1995 compared to 23.7
per cent recorded in 1990. The main reason for this was the decline in public savings.
The ratio of public savings of 3.6 per cent to GDP was very much lower than the Fourth
FYP target of 14.8 per cent and the ratio of 11.4 per cent reached in 1990. The private
national savings ratio to GDP in 1995 which stood at 5.4 per cent was similarly much
lower than the ratio of 12.5 per cent recorded in 1990, although it was very close to the
target of 5.5 per cent for that year.
The steep fall in both public and private savings ratios during the Fourth FYP is
reflected in the uncontrolled growth of consumption expenditure which as a percentage of
nominal GDP in 1995 reached 74 per cent compared to the plan target of 67 per cent.
While the plan target for the ratio of public consumption to GDP was 25 per cent, the
actual ratio in 1995 reached 33 per cent (cf. table 5.2).
Thus whilst the Fourth FYP succeeded in substantially enhancing the share of non-
oil sector in nominal GDP from 50 per cent in 1990 to 62 per cent in 1995 (cf. table 5.1),
it failed to overcome the two main constraints on Oman's growth, viz. declining savings
ratio and growing fiscal deficit. Although the government had no control on the
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international political economy of oil and its subsequent impact on oil revenues, limiting
the growth of public expenditure and arrest the decline in national savings, clearly lay
within its power.
The plan was successful in meeting the target of GFCF. As table 5.3 shows, actual
investment in the public sector was 90.5 per cent of planned investment. In the case of
private investment, the ratio of actual to planned was 102 per cent. However at the
detailed sectoral level, and as Appendix tables 5-AT and 5-All show, the performance
varied between the public and private sectors and among the different sub-sectors1.
Confirming the pessimism of the Centre-Periphery school and of the "dependencia"
perspective discussed in Chapter H regarding international trade and its impact on
development, Oman's terms of trade continued to deteriorate during the Fourth FYP.
Because average oil prices during 1991-95 were much lower than even the average prices
realised in 1987, while the prices of its imports were on the increase since 1987, Oman's
net barter terms of trade index declined in 1995 to 77 (1987 = 100) compared to 1985
when the index stood at 182 (World Bank, 1997a:p.219).
In the case of regional development, the level of investment allocated to each
region was generally realised2, and the aggregate level of implementation was about 90.6
In the case of public investment, the rate of implementation (ratio of actual to planned) in the
manufacturing sector was only 17 per cent, in fisheries it was 23 per cent, in vocational training it was 52
per cent and in trade and tourism it was 76 per cent (cf Appendix table 5-Al). In the private sector, the
rate of implementation in these sectors was much higher. For manufacturing it was 72 per cent, fisheries
92 per cent and for trade and tourism it was 98 per cent. The higher levels of implementation achieved by
the private sector reflected the increasing confidence of the private sector which has been nurtured by the
slate through various policy measures.
2 Compared to the planned level of investment allocated to each region which was: Muscat 18.9 per cent,
Al-Batinali 15.4 per cent, Musandam 3.4 per cent, Adh Dhahirah 8.7 per cent, Ad Dakhliyah 8.3 per cent,
Ash Sharqiyali 10.3 per cent, Al Wusta 1.6 per cent, Dhofar 8.3 per cent and projects of a general nature
about 25.1 per cent of total civil development expenditure, the actual levels for these regions were 18.3 per
cent, 14.4 per cent, 3.6 per cent, 8.6 per cent, 13.2 per cent, 8.5 per cent, 1.8 per cent, 8.1 per cent, and
23.5 per cent respectively (Oman, 1996a:p. 102).
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per cent (Oman, 1 996a:p. 102). Moreover, as in the previous three five-year plans,
considerable progress was also achieved in social development during the Fourth FYP1.
The goal of formulating rolling plans within a long-term perspective could not be
achieved. This was because of lack of technical expertise both at the technical
secretariat's level and at the level of operating ministries and departments.
5.10.3 An assessment of the Fourth FYP: the success and failure of planning
The Fourth FYP was successful in a number of areas where planning had an
impact. Thus, for instance, the growth of the Omani economy in real terms during 1990-
95 at an annual average rate of 6.0 per cent was the third highest among the 17 Upper-
middle-income economies and the 11th highest among the 58 Middle-income-economies,
while the rate of inflation during the period was the lowest among both of these groups
(World Bank, 1997a:pp.216-218, 234-235 and 247).
Similarly the transfers to the SGRF, which were reduced to 5 per cent of gross oil
revenues during the Third FYP, were increased to 15 per cent. This was in line with the
objectives of the plan to strengthen the government's financial reserves and thus reinforce
the institutional mechanism that facilitated the development process.
As a result of a large increase in public investment, the social indicators continued
to improve, regional development was enhanced and a number of projects relating to
improving the statistical data base such as the national census were carried out.
'In terms of social indicators, life expectancy, for example, further increased between 1990 and 1995
from 66 years to 70 years, infant mortality decreased from 33 per 1,000 live births to 18 during the period,
and the percentage of population with access to health care, sanitation and safe water also showed large
increases, as we noted in Chapter IV. While the gross primary enrolment ratio, as a percentage of relevant
age group increased from 52 per cent in 1980 to 85 per cent in 1993, and for secondary the percentage
increased from 12 in 1980 to 61 in 1993 (World Bank, 1981 and 199Th).
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However, the main failure of the Fourth FYP was the government's inability to
control public current expenditure. This in fact confirms Byres (l994:p.532) argument
about the Indian planning system, that the problem of planning (in India) was not one of
technical capabilities and its functionaries but rather with the nature and levels of decision-
making.
Similarly, as we argued in section 3.5.3 of Chapter III, external factors also
influence positively or negatively a plan's outcome. Although Oman's planners took
precautions in avoiding over-optimistic oil price projections, yet the actual average oil
price realised during the Fourth FYP period turned out to be lower than the projected
price used in the plan. On the other hand, the price of manufactured imports increased.
Hence Oman's terms of trade deteriorated.
Although the government in response to declining oil prices and rising public
expenditure took a number of measures during 1993, these were largely ineffective for a
number of reasons. These included, for example, the difficulty of reducing current
expenditure without causing large scale redundancies in the civil service, the resistance by
the various interest groups to increasing the level of fees or taxes imposed by the
government, and so on. Again this reflects Byres (1994:p.20) notion of the decline of the
relative autonomy of the state as development progresses.
Another negative implication of the expansion of current public expenditure and
the consequent increase in the level of final consumption in the economy has been the rise
of rent-seeking mentality among the private sector in particular and among Omanis in
general. As a result, and as we shall see in Chapter VII, about 69 per cent of the Omani
labour force was employed in the public sector. Moreover, only 23 per cent of the
expatriate labour was employed in the goods producing sectors, while the rest were
employed in construction, and other services like trade restaurants, public administration
and so on (cf. table 7.3, Chapter VII).
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To address the difficulties faced in sustaining the development process, and in
preparation for the Fifth FYP (1996-2000) the government in Oman conducted a number
of studies on the economy in 1994. While the study conducted by the World Bank (World
Bank, 1994a) recommended a reduction in the role of the state and a number of orthodox,
neo-classical policies such as curtailing the role of the government in social and economic
services and building up large external reserves, the study conducted by the Omani
Ministry of Development took a different approach. As we shall see in Chapter VII, the
Omani study' took a broader view of the development process. While it emphasised the
importance of fiscal discipline and building of financial reserves, it reiterated the important
role the state had to play through development planning to accelerate the process of
diversification through a stronger public-private partnership. The Omani study also
considered human resource development as being one of the main pillars of the New
Development Strategy for the 1 990s and concluded that this task could not be left to the
market alone. The state had to lead the process of development within the framework of
the five-year plans.
5.11 Conclusion
In this chapter we have analysed the medium-term objectives, achievements and
implementation of the First, Second, Third and Fourth FYPs of Oman. Our analysis
indicates that on the whole Oman has been relatively successful in formulating and
implementing plans and policies appropriate to its needs and capability prevailing at that
time. While the First and Second FYPs were successful in achieving the targets of growth
in income and investment, the implementation of Third and Fourth FYP ran into
difficulties originating not only from the low level of oil prices and its effects on public
revenues but also from declining rates of savings and investment. Some of these problems
are endogenous to Oman's development process and are due to shortcomings in policies
aimed at dealing with growth in consumption and the government's recurrent expenditure.
However, the decline in oil prices and its adverse impact on government revenues is an
'This study culminated in the fonnulation of the 'Vision: 2020', which we discuss in Chapter VII.
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outcome of exogenous factors, over which the state in Oman has little influence. In this
sense it is suggested in this chapter and in this thesis, that Oman's planning and policies
have been important not only for securing development by meeting targets and objectives,
but also because in the absence of these, Oman would have experienced great oscillation
and even dislocation in its economic and social process. This would have been inevitable
given the initial conditions of backwardness prevailing in Oman in 1970 and an extremely
volatile primary commodity, oil, which was to finance subsequent development.
We have described the way the government has assumed a prominent role in
formulating and implementing development plans from 1976 to 1995. Its direct role was in
carrying out a major portion of total investment. Apart from its efforts in raising the level
of GFCF, the government has also played an important role which has helped Oman in
two ways. First, the government has quickly responded with appropriate policy measures
to deal with external shocks, particularly during the Third FYP, which coincided with
rapidly declining oil prices. Secondly, the government undertook a number of measures to
support and expand private sector activities. This was particularly notable during the
Second FYP. Another feature of Oman's development planning is the government's
commitment to development planning. When the Omani economy was severely jolted by
the collapse of oil prices in 1986, the commitment to implement the plan and its policies
was not weakened. In this context the Third FYP targets were revised and new policies to
handle changed situations were implemented. The result was that the outcome of Third
FYP was better compared to the pessimism prevailing in achieving targets. The same
commitment is observable in the preparation of the Fifth FYP based on a shift in strategy
to deal with the long-term constraints faced during the Fourth FYP.
A notable feature of our analysis in this chapter is the way that development
planning and policy in Oman has had to balance a number of seemingly opposing
processes, such as securing high rates of growth and development with focus on capital
formation; and on the other continuing to provide sophisticated levels of social welfare
and maintaining higher standard of living. The additional complicating factors in this
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dynamic process have been the uncertainty and volatility of the international oil economy
and its impact on the magnitude of revenues accruing to Oman and, secondly changes in
international policy, such as in SAPs which influenced policy makers in Oman and its
subsequent impact on the country's development.
Thus Oman's relative success in negotiating complex and sometimes very
uncertain conditions can be attributed to the commitment of the state to achieving rapid
economic and social development in general and through development planning in
particular, in a way that state and development planning attempted to do this with varying
success in other countries, as we have described in earlier chapters.
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CHAPTER VI
THE STATE AND MARKET IN OMAN'S DEVELOPMENT
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter we assess the role of the market in Oman's development. This is
done by examining the activities of the private sector in the economy. We also describe
the way the state, through a series of FYPs, has fostered the market and the private sector.
This analysis will enable us to assess the relationship between the state and market and the
contribution of the latter to Oman's development.
This chapter shows that the planners and policy makers in Oman considered the
roles of the state and markets as complementary and not mutually exclusive and
competitive. Although the state itself is a major entrepreneur, it has assumed this role
without discouraging or displacing private enterprise'. In fact, without the state's
encouragement the private sector and markets would be extremely weak in Oman. Put
another way, this chapter concretises systematically the assertions made in this research
that the state has fostered the private sector and the market in Oman. This is illustrated
by, among other things, the increased role and importance of the private sector in Oman's
economic activity. Of course, some aspects of the private sector's role in Oman's
development have been described in the previous chapters, especially Chapters IV and V.
There, among other things, the role of the private sector in gross capital formation was
analysed.
In this respect, Oman stands out in contrast to the mixed economy of India where during the first two
decades of planning (1951-71), the state discouraged entry of private sector in heavy industries, notably
steel and displaced private (foreign) firms in petroleum (See Chakravarty, 1987:Chapters 1 and 2).
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6.2 Basic Approach towards Market and Planning in Oman
The Development Council's resolution dated 09/2/1975 on "Aims and Objectives
of Economic Development Policy in the Sultanate" (Oman, 1976a:p. 107) explicitly states
the Omani government's intention and commitment to combine the merits of state
sponsored planning and the market system for promoting economic development'. The
following quotation from that resolution clearly brings out the policy perspective of
Oman's development strategy.
[TJhe basis of our development policy should be to achieve
the basic requirements of a free economy in which an
efficient and capable private sector plays a leading role
[Tb achieve this aim the government has undertaken the
execution of supporting infrastructure projects, decided on
incentives in the form of exemptions from customs duties,
granted loans with easy repayment terms to productive
projects, and participated in the capital of some vital
projects within available government resources
	 [T]he
plan must aim at maintaining and developing the prevailing
economic activities by giving them support and
encouragement particularly in the sector of agriculture and
fisheries [I]t is important to encourage domestic trade
activities by finding suitable solutions to the problems of
transportation and storage and other obstacles which block
the way to reach the state of perfect market (Oman,
1976a:pp. 106-109).
The text of this resolution is reproduced in Appendix C of The First Five-Year Development Plan,
1976-80 (Oman, 1976a).
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6.3 Role of the State in Promoting the Market in Oman
With its control over the oil revenues, the state, through the FYPs, performs the
tasks it is most suited to perform; whist the private sector undertakes activities for which it
is most suited under the promotional policies of the state. Following this simple rule of
division of labour - specialising in the job which one is most suited to perform - the
fUnctions that the state performs in Oman are reflected in the pattern of activities and
investment undertaken by the government under the successive plans. The major
functions performed by the state in Oman over the last 20 years to promote a competitive
and efficient private sector are discussed below.
6.3.1 Macroeconomic management and economic stability
The two most important areas of macroeconomic management which influence
private sector activity are related to the government's budgetary position with its
implications for price stability and the exchange rate management. Although there is no
convincing theoretical case for a balanced budget, and the desired level of budget deficit
or surplus will depend on a range of factors', sound policy requires, as Weiss (1995)
indicates, that deficits are not so high as to stimulate inflation, depress private investment2
or create unsustainable external debt. "On the other hand, they should not be so low as to
hold back growth through their depressing effect on domestic demand (ibid :pp.9-l0).
In Oman, the government has used the FYPs as means to ensure appropriate
economic management. Although budget deficits have been large in recent years 3, they
have not generated inflation. Over the period 1985-95, for example, average annual
inflation rate, as represented by the GDP deflator, was -3.6 per cent, and during the
These include, for example, the extent of unemployed resources in the economy, the returns on marginal
government investment, the cost associated with deficit financing and the availability of foreign exchange
reserves.
2Through the 'crowding out' effect, by raising the cost of borrowing for the private sector.
Average annual fiscal deficits increased to about 10 per cent of (3DP during 199 1-95 compared to about
5 per cent of GDP during 1976-80 (Oman, 1996b).
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period 1990-95, the average annual rate was -2.9 per cent (World Bank, 1997b:p.2O7).
And since these deficits were to a large extent financed through withdrawals from the
reserve finds (SGRF) created in 1980, it was unnecessary to finance these through money
creation, and thus harm prospects for economic growth. Neither have they resulted in
'crowding out' of private investment through excessive domestic borrowings, nor have the
deficits been funded through large external borrowings'.
6.3.2 Provision of physical infrastructure
Physical infrastructural services - power, transport, roads, telecommunication,
water and so on - are not only important consumption goods (as with clean water and
electricity for households) but also provide vital inputs in the production process.
Therefore, the quality and adequacy of infrastructure are important determinants of the
success of firms in delivering products and services of high quality, at competitive prices
and in the shortest possible time. This is in line with our discussion in Chapter II, about
the need for a minimum size of investment in each infrastructure project for the provision
of social overhead capital, because such a provision creates investment opportunities in
other industries. Moreover, as Rosenstein-Rodan (1943 and 1984) argues, the supply of
this minimum is beyond the capacity of individual entrepreneurs.
Therefore, to facilitate private sector activities and improve the market mechanism.
the government since the mid 1970s has embarked upon an ambitious programme of
physical infrastructure development. Out of a total cumulative public investment of RO
7.9 billion undertaken during the period 1976-95, investment in social and economic
infrastructure2 amounted to RO 3.7 billion, representing a share of almost 47 per cent (cf
table 5.3 and 5.4 of Chapter V). In view of the large size of the country, and in order to
promote small and informal enterprises particularly in rural areas, and to create linkages
'Oman's total public debt of RO 1,500 million is relatively low compared to its GDP. At the end of 1995,
Oman's external debt of 29.5 per cent as a percentage of its GNP was much lower than that of most of the
Upper-middle-income countries (World Bank, 1997a:p.247).
2 This includes investment in roads, ports, airports, municipal services, public administration, health, and
education.	 -
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within the domestic market, 20 per cent of the total amount invested in infrastructure has
been spent on constructing a wide network of roads throughout the country.
Emphasising the importance of transport infrastructure, the 1997 World
Development Indicators (1 997b:p.279) states "providing the infrastructure for
transportation to meet the demands of a modern economy is one of the major challenges
of economic development". Comparing the level of transport and infrastructure with
other countries, we find, for example, that the 'normalised road index" in Oman in 1995
was 211 compared to 118 in South Korea, 38 in Indonesia and 140 in Thailand
(ibid. :pp.277-279).
6.3.3 Development of human resources
One of the main elements of Oman's long-term development strategy has been the
development of its human resources. Human resources are both the means through which
development is achieved and the ultimate objective of development. Moreover, well-
developed human resources are the key to long-term competitiveness, and only by
investing in human resources can countries create new and dynamic competitive
advantages. As the World Bank report on Private Sector Development indicates, "the
link between literacy and productivity improvements is strong and experience has
demonstrated the difficulty of imparting information about technologies, markets, and so
on to an illiterate population" (World Bank, 1995c:p.44). To achieve this goal, the
government in Oman has undertaken the task of building a country-wide network of social
infrastructure in the form of educational and vocational training institutes; health care
organisations like hospitals and clinics; and cultural and social centres.
Normalised road index is the total length of roads in a country compared with the expected length of
roads, where the expectation is conditioned on population density. per capita income, urbanisation, and
region-specific dummy variables. A value of 100 is "normal". If the index is more than 100, the
countiy's stock of road exceeds the average (ibid.).
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Therefore, commitment to human development in Oman's development strategy
has been very strong. Oman's record of progress in this respect is highlighted by the 1997
Human Development Report, which states:
Beginning in 1970, Oman undertook a comprehensive
programme of human development, achieving some of the
most rapid advances ever recorded. Life expectancy has
increased by 30 years, from 40 years in 1970 to 70 years in
1994 ... [I]mprovements in education have been even more
impressive ... [I]mprovements in health and education have
been accompanied by rapid advances in other areas of
human development (UNDP, l997:p.28).
As we shall see in Chapter VII, enhancing human resource development, in order
to equip all Omanis with the necessary skills and abilities to cope with the challenges
posed by globalisation is one of the main elements of Oman's New Development Strategy.
6.3.4 Government support to agriculture and fisheries'
Since the 1 970s Oman's development strategy has continued to support the
dominant role of the private sector in the agriculture and fisheries sectors. The
government has through successive FYPs initiated a variety of projects, such as fishing
harbours, boat repair facilities, water dams and irrigation systems to develop this sector.
The government also provides a range of subsidised inputs in the form of veterinary
services, seeds, fertiisers, fishing boats and nets, and so on, through its current budget.
During the Second FYP, for example, the Government established the Agriculture and
Fisheries Bank2 to provide medium-term finance to this sector at subsidised interest rates.
'Chapter V provides details of the various types of support provided to this sector.
2 The Development Bank of Oman was formed in March 1997 to take over the functions of both the
Agriculture and Fisheries Bank and the Oman Development Bank. The new bank will continue to provide
subsidised finance to the private sector at rate of interest not exceeding 3 per cent per annum. The bank
will extend medium-term finance for manufacturing, agriculture, fisheries, non-oil mining, health,
education and handicrait activities (Oman, 1997:Decree no. 18/97).
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Though the traditional nature of this sector (it may be considered to constitute the
informal sector) makes it difficult to assess the magnitude of private sector investment in
it, available data indicate that total private sector investment over the previous two
decades amounted to RO 113 million. Excluding the private sector's investment in the oil
and gas sector, this represented about 6 per cent of total private sector investment in the
economy over the period 1976-95 (cf. Appendix table 5-All of Chapter V).
Similarly, during the Second FYP, the government set up the Public Authority for
Marketing of Agriculture Produce (PAMAP) to facilitate the collection, distribution and
marketing of agriculture produce. This was done because the existing marketing channels
were unable to provide these services throughout the country. Thus the government
support to this sector of the economy, which is owned and managed entirely by the private
sector, has led to an increase in its value-added of more than 7 times, from RO 18 million
in 1976 (Oman, 1986b:pp.396-404) to RO 152 million in 1995 (Oman, 1996b:pp.380-
385). As a result, this sector's share in GDP has grown from 2.1 per cent in 1976 to 2.9
per cent in 1995 (ibid).
Unlike many developing countries, where the agricultural sector suffered from
discrimination in the provision of subsidised credit, social infrastructure and public
services (Myint, 1987:p.l24), in Oman the development policy has treated both the
traditional agriculture sector and the modern manufacturing sector evenly in this respect.
However, perhaps a major shortcoming of Oman's development policy has been the lack
of protection provided to the agricultural and fisheries sector. While the modern
manufacturing sector has been provided with custom duty protection' from competing
imports, this has not been the case with the agriculture sector 2. Even the mean tariff of
about 5.7 per cent (World Bank, 1997a:p.253) applicable to almost all imports, does not
apply to food imports, which remain exempt. Although such a policy keeps food prices
low, it works against the development of the agriculture sector.
Although, as we have mentioned in Chapter IV, this has also been limited.
2 Agriculture sector also includes fisheries, unless otherwise indicated.
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6.3.5 Government as entrepreneur
Oman has had a long and well established tradition of private entrepreneurship in
agriculture, fisheries and trade. However, it has faced a shortage of entrepreneurial skills
in the management of organised business in the modern 'formal' economy. Therefore, the
Omanis need training and assistance to be able to participate fully in the ownership and
management of diversified businesses. Recent efforts on the part of the government are a
pointer in this direction. For example, the government's Omanisation policy both at the
sector and individual unit levels attempts to fill this gap by promoting the development of
indigenous entrepreneurship.
Since the private sector in Oman was relatively weak and modern industry was
almost non-existent till the 1 970s, the government had to play the role of the
Schumpeterian pioneering entrepreneur. This was, as we discussed in Chapter II, due to
the externalities and indivisibilities of large investment projects and the need to create
backward and forward linkages (Hirschman, 1958) in the economy through either a
balanced or an unbalanced growth strategy 1 . The government was, therefore, instrumental
in the setting up of a number of public enterprises with the intention of "crowding in"
private sector investment and enhance the efficiency of the working of the markets.
For example, the government entered into a partnership with the private sector in
setting up in 1977 the first national insurance company2 to provide general and life
insurance services. Similarly, the Oman Cement Company was set up as a public-private
joint venture to overcome the extreme shortage of cement in the 1970s that was
Although, as we discussed in Chapter II, there were neo-classical economists such as Bauer, who
opposed such a role for the government. Bauer believed, for example, that a developed infrastructure was
not a precondition for growth, "[I]t is unhistorical to envisage an elaborate and expensive infrastructure as
a necessary ground-work for economic advance". And that economic development was to a large measure
due to "individual voluntary responses of millions of people to ... opportunities created largely by external
contacts and brought to their notice ... primarily through the operation of the market" (Bauer, 1984:pp.3O-
31).
2 Oman National Insurance Company was set up in 1977, with the government owning 15 per cent of its
capital.
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frustrating both public and private sector investments; and the Port Services Corporation
was set up as a joint venture with the private sector to manage the main port - Port
Sultan Qaboos - which was facing serious management problems in the 1970s. In fact
most of the state-owned enterprises were set up to overcome supply bottlenecks and
entrepreneurial scarcity or to improve market and managerial efficiency.
6.3.5.1 Performance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
One of the grounds on which the IFIs and neo-classicals have advocated "rolling
back" the state in the developing countries is that SOEs are generally considered to be
loss-making and on many counts are less efficient compared to privately-owned
enterprises (POEs)'. To show that this is not the case in Oman we briefly examine the
financial performance of SOEs in Oman and compare this with the performance of POEs.
It is important to do so, because, as we shall see in Chapter VII, one of the dilemmas of
privatisation in Oman is that it would lead to loss of government revenues as a majority of
SOEs make good profits.
Moreover, a number of empirical studies 2 show that in many LDCs including
Oman, the SOEs have pioneered a whole range of new industries and induced private
investment in the initial phase of development.
There are at present 25 SOEs in Oman and as table 6.1 indicates, these include
wholly owned government companies, public authorities, companies in which the
government owns a majority interest and companies in which the government holds less
than 51 per cent but has a significant management role. State-owned public utilities like
As we have noted in Chapter I, the IFIs (World Bank, 1987) and the neo-classical economists advocate
"rolling back" the over-extended public sector in developing countries because they argue that SOEs have
been inefficient, over-centralised, loss making and poor performers on various other counts. It is also
argued that they have not even succeeded in playing the strategic role in industrialisation that government
had hoped for. Thus it is suggested (Roth, 1987; Biersteker, 1992) that privatisation of these SOEs will
improve efficiency, reduce total public outlays on services presently provided by the state and promote
private sector development through encouragement of foreign investment and preventing the stale from
"crowding Out" the private sector from the capital and financial markets.
2 For example, Hazari (1969); Wade (1990); and Petri (1993).
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water and electricity services are run as departments of the Ministry of Electricity and
Water, and although prices are charged for these services, their revenues and expenditures
are included in the public revenues and public expenditure and form part of the general
state budget
As table 6.1 shows, out of the 17 SOEs for which financial data for the last three
years (1993, 1994 and 1995) are available, the return on share capital invested was
negative for only six SOEs in 1995 and of these, it was negative for 3 SOEs in all three
years. Thus in 1995, 11 out of 17 SUEs (i.e. 65 per cent) were profit-making, earning
positive return on government investment in their share capital.
Examining the financial performance of these 17 SUEs, table 6.1 shows that on
average the SOEs are performing well in comparison with the average performance of
about 100 companies listed on MSM' (Muscat Securities Market) all of which are private,
except the 6 listed SOEs. In the last three years (1993-95), the average annual return
earned by these SOEs has varied between 16 per cent to 21 per cent whereas the average
annual return for the companies listed on the MSM has varied between 16 per cent to 24
per cent. If one considers that the average cost of domestic government borrowing does
not exceed 8 per cent per annum, the average return of 16 to 21 per cent earned by the
SOEs is much higher than the cost of funding.
'They include 6 SOEs listed on the MSM.
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Table 6.1
State-owned enterprises and their financial performance 1993-1995
Year of	 Govt. holding
Enterpnses	 establish-	 In share	 Return on share capital
ment
_____ (%) ______ (%) _____
1993	 1994	 1995
A. Companies listed on MSM
OiOinanCementCompanySAOG	 1977	 63.5	 28.4	 19.9	 25.7
2. Oman Flour Mills Co. SAOG	 1975	 59.9	 51.6	 59.2	 53.7
3. Oman Development Bank SAOG	 1977	 54.2	 18.7	 6.0	 8.9
4. Port Services Corporation SAOG	 1975	 35.5	 21.2	 4.8	 1.2
5. Oman Aviation Services Co. SAOG	 1981	 33.9	 42.4	 38.3	 35.0
6. Oman Fishenes Co. SAOG	 1989	 24.0	 19.8	 21.8	 17.9
B. Non-listed companies
01.SalalahHotelsCo.SAOC	 1978	 100.0	 33.2	 7.2	 2.0
02. Oman Bank for Agriculture & Fisheries SAOC	 1981	 100.0	 (46)	 (3.0)	 1.0
03.OmanNationaITTanSpoItSAOC 	 1978	 99.9	 0.8	 (3.1)	 (1.0)
04.Oman Mining Co. LLC.	 1976	 99.8	 (4.4)	 (9.0)	 (9.2)
05. Oman Refinety Co. LLC.	 1983	 98.3	 105.3	 86.3	 150.5
06.OmanHousingBankSAOC	 1976	 60.9	 7.8	 7.5	 8.1
07. Petroleum Development Oman2	 1974	 60.0
C. Public authorilies (with specified capital)
1. General Telecommunications Organisation	 1975	 100.0	 44.2	 52.7	 72.2
2. Public Authority for Marketing of
Agriculture Produce (PAMAP) 	 1985	 100.0	 (4.7)	 (4.7)	 (3.1)
3. PubLic Authority for Storage & Food Reserves 	 1980	 100.0	 (5.6)	 (3.2)	 (6.2)
4. Oman Advertising Agency	 1986	 100.0	 2.2	 2.2	 (2.0)
5. Oman Newspaper House 	 1980	 100.0	 12.9	 0.5	 (9.4)
06.CentralBankofOman4	 1975	 100.0
D. Public enterprises with un-specified capital5
1. Al Bustan Palace Hotel	 1985	 100.0
2. Muscat Intercontinental Hotel 	 1987	 100.0
03.SeebNovotel 	 1982	 100.0
4. Oman International Exhibition Centre 	 -	 100.0
5. Al-Inshirah Restaurant	 1987	 100.0
6. Khasab Hotel	 -	 100.0
Overall average return for all SOEs	 20.8	 15.9	 193
MSM average return	 ______ _________	 16.0	 203	 23.5
Notes:
1) Share capital means the equity capital invested by the shareholders
2) Petroleum Development of Oman operates as a non-trading oil producing company. All costs of its
operations are funded by its shareholders in proportion to their shareholdings. While all oil produced
by it is sold directly by its shareholders, in proportion to their shareholdings, and thus all sale
proceeds accrue to them.
3) Negative returns are shown in brackets.
4) Central Bank of Oman (CBO) is excluded from this analysis because of its non-commercial nature
and also to avoid any distortions in our analysis because of the large profits earned by the CBO in
relation to its capital.
5) Returns for these enterprises are not calculated because they are not organised as independent legal
enterprises, neither is their capital specified. However, most of these are managed professionally
under contract, by international hotel chains.
Sources: Financial returns of SOEs are calculated from published reports and internal data supplied by
the Ministry of Finance. MSM averages are compiled from MSM Monthly Statistical Bulletin,
December 1993-1996.
319
Petroleum Development (Oman) Ltd., being one of the 25 SOEs listed in table 6.1,
presents an important case of public-private co-operation. PDO has been the vehicle
through which state of the art technology, modern management methods and foreign
investment have been introduced in Oman's oil sector. The ability of the state to generate
additional resources from the oil sector has provided it the autonomy required to realise
the nation's socio-economic goals. The state in Oman has been able to create significant
"fiscal linkages" between oil and the rest of the economy, which as }Iirschman (1981)
suggests are analogous to the "backward" and "forward" linkages created by other
industries. These resources have enabled the state in Oman to provide 'basic goods' to its
people at affordable prices.
6.3.6. Role of the state in developing the market
In addition to investing wholly or in partnership with the private sector in specific
industrial projects like refinery, copper smelting, cement manufacturing etc., the state in
Oman initiated a number of policies through successive FYPs to develop and stimulate the
market.
First, the Oman Development Bank' was established to provide or guarantee
medium- and long-term loans to private projects in manufacturing, agriculture, petroleum,
mining and fisheries. Among the terms of reference of this bank was to provide technical
assistance to the private sector and participate in the equity capital of private enterprises
(Oman, 1976a).
Second, the continued emphasis on provision of soft finance and infrastructural
support to the agriculture and fisheries sector, as we noted in section 6.3.4.
l This bank was dissolved in 1997 and a new bank "The Development Bank of Oman" was formed.
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Third, the setting-up of industrial estates, in addition to providing a number of
incentives' for the development of private industry. Because: "The construction of an
industrial area is of vital importance to the development of Omani industry. The
construction of an industrial area would also help to protect other areas from industrial
pollution" (ibid p.47).
Fourth, to stimulate and facilitate private investment in the goods producing
activities of agriculture, fisheries, manufacturing, mining and handicrafts, a programme of
providing long-term interest free loans to the private sector, in addition to the soft loans
provided by the specialised banks 2, was adopted within the Second FYP:
The grants and loans programme represents a substantial
stimulus to the private sector enterprises. It was possible
for the government to direct these funds to the creation of
government-owned projects in these sectors as an
alternative. However, this would not have helped to
achieve a major objective of the economic development
strategy of Oman, namely the creation of an economy based
on private enterprise (Oman, 198 la:p.46) (emphasis added
by the present author).
Fifth, a Council for Agriculture, Fisheries and Industry was set up in 1979 to foster
public-private partnership in these sectors3 . The objectives of the Council included inter
These include a certain level of tariff protection, provision of soft finance, preferential treatment in
government contracts to locally produced goods (Oman, 1976a:p.47).
2 Specialised banks refer to the three banks set up by the government to provide subsidised medium- and
long-term finance to the private sector and Omani households. These are: Oman Housing Bank, Oman
Development Bank and Oman Bank for Agriculture and Fisheries (Oman, 198 la:p.47). The last two were
merged in 1997 to form the Development Bank of Oman.
The Chairman of the Chamber of Commerce and Industiy was appointed as President of the Council,
with the Undersecretaries of the Ministnes of Agriculture and Fisheries and Commerce and Industiy as
ex-officio members. In addition there were nine other members from the private sector. This council was
dissolved in 1981 when a wider form of public representation was introduced through the setting-up of the
first State Consultative Council in the same year (Oman, 1995c:Decree no.81/84).
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alia: to ensure the rapid growth of the three sectors, agriculture, fisheries and industry; to
enhance and support the role of national private enterprise; to eliminate the factors
preventing good administrative practice in government and monopolistic practices in the
private sector; and to ensure the participation of citizens in deciding on the ways and
means to achieve these objectives.
Sixth, continuing the support given to private sector development, the Fourth FYP
adopted a number of policies and measures which aimed to support the private sector and
strengthen the market mechanisms. These included: motivating the private sector to invest
in areas which have been the government's domain such as power projects', toll roads,
mining and health projects; provision of short-term finance and export insurance for
Omani exports; issue of development bonds to mobilise private savings; gradual
privatisation of government owned enterprises; stimulating the MSM so that it can play a
more active role in financial intermediation and in encouraging small investors to invest in
companies listed on the market; and providing support for the establishment of a business
school by the Omani Chamber of Commerce to create, inter alia, a generation of
entrepreneurs able to participate increasingly in the production and development processes
(Oman, 1991a:pp.127-129).
6.4 Role of the Private Sector in Oman's Economy
As a result of the policies and measures implemented during the four FYPs, the
role of the private sector has in general evolved in accordance with the growth of the
economy. Although the ratio of private sector investment to GDP has remained constant
at around 6 per cent, this has been achieved within an expanded GDP 2. Moreover, as
table 6.2 shows, the relative share of the private sector in GFCF has also been increasing,
The Manah project was the first private sector project set up in 1992 for generating electricity and
selling the output to the government (Oman, 1991a:p.128). In fact, the Fourth FYP introduced the
concept of privatisation which is discussed in Chapter VII.
2 Oman's nominal GDP (at market prices) has grown from RO 884 million in 1976 to RO 5,288 million
in 1995 (Oman, 1986b and 1996b).
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reflecting the government's strategy of encouraging the private sector to take an active
role in the development process. While the private sector's share of total GFCF was 23.8
per cent in the pre-plan period 1971-75, it rose to 28.3 per cent in the First FYP. And in
spite of fluctuations between 1981 and 1990, its share reached 34.7 per cent during 1991-
1995.
Table 6.2
Private sector's share in gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) 1970-95
Plan	 Plan period	 Annual average for each lan period
	 -
GFCF	 As % of GDP As % of total GFCF
_____ _________ ROMn. - _______ _________
Pre-plan	 1971-1975	 25	 7.1	 23.8
I	 1976-1980	 99	 5.7	 28.3
II	 1981-1985	 1S9	 4.8	 21.7
III	 1986-1990	 165	 4.6	 28.5
IV	 1991-1995	 269 -
	 5.6	 34.7
Source: Compiled from Statistical Year Book 1975; 1985; 1995 (Oman, 1976b:p. 122; and 1986b:p.429
for pre-plan and First FYP and 1996b:pp.430-43 1 for Second, Third and Fourth FYPs).
While a number of industrial, tourism, and commercial projects were set up by the
government in the early phases of development either solely or in partnership with the
private sector, no similar projects were set up, for example, in the Third and Fourth FYPs.
Moreover, although SOEs that were formed for owning and managing these projects are
presently profitable, the government in line with its New Development Strategy, intends to
privatise them within an appropriate time-frame, thus expanding and strengthening the
private sector further.
As table 6.3 indicates, the areas in which the private sector has a comparative
advantage remain entirely private. Thus agriculture, lisheries, construction, internal and
external trade (with the exception of oil trade), real estate, financial intermediation and
business services are almost entirely owned and managed by the private sector. Even in
manufacturing, the private sector is dominant with the exception of certain capital
intensive industries which were set up for reasons mentioned earlier.
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Table 6.3
Estimated relative contribution of the private sector in the value-added in the GDP
at current prices (1976 and 1995)
	
________________________ ___________________________	 (per centL
	_________	 1976	 ________ _________ 	 1995 __________
	
Share in	 Relative	 Private Share in	 Relative	 Private
Economic activity : value- 	 GDP	 contribut- sector's
	 GDP	 contribut-	 sector's
added	 ion of the share in 	 ion of the	 share in
	
private	 the GDP	 private	 the GDP
__________________________ _________ sector ________ _________ sector __________
1. Total petroleum sectora	 58.5	 40.0	 23.4	 38.2	 40.0	 15.3
2. Total non-oil sectorb	41.0	 44.3	 182	 60.9	 55.5	 33.8
2.1 Agriculture	 1.4	 100.0	 1.4	 1.9	 100.0	 1.9
2.2 Fisheries	 0.7	 100.0	 0.7	 1.0	 100.0	 1.0
2.3 Mining and quarrying	 -	 -	 -	 0.3	 -	 -
2.4 Manufacturing b
	0.5	 80.0	 0.4	 4.6	 80.0	 3.7
2.5 Electricity
 and water	 0.7	 -	 -	 0.9	 -	 -
2.6 Construction	 10.0	 100.0	 10.0	 2.6	 100.0	 2.6
2.7 Trade, hotels and
restaurants	 8.7	 60.0	 5.2	 13.5	 80.0	 10.8
2.8 Transport and
communication	 1.5	 50.0	 0.8	 6.3	 50.0	 3.2
2.9 Financial intermediationc	 0.1	 80.0	 -	 0.4	 90.0	 0.4
2.10 Real estate, business, and
other services	 9.2	 100.0	 9.2	 7.9	 100.0	 7.9
2.11 Public administration 	 6.7	 -	 -	 13.3	 -	 -
2.12 Education'1	 0.6	 -	 -	 4.2	 -	 -
2.13 Health'1	 0.4	 -	 1.7	 -	 -
2.l4Otherservices	 0.5	 100.0	 0.5	 2.3	 100.0	 2.3
3. Plus: Import duties	 0.5 _________	 -	 0.9	 -
4. Total GDP at market
prices(1 +2 +3)	 100.0 __________	 41.6	 100.0 ___________	 49.1
Notes:
a) Because there are foreign shareholders to the extent of 40 per cent in P1)0, the main oil producing
company in Oman, private sector's share has, therefore, been estimated at 40 per cent of the oil-GDP.
Moreover, the oil sector is run like any other private enterprise in terms of commercial discipline,
management systems, and decision making.
b) For manufacturing sector value-added by public and private are not available. Hence it is assumed
that about 80 per cent of value-added in this sector is by industries in which private sector is
predominant.
c) This figure is net of imputed financial charges. At a gross level, this sector's contribution was 1.27
percent in 1976 and 2.9 per cent in 1995.
d) Although there are quite a few private schools and clinics, their relative contribution is still very
small.
Source: Estimates compiled from Statistical Year Book 1985; 1995 (Oman, 1986b:pp.402-404 and
1996b:p.384).
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Despite the private sector's apparent success in participating actively in the
development of Oman's economy, the state in Oman intends to further strengthen this
role. The New Development Strategy and Policy, which we shall discuss in Chapter VII,
envisages the private sector taking an even larger role in the economy within the
framework of the plan and market working in co-operation with and under the state's
overall guidance.
6.4.1 The complementary nature of public and private investment
The fact that in Oman the areas of economic activity of the state and the private
sector are not conflicting but complementary is also clearly brought out by the patterns of
public and private investment in the four FYPs. We thus find, from table 5.3 in Chapter V,
while investment in infrastructure sector which has continued to remain entirely within the
domain of the public sector, the private sector's share in the total investment in goods
producing and services sectors was nearly equal to that of public sector. Its share of
investment in goods producing sector was about 49 per cent, while its share in services
sector investment was around 46 per cent during the period 1976-95. However, the
sectoral distribution of public and private investments differ significantly. As table 5.4 in
Chapter V indicates, almost half of private investment is in the oil sector and this is
contributed solely by way of foreign direct investment by the oil multinationals. About 27
per cent of private investment is in the housing sector. Of the remaining 23 per cent, 9.8
per cent is in manufacturing, 2.9 per cent in agriculture and fisheries, 2.7 per cent in
construction, 2.1 per cent in financial institutions and 5.8 per cent in trade, tourism and
transport. In contrast, 47 per cent of public investment is in economic and social
infrastructure where private investment is conspicuous by its absence. The share of oil
sector in government investment is relatively small at 24.3 per cent which perhaps reflects
the government policy of building a strong partnership with the foreign private sector to
develop this strategic national resource, and also provide a substantial part of the funding
required for that purpose.
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An important aspect of the patterns of distribution of public and private investment
is the complementary nature of these investments. Thus, apart from oil and gas, where the
public and private sectors have developed a strong partnership, government's investment
in agriculture, fisheries and manufacturing has been mainly in developing a supportive
physical infrastructure for facilitating private sector activity.
In the case of housing, while the government had to build public housing for the
civil servants in the initial stages of development because no private alternative was
available, this practice was replaced in the early 1 980s when the government started
paying allowances in lieu of housing. Similarly in the initial stages, the government
provided low cost housing to the weaker sections of the society but in the Fourth FYP this
policy was discontinued. Instead, housing grants are being provided to people living on
social security and interest free loans are provided to low-income groups. Signalling the
shift in policy, the Fourth FYP stated:
[E]ncourage and support the role of the private sector and
enhance its participation in the housing sector and restrict
the government role to planning ... and developing the
appropriate organisational, institutional and legislative
framework. Provide appropriate means of finance for the
private sector and individuals and restrict housing projects
to specific items which are needed to implement these
projects (ibid :p.2O6).
Only in trade and tourism is the state being seen as competing with the private
sector. But here, too, the state had to invest in up-market hotels largely due to the same
arguments of market failure and scarcity of private capital, which we have discussed in
Chapters II and Ill. Nevertheless, all state-owned hotels are managed under contract by
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private hotel management companies. Overall, the patterns of public and private
investment have been mutually reinforcing.
6.5 Legal and Regulatory Framework for Private Business
One of the most important elements that foster private sector activities is the
availability of a legal and regulatory framework. In this connection, the government has
enacted a number of laws. These include: the Commercial Register Law and the
Commercial Companies Law of 1974 and their subsequent amendments. The former aims
to provide an official registration system for all business and commercial activities
conducted by merchants, commercial companies, branches and agencies of foreign
companies in Oman, while the latter law governs the formation of commercial companies.
According to the articles of this law, private business activities in Oman can be organised
in any of the following six legal entities: individual proprietorship, a general partnership, a
limited partnership, a joint stock company (approximately equivalent to a public limited
company in UK or in India) a limited liability company (LLC) (approximately a private
limited company in UK or India) and a holding company (which may be a joint stock
company or an LLC) (Oman, 1974).
The investment law of 1993 and its subsequent amendments regulate the activities
of non-Omani nationals wishing to engage in trade or business in the Sultanate or to
acquire an interest in the capital of an Omani company (Oman, 1995c:Decree no. 57/93).
According to this law, foreigners are allowed to own up to 49 per cent of any commercial
company in Oman. Approval of the Minister of Commerce and Industry has to be
obtained for foreign shareholdings exceeding 49 per cent and not exceeding 65 per cent,
beyond that, approval of the Cabinet is required. Under the law, foreign investors are
protected against nationalisation and ex-propriation.
The laws relating to property rights and collateral such as the 1980 Land Registry
Law regulate ownership of land and property, their sale and purchase, while providing the
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mechanism for creating mortgages on them (Oman, 1 995c:Decree no. 5/80). While, the
Muscat Securities Market Law of 1988 and its subsequent amendments provides the
regulatory framework for floatation and listing of joint stock companies on the securities
market. It also provides the mechanism for private sector companies to raise capital by
way of share or bond issue (Oman, 1995c:Decree no. 53/88). The 1981 law for
establishing the Authority for Settlement of Commercial Disputes' provides the
mechanism for rapid settlement of commercial disputes (Oman. 1 995c:Decree no. 79/81).
In addition to these, there are a number of other laws like the Commercial Agency
Law, Patents and Copyright Law which regulate commercial activity. Moreover, Oman's
membership of the two affiliates of the World Bank, viz., Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agency and the Centre for Settlement of Commercial and Investment Disputes
(Oman, 1995c:Decree no. 35/87) provides additional mechanism for resolution of
commercial disputes, arbitration and protection of foreign investment. Similarly a large
number of bilateral agreements have been signed with different countries for promotion of
trade and investment, investment protection, and avoidance of double taxation.
For Omani companies (with or without foreign shareholding) which intend to
undertake any industrial activity in Oman securing an industrial licence is obligatory. This
is issued by the office of Industrial Registration at the Ministry of Commerce & Industry.
In terms of industrial licensing, while before the 1980s, no more than one license would be
issued for an industrial project, thus creating artificial rents for the holder of such a license,
the system since the 1980s has been modified. Under the 1989 decree amending the
Industrial Registration and Promotion Law, the applicant for a new licence in a particular
industry is only made aware about the projects which have already been licensed (with
information about its/their production capacity, etc.) and then it is left to his/her
entrepreneurial judgement to take the risk of entering or not entering the concerned
1 The Authority has in 1997 been converted to a full fledged Commercial Disputes court. This will provide
it with more effective means to deliver and enforce its judgements.
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industry. Therefore, the legal requirement of obtaining an industrial licence does not act
as a barrier to new entry but enables the industrialists to arrive at a more informed
judgement about the potential risk and opportunities in the new line of business which
he/she may intend to enter (Oman, 1995c:Decree no. 80/89).
A major criticism levelled at developing countries relates, for example, to the
complex and highly discretionary regulation for customs and taxes, which thwart
competition and increase the cost of doing business (World Bank, 1995d). However, in
Oman the low tariff structure ensures that the customs clearing procedures are fairly
simple and straightforward. Moreover, the Tax Law of 1989', although discriminatory in
nature, is applied with great efficiency (Oman, 1 995c:Decree no. 77/89).
6.6 Public - Private Interaction in the Financial Sector
An efficient and vibrant financial system contributes much to economic
development. It mobilises savings and allocates them to investments by private
entrepreneurs. Therefore, fostering a robust financial system has been a part of the
government's drive to promote an efficient market.
In Oman the government has used a variety of policies, mechanisms and
instruments to achieve the objective. Unlike many developing countries, where most of the
commercial banks are publicly owned, (World Bank, 1995d) in Oman - excepting the
specialised banks - all banks are privately owned. This has enabled the Central Bank of
Oman to enforce prudent lending and capital adequacy guidelines and strict supervision for
avoiding bank failures2.
'In Oman, the main tax levied on commercial companies is the profits tax. The rate of this tax ranges
between 5 to 7.5 per cent on wholly owned companies, 15 to 25 per cent on Omani and non-Omani joint
ventures and between 25 to 50 per cent on wholly foreign-owned companies. Public Joint Stock
Companies, even with foreign ownership, are treated as wholly owned companies, provided the foreign
shareholding does not exceed 49 per cent (Oman, 1995c:Decree no. 77189 and its subsequent
amendments).
2 In Mauritania and Tanzania, for example, public sector bank recapitalisation is estimated to have cost
about 20 per cent of GD? in 1991 (World Bank, 1995d:p.131).
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Moreover, as noted earlier in section 6.3.1, the government has adopted a prudent
macroeconomic policy and thus has not resorted to the banking system to cover fiscal
deficits. Neither have the SOEs in Oman resorted to commercial banks to cover their
deficits or their financial requirements'. Moreover, most of the SOEs in Oman are
profitable and are run on a commercial basis and, therefore, do not have to resort to the
banking system to cover their losses. Thus, in Oman the situation is unlike many
developing countries where, "Inefficient public enterprises grew at the expense of the
more efficient private sector" (ibid :p. 124).
In order to provide trained manpower for the efficient working of the banking
system, the Central Bank in partnership with the banks operating in Oman has established
the Oman Institute of Bankers. As a result, the banks have been able to get up to 87 per
cent of their manpower requirement from the domestic market (CBO, l997:p.29).
While setting-up of new banks is restricted, the present number of 18 commercial
banks with 276 branches (Oman, 1 996b) operating throughout the country is considered
more than adequate by international standards to introduce and foster competition in the
banking system.
During the two decades of planned economic development, there has been a large
expansion in the volume of short and medium-term credit supplied by commercial banks to
the private sector. While the nominal GDP increased by about 6 times between 1976 and
1995, total commercial bank credit, as shown in table 6.4, grew during this period by
about 9.6 times, from RO 147 million to RO 1,407 million. At the same time, credit to the
government declined from RO 63 million to RO 26 million.
1 According to the Law of Signing Contracts or conunitments in the name of governments, no ministiy,
department, or public enterprise is allowed to sign any such contracts or commitments unless these are
countersigned by the Deputy Chairman of the Financial Affairs Council and the Undersecretaiy for
Finance (Oman, 1995c:Decree no. 47/75). This prevents any government department or SOE from
borrowing any funds without the explicit approval of the MinIStIy of Finance.
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Table 6.4 also shows the sector-wise distribution of the commercial bank credit
between 1975 and 1995. This reflects the changing structure of the economy. With the
growth of manufacturing sector's share in GDP, its share in bank credit has increased from
0.7 per cent in 1975 to almost 4.6 per cent in 1995. The growth in bank lending to
agriculture and fisheries is much more impressive as credit given to this sector increased
from almost zero in 1975 to RO 10 million in 1995. On the other hand, the share of
construction in bank credit declined from 11.6 per cent in 1975 to 9 per cent in 1995. All
these changes in the sectoral distribution and the growth of total bank credit to private
sector clearly indicate the rapid development of private businesses and the growing
importance of the private sector in the economy.
We thus find that the government's policies have laid the foundation of a
competitive banking system which in turn helps the development of a competitive private
sector, since borrowers are not dependent upon a few banks. Moreover, the presence of
foreign banks in Oman has further strengthened competition in the banking sector. In
addition, the development of the MSM has provided alternative channels for raising long-
term capital and thus contributed to deepening of the financial markets. And since all
commercial banks are privately owned in Oman, they do not have to be privatised, with
the risks and uncertainties that privatisation entails. This is clearly different from many
developing countries where privatisation of non-private banks has become an important
and complex issue.
Despite the growth in the banking sector, the level of financial depth of the system
is still rather narrow. For example, the ratio of domestic credit provided by the banking
sector in Oman, which is used as a measure of the growth of the banking system, was only
29.2 per cent of GDP in 1995, compared to 131.9 per cent for Malaysia, 54.1 per cent for
Trinidad and Tobago and 53.1 per cent for Mexico (World Bank, 1997b:pp.268-27O).
Another indicator of the efficiency of the financial sector is the margin between the
cost of deposits (mobilising liabilities) and the interest charged on loans. As the World
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Development Indicators state, "small margins are crucial for economic growth, since they
reduce interest rates and thus the overall cost investment" (World Bank, l997b:p.27l).
Moreover, interest rates reflect the responsiveness of financial institutions to competition.
Although in 1995 the spread of 2.9 points between lending and deposit rates 1 in Oman was
low compared to, for example, India where the spread was 6.5 points, Ireland 6.2 points,
Trinidad and Tobago 9.1 points and Chile 4.5 points, it was nevertheless high compared to
Malaysia, where the spread was 1.7 points and South Korea where it was 0.2 points
(ibid :pp.268-27O).
Table 6.4
Sectorwise distribution of commercial bank credit, 1975 and 1995
(RO Million)
1975	 1995
Sector	 Amount	 Relative	 Amount	 Relative
share	 share
_________________ (RO Mn.)	 %	 (RO Mn.) _______
Trade	 49	 33.3	 375	 26.7
Mining	 1	 0.7	 21	 1.5
Construction	 17	 11.6	 126	 9.0
Manufacturing	 1	 0.7	 65	 4.6
Electricity, gas, water	 1	 0.7	 9	 0.6
Transport and communication	 1	 0.7	 19	 1.4
Financial institutions	 _a	 54	 3.8
Services	 2	 1.4	 68	 4.8
Government	 63	 42.9	 26	 1.8
Personal	 10	 6.8	 442	 31.4
Agriculture and fisheries 	 10	 0.7
Others	 2	 1.2	 191	 13.7
Total	 147	 100.0	 1,407	 100.0
Note:
a) In 1975 credit to financial institutions amounted to RO 19,000 only, while to agriculture and fisheries
it amounted to RO 10.000 (Oman, 1976a:p.330).
Source: Compiled from Statistical Year Book 1985; and 1995 (Oman, 1986b:p.330 and 1996b:p.477).
The irony is that this spread was as low as 1.4 points in 1990 (ibid.), when the Central Bank of Oman
was imposing a ceiling on the maximum rate of interest that could be charged by commercial banks to
their customers. However, based on the urging of the IMF to liberalise interest rates, the spread has more
than doubled since interest rates have been liberaiised.
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6.7 Increase in the Volume of Private Sector Economic Activity
The measures taken by the state to foster private sector activities in Oman have
produced considerable results at least in the first and easier phase of the country's
development. It remains to be seen how the private sector will measure up in the next,
rather more difficult, phase of developing manufacturing and other types of economic
activities. We shall discuss this issue in Chapter VU.
As a result of state encouragement, the volume of economic activity involving the
private sector has increased significantly. This increase is reflected in (i) the number of
companies and establishments registered by type of legal entity; (ii) the number of
companies classified by region and size of capital; and (iii) the growth of the MSM.
Table 6.5
Number of companies and establishments registered as legal entity3
 and
relative distribution of registered companies and establishments by legal entity
Legal entity	 -	 1976	 1985	 1992
____________________ No. ____ No. % No. %
Sole ownership	 3,804	 79.9 22,417	 86.9 52,158 88.5
Limited partnership	 254	 5.3	 519	 2.0	 1,277	 2.2
General partnership	 544	 11.4	 2,054	 8.0	 3,458	 5.9
Limited liability	 134	 2.8	 701	 2.7	 1,818	 3.1
Joint stock
	
22	 0.5	 98	 0.4	 204	 0.3
Total	 4,758	 100 25,789	 100 58,915	 100
Note:
a) Available data on distribution of registered companies and establishments by type of legal entity are
for the period 1974-1992; since 1993 the Minisiry of Commerce & Industry has been engaged in
updating the data of the Commercial Registry.
Source: Statistical Year Book 1985; 1993 (Oman, 1986b:pp.22 1-254; 1 994c:pp.24 1-243).
Table 6.5 shows the growth of companies and enterprises from 1976 to 1992. The
total number of companies of all categories increased from 4,758 in 1976 to 58,915 in
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1992. The majority of companies in 1976 and in 1992 were in the category of sole
ownership, that is, wholly owned by the private sector. In 1976 this category of
companies formed almost 80 per cent of the total number of companies; by 1992 this
figure has increased to 88.5 per cent of the total. For this category of companies,
although the change in their proportionate share between 1976 to 1992 has not been very
large, the number of companies in this category has increased vastly from 3,804 to 52,158
between these two years. This indicates the extent of expansion in the small business
segment of private sector.
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Table 6.6
Registered companies and establishments classified by region and size of capital
_____________ _______ _______ ________ _______ _______ 	 (000' Rials Omani)
Size of capital	 0-10	 10-50	 50-100	 100-250 250-500	 500	 Total	 Relative
in 000' RO	 and	 Share
more
Region	 Nos.	 Nos.	 Nos.	 Nos.	 Nos.	 Nos.	 Nos.	 %
Muscat
1976	 1,307	 1,290	 210	 186	 41	 31	 3,065	 64.4
1995	 9,797	 8,400	 2,399	 1,561	 436	 359	 22,952	 30.4
Al Batinah
1976	 267	 251	 14	 8	 3	 1	 544	 11.4
1995	 13,255	 4,611	 637	 157	 17	 7	 18,684	 24.8
Ad Dakhliyah
1976	 48	 76	 3	 1	 1	 -	 129	 2.7
1995	 4,006	 2,360	 194	 94	 9	 2	 6,665	 8.8
Adh Dhahirah
1976	 30	 41	 3	 1	 -	 -	 75	 1.6
1995	 4,820	 2,101	 326	 119	 12	 2	 7,380	 9.8
Musandam
1976	 -	 1	 -	 2	 -	 -	 3	 0.1
1995	 239	 203	 21	 12	 2	 3	 480	 0.6
Dhofar
1976	 219	 339	 55	 27	 11	 5	 656	 13.8
1995	 5,397	 3,361	 355	 124	 31	 25	 9,293	 12.3
Ash Sharqiyah
1976	 118	 156	 8	 4	 -	 -	 286	 6.0
1995	 4.914	 4.057	 395	 66	 2	 -	 9,434	 12.5
AiWusta
1976	 -	 -	 -	 -	 .	 -	 0	 0.0
1975	 396	 187	 12	 3 ________	 -	 598	 0.8
Total for the
Sultanate
1976	 1,989	 2,154	 293	 229	 56	 37	 4,758	 100.0
1995	 42,824	 25,280	 4,339	 2,136	 509	 398	 75,486	 100.0
Source: Statistical Year Book 1985; 1995 (Oman. 1986b:pp.221-254 and 1996b:pp.228-232).
A noteworthy characteristic of the data in table 6.6 is the change in the regional
distribution of companies according to the size of their capital. This is commensurate with
the government's policy of pursuing development which emphasises equity between
regions. Thus in 1976, 64.4 per cent of registered companies in Oman were located in the
capital Muscat. In contrast the number of registered companies increased in almost all
other regions during the period, 1976 to 1995, while the percentage of companies
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registered in Muscat declined to 30.4 per cent in 1995. In Al Batinah the increase was
from 11,4 to 24.8 per cent; in Ad Dakhliyah from 2.7 to 8.8 per cent; in Adh Dhahirah
from 1.6 to 9.8 per cent; in Musandam from 0.1 per cent to 0.6 per cent. Only Dhofar
experienced a decline from 13.8 in 1976 to 12.3 per cent in 1995.
Of course as table 6.6 shows, the regional distribution of companies by size of
capital is still relatively unequal. The capital Muscat has a larger share of companies of all
sizes in terms of capital, as compared with the other regions. So regional inequalities exist
and are likely to persist 1 in so far as the distribution of private sector entrepreneurial
activities are concerned; this is in spite of policies that seek to distribute these rather more
equitably.
Another indicator of private sector development that we have chosen is the
changes in the volume of different types of transactions on the MSM. Table 6.7 shows
these trends during 1990-96.
For instance, as can be seen from table 6.6, the share of companies in Muscat with capital of more than
RO 250 thousand increased from 77 per cent in 1976 to 87 per cent in 1995.
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Table 6.7
Growth of the Muscat Securities Market (MSM) 2 1990-1996
Items	 1990	 1991	 1992	 1993	 1994	 1995	 1996
1. Number of companies listed on MSM
	 56	 58	 60	 66	 71	 83	 98
1.lRegularmarket	 50	 41	 39	 39	 34	 38	 39
1.2 Parallel market	 6	 17	 21	 27	 37	 45	 59
2. Market capitalisation (RU Mn.)	 363.3	 426.5	 408.5	 420.0	 655.7	 761.5	 1,059.8
2.1 Regular market	 333.8	 398.3	 374.6	 354.1	 455.1	 474.3	 708.8
2.2 Parallel market
	 29.5	 28.2	 33.9	 65.9	 200.6	 287.2	 351.0
3. Market capitalisation as (%) of
GDPb
	8.1	 9.8	 8.5	 8.7	 13.2	 14.4	 18.1
4. Turnover or trading volume (RU 	 45.7	 56.6	 39.4	 41.7	 93.1	 81.4	 210.1
Mn.)
4.1 Regular market
	 41.6	 53.6	 36.8	 30.5	 63.1	 45.8	 135.2
4.2 Parallel market	 4.1	 3.0	 2.6	 11.2	 30.0	 35.6	 74.9
5.Turnoverasa(%)ofGDP	 1.0	 1.3	 0.8	 0.9	 1.9	 1.5	 3.6
6. Turnover as (%) of market	 12.6	 13.3	 9.6	 9.9	 14.2	 10.7	 19.8
capitalisation______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______ ______
Notes:
a) MSM started its operations in 1990
b) For 1990-1996, the GDP figures are (RO Million): 4,493; 4,360; 4,787; 4,803; 4,967; 5,288; and
5,854 respectively (Oman, I 996b).
Source: Oman, MSM, Annual Reports 1991; 1992; 1993; 1994; 1995; 1996.
Between 1990 and 1996, the number of companies listed on the MSM nearly
doubled from 56 to 98. During this period market capitalisation increased by about three
times, from RO 363.3 million to RO 1,059.8 million and as a percentage of GDP market
capitalisation increased from 8.1 to 18.1 per cent. All the other indicators in table 6.7
show increased activity on the MSM, which reflects both directly and indirectly increased
private sector activity in Oman's economy.
6.8 Expansion of Information Base
Inadequate access to commercially useful information and non-availability of
economic data are serious obstacles to development of markets and private enterprise in
many underdeveloped countries. An important element of public-private partnership is the
dissemination of timely and reliable information on economic and business activity. As we
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saw in Chapter IV, up to 1970 even the basic information such as national income,
population, etc. about Oman's economy were neither officially compiled nor published'.
However, with the launching of a vigorous development policy in the early I 970s
and commencement of development planning in 1976, a number of steps have been taken
by the government to develop a modern network of statistical data and information.
These have included, for example, the enactment in 1988 of a law regarding collection,
analysis and dissemination of statistical information (Oman, 1995c:Decree no. 87/88).
This law vests the authority for national statistics in the Ministry of Development (MOD)2.
To enable it to monitor and evaluate socio-economic progress, the Ministry conducts
monthly surveys of consumer prices, quarterly and annual surveys of production and
periodical social surveys. In addition, other government ministries also conduct regular
surveys, relating to their activities in co-ordination with the Ministry of Development.
Another important development has been the conducting of the first ever census of
population, housing and establishments in 1993. Similarly, an Agricultural Census was
carried out in 1993 and an Industrial Census was carried out in 1994 (Oman,
1996a:p. 137).
As a result of these efforts, a number of monthly, quarterly and periodical bulletins
are published. The annual Statistical Year Book issued by the Ministry of Development,
for example, provides comprehensive and up-to-date time-series data on Oman's
economic and social development. The monthly bulletin issued by the Ministry provides
monthly and quarterly socio-economic indicators which cover, inter alia, consumer prices,
public finance, national income accounts, imports and exports, construction activity and so
on. Moreover, for the benefit of the general public the Ministry of Development regularly
'Most of the data for pre-1970 are estimated by international organisations like the United Nations and
the World Bank.
2 This authority was originally vested in the Technical Secretariat of the Development Council before the
formation of the Ministry of Development on 4.1.1994 (Oman. 1995c:Decree no. 2/94).
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publishes special reports giving full details of the FYPs including their objectives, policies,
programmes and projects.
In addition, a number of ministries, including the Ministries of Health, Education,
Agriculture and Fisheries issue annual reports relating to their activities. The Central Bank
of Oman also provides detailed information regarding the banking sector in its annual
reports and quarterly bulletins. PDO in its annual report and periodical newsletter gives
up-to-date information on developments in the petroleum and gas sectors.
The MSM publishes a monthly bulletin and an annual report which provide full
details of movements in prices of shares of all listed companies together with other useful
information on these companies, such as their turnover, profits, dividends, market
capitalisation and so on. In addition, the data on traded shares are published daily in
Oman's English and Arabic newspapers.
Government agencies, therefore, regularly collect and disseminate a wide range of
economic and social information in order to assist private individuals and enterprises in
making decisions on business opportunities and viability of projects.
6.9 Role of Market Mechanism in Oman
We have seen that development planning and the crucial role of government in
promoting economic and social development in Oman have not resulted in any wasteful or
stifling relationship between public and private sectors, and that the interests of the two
sectors have evolved in such a way that they are complementary rather than conflicting.
These two features of Oman's development during the period 1976 to 1995 explain how
the planners in Oman have been able to implement the long-term objective of encouraging
the existence of freely competitive market mechanisms and promoting private enterprise.
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As mentioned already, there are two main areas where the operation of market
forces has been left almost completely free. One is external trade. Oman's principal
export is oil, which is subject to forces operating in the world oil market. Oman has no
influence in determination of oil price because of its small share in the total world oil
supply. Since the world oil price is expressed in US dollars, Oman's exchange rate policy
cannot influence the export price of oil. The domestic cost of oil production also has no
effect on the price that Oman receives. Other non-oil exports are also not subject to any
form of export taxes or charges and are almost entirely undertaken by the private sector.
Secondly, in relation to imports, quota restrictions are almost non-existent 1 and
only a nominal tariff of 5 per cent is levied on non-food items. Even the exchange rate
which is pegged to the US dollar is held constant. Thus imports of goods, services, capital
and technology are not subject to any policy restrictions. The result is that in the sphere of
foreign trade, Oman has diligently followed the free trade policy based on the neo-classical
theory of comparative cost advantage. The policy of unrestricted imports has helped
Oman in controlling inflation despite increasing deficits in government finances. The
decision to adopt a liberal trade policy has been influenced on the one hand, by the high
share of oil exports in foreign trade and on the other, by the small size of import-
competing industries and agriculture.
The other area of the economy where the Omani government has consciously
refrained from interfering with the operation of market mechanism is that of allocation of
the available supply of goods and services among their buyers. This primary function of
market system is thus not interfered with through any measure of rationing or price
control. Thus internal trade in foreign or domestically produced goods is governed
entirely by free market forces. Moreover, since nominal customs duty on non-food
Only in a few cases licenses are required to import certain agriculture products when they are in
competition with local produce. However, these licences are easily awarded.
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imports is the only form of indirect tax, market functioning in Oman is not distorted
through the existence of indirect taxes'.
There are, of course, industrial subsidies; but their relative importance in industrial
value-added is not significant enough to cause any distortions in the price mechanism.
According to the World Bank's estimate (World Bank, l994a:p.82), the share of various
input-related subsidies in Oman accounted for only 11 per cent of total industrial value-
added in 1991. This magnitude of the ratio of subsidy to value-added is low enough so as
not to cause any significant allocative distortion. Moreover, total budgetary support to
the private sector accounted on average for less than 2 per cent of annual total public
expenditure during 199 1-95 (Oman, 1996b:p.436). In other words, the state intervention
in promoting the market has not caused serious distortions in resource allocation.
Thus in Oman although planning and direct involvement of government play a
dominant role in the development process, the policy framework is broadly speaking
"market conforming" in that it facilitates the functioning and expansion of the market
system. In this Oman stands out as an example where the roles of the state and market
have been synergetic and not adversarial. The two institutional instruments of
development are not conflicting; in fact they are acting in co-operation with each other.
6.10 Conclusion
We have seen in this chapter that with the commencement of the era of
development planning in 1976, the government of Oman had in its 1975 long-term
development policy statement declared its commitment to promote and sustain freely
competitive markets and free trade. The basic approach in Oman's development policy is
to ensure that planning does not substitute markets and that the roles of the state and the
private sector are complementary and not conflicting. Unlike China and India, for
This is with the exception of petroleum products where a 50 per cent tax on domestic consumption is
imposed (Al Yousef, l995:p.39); and prices of products and services that are provided by natural
monopolies such as electricity, water, gas and telephones, which are set by the government.
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example, Oman has refrained from demarcating the boundaries between the activities of
the state and private sector. In respect of the roles of planning and market, Oman's
approach has some common features with the approaches of Japan and South Korea, as
we discussed in Chapter III.
Through the resources generated from the primary produce, oil, the state has
played the leading role in initiating and sustaining the development process during 1970-
95. It has invested large sums of money in economic and social infrastructure to facilitate
private sector development. It has also taken up the role of the entrepreneur by putting in
motion the process of diversification. At the same time, it has provided a number of
financial incentives to induce private sector investment.
The state has developed a comprehensive framework of regulations and laws to
facilitate private sector activities, in addition to providing a wide range of statistical
information to assist it in making decisions regarding business opportunities. Equally
important has been the role of the state in promoting a robust financial sector, which, as
we noted, has been instrumental in promoting the growth of the private sector.
This chapter has shown that the role of the private sector is very important in most
of the non-oil economic activities and even in the oil sector, where foreign private sector
has played a very important role. In terms of GFCF we have seen that although the share
of the private sector is relatively small, it has been growing since the Second FYP. An
important aspect of capital formation is the complementary role played by the public and
private sectors in the sectoral distribution of investment. What is of great significance is
that while the role of the state in the initial stages of development was stronger in certain
activities, such as tourism and housing, the government has itself initiated appropriate
policies to gradually reduce its role, because the private sector is now in a better position
to conduct those activities.
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As a result of a conscious government policy, most of the activities in Oman's
economy are operating wholly through the market. These include non-oil foreign trade,
internal trade and exchange of most goods, services and finance between suppliers and
buyers. Public utilities and basic inputs provided by the state enterprises are also supplied
on market principles with the result that the SOEs providing these services are generally
run on a commercial basis. Thus the state through development planning has facilitated
the expansion of market mechanism and has attempted to ensure that these two
institutions reinforce each other.
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CHAPTER '/11
THE NEW DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY AND POLICY 1T OMAN OF THE
1990s
7.1 Introduction
In spite of the impressive development' achieved by Oman since the late 1 970s
some serious problems still need to be overcome. These problems which are embedded in
Oman's economy are an obstacle to further structural transformation 2, and their solution
constitute the major objectives of the New Development Strategy and Policy 3 which is
articulated within the 'Vision 2020' framework. Specifically, this chapter exa.mines the
main elements (diversification, private sector and HRD) of the New Development Strategy
which is formulated in the context of, and whose focal point is, the depletion of Oman's
oil reserves by the year 2020. This chapter will also examine the future role of the State in
Oman's development because although the strategy underlying the 'Vision 2020' does not
envisage "rolling back" of the state, it does envisage a reconstitution of the state's role in
the development process.
This chapter thus has two main objectives. Firstly to describe the main problems
that constrain Oman's further development and secondly to analyse the strategies and
policies formulated, within the planning framework to overcome these constraints in which
l As we noted in Chapter IV, Oman has made rapid socio-economic progress over the last quarter
century. Oman's nominal GDP has increased from RO 104 million in 1970 to RO 5,288 million in 1995,
while per capita income has increased from RO 158 to RO 2,477 between these two years. Life
expectancy has increased to 67.4 years and infant mortality has declined to 20 per 1,000 live births, while
primary education has become universally accessible (Oman, 1996c:pp.5-6).
2 The interrelated processes of structural change that accompany economic development are jointly
referred to as the structural transformation. The accwnulation of physical and human capital and shifts in
the composition of demand, trade, production and employment are described as the economic core of the
transfonnation, while the related socio-economic processes are identified as peripheral (Syrquiri,
1988:p.2O6).
Referred to also as the New Development Strategy.
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both the state and market play a role. The main problems which will be dealt with
consecutively are diversification of the economy, privatisation and private sector
development and human resource development.
Since macroeconomic management is identified as an essential factor in achieving
the objectives of the New Development Strategy, we shall also examine in this chapter the
main policies proposed to achieve macroeconomic stability.
7.2 Oman's Vision for the Year 2020'
The possibility of depletion of oil reserves within the next two decades combined
with a predominantly young and rapidly growing population 2 puts the Omani government
under great pressure to pursue a policy of diversification with great urgency with a view
to minimise dependence on the oil industry and at the same time maximise employment
opportunities for the Omani population (Oman, 1996a: Chapter IV). The 'Vision 2020'
and the New Development Strategy and Policy therefore represent a new era of state-led
development which places great emphasis on development of human resources, economic
diversification and private sector development.
The prime objective of the vision for Oman's economy over the next quarter of a
century is to maintain the current level of per capita income in real terms as a minimum,
and to strive to double it in real terms by the year 2020. The Vision also aims to provide
appropriate conditions for economic take-off In this regard, the government plans to use
the resources generated from the petrochemical sector, oil and gas, in promoting
sustainable economic diversification, while accepting full responsibility for the provision of
basic health and education facilities, in addition to training Omanis and upgrading their
skills (Oman, 1996a:p.168).
'This is because the 'Vision 2020' provides a twenty-five years perspective for the Omani economy and
society, from 1996 till 2020 (Oman, 1996a).
2 More than half of the Omani population is under 15 years of age, (Oman, 1993a:p.37) and its average
growth rate is 3.7 per cent per annum (Oman, 1996c:p.6).
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Since Oman implements its strategies through five-year plans, the specific policies
and programmes included in the Fifth FYP have been formulated in conformity with the
realisation of the main goals of the 'Vision 2020'.
In support of the new strategy a large number of policies and projects have been
approved. These include, for example, setting up of the Omani Centre for Investment
Promotion and Export Development (OCIPED), joining the World Trade Organisation
(WTO), setting up a venture capital fund to promote growth of small and medium size
enterprises, optimising the advantages of Oman's strategic location, upgrading general
education standards and introducing modern vocational training programmes.
7.3 The New Development Strategy and Diversification
To achieve change in the structure of composition of the GDP by the year 2020,
the New Development Strategy places added emphasis on high value-added strategy,
export diversification, integration with the global economy, encouraging technology
transfer, research and development, and promotion of newer sub-sectors such as
electronics and software.
Table 7.1 indicates the policies of the new long-term strategy which aim to achieve
a major shift in the sectoral composition of production in the economy. It is expected that
the value-added by the non-petroleum activities would reach 81 per cent of real GDP by
2020 compared to 65 per cent in 1995. By the year 2020, it is estimated that the
contribution of the petroleum sector' to real GDP will decline to 19 per cent. This
significant transformation in the structural mix of the production base of the Omani
economy constitutes the core of Oman's attempt at economic diversification.
1 As table 7.1 shows, because of the depleting oil reserves, contribution of crude oil to the GDP will
decline from 33.5 per cent in 1995 to 9.0 per cent in 2020, while the contribution of the gas sector is
expected to increase from 1.5 per cent in 1995 to 10.0 per cent in 2020.
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1995a
35.0
33.5
1.5
65.0
3.0
1.1
0.6
5.4
1.7
3.2
14.1
7.0
7.9
8.3
13.9
-1.2
100.0
2000
30.9
25.9
5.0
69.1
3.5
1.0
0.6
6.8
4.3
6.9
17.8
8.6
4.3
3.2
12.6
-0.5
100.0
r cen
2020
19.0
9.0
10.0
81.0
3.1
2.0
2.0
15.0
2.0
10.0
18.0
8.0
8.0
5.0
10.0
-2.1
100.0
Table 7.1
Structure of the economy: production (at 1993 constant prices)
Distribution of gross domestic product :1995a, 2000 and 2020
Sector
Petroleum sector value-added:
Oil
Gas
Non-petroleum activities value-added:
Agriculture
Fisheries
Mining and quarrying
Manufacturing
Electricity and water
Building, construction and real estate services
Trade and tourism
Transport and communications
Banks, insurance and financial services
Other servicesb
Public administration
Imputed banking services, net of custom duties
Gross domestic nroduct at market nrices
Notes:
a) The structure of the GDP for the year 1995 as shown in table 7.1 is different from that shown
elsewhere in this and other chapters. This is because it is based on 1993 constant prices, the year
when the estimates for the Oman's 'Vision 2020' were being formulated.
b) Educational and medical services, film distribution and exhibition, car repairs, laundiy and
sanitation services, domestic services and cosmetic services.
Source: Oman, Fifth FYP (1996a:p.240).
As table 7.1 shows, some profound changes are anticipated in the production
structure of the Omani economy during the period 1996-2020. Thus in the petroleum
sector, although the relative significance of oil in the economy is projected to decline to 9
per cent by the year 2020 from 33.5 per cent in 1995, part of this decline is planned to be
compensated by the gas sector. As we shall see later, the Fifth FYP comprises an
ambitious programme to develop the gas sector over the next 25 years, and this is to be
done through a public-private partnership.
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Since the significance of diversification for Oman lies in the need to expand the
value-added in the commodity producing sectors of agriculture, fisheries, non-oil mining
and manufacturing, it is forecast that the total value-added by these sectors will increase
from 10.1 per cent of GDP in 1995 to 22.1 per cent in 2020. And to realise these
structural changes the structure of the demand will undergo similar changes. Thus the
ratio of GFCF to GDP is projected to increase from 14.5 per cent in 1995 to 34 per cent
in the year 2020. This is planned to be achieved partly by reducing gradually the ratio of
final consumption to GDP, from 79 per cent in 1995 to 68 per cent by the year 2020
(Oman, 1 996a:p. 186).
7.3.1 Diversification : definition and issues
As we discussed in Chapters I and II, development is a process of transition from a
socio-economic structure with a lower to a higher productive capacity. Thus development
policy deals with ways in which different sectors' of the economy adapt over time to
changes in demand, factor supplies, and technology. Economic diversification, therefore,
refers to significant transformation in the structural mix of the production base of the
economy, with a view to avoiding excessive dependence on a single resource or a
depletable resource, and to the promotion of diverse activities to change the composition
of national output and income. Practically, this implies adding new economic sectors to
the domestic economy; for example, agriculture develops newer and additional sub-
sectors: arable farming, milk and dairy products, meat and meat products, fruit, vegetables
and so on. In industry, this would mean development of consumer goods, electronics,
software, labour-intensive products, capital goods, machine tools and various other items.
Similar additions and multiplication are also possible in the services sector. Even though
the structure of production may change over time from one sector to another, the
existence and multiplication of these sectors are the defining characteristics of a diversified
However, it is notable that neo-classical economics makes little use of conceptual distinction among
sectors of productIon, such as agriculture and industiy. "In an open economy ith competitive markets,
all tradable goods are highly substitutable and the main sectoral distinction that needs to be made is
between tradables and non-tradables" (Cheneiy. l988:p. 198).
348
economy. Another characteristic of this process is the linkages connecting sectors
together, i.e. backward and forward linkages (Hirschman, 1958). Diversification,
therefore, implies, inter alia, deepening of the national economy.
In a classic statement on the relationship between diversification and development
in developing countries, Streeten and Elson (1971 :p.13) assert that:
[W]hule it is broadly true, both that countries are poor
because they are not diversified (and therefore particularly
vulnerable to changes in technology and demand), and that
they are not diversified because they are poor, the more
fundamental of the two relations is the second.
Diversification is not so much the condition of successful
development, as it is its result.
Streeten and Elson' s statement underpins Oman's strategy of diversification. For
it anticipates the depletion of a valuable resource, oil, which, if depleted, may reduce
Oman's wealth which has depended on good management of this conirnodity. In some
ways of course, Oman's strategy inverts Streeten and Elson's conception of
diversification: Oman is diversifying both to increase and sustain its wealth and to prevent
it from becoming poor once the oil runs out.
Major arguments for diversification for a single resource or a depletable resource
economy have centred around: (1) avoiding shocks of adverse terms of trade between
primary commodities and manufactured products (the Prebisch-Singer thesis, referred to
in Chapter II); (ii) encouraging domestic resource-based industrialisation (Auty, 1990),
and creating new sources of income; (iii) developing new economic sectors and promoting
employment; and (iv) strengthening inter-linkages in the different sectors of the economy
(Hirschman, 1958 and 1977).
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7.3.2 Constraints to diversification
In order to formulate a revised and more dynamic policy for diversification, the
government carried out an extensive review of the Omani economy in 1994 and 19951.
The purpose of this review was to identifj the major constraints and challenges that
needed to be overcome if diversification was to be achieved. The findings of these studies
are summarised below.
First, unlike in the past 25 years (1970-95), Oman is faced with the prospect of
declining oil reserves during 1996-2020. In the earlier phase, oil-induced growth was able
to sustain the momentum of development in the economy which seems unlikely in the next
phase.
Second, there have been weak linkages between oil and the rest of the economy.
Oil has hardly succeeded in promoting sustained and autonomous growth in the non-oil
sectors, which remain heavily dependent on the oil sector. According to GeIb, the weak
structure of the non-oil sectors is a consequence of a number of complex factors; among
these, the Dutch disease effects of the oil boom are not the least important (Gelb,
l988:pp. 134-43).
Third, the Omani economy suffers from a low level of productive efficiency mainly
because of inadequacy of trained local manpower for the middle and higher management
levels. Moreover, most of the expatriate labour force has been engaged in low value-
added activities.
Fourth, private sector participation in the economy has been limited despite a
range of incentives, public support programmes and a flexible and supportive regulatory
Oman's Fifth FYP contains a detailed note about this review,, and the policies suggested to achieve the
goals of Oman's 'Vision : 2020' (Oman, 1996a:Chapter 3).
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framework. Rather, the economy has witnessed the emergence of monopolies and a
rentier mentality, foregoing competitiveness and efficiency in the process.
Fifth, the growing savings-investment gap is likely to be a major structural
constraint on the Omani economy in the future. High consumption induced growth (both
private and public) is sustainable only if the marginal rate of savings is high.
Sixth, the quality of general education and of vocational training has been below
the standard required to enable the Omanis to manage and adapt to changing technology.
Seventh., the small size of the Omani population and hence the limitation of the
domestic market also pose a major constraint on investment in the capital-intensive goods
sector. Though the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) does provide a larger market, more
efforts are needed to expand the market for supporting a wider range of activities.
In order to overcome these constraints and accelerate the pace of structural
transformation, the government has produced a comprehensive package of policies and
measures, the main elements of which are examined below.
7.3.3 Fifth FYP (1996-2000) and diversification
To achieve the multiple objectives of diversification, an expanded role for the
private sector and further integration with the global economy, it is expected that major
economic sectors will witness dramatic changes. For instance, while the average annual
growth rate of the petroleum sector' is estimated to be 1.1 per cent in nominal terms
during the Fifth FYP, the non-oil sector2 is planned to grow at 6.3 per cent on average per
This includes oil and gas industries. The estimated average annual growth rate for gas industiy is 36.4
per cent, while the oil industry because of an expected downturn in prices, is estimated to decline by an
average annual rate of 0.7 per cent, both in nominal terms (Oman, 1996a:p.315).
2 The terms oil sector, petroleum sector and petroleum activities and non-oil sector, non-petroleum sector
and non-petroleum activities are used interchangeably in this chapter.
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annum. As a result, nominal GDP is planned to grow at an average annual growth rate of
4.6 per cent. Within the non-oil sectors, the commodity sector' is planned to grow at 13.7
per cent per annum on average during the period 1996-2000 (Oman, 1996a:p.315).
The Fifth FYP also aims to diversi& the non-oil exports. While total merchandise
exports are planned to grow at an average annual rate of 3.8 per cent, the exports of
locally produced non-oil products are planned to grow at an average annual rate of 17.6
per cent, and re-exports are expected to rise annually by 14.3 per cent on average. Thus it
is envisaged that the high growth rates to be achieved in the non-oil exports will more than
compensate the expected decline at an average annual rate of 0.6 per cent in oil exports.
Moreover, it is expected that the trade surplus will also grow at an average annual rate of
4.7 per cent because of the expansion in non-oil exports (ibid. :pp.3 14-18). In terms of
export diversification, the example of Malaysia is instructive2.
7.3.4 Diversification indicators: analysis of trends
Since the sectoral composition of the output of the economy in Oman is divided
between two main activities, petroleum and non-petroleum3, we shall use the activities
falling under these headings as proxies for the main indicators of diversification.
The term commodity sector and goods producing sector are used interchangeably. This sector includes
non-oil mining, agriculture and fisheries, manufacturing, electricity and water, and construction (ibid.).
2 Malaysia's Second Outline Perspective Plan states: ... [Wlithin the primaiy commodities sector, palm
oil, petroleum and LNG offer the best prospects for boosting export earnings. On the other hand, exports
of manufactured goods will become increasingly important with its share expanding from about 60.4 per
cent of the value of total exports in 1990 to 81.8 per cent in the year 2000. Within manufacturing the
high growth sectors are anticipated to be food processing, industrial chemicals, textiles and clothing,
rubber products and non-metallic mineral products. The growth of the electrical machineiy and
equipment sub-sector is anticipated to slow down relative to other sectors within manufacturing.
Although exporting sizeable volume of primaiy goods, the rapid increase in manufacturing exports during
1971-90 and now planned for 1991-2000 has enabled Malaysia to achieve a diversified export basket over
the past twenty-five years (Malaysia, l99l:p.79).
The analytical division of the economy is based on composition of demand (consumption, capital
formation and net savings) and composition of production (output of the various sectors of the economy).
Although the most widely used categorisation is Kuznet's division of production into agriculture, industry
and services (Cheneiy, l988:p. 199) because of the importance in Oman's economy of the petroleum
sector on one hand, and the need, on the other hand, to reduce dependence on that sector through
diversification, production is principally divided into two main sectors petroleum and non-petroleum.
Each of these is then further sub-divided into a number of sectors and activities.
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However, our assessment will be limited to the main activities, since the results of the
successive five-year plans in promoting a diversified economy have been discussed in
Chapters IV and V.
Table 7.2 shows the structure of production in the economy during the period
under study. It reveals that the relative share of value-added by petroleum activities
declined from 58.5 per cent in 1976 to 38.2 per cent in 1995, whilst the relative share of
value-added by non-petroleum activities has increased from 41.5 per cent to 61.8 per cent
between these two years.
In the petroleum activities, crude oil has maintained its dominant position because
development of the gas sector has been limited up to now for domestic consumption.
However, with the discovery of a large quantity of gas reserves, the government has
launched within the framework of the Fifth FYP an ambitious programme for commercial
exploitation of these reserves. Table 7.1 shows that it is the value-added by the sub-sector
of gas that will gradually increase to 5 per cent of GDP by the year 2000, and ulirther to
10 per cent by the year 2020, thus overtaking the share of value-added by crude oil sector
in 2020.
Within non-petroleum activities, the value-added by the commodity sector has
been rather stable throughout the period; but the relative contribution of the individual
sub-sectors in this sector has undergone significant changes. For example, manufacturing
sector's share has recorded an impressive growth from 0.5 per cent in 1976 to 4.6 per cent
in 1995.
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Table 7.2
Structure of the economy: production
Distribution of GDP (at current prices): 1976, 1980, 1985, 1990 and 1995
_____________________________ _________ __________ _________ _________ (per cent)
1976	 1980	 1985	 1990	 1995
Petroleum activities value-	 58.5	 62.0	 49.6	 47.7	 38.2
added:
Crude oil	 58.5	 61.4	 48.6	 46.6	 37.3
Natural gas	 -	 0.6	 1.0	 1.1	 0.9
Non-petroleum activities value-	 41.5	 38.0	 50.4	 52.3	 61.8
added:
Commodity producing sector	 13.3	 9.9	 11.7	 9.0	 11.3
Mining and quarrying	 -	 -	 0.3	 0.3	 0.3
Agriculture and fisheries 	 2.1	 2.6	 2.3	 2.6	 2.9
Manufacturing	 0.5	 0.8	 2.2	 2.9	 4.6
Electricity and water	 0.7	 0.8	 0.8	 0.9	 0.9
Building and construction	 10.0	 5.7	 6.2	 2.3	 2.6
Services sector	 28.2	 28.1	 38.7	 43.3	 50.5
Government servicesa	 7.9	 9.4	 14.3	 17.6	 19.2
Other servicesb	 20.3	 18.7	 24.4	 25.7	 31.3
Gross Domestic Product	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0
GDP at market prices (RO
Million)	 884	 2,064	 3,591	 4,493	 5,288
Notes:
a) Government services include public administration and defence, education, and health.
b) Other services include trade, tourism, transport and financial, real estate and business services. These
are net of imputed bank charges and custom duties.
Sources: Columns 1 and 2 from Oman (1986b:pp.396-402) and data for 1980 are based on old national
accounts methodology. Column 3, 4 and 5 from Oman (1996b:pp.379-384) and data are based
onSNA, 1993.
As indicated in table 7.3 the value-added in manufacturing has increased from RO
4.3 million in 1976 to RO 248.7 million in 1995, representing an increase of almost 60
times, while the GDP has increased by about 6 times from RO 884 million in 1976 to RO
5,288 between these two years.
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The various sub-sectors of the manufacturing sector have also grown over the last
two decades. The value-added by the refined petroleum products has increased from RO
14 million in 1985 to RO 55 million in 1995, whilst its relative share in the total value-
added in the manufacturing sector has grown from 17.8 per cent to 22.0 per cent between
these two years. The other sub-sectors - food processing, weaving, apparels etc. -
have also increased their value-added by about 65 per cent between 1990 and 1995.
However, because the value-added by refined petroleum products grew by 270 per
cent between l990 and 1995, whereas the value-added by other non-petroleum
manufacturing grew by 66 per cent only, the relative share of the latter in manufacturing
went down from 89 per cent to 78 per cent between these two years. This of course is a
cause concern and indicates the prevailing constraints and frailties in the Omani economy.
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Table 7.3
Manufacturing sector in Oman : value-added by sub-sectors and their relative share
(a) Valueaddeda
	
________________________________ _______ _______ ______	 (RO Million)
______________________________ 1976 	 1980 1985 1990	 1995
Manufacturing value-added	 4.3	 14.0	 78.9	 131.7	 248.7
(1^2)
1 Refined crude petroleum
products	 0.0	 0.0	 14.1	 14.8	 54.8
2 Other manufacturing	 4.3	 14.0	 64.8	 116.9	 193.9
2.1 Food products and beverages.	 NA	 NA	 NA	 21.9	 40.1
2.2 Wearing apparel	 NA	 NA	 NA	 12.2	 31.3
2.3 Metallic mineral products	 NA	 NA	 NA	 33.5	 40.6
2.4 Fabricated metal products 	 NA	 NA	 NA	 10.6	 15.5
2.5 Other manufacturing	 NA	 NA	 NA	 38.7	 66.4
(b) Relative shares
_________________________________ ________ ________ ______ ________ (per cent
1976	 .1980	 1985	 1990	 1995
Manufacturing value-added 	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0
(1+2)
1 Refined crude petroleum
products	 0.0	 0.0	 17.8	 11.2	 22.0
2 Other manufacturing	 100.0	 100.0	 82.2	 88.8	 78.0
2.1 Food products and beverages.	 NA	 NA	 NA	 16.6	 16.1
2.2 Wearing apparel	 NA	 NA	 NA	 9.3	 12.6
2.3 Metallic mineral products 	 NA	 NA	 NA	 25.4	 16.3
2.4 Fabricated metal products
	
NA	 NA	 NA	 8.0	 6.2
2.5 Other manufacturing	 NA	 NA	 NA	 29.4	 26.7
Note:
a) Value-added is the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate
inputs. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for
depletion and degradation of natural resources. The Industrial origin of value-added is determined by
the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) (World Bank, 1997b:p. 137).
Source: Compiled from internal data of the Ministry of Development.
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The sectoral shift observed in Oman's (nominal) GDP components is in conformity
with the empirical findings of Chenery and Syrquin (1986) that as per capita income rises,
there is a shift from the production of primary goods to the industrial and services sector.
In the case of Oman, this has taken place from oil to non-oil sectors, with oil serving as
the engine of growth throughout the period.
If we look at charts 7.1 and 7.2 showing two different stages of Oman's
development, it is clear that in 1970 (chart 7.1) the Omani economy was relatively
undiversified, with the primary sector contributing 84.3 of the GDP, the secondary sector
consisting mainly of construction, contributing 8.4 per cent and the tertiary sector 7.3 per
cent. However by 1995, the relative shares of these sectors had changed significantly and
about one dozen sub-sectors in the manufacturing sector alone had been added to the
economy (chart 7.2).
Although this structural change is significant, it is by no means sufficient to ensure
that Oman's present relatively high standard of living is maintained in future when oil gets
depleted. The large increase in the non-oil sector is problematic because looked at closely,
it is top-heavy compared to the relatively low depth of the non-oil productive structure of
the economy. This, of course, poses a great cause for concern. The fast growth of non-
oil sectors is not indicative of growth in the production of physical outputs or
commodities, i.e. intermediate or consumption goods.
Another cause of concern, and one which provides a further justification for
accelerating the diversification process is the continuous decline in Oman's export prices,
especially oil. Table 7.4 below shows that whereas the value-added by crude oil sector, in
1988 constant prices, increased by 193 per cent between 1980 and 1995, in nominal terms
the increase was only 51 per cent. This reflects the concern of the Centre-Periphery
school, discussed in Chapter II, about the impact of the decline in terms of trade on
development in the peripheral economies. The same is the case with agriculture and
357
fisheries, where growth in value-added of 172 per cent in real terms was higher than the
growth of 158 per cent recorded in nominal terms.
Table 7.4
Structure of economy: production
Growth of GDP at current and constant prices - 1980 and 1995
___________________________ ________	 Current	 ________	 Constant (1988) pricesj
Sector type
	 1980	 1995	 Rate of
	 1980	 1995	 Rate of
growth	 growth
1980-95	 1980-95
___________________ RO Mn. RO Mn. % RO Mn. RO Mn. %
Petroleum activities 	 1,322	 2,021	 53	 578	 1,725	 198
1. Oil	 1,311	 1,974	 51	 567	 1,659	 193
2. Natural gas	 12	 47	 292	 11	 66	 500
Non petroleum activities	 862	 3,267	 256	 1,041	 3,048	 193
1.Non-oil industrya of which:	 140	 445	 218	 154	 463	 200
Manufacturing	 14	 241	 1,621	 18	 236	 1,211
2. Agriculture and fisheries 	 59	 152	 158	 60	 163	 172
3. Services	 660	 2,670	 304	 827	 2,422	 193
Total GDP
	
2,185	 5,288	 142	 1,619	 4,773	 195
Note:
a) Includes non-oil mining, manufacturing, electricity and water and construction.
Source: Oman (1986b:pp.379-388; 1996b) Statistical Year Book 1985 and 1996.
In contrast, as table 7.4 shows, between 1980 and 1995 the growth of 304 per cent
in the nominal value-added by the services sector, was much higher than the growth of
193 per cent in real value-added by this sector. This reflects the non-tradable character of
this sector and hence its ability to demand higher prices. Moreover, the high growth rates
achieved by this sector both in real and nominal terms have, on the one hand, resulted in
the premature expansion of the services sector, while, on the other hand, the liberal trade
policy and fixed exchange rate of the Omani Rial vis-à-vis the US dollar have prematurely
exposed domestic production to foreign competition. Therefore, and despite high growth
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rates in real terms, the growth in the relative share of manufacturing in the output of the
economy has been much lower than that of the services sector.
Another important indicator of diversification relates to Oman's employment
structure in relation to different activities. With the growth of the non-oil sectors during
1976-95 employment opportunities for Omani as well as expatriate labour have increased.
However, we find from table 7.5 that most of the employment opportunities have been
created in the services sector'. Whereas, the employment in this sector formed only 32.5
per cent of total employment in 1976, by 1995 the relative share of this sector in total
employment had grown to 65.8 per cent.
The new development policy also aims to diversii' government revenues gradually,
so that by the year 2020, at least 60 per cent of total public revenues are to be derived
from non-oil revenues (Oman, I 996a). At the same time, and as we shall see later, with
the growth of private sector activity, it is expected that the ratio of public expenditure to
GDP will gradually decline.
'This comprises trade and restaurants, transport and communications; finance, real estate and business
services; social and community services; and public administration and defence (cf table 7.5).
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7.3.5 The impact of diversification on trade patterns
The issue of diversification of the economy is related to the question of trade
policies and patterns, and the size of the domestic market. As we indicated in Chapter II,
one of the arguments put forward by Prebisch' (1950) in support of government
intervention to promote industrialisation was based on the fact that primary exporting
countries faced declining terms of trade vis-à-vis the industrial countries2 . In contrast, for
neo-classical theorists, foreign trade can be a propelling force for the development of these
economies3 (Lewis Jr., 1989: pp.1552-57).
As a small country, Oman had no choice but to adopt the neo-classical approach to
trade-based development of its primary resource. The successive FYPs (in line with the
staple theory of development that we discussed in Chapter II) have placed great emphasis
on optimising oil exports by raising the production levels and curtailing domestic
consumption on the one hand, and, on the other, creating the necessary linkages between
the primary sector and the rest of the economy. However, the performance of Oman's oil
exports confirms the argument put forward by Prebisch (1950) that primary producing
countries faced declining terms of trade (as indicated above). Whereas, between 1980 and
1995 the volume of oil exports increased from 102 million barrels to 285 million barrels
As discussed in Chapter II. there were other economists like Singer (1950a and 1950b), Myint (1954),
Lewis (1955) and Myrdal (1956) who argued that while the type and extent of trade of each peripheral
countly with the centre depended largely on its resources, the international political economic relations
enlarged the extent to which income was siphoned off by the centre.
2 This is borne out, for example, by the fact that while the unit value index of exports for petroleum
exporters has declined since 1980 by 36 per cent in 1994, for developed market economies' the unit value
index of exports has increased by 25 per cent during the same period. Similarly while the unit value
index of imports for petroleum exporters like Oman has increased by 21 per cent between 1980 and 1994,
for developed market economies the increase was only 10 per cent (UNCTAD, 1994:pp.40-4l).
we recall from Chapters I and H, the neo-classical criticism has been directed mainly against the IS!
strategies adopted by developing countries. Using the classical trade theory, the neo-classicals argue that
"Smithian trade induced growth is 'trade as the engine of growth par excellence" (Evans, 1 989:p.2). Such
an argument, as the Marxian and the structuralists contributors have argued, overlooks the role of social
and institutional factors. Moreover, they argue that the persistent bias in the terms of trade against
primary commodity producers significantly weakens the role of trade as an 'engine of growth'. "Both non-
neo-classical and analytical Mancian schools can find common ground in the proposition that trade is the
handmaiden rather than the engine of growth" (Evans, l989:p.283).
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(cf. Appendix table 4-All) representing an increase of 179 per cent, the value of these
exports, because of a continuous decline in oil prices', increased by only 47 per cent
between these two years. As table 7.6 shows, the value of oil exports increased from RO
1.244 million to RO 1,829 million between 1980 and 1995.
Since we have already discussed in Chapters V and VI the policies adopted by the
government to manage the effects of export price instability2 and to promote exports, we
will limit our analysis here to two aspects of diversification in trade patterns. These are:
the growth of non-oil exports and the direction and composition of non-oil exports.
7.3.5.1 Growth of non-oil exports
In addition to promoting shifts in the sectoral composition of production, demand,
public revenues and employment, all successive FYPs have emphasised the objective of
diversifying the composition of Oman's exports. The impact of these plans on the pattern
of Oman's exports is shown in table 7.6. The value of non-oil exports of locally produced
goods increased by 181 per cent, from RO I million in 1976 to RO 181 million in 1995,
and so their share in total exports increased from 0.2 per cent to 7.8 per cent. Similarly
between 1976 and 1995, the share of re-exports in exports increased from 1.1 per cent to
13.8 per cent and their value grew by 54 times (from RO 6 million to RO 322 million). As
a result, the share of non-oil exports in total exports has grown from a low level of 1.3
per cent in 1976 to 21.6 per cent of total exports in 1995. Thus, like the production
structure, the structure of Oman's exports has undergone significant changes.
In addition to decline in oil prices in current US dollars between 1980 and 1995. the real price has also
onunued to decline. Because oil is priced in US dollars. and the value of US dollar. vis-à-vis the
currencies of other industrial countries has been declining since 1973. the real price of oil has also been
declining. Chart 5.1 of Chapter V shows, compared to a price of US$ 20 per barrel in 1996. the
equivalent price in 1980 (in 1996 dollars) was more than USS 60 per barrel.
- Academic work analysing the effects of export instability was started with Coppock (1962) and followed
by MacBean (1966). Knudsen and Andrew (1975). Hellemer (1986) and Lim (1991). More recently.
cther studies have attempted to assess the effect of commodity prices or the terms of trade on growth. such
Deaton (1992) and Lutz (1994). David Dawe (1996) provides a new look at the effects of export
:nstbiIitv on investment and growth in developing countries.
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Table 7.6
Oman's trade structure (1976-95)
______ __________________________________ ______ ______ ______ (RO Million
Items	 1976 1980 1985
	
1990	 1995
1. Trade balance (2-3)	 167	 616	 555	 1,042	 650
2. Exports & re-exports	 551 1,294 1,717
	 2,118	 2,332
	
2.1	 Oil exports	 544 1,244	 1,597	 1,942	 1,829
	2.2	 Non-oil exports
	 7	 50	 120	 176	 503
	2.2.1	 Locally produced exports a
	1	 5	 23	 69	 181
	
2.2.2	 Re-exports	 6	 45	 97	 107	 322
3 Imports	 -384	 -678 -1,162 -1,076 -1,682
	3.1	 Recorded	
-251	 -615 -1,089 -1,031 -1,632
	
.3.2	 Unrecorded	
-133	 -63	 -73	 -45	 -50
% of Oil exports to total exports
	 98.7 96.1
	 93.0	 91.7	 78.4
% of Non-oil exports to total exports
	 1.3	 3.9	 7.0	 8.3	 21.6
Locally produced exports (%)
	 0.2	 0.4	 1.4	 3.3	 7.8
_____ Re-exports (%)
	 1.1	 3.5	 5.6	 5.0	 13.8
Note:
a) Locally produced exports include all exports of Omani origin, like manufactured goods, agricultural
and fisheries produce, other minerals, etc.
Sources: Compiled from Oman (1986b:p.323; 1991b:p.274; 1994c:pp.345-46; and l996b:pp.275-
76) Statistical Year Book various issues.
7.3.5.2 Composition and destination of non-oil exports
A small countly like Oman with limited domestic markets has to rely on
international markets for its exports and imports. Its options for adopting import-
substituting industrialisation strategies are therefore quite limited'. To overcome the
constraints of size, developing countries not only have to promote expansion of the
domestic market by creating new economic opportunities but they have also to seek the
larger expansion of their markets through regional economic integration. As Lewis
Perkins and Syrquin (1989:pp.l692-l753) provide a useful analysis of the influence that the size of a
country has on its policies. "The principal feature that separates very large and large nations from small
ones is the negative relationship between country size and the share of foreign trade in gross national
product ... Mineral exports, in contrast, have a proportionately much higher share of the exports of small
countries" (ibid.).
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(1 984b) and Perkins and Syrquin (1989) have suggested custom unions' may allow a
small country to enjoy some of the key benefits of large size and thus allow large-scale
industries to operate more efficiently.
Thus, Oman's membership of the Gulf Co-operation Council 2
 has enabled it to
expand its market size and optimise on economies of scale to the extent possible.
Moreover, the membership of GCC also acts as a mechanism to promote efficiency in
protected industries, since it subjects them to a form of external competition.
Table 7.7 shows the direction and composition of non-oil exports. This shows that
Arab countries, particularly the (3CC, absorbed the largest share of both locally produced
exports as well as re-exports in value terms in 1990 and I 9953• The Asian countries have
emerged as the second largest market for Omani non-oil exports. Although between
1990 and 1995 the percentage of locally produced goods exported to these markets fell
from 23.4 to 21.2, the percentage of re-exports destined for these markets increased from
14.1 to 31.5 respectively during this period. Countries in America (mainly the USA),
which absorbed 14.4 per cent of locally produced exports in 1995, compared to 6.1 per
cent in 1990, constitute the third largest market for these products. The A.frican region
has emerged as the third largest market for Omani re-exports, increasing its share from 5.3
per cent in 1990 to 14.6 per cent in 1995.
In terms of composition of non-oil exports, table 7.7 shows the rising trend in the
share of locally produced goods. Although their share in total non-oil exports declined
from 39.1 per cent in 1990 to 36.1 per cent in 1995, it nevertheless stood at almost twice
the level of 1976. Reflecting the effect of diversification, the composition of exports of
Customs unions involve the abolition of internal tariffs and the adoption of a common customs tariff
(Grimwade, l996:p. 11).
2 Gulf Co-operation Council was established in 1981 and includes Oman, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Babrain,
Qatar and United Arab Emirates. While these countries do not have a custom union, the Economic
Agreement between these countries allows free movement of domestically produced commodities -
having not less than 40 per cent of local value-added - among member countries.
These shares were 59.7 per cent and 54.9 per cent respectively in 1990 and 57.6 per cent and 46.3 per
cent respectively in 1995.
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locally produced goods has undergone significant changes as well. While food and live
animals made up almost 98 per cent of these goods in 1976, their share declined to only 29
per cent in 1995. In contrast, the share of manufactured goods' which was almost zero
until 1980, reached 50 per cent in 1995.
Despite the impressive growth of non-oil exports, the share of oil exports, (as table
7.6 shows) remains dominant. At the same time, while Oman's efforts to expand the value
of its oil exports have been frustrated by events taking place in the global economy 2, the
objective of diversifying and expanding its non-oil exports has been frustrated by internal
factors. As discussed in Chapter V, this is due to the government's policy of maintaining
low tariffs and an open economy which has promoted competition and kept inflation
relatively low. This might have led to efficient allocation of resources in the short-term,
but its liberal trade policy and limited protection for infant industries are likely to have an
adverse impact on the diversification process in the long-run.
Therefore one of the objectives of the New Development Strategy is to expand the
productive capacity of the economy so that imports can be reduced and non-oil exports
can be expanded gradually. It is thus projected that the ratio of imports to GDP will
decline from 34.5 per cent in 1995 to 20 per cent in 2020. On the other hand, it is
expected that the ratio of non-oil exports of Omani origin to GDP will increase from 9.4
per cent in 1995 to 13.0 per cent in 2020 (Oman, 1996a:p.186).
These include: manufactured goods, machinety and transport equipment, and miscellaneous
manufactured goods.
2 'l'his is because of the continuous decline in the oil price and as a consequence, a decline in its terms of
trade.
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Table 7.7
Oman : composition and destination of non-oil exports
Relative share in value terms
___________________________________ ________ ______ ________ ______ (per cent)
____________________________________ 1976	 1980	 1985	 1990	 1995
1. Total non-oil exports
	
100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0
1.1 Locally produced	 18.9	 9.2	 19.0	 39.1	 36.1
1.2 Re-exports	 81.1	 90.8	 81.0	 60.9	 63.9
1.1.1 Locally produced	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0
i) Food and live animals
	
97.9	 98.9	 68.3	 39.4	 28.8
ii) Beverages and tobacco
	
0.7	 0.4	 1.7	 0.5	 1.1
iii) Manufactured goods
	 -	 -	 28.7	 18.4	 24.1
iv) Machinery and transport
	 -	 -	 -	 -	 3.2
equipments
v) Miscellaneous manufactured	 -	 -	 -	 -	 22.5
goods
vi) Others	 1.4	 0.7	 1.3	 41.7	 20.3
1.2.1 Re-exports	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0
i)Foodandlivearnmals	 5.2	 4.6	 2.4	 3.9
ii) Beverages and tobacco	 7.8	 0.9	 0.3	 12.8
iii) Manufactured goods	 6.5	 4.1	 7.2	 5.7
iv) Machinery and transport 	 72.3	 68.5	 67.6	 66.3
equipment
v) Miscellaneous manufactured goods 	 6.2	 4.1	 10.6	 5.5
vi) Others	 ________	 2.0	 17.8	 11.9	 5.8
1.1.2 Destination of exports by region 	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0
(locally produced)
i) Arab countries of which	 60.5	 58.5
a) GCC	 59.7	 57.6
b) Other Arab countries 	 0.8	 0.9
ii) Africa	 0.1	 0.7
iii) Asia	 23.4	 21.2
iv)Ainerica	 6.1	 14.4
v) Western Europe	 8.9	 5.2
vi) Other countries	 ________ ______ ________	 1.0	 0.0
1.2.2 Destination of re-exports by region 	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0	 100.0
1) Arab countries of which	 63.4	 48.5
a) GCC countries	 54.9	 463
b) Other Arab Countries	 8.5	 2.2
ii) Africa	 5.3	 14.6
iii) Asia	 14.1	 31.5
iv) America	 2.2	 1.1
v) Western Europe
	
13.6	 3.4
vi) Other countries	 ________ ______ ________ 	 1.4	 0.9
Note:
Detailed data for destination of exports (locally produced and re-exports) for the years 1976, 1980 and
1985 are not available.
Source: Compiled from the internal data of the Ministry of Development.
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7.4 Private Sector Development and Privatisation
Private sector development is another pillar of Oman's New Development Strategy
and Policy. The objective of this strategy is to foster stronger co-operation between the
public and private sectors, and to create a dynamic efficient private sector that shall be the
main producer of national wealth. Similarly, privatisation is to be undertaken, not as an
end in itself, but as a means to achieve economic growth and development objectives. As
Martin (1993 : pp.1-2) suggests, the state has fundamental and important economic roles,
and the effective performance of these roles requires "[t]he development of new
approaches to the way the public sectors are run and relate to society and its citizens".
Before examining the objectives and policies that have been formulated to promote
the private sector development, we will first review the constraints that Oman faces in this
connection.
7.4.1 Constraints facing private sector development
Diversification of the economy and creation of dynamic comparative advantages
within the context of an ever changing global economy requires a dynamic and efficient
private sector capable of integrating with the world economy in order to enhance national
income and employment. To achieve these objectives, the government needs to overcome
a number of constraints which have been identified and explained in the Fifth FYP (Oman,
1 996a:pp.255-274).
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The main ones include the means and manner in which Oman can engage with an
increasingly globalise& economy particularly in pursuing a large share of the world
market.
Second, a reduction in its role in the economy similar to the experience of South
Korea, during 1953-1981 (Dutt and Kim, l994:pp.l69-209).
Third, to increase the relative share of the private sector in total investment. This
has been growing since 1976, but was still quite low at 35 per cent during 1991-95
(Oman, 1996b:pp.430-431). The aim is to increase this share to 53 per cent during 1996-
2000, as envisaged in the Fifth FYP 2
 (Oman, 1996a:p.480).
Fourth, during 1976-95, private sector activities have been concentrated mostly in
low value-added services which, as noted earlier, contributed almost 50 per cent of
nominal GDP in 1995-' (Oman, 1996b:p.384).
Such a concentration in low-value added activities has resulted in about 84 per
cent of private sector firms having in 1995 a capital of less than RO 25,000 and 85 per
cent of these firms were in 1993 sole proprietorship4 in 1995 (Oman, 1996b:pp.228 and
257).
l Globalisation can be defined as the increasing interdependence and interconnectedness of national
economies and the resulting erosion in the autonomy of nation-states. Globalisation is characterised by an
increasing movement of goods. services, capital. ideas and people across national borders; development of
regional trading blocs: growth in the number and expansion of global corporations; and a growing number
of socio-economic-environmental problems which require co-operation among several countries (Boyer
and Drache. l996:p.274). These authors argue against the notion that globalisation is resulting in a
decline of the nation-state.
Appendix table 7-AT shows the breakdown of projected public and private sector GFCF during the Fifth
FYP.
As shown in table 6.3 in Chapter VI. 32 per cent of value-added by the private sector in the non-oil
sector of the GDP in 1995 has been in trade. hotels and restaurants, 23 per cent in real estate and business
services, and only 20 per cent was in agriculture and manufacturing in the same year.
As mentioned in Chapter VI. data on distribution of registered establishments by type of legal entity is
being updated. The above data relate to 1993.
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Fifth, to create a dynamic and competitive financial sector to reduce dependence of
the private sector on soft loans from the government and the specialised banks'. At the
same time, the low level of domestic credit provided by the banking sector 2 needs to be
expanded in order to increase savings and investment and thus enhance the economy's rate
of growth. Similarly market capitalisation of the MSM which stood at around 16 per cent
of Oman's GDP in 1995', needs to be enhanced because stock market liquidity can also
encourage private savings and investment.
7.4.2 Policies for promoting private sector development
To overcome the constraints facing Oman in achieving a diversified economy in an
era of increasing globalisation, the New Development Strategy aims to combine the
promotional and strategic role of the state with the competitive and dynamic nature of the
private sector. There are a number of policies which aim at removing these constraints.
These include:
Gradual reduction of the government role in production activities and expansion
of its role in strategic guidance: to reduce government's role in production activities, a
gradual privatisation policy is to be implemented. This policy has two distinct
components: a) sale of SOEs and shares owned by the government in publicly listed
companies4 . These would be sold gradually through the MSM in a way which, on the one
hand, would ensure the highest return for the treasury, and, on the other, would allow, the
maximum number of Omanis to purchase these shares; and b) privatisation 5 of existing
public utilities by the granting of franchises to the private sector to build, own and operate
'Oman Development Bank and Oman Agriculture & Fisheries Bank and now the Development Bank of
Oman.
2 This was 29 per cent of GDP in 1995 compared to 132 per cent of GDP in the case of Malaysia and 58
per cent in the case of Chile (World Bank, l997b:pp.268-69).
M compared to 261 per cent for Malaysia, 121 per cent for Chile, and 40 per cent for South Korea
(World Bank, l997b:pp.240-242).
The Financial Affairs Council is entrusted with establishing the basis and programme for selling-off
these assets in a way that would be commensurate with the ability of the private sector and the MSM
(Oman, 1996a:p.260)
This process will be undertaken according to the policies and regulations detailed in Appendix 7-MI.
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services that are either not being provided by the government, such as sewerage, or are
not provided in certain areas. The objectives of the privatisation policy include: enhancing
the level and efficiency of public utilities and broadening the coverage of these services to
areas that are hitherto unserved; promoting the role of the private sector in the economy
and creating suitable opportunities for its growth and expansion; and strengthening
domestic inter- and intra-regional linkages.
Upgrading the regulatory framework: this is to be achieved by adopting a "one
stop shop" for facilitating the establishment of new projects; converting the Authority for
Settlement of Commercial Disputes into a Commercial Court; abolishing the Commercial
sponsorship system; revising the Commercial Agencies Law; allowing companies to own
land; and reviewing all financial and economic laws to ensure their consistency with the
objectives of the New Development Strategy and Policy.
Streamlining the incentive .system: to review the entire range of incentives
provided to the private sector to ensure their effectiveness and to link these incentives to
achievement of specific targets.
Support and develop the financial and banking sector: the policies planned to
achieve this objective include: establishing appropriate regulations to commit public and
private pension funds to invest in the MSM; encouraging small investors to invest in the
MSM; supporting the setting up of investment funds and allowing expatriates to invest in
them; streamlining procedures, developing financial transparency and encouraging
financial journalism to promote Oman as a financial centre; merging the Oman
Development Bank and the Oman Agriculture and Fisheries Bank into one bank and
directing the merged bank to concentrate on providing medium-term finance to small and
medium companies 1 ; transferring the management of government's soft loan schemes for
medium and large companies from the Oman Development Bank to commercial banks;
This merger has taken place in March, 1997, and the new bank is called "The Development Bank of
Oman" (Oman, 1997:Decree no.18/97).
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and encouraging the establishment of a specialised private sector real estate bank to
supplement the activities of the Oman Housing Bank.
Other policies: to establish a new port to cater to the growing requirements of the
Omam economy and to develop Oman as a regional trading centre; to establish a
petrochemical complex; to expand fishing harbours; to deregulate partially the
telecommunications sector; and to change the role of the government from a service
provider to that of a regulator. Policies relating to HRD, discussed in section 7.5, also
have bearing on private sector development.
Private sector development and diversification in a relatively free enterprise
economy like Oman are mutually reinforcing. With planned diversification of the Omani
economy in the next twenty-five years, and with most of the economic activities to be run
by the private sector, it is expected that the role of the private sector in the economy will
increase substantially. It is projected, for example, that the ratio of private investment' to
GDP will increase to 31 per cent by 2020, while that of the public sector will decline to 3
per cent of GDP (Oman, 1996a:p.186).
7.4.3 Dilemmas of privatisation in Oman
Over the years, various interpretations have been associated with the term
'privatisation' (Roth, 1987; Biersteker, 1992; Kikeri, eta!., 1992). Kikeri and others have
defined privatisation "as the transfer of ownership of SOEs to the private sector by the
sale - fill or partial - of ongoing concerns or by the sale of assets following liquidation"
(ibid :p. 14). In its broadest sense, privatisation can be defined as a range of different
policy initiatives designed to alter the balance of the public and private sector. It is this
concept of privatisation that Oman intends to pursue gradually within its New
Development Strategy.
These ratios in 1995 were: 5.0 per cent of GDP for private investment, and 11.1 per cent of GDP for
public investment (cI, table 5.2 of Chapter V).
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Although privatisation has been adopted within the New Development Strategy as
a means to promote growth and efficiency, there are a number of dilemmas that
privatisation poses and which need to be addressed. And while some of these dilemmas
are a natural response of the society towards the changes envisaged in the role of the state,
a number of these dilemmas are similar to the experience of privatisation in a number of
other developing countries.
First, while privatisation' of SOEs has been promoted by the IFIs because of their
poor performance and their lower financial returns compared to private firms (World
Bank, 1987), in Oman, as we mentioned in Chapter VI, the returns earned by most of the
SOEs, with a few exceptions, are comparable with those of private firms. Therefore, the
sale of profitable SOEs would deprive the government of an important source of non-oil
revenue. On the other hand, since the private sector will not easily buy loss-making SOEs,
the net budgetary burden of supporting the loss making SOEs would rise if only the profit-
making SOEs were to be privatised.
Second, the Omanisation of the labour force could suffer as a result of
privatisation. Efforts by private owners to maximise profits through staff reductions could
retard the drive towards Omanisation.
Third, for the reasons of national interest, enterprises like PDO2 cannot be
privatised. Moreover, the loss of revenue that might occur if PDO is privatised might
deprive the state in Oman of the autonomy3 that is needed to ensure that the new
strategies of diversification and private sector development are implemented successfiully.
As discussed in Chapters I and II privatisation of SOEs is one of the main elements of the economic
liberalisation and market reforms advocated by the World Bank and the IMF.
2 PDO produces about 92 per cent of oil in Oman, and the government owns 60 per cent of its equity,
while foreign multinationals own the rest (Oman. 1996b:p.196)..
As we mentioned in section 3.5.2 of Chapter III, the high degree of autonomy enjoyed by the state during
the First FYP was crucial in igniting the development process.
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Fourth, 'getting the prices right' has been one of the principal reasons for
privatisation. But in the case of infrastructure and public utilities, which are natural
monopolies, privatisation may, without state intervention, lead to exploitation of users
(World Bank, 1995b:p.28). In Oman, for example, privatisation of electricity has created
its own specific problems. Because of the presumed success of privatisation of electric
utilities in a number of countries', Oman has been investigating the possibility of
privatising the electricity sector. However, because most of the functions of maintenance
and operation of the power plants, electricity billing and collection, and erection and
maintenance of transmission and distribution networks are contracted out to private
parties in Oman, it is found that privatisation of the electricity sector would only increase
the costs. This is due to a number of reasons though one need mention only two. Firstly
the range of efficiencies that could be gained from privatisation have already been
achieved through contracting out 2. Therefore, a change of ownership would not bring any
further efficiencies (World Bank, 1995c). Secondly a World Bank study carried out in
April 1997 estimated that the private sector would demand an average return of 25 to 30
per cent per annum on its equity for investing in this sector 3 . This is almost 3 times the
rate the government pays for its borrowings on the money market.
Notwithstanding the constraints and dilemmas of privatisation, the Omani
government has privatised certain activities and divested some of its holdings whenever
deemed appropriate. Thus in the Fourth FYP, the government implemented a programme
of transferring certain operations of SOEs to the private sector, e.g., collection of
telephone bills, street cleaning, maintenance and cleaning of public buildings and so on.
Similarly, the government has also divested its entire holding in a few companies, such as
Gulf Hotel, Oman National Insurance and Raysut Cement; while a partial sale of
Because of the presumed success of privatisation of electric utilities in UK, Chile and Mexico, electricity
privatisation formed about 27 per cent of total value of infrastructure privatisation during 1988-92 in
developing countries (ibid.: p.151).
2 A number of studies carried Out for comparing the performance of private electric utilities with that of
publicly owned utilities have concluded that there is little difference in technical or cost efficiency between
public or private ownership and that efficiency depends more on the form of regulation than on the form
of ownership (World Bank, 1995c).
This study was carried out for the Omani government.
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government holdings in Oman Flour Mill and Oman Cement has taken place. And in order
to facilitate the process of privatisation within the framework of its New Development
Strategy, the government has established broad policies and regulations to optimise the
benefits of privatisation and minimise its negative aspects (cf. Appendix 7-All).
7.4.4 The role of Fifth FYP in promoting private sector development
The Fifth FYP represents a watershed in Oman's development planning because in
the previous four plans the state had led the development process by contributing a major
share of capital formation' and allocation of resources, the Fifth FYP envisages the
introduction of policies which will enable the private sector to assume the lead role in the
next phase of Oman's development.
The Fifth FYP, therefore, envisages that the private sector's share of total
investment2, will increase to 53 per cent during 1996-2000 compared to its share of 35
per cent during the Fourth FYP, 1991-95. Thus total private sector investment 3 is likely
to reach RO 3,900 million in the Fifth FYP as against an estimated RO 1,344 million in the
Fourth FYP. As a result, the ratio of private GFCF to GDP which averaged 5.6 per cent
in the Fourth FYP, is expected to increase to 12.2 per cent in the Fifth FYP. In contrast
the share of the public sector in total investment is planned to decline to 47 per cent in
Fifth FYP from 65 per cent in the Fourth FYP 4 (Oman, 1996a:pp.409-474).
'The government undertook 65 per cent of total investment undertaken during the period 1976-95 (cf.
table 5.3, Chapter V).
2	 terms gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) and investment are used interchangeably here.
Total investment planned during Fifth FYP is RO 7,321 million (public RO 3,421 million; private RO
3,900 million) showing an increase of 90 per cent over the actual total investment in the Fourth FYP
(Appendix table 7-Al).
Compared to Oman, in Malaysia, for example, the share of private investment in total investment is
projected to rise to 82 per cent in 2000 from 67 per cent in 1990. Consequently the share of public
investment declines to 18 per cent in 2000 from a high 33 per cent in 1990 in that countly. In absolute
terms, total investment in Malaysia is estimated to reach US$ 126.7 billion in 2000 from US$ 38.8 billion
in 1990, an increase of nearly 227 per cent during 1990-2000 (Malaysia, 1991:Table 3-3, p.78).
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Although the Fifth FYP intends to change radically the ratio of public to private
investment, most of the large projects involving private investment in the Fifth FYP have
been formulated within its framework and not left to private decisions. Some of these are
in the manufacturing sector while others relate to ports, electricity, water and roads. The
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) project has been conceived as one of the best examples of
public-private partnership. Thus, while the state's share in capital formation is going to
shrink, its overall responsibility in promoting economic and social development will
actually increase.
There are several aspects of the Fifth Plan's investment programme which need to
be emphasised. These are: firstly, contrary to the neo-classical theory of "crowding-out"
effect of public sector investment, the proposed public investment programme will actually
"crowd-in" private investment', particularly private foreign investment. Table 7.8 below
shows that the government investment of RO 1,427 million in the Liquefied Natural Gas
Project is going to induce private foreign investment of RO 928 million. For the oil and
gas sector, public investment of RO 2,296 million is going to induce private foreign
investment of RO 1,743 million; secondly, the involvement of the foreign private sector in
the privatisation programme 2, along with its investment in the oil and gas sector, is
envisaged to cover almost the entire savings gap in the Fifth FYP 3; and thirdly, in pursuing
the policy of broadening the private sector participation in the economy, the private sector
will be investing for the first time in the gas, electricity and water sectors during the Fifth
FYP (cf. Appendix table 7-Al). However, as mentioned earlier, the government has to
overcome several problems before privatisation of public utilities can proceed.
The "crowding-in" effect is one example of the complementarity between public and private sectors. In
contrast to the normally assumed "crowding-out" effect, resulting from higher interest rates, the
crowding-in effect of public investment, particularly in infrastructure, stimulates private sector investment
(Streeten, l995:p.2O5).
2 According to the Fifth FYP, it is estimated that out of an estimated RO 1,008 million privatisation
programme, RO 200 million will be invested by the domestic private sector, RO 133 million by the
foreign private sector while RO 675 million will be covered by foreign loans (Oman, 1996a:p.328).
Total national savings estimated for the Fifth FYP amount to RO 4,521 million whereas (public and
private) planned investment amounts to RO 7,321 million. The savings gap of RO 2,800 million is
planned to be met through foreign investment (ibid. :p.328).
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Table 7.8
Share of public and private foreign investment in oil and gas sectors (1996-2000)
__________________________ - Total	 Public	 - Private	 Relative share
Sectors	 investment	 investment	 foreign	 of private
investment	 foreign
investment
_________________________ RO Million	 RO Million	 RO Million	 %
Oil sector	 1,684	 869	 815	 48.4
Liquefied Natural Gas
project	 2,355	 1,427 -	 928	 39.4
Total	 4039	 2,296	 1,743	 43.2
Source: Compiled from Oman's Fifth FTP, (1996-2000) (Oman, 1996a:pp.413-481).
As a consequence of the expected increase in the share of the non-oil sectors in
GDP to 69 per cent 1
 by the year 2000 and the associated growth in private investment, the
share of the private sector in total employment is estimated to rise to 74 per cent in the
year 2000 as against 68 per cent in 1995 (Oman, 1996a:p.62). The Fifth FYP projections
estimate that the private sector will generate 161,000 new jobs during 1996-2000 while
the employment in the public sector is expected to decline by about 12,000 jobs (ibid.).
Thus, the Fifth FYP envisages the private sector making a major contribution in capital
formation and employment generation. This represents a re-arrangement of the state-
market relationship with the market taking on the function hitherto monopolised by the
state. The significant point is that this new re-arrangement is being constructed through a
plan, the Fifth FYP.
At 1993 constant prices.
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7.5 Human Resource Development'
Human Development is the ultimate objective of Oman's 'Vision 2020'. Hence
human resource development (HRD) represents one of the four pillars of the New
Development Strategy. The new strategy for HRD involves a package of policy measures
expected to be implemented over the next 25 years, starting with the Fifth FYP.
7.5.1 Objective of the new HRD strategy
Within the overall objective of the 'Vision 2020', of maintaining and improving
living standards, the HRD objective aims at "Development of human resources, upgrading
the capabilities and skills of the Omanis to cope efficiently with technological progress and
manage the changes that take place within it, and be able to face the ever changing
domestic and global circumstances" (Oman, 1 996a:p. 171).
7.5.2 Policy perspectives of the HRD strategy
While discussing the policy perspectives and parameters of the IIRD strategy, it is
important to highlight the sub-sectors of HRD. For our analysis, these will include
population, health, education, and employment. The policies envisaged in the Fifth FYP
for each of these sub-sectors are analysed below (Oman, 1996a:pp. 193-220).
Human development is a much broader concept than HRD. Human development as defined by Streeten
(1995 :pp.2 1-22) is "development of the people, for the people and by the people". Human resource
development is much limited in scope, in the sense that it aims at productive adults as being the means of
production; human resources or human capital (ibid.). In the case of Oman, since the long-term
development strategy (see Chapter I) treated the individual as both the end objective of development and
its means, broadly speaking, the terms "human development" and "human resource development" are
used therefore, interchangeably in the case of Oman.
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7.5.2.1 Population policy
The objective of the long-term vision is at least to maintain the present real per
capita income and work towards doubling it by the year 2020. To achieve this objective a
clear population policy is to be formulated immediately to achieve a balance between
population and economic growth. The aim is to reduce through persuasion, awareness
and information campaigns' the present high annual rate of population growth (estimated
at 3.7 per cent) to less than 3 per cent.
7.5.2.2 Policies for health
In recent years, the production, distribution, and consumption of health services
have been viewed as analogous to those of any other commodities. Thus the neo-liberals
argue that it is best to allow supply of even health care to be guided by prices established
in a free market. The main recommendation is that user fees should be charged for all
services unless a specific market failure can be shown to exist (Bloom, 1991 :p.3 18).
However, while the neo-liberal case is unconvincing because a number of factors make
health care quite unlike a typical commodity 2, the value of which can be ideally established
in the market, this issue has stimulated the ongoing debate about the most appropriate way
to fund the health sector. Based on detailed studies conducted to formulate a long-term
health strategy, a number of policies have been adopted to achieve the objectives of
providing essential public health services3 to all Omanis at no cost, while avoiding misuse,
wastage and inefficiency.
'For example, the Ministiy of Health has recently launched a birth-spacing programme which no doubt
will contribute towards reduction of population growth.
2 Mnong these, the two important factors are: demand for health care is for most buyers perfectly inelastic
and though the products supplied are highly differentiated (varieties of therapy and medicines), buyers
therefore neither have any knowledge of the differences in products supplied nor have they any choice in
selection of quality/kind of product which is decided by doctors.
Primary health care, preventive care and emergency services will be provided free of charge to all
Omanis. This is in line with the 1978 Alma Ata Declaration on public health care (ibid p.215).
380
The policy perspective on health care also emphasises upgrading of medical
facilities and improving referral services. And in order to create employment opportunities
for the Omani labour force in the health sector, the Ministry of Health is expected to
enhance the capacity of various training institutes.
In terms of funding the health sector within the constraints placed on government
budgets, there is an official move towards partial self-financing of medical facilities for
Omanis. It is proposed that the government should charge RO 5 annually on each health
card 1
 as of 1 January, 1996 and this should be increased to RO 10 by 1998 in case a health
insurance scheme is not operative2. These charges are expected to meet 10 per cent of the
health sector budget by the year 2000 and 50 per cent by the year 2020. Moreover, in
order to foster the role of the private sector, it is intended to provide it with long-term
concessional loans to set up and/or upgrade private medical facilities, and it is further
intended that the government should procure health services from the private sector,
whenever it is economically feasible.
7.5.2.3 Education policy
Provision for education has remained an important area of state action for reasons
of equity, efficiency, potential market failure and externalities. Similarly, upgrading the
skills and capabilities of the labour force improves a nation's competitiveness which is
very important in a world moving towards globalisation and increased international
competition.
1 At present, each Omani has a health card which provides him access to all medical facilities. The fee for
the card is 100 baizas (1/10th of one Rial). Treatment and medicines are provided free of charge. The
cabinet, based on recommendations of the Ministiy of Health, has decided to reduce the health card fee to
RO 1 and introduce a fee of 500 baizas for each visit to the doctor with effect from Januaiy, 1996. The
visit fee has been introduced to reduce the number of out-patient visits an Omani makes to the doctor
annually, because it was found that on an average the number of visits per patient is far higher than the
world average. People on social welfare will be exempt from these fees (Oman, 1996a:p. 199).
2 The Ministiy of Health is to cariy out a detailed study about introducing health insurance in Oman. It is
proposed that once health insurance is introduced, all user fees will be abolished.
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However, in view of the budgetary constraints, and the need to generate additional
resources for investment in education and training, Oman, like many developing
countries, has to devise alternative strategies to fund investment in this area. The
formulation of official policies aims at (i) maintaining the government's commitment to
provide of free basic education to all; and (ii) encouraging private sector participation and
cost sharing in vocational training and higher education.
The main thrust of the new educational policies is, therefore, to upgrade the
present general education curricula for Omanis and modemise them to a level comparable
with best practices available in the world. Similarly, it is planned to restructure the
existing technical and vocational training systems'. As UNDP (1996) states, "Without
basic literacy and numeracy people's ability to adapt to changing production methods and
technologies is severely constrained" (p.105). Similarly, the policy intends to continue
providing equal access to education for all, to promote equitable distribution of job
opportunities and thereby ensure economic empowerment of all.
Equally important within the context of such restructuring is the question of
selecting an appropriate balance between education and vocational training to meet the
highly diversified requirements of the labour market. In allocating resources, it is
therefore, proposed to provide free basic education for 10 years, while secondary2
education ranging between 2 to 3 years will be funded to the extent of 70 per cent by the
government. Again for post secondary education, university level education at Sultan
Qaboos University will continue to be provided free, while the state would fund a
maximum of 70 per cent of the cost of all post secondary education provided at private
colleges or institutes (Oman, 1996a:pp. 194-220).
It is proposed to adopt the British General National Vocational Qualifications (GNVQs) for technical
education and the British National Vocational Qualifications (NVQs) for vocational training after suitably
adapting them for the Omani labour market.
2 There will be two streams for secondaiy education. General secondaiy which will be for 2 years and
technical secondary whose duration will range between 2-3 years (ibid.).
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7.5.2.4 Role of the private sector in Oman's new HRD strategy
The new IIRD strategy envisages a stronger public-private partnership in the field
of education and training. In order to expand private sector's role in the provision of
education and training, it is proposed to provide long-term concessionary loans to the
private sector to set up or upgrade schools, institutes and colleges. Moreover, to further
expand the concept of private delivery and public funding, it is envisaged that the
government will not increase the number of secondary level schools, vocational training
institutes and higher educational colleges. Instead it will provide the students with a grant,
covering about 70 per cent of the tuition fees, to enrol in private institutions (Oman,
1996a:p.201).
In order to maintain high standards of education and training, the government shall
institute necessary regulations to monitor implementation of those standards, quality of
delivery in private schools and institutions, and the provision of grants to students.
For generating employment for Omanis, it is intended to place stronger emphasis
on technical education and vocational training and linking the level and type of education
and training with the demands of the labour market. There will be a closer relationship
with the private sector to achieve these goals.
At the same time, in order to bring the actual cost of employing expatriate labour
closer to its real economic cost, it is intended to increase the minimum annual labour levy
from RO 60 per person to RO 1201 per person from 1996 onwards. The revenues
generated from this levy will be allocated solely for implementing the new human
resources development strategies.
'The cabinet has subsequently decided to defer the increase to 1.1.98 and to reduce the increase to RO 30,
so that the labour 1ey becomes RO 90 as a minimum (ibid. :p.212).
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In order to commit the private sector to employ Omanis, the government has laid
down specific targets' for the level of Omanisation that each private company must
achieve within a given time frame. Moreover, each company must submit a training
programme to the ministry concerned to demonstrate its commitment towards achieving
Omanisation targets. Fines would be levied in case of non-compliance. Chart 7.3 below
illustrates the policy framework through which the government intends to promote an
active public-private partnership to promote Omanisation.
'These targets have been set on the basis of estimated output of the education and vocational training
systems and the present stock of unemployed persons.
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7.6 Provision of a Stable Macroeconomic Framework
In view of the importance of macroeconomic stability for promoting diversification
and private sector development, the New Development Strategy aims to further reinforce
the policies that have been adopted for this purpose over the last two decades. Along with
diversification of the economy, private sector development and privatisation and HRD, the
'Vision 2020' aims at: "Provision of a stable macroeconomic framework., including the
achievement of financial equilibrium in the State General Budget; avoidance of inflationary
pressures, and working towards stabilising the nominal exchange rate of the Omani Rial
and maintaining its convertibility" (Oman, 1996a:p.171).
7.6.1 Achieving a balanced budget
It is planned to achieve a balanced budget by the last year of the Fifth FYP (2000)
and work towards generating annual budgetary surpluses thereafter to the extent of 3 per
cent of GDP. The main measures which are designed to realise this policy objective
include: a) strengthening fiscal discipline by legislating that the annual state budget must
strictly conform to the fiscal framework of FYPs; b) funding all expenditures above
approved budgets from the general revenues of the state without resorting to public
financial reserves (mainly the SGRF) or to public borrowings; c) stringency in ministries
and departments; and d) gradual government withdrawal from provision of public utilities
(electricity, water, posts, telecommunications, etc.) and provision of these services by the
private sector where this is possible.
In addition to the above, the new policies aim to diversify and increase non-oil
revenues, so that by the year 2020, these contribute at least 60 per cent of total
government revenues compared to their present share of 25 per cent. It is planned to raise
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the share of non-oil revenues 1
 through imposition of new fees, new taxes, raising rates of
existing taxes, and streamlining the system of tax collection.
7.6.2 Promoting public savings and building financial reserves
There are a number of measures planned within the Fifth FYP for raising the level
of public savings and enhancing financial reserves. The main ones include transferring to
the SGRF all oil revenues realised above the price of US$ 15 per barrel and up to USS 17
per barrel as a minimum; transferring to the SGRF all proceeds realised from sale and/or
privatisation of public assets; and freezing public debt, both external and internal, at the
level of RO 1,500 million2.
7.7 The Future Role of the State
The role of the state in Oman's development has been described and analysed. An
important question which now arises is: what should be the role of the state in Oman
under the New Development Strategy? The World Bank, for example, has suggested in
its report on Oman that the role of the government should be curtailed and development
planning should be limited to a three year economic plan (World Bank, 1994a). In
contrast, we have argued that the role of development planning and of government should
be strengthened; otherwise it is possible that the gains and the momentum of development
may be jeopardised.
When one looks, for example, at the large saving gap of RO 2,800 million in the
Fifth FYP, representing almost 38 per cent of the total investment required, it is clear that
such a gap can be handled only within a medium- to long-term perspective. In order to
finance this large gap, the state alone is capable of ensuring that macroeconomic stability
is maintained, adequate physical infrastructure exists for investment activity and the
It is also expected that with the growth of the SGRF assets and revenues, the fund will be able to support
non-oil public revenues when oil revenues start to decline gradually in the next century.
2 Public debt as we noted in Chapter W, stood at this level at the end of 1995.
387
regulatory framework and political and social stability remain conducive for private sector
investment.
Since an important part of the diversification programme is based on the
development of gas based industries, which will require substantial foreign investment and
technology, direct involvement of the state is equally important for a number of reasons'.
First, since gas is owned by the state on behalf of the society, it has to negotiate with
foreign investors to maximise the economic rent; second it has to ensure that adequate
financial resources are allocated for the supporting infrastructure 2; and third, the selection
of appropriate technology and the necessity of creating backward and forward linkages
require government intervention, because only the government can take a long-term view
for the benefit of society.
In order to promote an export-led diversification, the state has to take a much
more direct role in guiding the process. The state's involvement is not only necessary to
conduct negotiations with the World Trade Organisation (WTO), but also to provide
direct support to Omani industries to be able to compete in overseas markets. As Palan, et
al. (1996:p.63) state, the new trade theorists like Reich, Krugman and Zysman have
argued that in reality the global market does not match the perfect conditions of the neo-
classical rationale, "[a]nd that political intervention can actually create comparative
advantage, or as Porter succinctly describes it, competitive advantage" (ibid). The state's
role should therefore be to facilitate the process of globalisation. Moreover, in view of
Oman's extremely liberal trade policy, as indicated by its low tariffs and freely convertible
currency, state intervention in achieving the objectives of the New Development Strategy
is even more justified.
1 These are in line with Evans' (1985:p.195) argument that transnational capital may, under certain
circumstances, prefer dealing with a "stronger", more bureaucratically capable slate apparatus. And that
the challenges of dealing with MNCs "[m]ay legitimate the expansion of the state's role into areas that
would otherwise be the preserve of private capital" (ibid).
2 This includes gas exploration and drilling. laying of pipelines for transportation of gas and so on.
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Last, but not the least, enhancing the role of the private sector in the process of
diversification, warrants an even more effective role for the government in guiding and
assisting it to achieve the desired objectives. What is required is to form a strategic
alliance between the government and the private sector, in the form of 'Oman
Incorporated', as is recommended in the Fifth FYP (Oman, 1996a:p.258). In the Fifth
FYP, the state's role will therefore, shift to providing strategic guidance, monitoring and
promoting a broad-based development process'.
In the case of privatisation, the state has the responsibility of managing the
process, but it has also to ensure that it actually promotes efficiency and competition.
This is particularly true in the case of natural monopolies such as electricity and water
where the state has to ensure that all privatisation policies and regulations are adhered to
and that appropriate regulatory policies are in place. "Nowhere is the changing role of
government and the increasing reliance on market-based regulatory policies more evident
than in the telecommunications and electricity industries" (Stiglitz, l996:p.21). In many
small developing countries like Oman, as Biersteker (l992:p.2O5) argues, where the public
sector can support a limited number of enterprises, the private sector is not likely to be any
more efficient than the public sector. The government has therefore to look at alternative
In order to emphasise the significance of the state's role in providing strategic guidance for directing the
industrialisation process, it is worthwhile to note here Japanese government's views on industrialisation.
This was expressed by former Vice Minister Ojimi as follows: The MITI decided to establish in Japan
industries which require intensive employment of capital and technology, industries that in consideration
of comparative cost of production should be the most inappropriate for Japan, industries such as steel, oil
refining, petro-chemicals, automobiles, aircraft, industrial machinery of all sorts, and electronics,
including electronic computers. From a short run, static viewpoint, encouragement of such industries
would seem to conflict with economic rationalism. rut, from a long-range viewpoint, these are precisely
the industries where income elasticity of demand is high, technological progress is rapid and labour
productivity rises fast. It was clear that without these industries it would be difficult to employ a
population of 100 million and raise their standard of living to that of Europe and America with light
industries alone; whether right or wrong, Japan had to have these heavy and chemical industries.
According to Napoleon and Clauseqitz, the secret of a successful strategy is the concentration of fighting
power on the main battle grounds; fortunately, owing to good luck and wisdom spawned by necessity,
Japan has been able to concentrate its scant capital in strategic industries (Singh, l991:p.41).
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ways of increasing efficiency of the public sector and expanding the service to the
consumers'.
Finally, as we have suggested, privatisation on its own will not lead to a broad-
based private sector development. For privatisation to succeed it has to form a part of the
whole package of measures aimed at regulatory and market reform, and liberalisation.
Moreover, it should not be undertaken as an end in itself but as a means of achieving
wider developmental objectives.
7.8 Conclusion
This chapter has described some of the major components of the New
Development Strategy and Policy in Oman which attempt to deal with the three main
problems that constrain further development of Oman. That is, diversification, private
sector development and human resource development. In all these spheres, the role of the
state, as well as the private sector, in meeting the objectives of the New Policy, is to
continue to work in a complementary but changed manner. Because, as we have argued,
the state has fundamental economic and social roles, and as development progresses, the
state has to devise new policy approaches for the effective performance of these roles. It
has been argued that on completion of the New Development Strategy in 2020 the role of
the state is not likely to shrink but will certainly undergo a dramatic change. The state's
role is therefore likely to shift from control to regulation of Oman's economy and society,
though without completely relinquishing the former while taking over the latter. Hence, in
some ways the state will continue to be the overall protector and guardian of the country's
economy.
This can be done, for example, by leasing of power plants instead of privatismg generation, or by
corporatising. "Privatisation represents only one point along a spectrum of organisational forms that
include a variety of corporatisation structures within the public sector" (Stiglitz, op. cit., 1996 p.20).
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Appendix 7-All
ROYAL DECREE NO. 42/96 issued on June 8, 1996 (Oman, 1996h)
Policies of Privatisation
1. Privatisation represents a part of the government programme aimed at achieving
sustainable development, increasing growth rates and distributing the benefits of
development among all regions and segment of the society.
2. Priority of privatisation shall be given to services that operate on a commercial basis,
such as wastewater, electricity, water, telecommunications, highways and postal
services. When privatising these services, consideration shall be given to the financial
and administrative capacities of the private sector.
3. In order to ensure that any changes in the economic and social situation are made in a
measured and gradual manner, privatisation shall be applied gradually to the existing
governmental production and services enterprises.
4. Transparent and explicit criteria shall be set for the selection and evaluation of
privatisation proposals; in addition clear identification of the responsibilities of the
concerned government authorities and for the system of improving the system of
monitoring the privatisation programmes shall be laid down.
5. More than one company shall be established to render a service, whenever possible, in
order to increase competition and enable the government to compare the performance
and efficiency of the service providers.
6. The government shall determine the unified maximum tariff to be paid by all
consumers in the Sultanate, regardless whether the project is operated by the
government or by the private sector. The tariff shall not be amended without
government approval.
7. To benefit from foreign capital and technical and administrative expertise, foreign
participation in the privatisation projects shall be encouraged; such participation
should be in accordance with the Foreign Investment Law.
8. The government shall set the regulations and standards for protecting the environment
from any negative impact that may arise, alter privatisation of certain sectors, as a
result of the efforts of the privatised enterprises to reduce cost.
Appendix 7-All contd...
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9. The government, through the use of various means of mass media, shall prepare the
society to accept forthcoming changes in the economic and industrial structure of the
country, by elaborating the advantages of privatisation to the members of the society,
its importance to their prosperity, particularly to the fixed-income group, and its
contribution to the comprehensive development process.
10. The sale proceeds of government assets in the privatised production and service
projects, shall accrue to the State general Reserve Fund.
Regulations of Privatisation
1. The selection of the company best suited to finance, implement and operate the
project, shall be determined through open tender, for which maximum number of
Omani companies shall be invited.
2. The selected company shall take the form of a joint stock company with Omani
participation being not less than 51 per cent. At least 40 per cent of the equity shall be
floated for public subscription.
3. Companies established for privatisation projects shall be treated as Omani companies
for tax purposes.
4. Companies established for privatisation projects, where the government does not
guarantee to purchase all or part of their output, shall be treated as industrial
companies for the purpose of taxation and custom duties.
5. All profits exceeding an average of 20 per cent - over a period of three years - of
the paid up capital of the company holding a government franchise' shall be shared
with the government.
6. No soft loans or interest free loans shall generally be extended to privatisation projects
by the government, exceptions if any, shall be kept to the minimum.
Appendix 7-All contd...
1 That is. companies established for privatisation projects.
393
Appendu 7-All contd...
7. The government shall set the appropriate level of standards and specifications for all
privatised projects; and all companies should be committed to apply such standards
and specifications while implementing, managing and operating these projects.
8. Implementation, operation and management of privatised projects shall be in
accordance with the performance and efficiency criteria specified by the government.
9. To the extent possible, employees currently working in production and services
projects to be privatised shall be transferred to the project company.
10. In the case of submission of equal bids by the investment consortia, and in order to
broaden the investor's base in privatised projects, preference may be given to the
consortia that have not been awarded any other privatisation projects.
394
CHAPTER Vifi
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
8.1 Introduction
Our research has analysed the role of the state, through planning and the market, in
securing development in Oman. This process itself has been shaped by a range of
institutional, ecological, historical, political and ideological factors prevalent in the country
and at an international level. A crucial element in this process has been the conscious
effort by the state to fashion an individual development path for Oman by creating a
number of institutions and formulating plans and policies which have been able to tackle
issues and problems that are specific to the country. As we have shown, an important
characteristic of these policies has been to secure development which includes both
economic growth and distribution of social welfare. An assessment of the synergetic
working of the plan and the market in this process has been another element in our study.
Our analyses indicate the necessity of a continued role for the state in the economic and
social transformation of Oman, and other things being equal, for other developing
countries as well. Though of course this role is not static and may change to meet new
demands and challenges (Waterston, 1982; Urrutia and Yukawa, 1988).
In Oman, as we have seen, the primary role of the state has been to ensure that
scarce resources - particularly revenues from oil - are channelled to the most useftil and
desirable purposes, i.e. promoting economic development and social welfare. The thesis
has shown that the role of planning and market in meeting these objectives has been
complementary rather than antagonistic. In this context there are two main objectives of
this chapter. Firstly, to provide a summary of our study, and secondly, to reflect on the
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question of how the state and market in Oman can complement each other in furthering
economic and social development in the future.
Our study has shown that prior to 1970 Oman was a poor and underdeveloped
country. The mainstay of the economy was agriculture and fisheries and trade based
largely on these (Speece, 1989; Al Yousef, 1995). In 1964 oil was discovered and in
1967 it began to be extracted on a commercial basis for exports. However, from 1970
when the present Sultan, H. M. Qaboos bin Said, assumed power development started in
earnest in Oman. A number of institutions were established to facilitate and co-ordinate
the development process with financial resources provided by oil revenues.
There are two main characteristics of Oman's development policies and strategies
which have been executed through the FYPs. Firstly, these emphasised economic growth
and social welfare. In many other developing countries high rates of growth had not
translated into increased welfare - the benefits of growth had not trickled down. In
Oman this situation was avoided through policies and institutions specifically designed to
ensure that growth in the economy was accompanied by improvement in social welfare.
The second major characteristic has been the combination of plan and the market,
that is, the state and the private sector, to secure economic and social development.
Where the market was weak or absent, the state through allocation of investible funds via
the FYPs, has fostered or developed this. In other words, rather than being a pure choice
between market and state it has usually been a choice between different combinations of
the two, and different degrees of one or another mode of allocating resources.
8.2 The Context
When Oman's development process commenced in an organised and systematic
manner in 1976 it had to negotiate three main contexts or situations. These were, the
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initial socio-economic conditions in Oman; the nature of oil as a major revenue earner; and
the international political economy comprising ideology and politics of development.
Firstly, the initial socio-economic conditions and infrastructure were extremely
underdeveloped even compared with other developing countries. Not having been
colonised (probably because prior to the discovery of oil the country had no significant
exploitable resources as in the colonised countries) the country lacked the basic necessities
of roads, ports, airports, electricity and water, health and education and other essential
socio-economic infrastructure and institutions which other developing countries
possessed. The state in Oman had therefore to undertake, on the one hand, the
development of its primary produce, oil, and, on the other, to use the resources generated
from it to launch comprehensive and effective investment programmes. Thus a
considerable proportion of Oman's oil revenues went towards constructing basic
infrastructure (Skeet, 1992; Al Yousef, 1995). The second context that Oman's planning
had to negotiate is related to the nature of oil as an export commodity. The price of oil
fluctuated, sometimes drastically, which affected the implementation of plans and often
required a re-arrangement of sectoral priorities. Related to this process is the movement
in Oman's terms of trade. While in the short-term these could be favourable, in the long
run there was a secular decline in these against Oman.
However, inspite of fluctuations and instability of oil revenues, expenditure on
social welfare was not cut. In this Oman stands out. The usual scenario is a reduction in
expenditure on social welfare when there is a need for austerity.
Given that the price of oil, and hence revenues, fluctuated significantly, it was
necessary to establish a mechanism to provide a buffer against these to prevent disruption
in the funding of development. Thus the State General Reserve Fund was set up in 1980
as a facilitating institution to work in conjunction with development planning.
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The third aspect is the context in which development planning in Oman was
located in 1976. This was the ideological and political context of development thought
prevailing in the late I 960s, which was strongly critical of the role the state had played in
development, but from two opposing perspectives (Wade, 1990). This critique was
related to the serious side-effects of development in the developing countries which began
to surface in the 1970s: increase in relative and absolute poverty, unequal distribution of
income, and lack of other aspects of development such as health, education, employment,
and so on.
From the perspective of what may be called the progressive theorists that include
Seers, Streeten and UI Haq, the state needed to develop mechanisms to ensure the
distributional aspects of development. The state therefore had to expand its intervention
in the economy and society to meet basic needs of the population. The concept of (and
obsession with) growth rates and per capita income needed to be replaced by a multi-
dimensional concept of development which comprised both growth and social welfare.
The opposing view, espoused by the IFIs and many influential neo-classicist thinkers such
as Bauer and Lal, among others, was that the role of the state should be minimal if not
absent from the functioning of the economy, and that development planning should be
abandoned in favour of the market mechanism as an alternative for allocating resources in
a rational manner. This would increase economic activity which in turn would reduce
poverty, increase productivity, employment, and so on. Furthermore, the imputed role of
private enterprise in South Korean and Taiwanese development, by ignoring the special
relationships the former had with the developed countries (Nazir, 1991) provided
additional justification for a minimal state.
In this context it must be stated that the process of planning for development in
Oman posed much greater problems than in Korea and Taiwan. in Korea as we have
stated in earlier chapters, a relatively well-developed infrastructure as well as a highly
skilled population were in place at the start of its development planning, especially in the
early 1 960s. The reasons were the nature of Japanese colonial rule and the massive
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allocation of resources by the USA in building South Korea as a bulwark against
communism (Nazir, 1991). Also crucially important was the fact that Korean
development was financed in later phases by export of manufactured goods, especially
textiles. At that time (1950s and 1960s) there was relatively little global competition for
these and these were not subjected to the declining as well as volatile terms of trade that
Oman had to negotiate with its sole export of a primary commodity, oil. In addition in
Korea it was only from its Fifth FYP (1980s) that welfare aspects of Korean development
came to be addressed in a systematic manner (Dutt and Kim, 1994). In contrast, as we
have analysed, in Oman, social welfare was a more important component of development
planning when this commenced in the 1 970s.
Be that as it may, it was not only the economic and social structure which
constrained Oman's development. When Oman began its development planning the
intellectual and political environment was also hostile to state intervention in the economy
in general, and to development planning in particular. In fact by the late 1 970s and the
early 1980s with the coming to power in the UK and the USA of conservative
administrations and the emergence of the debt crisis of the early 1 980s, the concern for
basic needs was tacitly buried, and the emphasis shifted to SAPs. These programmes, in
essence were a disguise for the neo-classical policy approach which was dormant during
the 1950s and 1960s and concentrated then more on efficiency and fiscal aspects of the
economy. However, a major criticism that was directed against the SAPs was that the
distributional aspect remained more or less neglected. This is not to say that those who
support these programmes (such as the World Bank) ignored the need to eliminate
poverty; rather it was the strategy on how to alleviate poverty that changed. The emphasis
in SAPs' is on increasing productivity of the poor, with government concentrating on
liberalising the economy and providing the minimum services required to conduct private
business efficiently and to protect society's weakest members (UNRISD, 1995). The
'However, as a result of a number of empirical studies carried out (most notably the 1987 UNICEF Study
(Cornia. et a!.. 1987)) which have proved the serious human cost of the SAPs, the World Bank and the
IMF have since the early I 990s, been changing the content and scope of these SAPs (World Bank, 1990;
tJNR.ISD, 1995).
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expectation is that by "getting the prices right" the invisible hand of the market will
promote social welfare and equitable distribution of income. As the Human Development
Report (UNDP, 1 996:p.49) states, "During this whole process of liberalisation, adjustment
and privatisation, concern for the poor was pushed into the background".
It is apparent from our study that Oman learnt from the shortcomings of the
planning and development strategies of other developing countries and incorporated
various policies, strategies and mechanisms aimed at minimising the negative aspects of
development planning experienced in these countries. Firstly, there was a firm and serious
political commitment of the state to development. There was no window dressing,
cosmetic or propagandist gestures to appease or placate hostile or favourable opinion.
The government in Oman itself directly, rather than through a planning commission (as in
India) formulated development plans and policies, and then mobilised the necessary
resources. There was an objective need for the state to develop the countly; and given the
conditions of the country, this could only be done with the state playing the dominant role.
Secondly, the state ensured that social welfare and economic growth were achieved
simultaneously. For example during the Third FYP (1986-90) when Oman had to
implement a self-initiated SAP to adjust its economy to the collapse of the oil price,
expenditure on education and health was maintained and was not subject to any cut-backs.
Thus, while a number of oil exporting developing countries experienced a decline in
human development, Oman was able to improve the average life expectancy, infant
mortality and primary enrolment rates. Thirdly, the roles of the market and the private
sector were conceptualised as being complementary and the latter was given an important
role in the development process. There were no threats to nationalise privately owned
enterprises or industry, or reservation of industries for the public sector'. As we have
shown, profitable SOEs were privatised, when deemed appropriate, as a means of securing
the best mixture of the strategies of development. By following this, rather than
As was the case in India till the introduction of economic reforms in July 1991. See Government of
India, Ministiy of Finance (1992) Economic Survey, 1991-92, New Delhi.
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alternative paths, Oman was able to turn a discredited development strategy and a hostile
environment, as well as negative experiences of other countries to its advantage.
Inspite of the economic and social progress made in Oman, there have been
relative failures in a number of areas which are a cause for concern. This is especially so
in relation to the diversification of the economy. As we have explained, while Oman has
succeeded in reducing its dependence on the oil sector as a major source of its GDP, its
attempt to develop the non-oil commodity producing sector has been less than
satisfactory.
We have shown that compared to other primaiy exporting countries like Malaysia,
Mexico, and Gabon, Oman had in 1994 the smallest relative share of value-added in
manufacturing at 4 per cent; compared to 32, 20, and 11 per cent for the above countries,
respectively. Of equal importance is the fact that Oman's GDP has the smallest relative
share of value-added by agriculture as well: 3 per cent, as compared to 14, 8, and 8 per
cent respectively for Malaysia, Mexico, and Gabon (World Bank, l996:pp.190 and 211).
Clearly this situation needs to be rectified if Oman is to sustain its present standard
of living, once the oil reserves are depleted in about 2020. In fact the government in
Oman, through planning and the private sector is currently involved in dealing with this
situation, through diversification of the economy within the framework of the Fifth FYP
and the 'Vision: 2020' perspective.
8.3 The Four Pillars of Oman's Development Strategy and Policy
The continuing bottlenecks and constraints on Oman's further development and
the consolidation and sustaining of the gains secured so far, hinge on the Four Pillars of
Oman's Development Strategy and Policy. The aim of this is to accelerate the pace of
economic diversification through a state-private sector partnership, a dynamic and efficient
private sector, a well-developed human resource and a stable macro-economic framework.
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Planning and policy in Oman through these four pillars of New Development Strategy is
expected to overcome the constraints on economic growth experienced by Oman during
the last decade, covering the Third and Fourth FYP.
8.3.1 Constraints on growth
The major constraints on growth include the continuing low relative share of
commodity producing sectors of agriculture and fisheries and manufacturing beyond their
combined share of 7 per cent; and on the other, to curb the premature expansion of the
services sector. The other three major constraints are: declining rates of savings and
capital formation, rapidly growing fiscal deficits and growing unemployment among young
Omanis in the face of expanding employment. The salient features of some of these
problems are discussed in Oman's New Development Strategy and Policy embodied in
Oman's 'Vision 2020' and the Fifth FYP (Oman, 1996a).
8.3.2 Prospects of the New Development Strategy and Policy
The current Fifth FYP is the first of a series of FYPs which will be launched over
the next twenty-five years to implement the New Development Strategy and Policy which
is articulated within the 'Vision 2020' framework.
The main goal of Oman's 'Vision 2020' is to maintain the present living standard
and to work towards doubling the real per capita income by the year 2020. This means,
among other things, removal of constraints which we mentioned in the previous section.
Specifically, the major objectives of the New Development Strategy and Policy are:
diversification of the economy; privatisation and private sector development; and human
resource development, all of which are to be implemented within the framework of
development planning, and in a context in which the state, in different guises, is of major
significance.
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To accelerate the pace of diversification, the Fifth FYP (1996-2000), thus places
added emphasis on diversifying into high value-added exports, closer integration with the
global economy and technology transfer. Based on the projections made for the Omani
economy at constant 1993 prices, it is expected that the structure of production and
demand in the economy will undergo a profound change.
In the emerging trade structure, the share of oil exports in total exports is expected
to decline, while the share of non-oil exports is expected to increase during this period.
Reflecting the expected growth in domestic production between 1995 and 2020, the ratio
of imports to GDP is envisaged to decline also.
Diversification of the economy and creation of dynamic comparative advantages in
an ever changing global political economy requires, inter alia, a private sector that is
dynamic, efficient and capable of integrating with the world economy. In order to
strengthen and expand the role of the private sector in development, the Fifth FYP
comprises a number of policies and measures to enhance public-private interaction in the
economy. As a result, the private sector is expected to contribute 53 per cent of the total
investment planned for the Fifth FYP (compared to its contribution of 35 per cent during
the Fourth FYP) (Oman, 1 996a). In addition, a number of areas, such as electricity,
sewage, gas, water and ports, which have hitherto been in the domain of the public sector
will now be opened up for private sector participation.
Rather than viewing globalisation and the state as two mutually exclusive
dynamics, the state can facilitate, adapt and interface Oman's economy and society to the
new conditions. Similarly, the Fifth FYP includes a framework of policies and regulations
which address the dilemmas of privatisation, but also use this as one of the means to
achieve economic growth and development.
Human development is the declared ultimate objective of Oman's 'Vision 2020'.
To achieve this, human resource development has been identified as one of the main pillars
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of the New Development Strategy'. Hence despite the calls for minimal state intervention
by the neo-classicals and the IFIs, the state in Oman continues to support the provision of
essential public health services, basic education and increasing the participation of Omanis
in the labour market. However, this is combined with the Fifth FYP's objective of
eliminating wasteful consumption of health services, upgrading the general education
curricula and restructuring the technical education and vocational training systems. To
encourage the private sector to invest in the provision of health and education facilities, a
number of policies have been initiated. These include, for example provision of soft loans
by the state to the private sector for investing in these facilities, expanding the concept of
public funding for privately delivered education and vocational training, and expanding
procurement of health services and facilities from the private sector.
An important area expected to be influenced by the policies formulated to promote
private sector development is the pattern of employment. It is expected that by the year
2000, 48 per cent of the Omani labour force will be employed in the private sector
compared to 18 per cent in 1995. Omanisation in the private sector is expected to
increase during the Fifth FYP, while overall level of Omanisation of the total labour force
will increase from 35.2 per cent in 1995 to 38.9 per cent in 2000.
To support the process of diversification and private sector development,
macroeconomic stability will be reinforced. In view of the rising fiscal deficits since the
late 1 980s, the Fifth FYP includes measures to achieve a balanced budget by the year 2000
and to generate thereafter annual budgetary surpluses to the extent of 3 per cent of GDP.
Public debt shall be frozen and the institutions facilitating the development process, such
as the State General Reserve Fund shall be further reinforced.
To achieve these objectives, the New Development Strategy and Policy has
brought in major shifts in some existing policies, and placed more emphasis on others.
The terms the New Development Strategy and Policy and the New Development Strategy are used
interchangeably in this chapter.
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Thus a certain degree of import-substituting protectionist measures to create a home
market for indigenous industries, and a more flexible approach to exchange rate
management to enhance export competitiveness of Omani products will be necessary in
this new stage of development. Of course, both a competitive exchange rate to encourage
non-oil exports and some import-substituting duties will raise costs of imports and thereby
generate some inflationary pressures. But as Evans (1991:p.49) argues "[E)qually, where
there are scale economies, depending on the nature of the competition, it may be better to
allow a domestic monopoly to reap the benefits of scale economies behind a tariff or
export subsidy".
8.3.3 The role of the state and market under the new strategy
An important question arises as to the future role of the state in Oman. Does the
New Development Strategy imply a curtailed role for the state and ipso facto for
development planning?
It has been argued in this thesis that the New Development Strategy involves new
and changed functions for the state. State intervention is necessary to mobilise domestic
and foreign resources required for accelerating the process of diversification. And to
ensure the achievement of the Fifth FYP target of private investment the state continues to
undertake facilitating measures such as improving the regulatory framework and
upgrading the physical infrastructure. Moreover, the selection of appropriate technology
and foreign partners for petrochemical projects and optimising their externalities require
government intervention. Because as Rueschemeyer and Evans (l98S:p.44) argue, the
state must acquire a certain degree of "relative autonomy" from the local dominant elite
and foreign investors generally required in these industries.
Nowhere is the role of the state in Oman going to be more pronounced than in the
field of human resource development. Upgrading the skills and capabilities of people
involve large externalities which the market alone cannot deliver.
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In the case of privatisation too, the state's role is crucial to integrate it within the
planning process, to enable privatisation to promote efficient resource allocation, and to
minimise the human cost of privatisation. The state will regulate private enterprises to
ensure they incorporate welfare provisions in their operations.
The market will continue to have an important and enhanced role in implementing
the new strategy, since the underlying objective is to build a stronger partnership between
the public and private sector, and between the market and the plan. But while the state
can accommodate the market mechanism and its discipline within the planning process, the
opposite is not true. Because even under ideal conditions, the market, in most developing
countries cannot address the concerns which the state aims to address through
development planning. For example, in the case of Oman, the operation of free market
reflected in liberal trade policy and a flexible expatriate employment policy has thwarted
the process of diversification. At the same time it has placed a heavy burden on the
petroleum sector to provide the foreign exchange required to pay for the progressively
growing volume of imported commodities and services.
8.3.4 The future role of the state in Oman
The New Development Strategy implies a paradigm shift from a phase where the
state had assumed a leading role in capital formation, structural transformation,
mobilisation of resources and creation of employment to a phase where the role of the
state will shift towards strategic guidance, protection of society and facilitation of the
development process. The success of the strategy will depend on one hand, on the ability
of the state to mobilise public opinion to accept these changes, and on the other, it will
depend on the technical ability of the bureaucracy to manage an increasingly complex and
integrated (internally and externally) economy.
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Equally important is the response of the private sector to this paradigm shift
involved in new strategy. The private sector has to shift its emphasis from low value-
added to high value-added activities, from services requiring low investment, inexpensive
semi-skilled labour and involving low risk, to industrial activities involving long gestation
period, high initial investment, skilled labour, and high business risk.
Then there are external factors such as the international political economy and its
impact on Oman's economy which can also influence, positively or negatively, the
outcome of the new strategy. These include, volatility of the oil market, geopolitics of the
Gulf region, which has seen two wars in less than two decades, and the fragile politics of
the Middle East. Of course, as discussed in Chapter V, the state in Oman has already
created facilitating institutions and mechanisms to mitigate to the extent possible, the
negative consequences of these external factors for Oman's development process.
Despite the above challenges, the case for a state-led development strategy is not
weakened. Moreover, as Commack (1991 :p.39) argues, the market, without the support
of the state, cannot succeed either and a turn from interventionist to market-oriented
policies requires decisive action. Our analysis indicates that the policies adopted by Oman
in the context of the New Strategy can be implemented effectively.
8.4 Future Research
We have demonstrated that state-led development can and has been able to
promote successftul development, including in Oman. However, frirther research is needed
to understand the impact of social, political and cultural processes which make such a
strategy succeed in some countries and fail in others. In other words, what is the mix of
socio-cultural and political factors that have led to uneven results of planning in mixed
developing economies?
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In the case of Oman, more work needs to be done, for example, on the potential
role of agriculture in Oman's economy and society. The scope and content of an active
industrial policy also needs to be examined in conjunction with a study of the policies
concerning import trade, exchange rate mechanism, foreign investment and labour market
and their significance for the pace of the diversification process. The question of Oman's
competitiveness in the international economy and the policies required to face the
challenges of globalisation also need to be studied in depth.
8.5 Concluding Remarks : the Importance of State in Developing Economies
As we come to the end of the millennium, and to the end of our thesis, the debate
surrounding the state and markets is far from settled. Indeed it is too early to write on
the demise of the state and development planning.
In the face of emerging trends in international political economy, gloablisation
appears to be inescapable and, in some ways, even beneficial as it may prevent a country
from technological stagnation. But on this basis one cannot dismiss the demands of
national sovereignty as misguided because the experience of developing countries justifies
these demands. As we have discussed in this thesis, the neo-classical formula of structural
adjustment programmes has resulted in social and economic dislocation, economic
insecurity, persistent unemployment and a dangerous erosion of trust in political and
economic institutions. And despite the hardship, the promised benefits are yet to
materialise.
On the other hand, it is by now widely accepted that the success stories of East
Asian economies repeatedly told by the neo-classical and the World Bank economists are
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models not of market liberalism but of aggressive and judiciously selective state
intervention'.
The main lesson that the East Asian experience teaches is that even if globalisation
and economic liberalisation are inevitable, these processes have to be managed by a
national economy in accordance with a set of socially rooted and politically legitimated
values and priorities. Failure to do so would lead to instability, conflict and polarisation2.
This supports Bienefeld' s (1996) argument that economic liberalisation under the present
imbalances in the global political economy, is not necessarily beneficial, and protection or
intervention is not necessarily detrimental.
As we have shown in relation to Oman, the choice therefore between markets and
government is a matter of degree of involvement and that the choice need not be
permanent or invariant; the choice has to change according to the particular stage of
development. We have argued that as a general allocative mechanism markets do
accomplish a number of tasks, many of them critical for static and dynamic efficiency, 3 the
existence of competitive markets cannot be taken for granted in many developing
countries. Therefore, in addition to the provision of pure public goods like defence and
public order, the state can contribute to improvements in the functioning of markets by
The irony of the recent unfolding of the currency and stock market crises in the Southeast Asian
economies (Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand)
lies in the fact that while these economies were seen as shining examples of the triumph of markets over
states (as discussed in Chapters I, U and ifi), and while their success was attributed to good
macroeconomic management, secure bank-based financial systems and an efficient allocation of resources
(World Bank, 1993b), these are the veiy factors which are now blamed for these crises. In South Korea,
for example, the recent stock market tumble is attributed to corporate indebtedness and slowness of
reform, though in 1993, one World Bank (1993b) study found South Korea's policy of banking
supervision and credit allocation to be exemplaiy. Similarly, while East Asian economies were praised for
using markets to promote high rate of capital accumulation and inducing large inflow of foreign
investments, it is now argued that most of the money went into property development, speculation and
building factories for which there is little demand.
2 What rapid globalisation and liberalisation can do in hitherto regulated economies is clearly manifested
by the recent currency and stock market crisis in the latecomers on the East Asian scene, namely,
Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand.
Static efficiency relates to realising a higher ratio between outputs, on the one hand, and inputs, on the
other, while dynamic efficiency relates to sustaining a higher rate of economic growth over time (Wolf,
Jr. l994:p. 157).
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establishing those institutions that are necessary for their efficient functioning and
maintaining a stable macroeconomic framework.
In fact the World Bank (World Bank, 1997a), generally an ardent supporter of
globalisation and liberalisation, in its latest World Development Report realises now that
good economic policies require capable state institutions. It also recognises the concerns
that have been growing about the potentially destabilising effects of large and rapid flows
of portfolio capital, particularly when a crisis in one country can spill over into other
markets, as has been the case recently in the East Asian markets. In fact, in contrast to its
previous call for "rolling back" the state, one can discern signs in the report of "bringing
back" the state. "[T]his makes the state 's role all the more critical both in handling such
shocks and in helping people and firms grasp the opportunities of the global market-
place" (World Bank, 1997a:pp. 1-12; emphasis added by the present author). That is why
the end of history and the demise of the state will remain a futile dream.
But if the state and ipso facto development planning is worth restoring, what are
the requirements for ensuring its success? As we have discussed in this thesis with
reference to Oman's experience and a number of other developing countries, states like
markets are not natural given phenomenon but institutions comprising of various interest
groups. Hence as we have shown with regard to Oman in addition to creating a
competent bureaucracy dedicated to the state and to collective goals, there is need for
strong political commitment and support from the leadership for socio-economic
development. A degree of "state autonomy" is another essential requirement for
successful development. Without a certain degree of autonomy, the best laid plans and
policies can be frustrated by divergent vested interests. And while these elements are of
prime importance in achieving a successful transformation, the state must not over-ride the
market. The role of the state in the development process should be articulated effectively
within a market-oriented economy rather than one of central control and direction.
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To conclude, development is a dynamic process and, therefore, needs a dynamic
approach. Policies and strategies have to respond to the ever changing domestic and
international environment. The state can neither monopolise the process, nor can the
markets function on their own. Both states and markets must work in a spirit of co-
operation to achieve the supreme objective of development - that is, Human
Development.
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